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GIVEN    BY 


GIFT  OF 
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PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 


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PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

ITS  NATIONAL  STATES  OF  MIND 


BY 

T.   LOTHROP  STODDARD,   A.M.,  Ph.D.  (Harv.) 
Author  of  "The  French  Revolution  in  San  Domingo,"  Etc 


NEW  YORK 

THE  CENTURY  CO. 

1917 


GIFT  OF 

H.  W.  WILSON 

MAR  2  2  1929 


Copyright,  1917,  by 
The  Century  Co. 


Published,  May,  1917 


^   ^sz. 


PREFACE 

This  book  resolved  itself  from  the  first  into  a 
series  of  choices.  The  problem  was,  how  to  por- 
tray within  the  limits  of  a  single  volume  the  war 
psychology  of  the  various  European  nations. 
That  problem  was  not  an  easy  one.  The  portrayal 
of  national  states  of  mind  requires  treatment  dif- 
fering radically  from  that  employed  in  a  narrative 
of  events.  The  only  satisfactory  method  of  por- 
traying thought  and  emotion  is  the  use  of  direct 
evidence — the  testimony  of  the  people  themselves 
This  explains  the  numerous  direct  quotations 
which  will  be  found  in  the  succeeding  pages.  No 
words  of  a  foreign  observer  could  mirror  the 
spirit  of  warring  Europe  as  do  the  voices  of  its 
sons  and  daughters  crying  out  from  a  full  heart 
in  the  very  hour  of  trial. 

The  evidence  adduced  has  been  of  the  most 
contemporary  and  popular  character.  Speeches, 
press-comment,  pamphlets,  brochures — the  words 
of  and  for  the  moment :  these  best  bespeak  the  stir- 
rings of  the  national  soul.  Official  utterances, 
carefully  weighed  and  craftily  spoken  as  they  are, 
are  never  quoted  save  when  they  faithfully  rep- 
resent popular  feeling  or  when  they  produce  a 
marked  effect  upon  public  opinion. 

Lastly,  natives  alone  are  permitted  upon  the 
witness  stand.    For  example:  in  the  chapter  on 


> 


PEEFACE 

England,  only  Englishmen  speak;  in  the  chapter 
on  France,  only  Frenchmen;  and  so  on.  What 
other  Europeans  say  about  England  or  France 
may  be  discovered  in  subsequent  chapters  devoted 
to  other  peoples.  The  only  departures  from  this 
direct-quotation  rule  are  the  closing  chapters  deal- 
ing with  minor  nationalities,  where  considerations 
of  space  made  the  employment  of  this  method  im- 
practicable. 

The  great  objection  to  our  method  is,  of  course, 
precisely  this  matter  of  space.  But  there  is  no 
other  way  of  portraying  with  equal  vividness  the 
national  temper,  especially  in  times  of  intense  emo- 
tion. For  this  reason  I  have  elected  to  confine 
myself  to  a  full  presentation  of  the  great  currents 
of  European  thought  and  feeling  regarding  the 
war  and  future  intra-European  relations.  Many 
interesting  collateral  issues  have  been  thereby  ex- 
cluded from  consideration,  and  important  ques- 
tions, such  as  Europe's  attitude  toward  America 
and  the  Far  East,  have  been  perforce  entirely 
passed  over.  All  this  is  unfortunate,  but  I  have 
preferred  to  emphasize  essentials  rather  than  sac- 
rifice clearness  to  detail. 

T.  LoTHROP  Stoddard. 

Brookline,  Mass.,  March  14,  1917. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

Before  the  Storm 3 

I     England 7 

II    France 39 

III  Germany        71 

IV  Austria-Hungary 119 

V    Italy 145 

VI    RussLv 178 

VII    The  Balkans 220 

A.  Serblv 223 

B.  Bulgaria 235 

C.  Greece 246 

D.  Rumania        254 

VIII    Turkey  and  the  IMoslem  East    ....  260 

IX    Belgium  and  Holland 284 

A.  Belgium 284 

B.  Holland 290 

X    Scandinavia        296 

A.  Denmark 302 

B.  Norway 303 

C.  Sweden 304 

XI    Spain  and  Portugal 308 

A.  Spain        308 

B.  Portugal 312 

Conclusion 314 

Index 317 


PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 


> 


PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 


BEFORE  THE  STORM 

THE  immediate  reason  for  the  Great  War  may 
have  been  a  murder,  a  monarch,  a  clique,  a 
policy,  or  a  philosophy.  The  underlying  cause 
was  unquestionably  a  militant  spirit  of  unrest. 
The  preceding  decades  plainly  heralded  one  of 
those  great  crises  in  Man's  historic  evolution,  such 
as  the  Reformation  and  the  French  Revolution, 
which  stand  forth  as  periods  of  ''revaluation  of  all 
values." 

The  twentieth  century  dawned  upon  a  worn- 
out  age,  foredoomed  to  speedy  dissolution.  The 
omens  clearly  betokened  its  approaching  end.  All 
the  ancient  ideals  and  shibboleths  were  withering 
before  the  fiery  breath  of  a  destructive  criticism. 
Everywhere  the  solid  crust  of  tradition  cracked 
and  split  under  the  premonitory  tremors  of  the 
impending  cataclysm.  The  old  was  patently  about 
to  make  way  for  the  new. 

Many  observers  saw  in  all  this  the  symptoms  of 
decadence.  They  were  wrong.  A  decadent  age 
cannot  regenerate  itself;  it  must  gain  salvation 
from  without.  The  Roman  Empire  awaited  sul- 
lenly the  cleansing  fire  of  Barbarism.  But  twen- 
tieth century  Europe  was  in  no  such  supine  mood. 

3 


4  PRESENT-DAY  EUEOPE 

Never  had  the  race  manifested  a  more  superabun- 
dant energy.  Never  was  thought  more  active  or 
action  more  intense.  A  scant  half-century  had 
transformed  a  semi-rural  continent  into  a  swarm- 
ing hive  of  industry,  gorged  with  goods,  capital 
and  men.  Its  adventurous  sons  quartered  the 
solid  earth  and  scoured  the  seven  seas  for  the 
wealth  of  the  outer  world.  Its  no  less  adventur- 
ous intellects  invaded  the  unknown  realms  of 
science  and  speculation  to  wring  from  Nature  her 
hidden  treasures  and  enrich  the  mental  life. 
Never  was  Europe  so  wealthy,  so  eager,  so  virile, 
as  on  the  fateful  First  of  August,  1914. 

But — **Man  does  not  live  by  bread  alone."  All 
this  prosperity,  all  this  mighty  edifice  of  material 
well-being,  rested  upon  outworn  and  insecure 
foundations.  The  stupendous  changes  of  the  pre- 
ceding half -century  had  created  a  mechanical  en- 
vironment differing  not  merely  in  degree  but  in 
kind  from  that  of  past  generations.  Material  con- 
ditions had  radically  altered :  the  idealistic  frame- 
work had  remained  fundamentally  the  same.  The 
soul  of  Europe  was  like  a  youthful  giant  pinched 
in  his  swaddling-clothes.  The  archaic  bonds 
galled  and  chafed  at  every  turn.  Hence  the  pro- 
found dissatisfaction,  the  universal  unrest.  Had 
the  European  been  a  weakling  he  would  have  re- 
signed himself  in  fatalistic  apathy,  conformed  to 
the  cramping  bands  of  the  past,  and  sunk  gradu- 
ally into  a  bloodless  mummy  like  the  ancient  Egyp- 
tian or  the  citizen  of  decadent  Rome. 

However,  the  twentieth  century  European  was 


BEFORE  THE  STOEM  5 

no  weakling.  He  was  every  incli  a  man,  in- 
stinct with  virile  life  and  resolved  to  attain  a 
worthy  future.  Accordingly,  he  began  to  tug  and 
strain  at  his  swathings,  and  it  was  inevitable  that 
some  day  he  would  cast  this  Nessus'  garment  from 
him,  even  though  in  so  doing  he  should  tear  the 
living  flesh  from  his  bones. 

It  is  this  revolt  against  the  past,  this  determina- 
tion to  throw  off  cramping  limitations  even  before 
the  new  ideal  goals  are  yet  in  sight,  which  gives 
the  key  to  recent  European  history.  Everywhere 
we  see  bursting  forth  increasingly  acute  irrup- 
tions of  human  energy :  a  triumph  of  the  dynamic 
over  the  static  elements  of  life ;  a  growing  prefer- 
ence for  violent  and  revolutionary,  as  contrasted 
with  peaceful  and  evolutionary,  solutions,  running 
the  whole  politico-social  gamut  from  "Imperial- 
ism" to  ''Syndicalism."  Everywhere  we  discern 
the  spirit  of  unrest  setting  the  stage  for  the  final 
catastrophe. 

Although  a  catastrophe  was  inevitable,  its  exact 
nature  was  up  to  the  last  moment  somewhat  un- 
certain. For  instance,  it  might  conceivably  have 
taken  the  form  of  a  series  of  local  convulsions 
within  the  various  European  state  bodies.  When 
the  Great  War  began  England  was  actually  on  the 
verge  of  civil  strife,  Russia  was  in  the  throes  of  an 
acute  social  revolt,  Italy  had  just  passed  through 
a  "Red  Week"  threatening  anarchy,  and  every 
European  country  was  suffering  from  grave  in- 
ternal disorders.  It  was  a  strange,  nightmarish 
time,  that  early  summer  of  1914,  to-day  quite  over- 


6  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

shadowed  by  subsequent  events  but  which  later 
ages  will  assign  a  proper  place  in  the  chain  of 
world-history/;. 

However,  it  is  through  the  weakest  spot  in  the 
earth-crust  that  the  pent-up  lava  bursts  its  way, 
and  since  the  international  situation  was  the  most 
dangerous  point  of  Europe's  instability  it  was 
here  that  war's  eruption  took  place.  The  story 
of  the  events  leading  up  to  the  Great  War  has  been 
told  and  re-told  ad  nauseam,  and  need  not  here  be 
repeated.  We  recollect  all  the  moves  in  the  dip- 
lomatic game.  We  remember  the  varied  setting 
of  the  historic  background:  the  rivalry  of  Briton 
and  Teuton,  the  feud  of  Teuton  and  Slav,  the 
vendetta  of  Gaul  and  German,  the  Roman  dream 
of  Italy,  the  Balkan  bear-garden,  the  awakening 
East.  This  book  is  not  a  story  of  current  events. 
It  is  a  study  of  Europe's  state  of  mind.  The  point 
here  emphasized  is  Europe's  incredibly  volcanic 
psychology  when  the  cataclysm  began.  The  re- 
actions of  the  various  European  peoples  to  that 
cataclysm  will  be  the  subject  of  the  succeeding 
pages. 


CHAPTER  I 

ENGLAND 

NO  nation  was  more  affected  by  the  prevalent 
unrest  than  England  just  before  the  war. 
l''or  years  past  Great  Britain  had  been  the  scene 
of  profound  political  and  social  disputes  that  had 
more  than  once  threatened  the  country  with  armed 
strife.  The  Irish  question  in  particular  seemed 
fast  degenerating  into  civil  war,  and  during  the 
opening  phase  of  the  great  European  crisis  at  the 
end  of  July,  1914,  blood  w^as  actually  flowing  in 
Ireland  between  the  Irish  Nationalists  and  the 
British  regular  troops. 

Indeed,  so  immersed  was  the  British  people  in 
its  internal  difficulties  that  the  first  days  of  the  Eu- 
ropean crisis  passed  almost  unnoticed.  Not  until 
July  29  did  the  London  " Times"  urge  British  par- 
ties to  "close  ranks"  and  suspend  their  political 
strife  in  face  of  the  external  peril. 

When  the  full  gravity  of  the  international  situ- 
ation was  finally  grasped,  domestic  disputes  were 
quickly  shelved ;  but  even  then  public  opinion  was 
by  no  means  united  on  the  attitude  which  England 
was  to  assume.  Strong  opposition  to  war  devel- 
oped both  in  Parliament  and  in  the  country.  The 
Liberal  press  emphatically  urged  the  maintenance 
of  neutrality,  and  the  declaration  of  war  on  Ger- 

7 


8  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

many,  August  4,  was  preceded  by  three  resig- 
nations from  the  Cabinet — Lord  Morley,  Mr. 
Charles  Trevelyan,  and  the  labor  leader  John 
Burns. 

The  cause  of  Serbia  excited  no  enthusiasm. 
Serbia  had  long  been  in  bad  odor  with  Englishmen, 
and  the  British  press  did  not  hesitate  to  voice  most 
unflattering  opinions.  The  London  *' Outlook" 
laid  the  responsibility  for  the  existing  crisis  flatly 
at  Serbia's  door.  It  declared  that  country  to  be 
*'frankly  impossible  as  a  neighbor,"  and  went  on 
to  say:  *'It  must  be  contended  that  Serbia  has 
been  receiving  an  amount  of  sympathy  which  is 
quite  unwarranted  by  circumstances.  The  highly 
colored  portrayals  of  her  as  a  gallant  little  nation 
fighting  against  odds  in  defense  of  downtrodden 
fellow  nationals  is  utter  fudge."  A  North  Coun- 
try paper  regretted  that  Serbia  could  not  be 
** towed  out  to  sea  and  sunk." 

Distrust  of  Russia  was  widespread.  The  recent 
Russian  entente  had  never  been  really  popular  in 
England,  and  the  British  government's  complai- 
sance toward  Russian  aggression  in  Persia,  Ar- 
menia, and  the  near  East  generally  had  alarmed 
most  Liberal  and  even  some  Conservative  circles. 
A  number  of  anti-Russian  manifestos  were  now 
issued,  notably  one  by  a  group  of  Cambridge  in- 
tellectuals, declaring  that  war  against  Germany  on 
behalf  of  Russia  and  Serbia  would  be  a  ''sin 
against  civilization."  The  labor  press  unitedly 
condemned  war  in  the  interest  of  ''Russian  autoc- 
racy." 


ENGLAND  9 

"War  once  declared,  however,  the  bulk  of  public 
opinion  rallied  round  the  Government  in  support 
and  approval.  The  national  temper  was,  on  the 
whole,  dignified  and  serious,  jingo  outbursts  being 
surprisingly  rare.  The  press  voiced  a  stern,  yet 
lofty,  resolution.  The  prevailing  note  was  that 
this  was  a  "war  to  end  war."  ''The  British  peo- 
ple," declared  the  London  "Times"  of  August  10, 
"are  fighting  for  the  cause  of  an  established  and 
abiding  peace,"  and  on  August  16  it  remarked,  "If 
ever  there  was  a  war  against  war,  it  is  the  war  we 
are  entered  upon  to-day."  The  London  "Ex- 
press" struck  a  sterner  note:  "Fighting  must 
now  go  on  until  either  Germany's  power  to  intimi- 
date Europe  has  been  taken  from  her  forever  or 
until  Britain  has  been  beaten  to  her  knees  and 
can  fight  no  more.  We  are  fighting  for  our  own 
existence  as  a  great  world  power." 

Although  both  resolute  and  confident,  the  British 
public  seemed  at  first  rather  dazed.  The  English 
publicist,  H.  Fielding-Hall,  writing  in  an  American 
magazine,  the  ' '  Century, ' '  declared :  "  It  is  a  war 
as  passionless  as  if  we  were  about  to  fight  an  earth- 
quake, a  whirlwind,  or  a  volcano — the  more  de- 
termined for  that.  That  is  our  present  temper." 
The  general  opinion  was  that  the  war  would  be  a 
short  one.  When  Lord  Kitchener  declared  it 
would  probably  last  three  years  he  was  almost 
universally  disbelieved.  The  traditional  British 
phlegm  showed  in  the  current  shibboleth,  "Busi- 
ness as  usual!" 

Continued  opposition  to  the  war  was  still  voiced 


10  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

by  extreme  pacifists  and  by  a  portion  of  the  labor 
press,  while  a  number  of  prominent  Radicals,  al- 
though admitting  that  the  struggle  could  not  now 
be  stopped,  severely  criticized  the  Government  for 
bringing  on  the  war,  and  urged  its  circumscription 
to  definite  objectives  which  would  permit  an  early 
pacification.  This  opposition  soon  crystallized 
into  an  organization  known  as  the  ' '  Union  of  Dem- 
ocratic Control,"  which  began  an  ardent  propa- 
ganda for  a  speedy  and  moderate  peace.  The 
point  of  view  of  this  school  of  thinkers  is  best  ex- 
pressed in  an  article  by  the  well-known  writer,  H. 
N.  Brailsf ord,  in  the  ' '  Contemporary  Review ' '  for 
September,  1914.  *'We  are  taking  a  parochial 
view  of  Armageddon,"  he  declared,  "if  we  allow 
ourselves  to  imagine  that  it  is  primarily  a  struggle 
for  the  independence  of  Belgium  and  the  future 
of  France.  The  Germans  are  nearer  the  truth 
when  they  regard  it  as  a  Russo-German  war.  .  .  . 
We  are  neither  Slavs  nor  Germans.  ...  A  me- 
chanical fatality  has  forced  France  into  this  strug- 
gle, and  a  comradeship,  translated  by  secret  com- 
mitments into  a  defensive  alliance,  has  brought 
us  into  the  war  in  her  wake.  It  is  no  real  concern 
of  hers  or  ours.  It  is  a  war  for  the  Empire  of  the 
East.  If  our  statesmanship  is  clear-sighted  it  will 
stop  the  war  before  it  has  passed  from  a  struggle 
for  the  defense  of  France  and  Belgium  into  a  colos- 
sal wrangle  for  the  domination  of  the  Balkans  and 
the  mastery  of  the  Slavs.  ...  To  back  our  West- 
ern friends  in  a  war  of  defense  is  one  thing,  to  fling 
ourselves  into  the  further  struggle  for  the  Empire 


ENGLAND  11 

of  the  East  quite  another.  No  call  of  the  blood, 
no  imperious  calculation  of  self-interest,  no  hope 
for  the  future  of  mankind,  requires  us  to  side  with 
the  Slav  against  the  Teuton.  ...  It  lies  with  pub- 
lic opinion  to  limit  our  share  in  this  quarrel  and  to 
impose  on  our  diplomacy,  when  victory  in  the  West 
is  won,  a  return  to  its  national  role  of  peacemaker 
and  mediator  in  a  quarrel  no  longer  its  owm." 

This,  however,  was  not  the  view  taken  by  most 
Englishmen,  who  were  fast  coming  to  consider  the 
war  a  lif  e-and-death  struggle  between  England  and 
Germany.  A  decade  of  Anglo-German  rivalry  had 
diffused  an  immense  amount  of  suspicion  and  ill- 
will  among  the  British  people,  and  the  outbreak  of 
hostilities  quickly  focused  this  previously  latent, 
half-articulate  feeling  into  intense  hostility  against 
England's  chief  antagonist.  Germany's  initial 
successes,  British  defeats,  and  tales  of  Teutonic 
atrocities  in  Belgium,  quickly  fanned  this  hostility 
to  fever  heat.  Popular  sentiment  demanded  the 
utter  crushing  of  "Prussian  militarism," — what 
H.  G.  Wells  called  "this  drilling,  trampling  fool- 
ery" led  by  Prussian  junkers  "with  a  taste  for 
champagne  and  f rightfulness," — and  the  German 
soldiers  were  generally  dubbed  "Huns." 

At  first  this  hatred  was  directed  against  the 
Prussian  leaders  and  military  men  rather  than 
against  the  whole  German  people.  The  Kaiser 
and  the  Hohenzollern  family  were  special  targets 
for  abuse  which,  in  some  of  the  popular  organs,  at- 
tained truly  extraordinary  virulence.  Horatio 
Bottomley's  penny  weekly,  "John  Bull,"  termed 


12  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

Emperor  William  "The  Butcher  of  Berlin,"  *'That 
mongrel  Attila,"  "The  fiend  of  hell  let  loose 
on  civilization,"  and  predicted  that  he  would  be 
"known  to  infamy  forever  as  William  the 
Damned. ' '  Another  popular  penny  weekly,  ' '  The 
Passing  Show,"  asserted  that  the  Kaiser  "is  a 
Mohammedan,  a  Lutheran,  and  a  Roman  Catholic 
as  the  humor  suits  him ;  but  his  taste  in  neckties  is 
vulgar;  his  mind  is  that  of  a  third-rate  Hooligan 
with  three  strains  of  madness  in  his  blood."  Ac- 
cording to  this  paper  "the  Hohenzollern  brood 
must  be  exterminated.  For  if  we  leave  to  a  time 
of  peace  the  question  of  the  treatment  of  the  Lord 
High  Hun,  he  will  not  only  get  off  cheaply,  but  may 
remain  on  the  throne  of  Prussia  and  be  succeeded 
by  a  degenerate  cracksman,  who  is  neither  gentle- 
man nor  sportsman,  as  some  burglars  have  been 
known  to  be." 

But  the  tidings  of  German  unanimity  and  hatred 
of  England  soon  turned  the  stream  of  British 
wrath  against  the  whole  German  people.  "It  is 
not  a  case  of  a  refined  and  high-minded  people 
overborne  by  a  single  'caste,'  "  exclaimed  the 
' '  Pall  Mall  Gazette ' '  early  in  October,  1914.  ' '  We 
are  fighting  with  a  nation  whose  moral  level  is  in- 
trinsically low,  which  has  little  trace  of  humane  in- 
stinct, and  still  less  comprehension  of  the  meaning 
of  honorable  obligation.  ...  It  is  not  only  her  rul- 
ers, but  her  people,  who  have  to  receive  their  les- 
son, and  there  is  but  one  educational  process  to 
which  the  bully  has  ever  been  found  susceptible." 
That  leading  organ  of  the  Anglican  church,  ' '  The 


ENGLAND  13 

Guardian,"  was  equally  severe.  *' There  is  abso- 
lutely no  room  for  ma.i^nanimity,"  it  declared  about 
the  same  date.  **It  is  imperative  that  the  disease 
of  militancy  which  has  laid  hold  upon  an  entire 
people  should  be  extirpated.  It  is  absurd  to  say 
that  conditions  of  peace  must  be  &uch  that  a 
proud  nation  can  accept  them.  We  have  to  do, 
not  with  a  proud,  but  with  a  criminal,  nation.  .  .  . 
She  must  finally  be  deprived  of  the  power  to  do 
mischief.  'Never  again'  must  be  the  motto  of  the 
Allies  when  the  final  reckoning  comes."  Even  so 
normally  pacific  an  organ  as  the  Nonconformist 
"British  Weekly"  exclaimed,  "There  may  be 
those  who  think  that  German  militarism  is  the  gos- 
pel of  only  a  few  among  the  German  people.  For 
this  we  see  no  reason.  Militarism  is  not  a  tem- 
porary flush  of  spirit.  The  color  behind  it  has 
been  prepared  for  with  persistent  assiduity,  with 
infinite  duplicity,  with  illimitable  cunning,  for  a 
long  term  of  years.  In  fighting  the  war  lords  of 
Germany  we  are  fighting  Antichrist.  That  arro- 
gance must  be  crushed  out  with  iron  heels."  The 
noted  critic,  G.  K.  Chesterton,  declared  that  the 
solution  of  the  Teutonic  enigma  was  that  the  Ger- 
mans were  "Barbarians,"  "though  the  Prussians 
themselves  cannot  form  a  notion  of  what  we  mean 
— precisely  because  tliey  are  barbarians." 

Some  voices,  it  is  true,  were  raised  against 
this  rising  tide  of  passion.  The  London  "Labor 
Leader"  deprecated  the  "efforts  being  made  to 
arouse  the  hatred  of  British  workers  against  the 
workers  of  Germany,"  and  added,  "Any  word 


14  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

now  spoken  by  us  against  the  German  people  will 
make  our  task,  and  their  task,  more  difficult  in  the 
years  to  come."  And  Dr.  Conybeare  of  Oxford, 
in  a  letter  to  the  New  York  ''Nation,"  asserted, 
"After  all  is  said  and  done,  the  Germans  are  our 
natural  allies  in  Europe ;  they  are,  after  the  Dutch, 
the  only  European  race  akin  to  us."  But  these 
voices  were  few  in  number  and  found  no  popular 
echo. 

During  the  autumn  of  1914  the  political  settle- 
ment of  Germany  after  the  war  was  much  dis- 
cussed, and  the  idea  of  resolving  the  German  Em- 
pire into  its  component  fragments  as  these  existed 
before  1866  found  considerable  favor.  This  idea 
was,  however,  scouted  by  most  well-informed  stu- 
dents of  world-politics.  **The  Teutons  are — and 
will  remain — one  united  community,"  declared 
that  keen  observer.  Dr.  E.  J.  Dillon,  in  the  ''Con- 
temporary Review"  for  January,  1915.  *' Those 
among  the  Allies — and  their  name  is  legion — who 
anticipate  a  recrudescence  of  the  separatist  spirit 
which  for  centuries  made  Germany  a  house  di- 
vided against  itself  are  doomed  to  disappointment. 
Bavarians  and  Saxons,  Schwabs  and  Prussians, 
are  all  tarred  with  the  same  Kultur  brush.  The 
corrosive  ideas  of  the  Prussian  schemers  have 
been  imbibed  and  assimilated  by  all  branches  of 
the  German  race,  including  those  of  Austria,  with 
whose  patriotic  sentiments  they  now  blend  indis- 
solubly. ' ' 

The  opening  months  of  1915  saw  a  distinct 
change  in  the  popular  mood — a  hardening  of  the 


ENGLAND  15 

war-temper,  a  broadening  of  aspirations,  and  a 
much  more  realistic  attitude,  Russian  successes 
in  Galicia  and  the  Carpathians,  and  the  spectacu- 
lar attack  on  the  Dardanelles  threw  Allied  pros- 
pects into  a  bright  light,  and  the  spring  found  a 
thoroughly  optimistic  Great  Britain. 

The  realist  note  was  clear.  In  its  leader  of 
March  8,  1915,  entitled  "Why  we  are  at  war," 
the  London  ''Times"  declared  frankly:  "There 
are  still,  it  seems,  some  Englishmen  and  English- 
women who  greatly  err  as  to  the  reasons  that  have 
forced  England  to  draw  the  sword.  .  .  .  They  do 
not  reflect  that  our  honor  and  our  interest  must 
have  compelled  us  to  join  France  and  Russia,  even 
if  Germany  had  scrupulously  respected  the  rights 
of  her  small  neighbors.  Why  did  we  guarantee 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium?  For  an  imperious 
reason  of  self-interest.  .  .  .  We  keep  our  word 
when  we  have  given  it,  but  ...  we  do  not  set  up 
to  be  international  Don  Quixotes,  ready  at  all  times 
to  redress  wrongs  which  do  us  no  hurt. ' '  And  on 
March  17,  the  "Morning  Post"  wrote:  "This 
country  did  not  go  to  war  out  of  pure  altruism,  as 
some  people  suppose,  but  because  her  very  exist- 
ence was  threatened.  .  .  .  That  is  what  really  un- 
derlies 'the  scrap  of  paper'  and  all  the  talk  of 
'German  Militarism'!" 

The  rising  war  spirit  of  the  nation  was  equally 
plain.  "The  absurd  talk  about  tliis  being  a  war 
against  militarism  has  now  subsided,"  asserted 
the  ' '  Morning  Post. "  "  After  all,  the  British  Em- 
pire is  built  up  on  good  fighting  by  its  army  and  its 


16  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

navy;  the  spirit  of  war  is  native  to  the  British 
race."  Leading  publicists  like  Archibald  Hurd 
asserted  that  this  war,  far  from  ending  arma- 
ments, would  increase  them  even  in  the  event  of 
an  Allied  victory.  The  British  Empire  must  not 
only  retain  its  present  naval  preponderance,  but 
must  also  maintain  a  much  larger  military  estab- 
lishment than  ever  before.  Many  voices  also  de- 
manded the  retention  of  Germany's  conquered 
colonies  as  necessary  for  the  future  safety  and 
prosperity  of  the  British  Empire.  Some  plans 
went  even  further  in  their  scope.  One  of  the 
most  ambitious  of  these  was  the  demand  of  the 
English  writer,  D.  L.  B.  Castle,  for  the  annexation 
of  Germany's  North  Sea  coast,  which  appeared  in 
the  ''National  Review"  of  July,  1915.  Recogniz- 
ing the  impossibility  of  resolving  the  German  Em- 
pire into  its  political  fragments,  Mr.  Castle  as- 
serted that  England  must  at  all  costs  prevent  a 
German  war  of  revenge,  which,  owing  to  the  rapid 
development  of  submarines,  might  be  fatal  to  Eng- 
land by  shutting  off  her  food-supply. 

These  same  months  witnessed  a  further  deepen- 
ing of  the  gulf  of  hatred  toward  Germany.  Just 
as  the  opening  period  of  the  war  had  seen  the  at- 
tack shift  from  the  German  leaders  to  the  Ger- 
man people,  so  now  the  assault  was  broadened  to 
include  German  ideas  and  cultural  achievements. 
''I  cannot  see  what  is  proposed  by  the  German 
idea,"  wrote  Rudyard  Kipling  to  the  Paris 
*' Temps,"  ''unless  it  is  to  march  with  parade- 
step  across  a  series  of  hells  philosophically  con- 


ENGLAND  17 

structed,  with  the  object  of  self-adoration  for  the 
noise  it  makes  with  all  its  harness.  At  least  the 
Arabs  offer  a  choice  between  Islam  and  the  sword, 
but  the  Boche  has  only  the  sword  in  his  philoso- 
phy." ''The  Germans,"  wrote  H.  G.  Wells  in 
the  London  ''Daily  Chronicle,"  "have  been  made 
into  a  kind  of  scientifically  equipped  Zulus." 
Professor  A.  H.  Sayce  of  Oxford,  in  the  London 
"Times,"  penned  a  sweeping  indictment  of  Ger- 
man literary  ability.  ^Goethe  was  the  exception  to 
the  rule,  but  Schiller  was  "a  milk  and  water  Long- 
fellow," Heine  a  Jew  who  "regarded  the  Ger- 
mans as  barbarians,"  and  Kant  "more  than  half 
Scottish  in  origin."  "On  the  artistic  side,"  con- 
tinued Professor  Sayce,  "perhaps  the  less  said 
the  better.  German  taste  in  architecture  and 
dress  is  proverbial.  A  people  who  have  destroyed 
the  art  treasures  of  Belgium  and  Eastern  France 
are  outside  the  pale  of  civilization.  They  are  still 
what  they  were  fifteen  centuries  ago,  the  barba- 
rians who  raided  our  ancestors  and  destroyed  the 
civilization  of  the  Eoman  Empire.  For  a  thou- 
sand years  the  blight  of  German  conquest  hung 
over  Western  Europe,  until  at  last  the  conquer- 
ors perished  in  internecine  conflict  or  were  ab- 
sorbed into  the  older  populations,  and  the  Dark 
Ages  came  to  an  end.  W^e  must  trust  that  they 
will  not  return  under  a  new  avalanche  of  Teutonic 
barbarism,  and  that  the  Germans  may  resume  their 
old  vocation  as  the  intellectual  'hewers  of  wood 
and  drawers  of  water'  for  Western  Europe." 
Another  English  scholar,  Sir  Clifford  x\llbutt,  does 


18  PEESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

not  even  except  Goethe  in  his  critique  of  German 
intellectual  ability.  Professor  E.  Ray  Lankester 
asserted  that  Germany's  reputation  in  the  field  of 
scientific  research  ''is  due  to  the  irresponsible 
gush  of  young  men  who  have  benefited  by  the  nu- 
merous and  well-organized  laboratories  of  German 
universities."  Similar  denials  of  German  musi- 
cal and  artistic  ability  appeared  from  English 
pens  at  this  same  period. 

The  spring  and  summer  of  1915  saw  a  further 
exacerbation  of  British  public  opinion  against  the 
German  people.  German  naval  bombardments  of 
English  coast  towns,  Zeppelin  raids,  and  numer- 
ous sinkings  of  English  passenger  ships,  culminat- 
ing in  the  Lusitania  disaster,  roused  a  perfect 
wave  of  fury  in  England  and  evoked  repeated  calls 
for  reprisal  and  revenge.  Major-General  Sir  Al- 
fred E.  Turner  wrote  in  the  "Saturday  Review" 
of  September  18,  1915,  "No  terms  can  safely  be 
made  with  such  a  people  of  outsiders,  to  whom 
the  quality  of  mercy  is  not  known,  and  who,  like 
all  other  savages,  regard  generosity  and  forbear- 
ance as  signs  of  weakness.  .  .  .  Germans  are  only 
to  be  subdued  by  force  and  frightfulness,  their 
own  weapons,  and  it  is  high  time  that  velvet  gloves 
should  be  taken  off,  as  they  were  when  we  fought 
with  the  Dervishes  of  the  Sudan,  the  Zulus,  and 
the  Boxers  of  China,  who  were  akin  in  more  than 
one  sense  to  the  Prussians."  "To  avenge!" 
writes  W.  S.  Lilly  in  the  "Nineteenth  Century  and 
After"  of  July,  1915,  "The  words  strike  the  key- 
note."   "However  the  world  pretends  to  divide 


ENGLAND  19 

itself,"  asserted  Rudyard  Kipling,  ''there  are 
only  two  divisions  in  the  world  to-day, — human  be- 
ings and  Germans.  And  the  German  knows  it. 
Human  beings  have  long  ago  sickened  of  him  and 
everything  connected  with  him:  of  all  he  does,  of 
all  he  says,  thinks,  or  believes.  From  the  ends  of 
the  earth  to  the  ends  of  the  earth  they  desire  noth- 
ing more  greatly  tlian  that  this  unclean  thing 
should  bo  thrust  out  from  the  membership  and  the 
memory  of  the  nations."  Edward  Jenks,  in  the 
July  ''Contemporary  Review,"  urges  the  imposi- 
tion of  a  lasting  tabu  upon  everything  German. 
"It  is  the  most  ancient  of  all  social  sanctions,  and 
still  the  most  terribly  effective.  If  it  does  not 
now  as  formerly  mean  actual  physical  starvation 
or  death  from  beasts  of  prey,  it  means  commer- 
cial ruin,  intellectual  starvation,  social  extinction. 
Let  no  one  think  that  such  a  punishment,  applied 
to  a  nation,  would  be  a  light  one.  .  .  .  There  will 
be  no  appeal  from  the  sentence;  no  possibility  of 
condoning  it.  The  '  Everlasting  No '  wdll  then  take 
on  an  entirely  new  aspect  for  its  champions,  when 
the  Gorgon  face  shall  be  turned  inw^ards,  w^hen 
those  who  have  made  an  alliance  w'ith  the  powders 
of  darkness  shall  see  the  thick  darkness  descend 
upon  the  guarded  Brandenburger  Tor  and  the  pil- 
lared eagles  of  Schonbrunn." 

This  intense  wave  of  anti-German  feeling  is  of 
course  also  accounted  for  by  British  exasperation 
at  the  increasingly  unfavorable  state  of  affairs 
both  abroad  and  at  home.  Italy 's  adhesion  to  the 
Allies  in  May,  1915,  was  soon  more  than  counter- 


20  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

balanced  by  a  whole  series  of  crushing  disasters. 
The  Austro-Grerman  offensive  in  Galicia,  which  be- 
gan in  the  early  days  of  June,  never  slackened  till 
the  Teutons  were  masters  of  all  Poland,  and  Rus- 
sia's defeat  was  only  the  prelude  to  Germany's 
great  Balkan  ''drive,"  which  ground  Serbia  and 
Montenegro  to  dust,  won  Bulgaria  to  the  Teutonic 
cause,  and  opened  the  road  to  Turkey  and  the  near 
East.  That  rendered  the  Allied  evacuation  of 
Gallipoli  inevitable,  and  this  British  disaster  was 
obviously  to  be  followed  by  another  humiliation 
farther  east,  where  the  surrender  of  the  British 
Mesopotamian  army  cooped  up  at  Kut-el-Amara 
had  become  merely  a  question  of  time.  Not  even 
in  the  West  was  solace  to  be  found,  for  the  "big 
push"  in  northern  France,  kept  up  for  months  at 
a  huge  sacrifice  of  life,  had  yielded  most  meager 
results.  The  Allies'  military  prospects,  so  bright 
in  early  1915,  had  thus  by  the  close  of  the  year  be- 
come gloomy  in  the  extreme. 

But  even  the  military  disasters,  taken  by  them- 
selves, did  not  tell  the  whole  story.  Despite  a 
rigid  censorship,  the  English  public  was  gradually 
waking  to  the  fact  that  these  Allied  reverses  were 
due,  in  part  at  least,  to  British  ''muddling"  and 
ineptitude.  The  humiliating  failure  in  northern 
France  was  the  logical  fruit  of  Great  Britain's 
faulty  munitions  system.  The  disasters  in  Meso- 
potamia and  at  Gallipoli  were  the  results  of  blun- 
dering British  strategy.  The  Balkan  collapse 
was  bound  up  with  short-sighted  British  diplo- 
macy.   Obviously,  the  British  governmental  mech- 


ENGLAND  21 

anism  was  not  standing  up  properly  under  the 
strain  of  the  Great  War. 

That  realization,  to  be  sure,  did  not  come  in  a 
day.  It  took  time  to  penetrate  the  armor  of  Brit- 
ish optimism.  But  the  facts  were  too  damning  to 
be  ignored,  and  a  gradual  process  of  disillusion- 
ment spread  through  ever-widening  circles  of  the 
British  people.  Voices  began  to  be  raised  criti- 
cizing the  Government's  shortcomings,  warning 
against  the  consequences  of  "muddle,"  and  de- 
manding thorough-going  reform. 

As  far  back  as  January,  1915,  Austin  Harrison, 
editor  of  the  influential  ''English  Review,"  had 
raised  a  warning  note  against  the  easy  optimism 
which  then  prevailed.  England,  he  asserted,  did 
not  yet  realize  the  magnitude  of  her  task,  ''the 
terrible  nature  of  the  war  she  is  engaged  upon," 
while  "ink-pot  gibes  at  the  Germans"  and  the 
"silly  prattle"  about  cockney  valor  would  never 
win  victory.  From  that  time  on  leading  organs, 
and  publicists  like  Dr.  E.  J.  Dillion,  J.  Ellis  Bar- 
ker, etc.,  began  a  regular  campaign  of  education 
under  the  slogan  "Wake  up,  England!" 

Criticism  of  the  English  governmental  system 
grew  continually  sharper  and  more  uncompromis- 
ing. "The  old  mechanism  of  government  which 
kept  the  British  nation  unprepared  for  the  war 
is  still  in  daily  use  unmodified,"  wrote  Dr.  Dillon 
in  the  "Fortnightly  Review"  of  January,  1916. 
"W^hile  everything  and  everybody  around  us  is 
changed  or  changing,  that  remains  as  it  was.  .  .  . 
Its  action  is  mischievous,  not  helpful.     It  works 


22  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

havoc  with  our  best-laid  plans,  and  belies  our  most 
reasonably  hopeful  forecasts.  .  .  .  Our  effete  sys- 
tem of  governance,  with  its  roots  in  a  dead  past 
and  its  blighting  shadow  flung  across  the  present 
and  future  of  the  nation,  must  be  swept  away. 
The  illusions  with  which  it  is  warping  British 
thought  and  sapping  British  force  must  be  dis- 
pelled. .  .  .  Unless  that  system,  together  with  its 
old  parliamentary  doctrines,  its  cherished  tradi- 
tions of  liberty,  its  sharply  accentuated  individual- 
ism, its  conservative  predilections,  and  its  insular 
illusions,  be  speedily  adjusted  to  the  new  condi- 
tions, much  that  is  precious,  not  only  to  the  race, 
but  also  to  civilized  man  generally,  will  be  swept 
away  into  history  by  the  Teuton  tide  of  which  the 
present  war  is  but  the  first  inrush."  In  the 
"Nineteenth  Century  and  After"  of  February, 
1916,  Mr.  J.  Ellis  Barker  is  equally  severe :  "The 
British  Government,  as  at  present  constituted,  is 
not  the  organization  of  efficiency,  but  its  negation. 
It  is  an  organization  similar  to  that  which  caused 
the  downfall  of  Poland.  It  is  the  organization  of 
disorganization.  Amateurs  are  bound  to  govern 
amateurishly,  and  their  insufficiency  will  be  partic- 
ularly marked  if  they  have  to  run  an  unworkable 
government  machine  and  are  pitted  against  per- 
fectly organized  professionals."  No  mere  re- 
placement of  a  Liberal  by  a  Conservative  Cabinet 
would  suffice,  for  "it  is  questionable  whether  an- 
other set  of  amateurs  will  do  better  than  the  pres- 
ent one.  The  fault  lies  chiefly  with  the  system. 
Government  by  debating  society  has  proved  a  fail- 


ENGLAND  23 

uro.  It  should  be  abolished  before  it  is  too  late." 
Tlie  warning  note  grew  more  insistent  as  time 
went  on.  ** Unless  we  quicken  our  movements," 
cried  Dr.  Dillon  in  February,  1916,  "damnation 
will  fall  on  the  sacred  cause  for  which  so  much  gal- 
lant blood  has  flowed.  And  as  yet  there  are  no 
signs  of  any  quickening."  And  in  May,  1916,  he 
wrote:  "We  are  not  winning  the  war,  nor  are 
we  adopting  the  means  to  win  it.  .  .  .  The  result 
has  been  to  inoculate  the  nation  with  the  bacteria 
of  general  paralysis.  A  little  while  longer,  and 
we  shall  be  slouching  into  irreparable  disaster." 

The  cardinal  reform  which  all  these  critics  de- 
manded was  the  transformation  of  cabinet  gov- 
ernment into  a  dictatorship.  "Temporary  autoc- 
racy, ' '  urged  Dr.  Dillon,  * '  is  what  we  need  during 
a  struggle  like  the  present.  Respect  for  individ- 
ual liberty  and  parliamentary  rights  should  give 
way  to  considerations  of  a  higher  order  for  the 
sake  of  more  momentous  issues." 

The  reasons  for  such  drastic  demands  were  to 
be  found  not  only  in  governmental  inefficiency  but 
also  in  certain  disquieting  aspects  of  the  national 
temper.  We  have  already  seen  how  strong  had 
been  the  opposition  to  war  in  the  summer  of  1914. 
Now  this  opposition,  w^hile  it  had  diminished  with 
the  course  of  the  struggle,  had  by  no  means  en- 
tirely died  away.  The  extremely  class-conscious 
British  labor-unions  persisted  in  regarding  the 
war  as  the  work  of  capitalist  diplomacy,  and  labor 
leaders  like  Keir  Hardie  and  Ramsay  Macdonald 
formally  refused  to  give  it  their  blessing.    Also 


24  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

radical  groups  such  as  the  "Union  of  Democratic 
Control"  joined  the  labor  opposition  in  demanding 
an  early  and  compromise  peace,  while  extreme  pa- 
cifists like  Bertrand  Russell  denounced  the  war  on 
principle,  and  refused  to  assist  it  in  any  way, 
shape,  or  manner.  Lastly,  symptoms  of  moral 
flabbiness  and  selfish  indiiference  were  unmistak- 
ably apparent  in  many  circles,  particularly  in  the 
lower  middle  classes.  The  result  of  all  this  was 
slacking  and  shirking  in  munition  factories,  dan- 
gerous strikes  even  in  such  vital  industrial 
branches  as  the  shipyards  and  coal  mines,  and  fail- 
ure of  the  most  energetic  recruiting  campaigns  to 
produce  by  voluntary  enlistment  the  armies  neces- 
sary for  the  further  prosecution  of  the  war. 
Even  appeals  like  that  of  Minister  Lloyd- George 
before  the  Trade-Union  Congress  at  Bristol  in  the 
autumn  of  1915 — "I  beg  you  as  a  man  brought  up 
in  a  workman's  home,  do  not  set  the  sympathy  of 
the  country  against  labor  by  holding  back  its  might 
by  regulations  and  customs  when  the  poor  old 
land  is  fighting  for  its  life" — did  not  produce  the 
desired  effect. 

But  the  second  half  of  1916  saw  an  almost  start- 
ling change  in  the  national  consciousness.  Stung 
to  the  quick  by  internal  shortcomings  and  external 
failures,  England  at  last  roused  to  the  peril,  and 
before  the  year  was  out  sweeping  legislation  had 
revolutionized  the  British  governmental  system 
and  radically  transformed  the  whole  aspect  of 
English  life.  The  armies  had  been  filled  by  com- 
pulsory military  service,  the  munitions  muddle 


ENGLAND  25 

had  been  solved  by  industrial  conscription,  and 
cabinet  government  had  vanished  before  an  om- 
nipotent triumvirate  headed  by  Lloyd-George. 
With  the  opening  of  1917  England  stood  on  an 
efficiency  basis. 

It  must  not  be  thought  that  this  disheartening 
time  had  caused  any  perceptible  abatement  of  the 
national  longing  for  a  decisive  victory.  Unques- 
tionably there  was  much  pessimism  and  some  de- 
spair, but  hatred  and  abhorrence  of  the  German 
flamed  up  as  hotly  as  before.  ''Unless  the  Allies 
grind  to  powder  the  lawless  murderers  in  the  red 
mill  of  war,"  asserted  Dr.  Dillon,  ''the  sands  of 
civilization  will  have  run  down."  Writing  in 
"Blackwood's  Magazine"  for  August,  1916,  Ma- 
jor-General  C.  E.  Callwell  maintained  that  Ger- 
many must  be  beaten,  crushed,  and  permanently 
kept  down,  for  "the  German  nation  is  a  nation  of 
barbarians,  a  nation  without  honor,  without  chiv- 
alry, and  without  shame."  Normally,  the  victor 
may,  and  often  should,  grant  terms  that  are  not 
degrading,  "but  the  Germans  can  no  longer  be  ac- 
counted a  civilized  race.  .  .  .  Paper  guarantees 
are  worse  than  worthless  when  they  are  furnished 
by  rogues.  .  .  .  We  are  dealing  with  a  wild  beast 
that  has  to  be  caged  and  that  has  to  be  kept  in  a 
cage  until  it  is  tamed."  Sir  Harry  Johnston,  in 
the  English  "Eeview  of  Reviews"  for  April,  1916, 
wrote  that  Germany  must  be  "punished  to  the 
full;  whether  we  can  accomplish  this  punishment 
in  six  months,  in  one  year,  in  ten  years,  or  in 
fifty."    And  the  eminent  English  philosopher,  L. 


26  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

P.  Jacks,  stated  in  his  organ,  the  "Hibbert  Jour- 
nal," "I  write  with  deliberation  when  I  say  that 
we  are  fighting  hell. '  * 

Such  being  the  prevalent  English  temper  toward 
Germany,  it  was  easy  to  foresee  that  the  peace  ru- 
mors which  at  this  time  began  to  be  bruited  abroad 
would  not  meet  with  a  particularly  warm  recep- 
tion from  British  public  opinion.  Peace  had  of 
course  always  been  discussed  in  England — a  peace, 
that  is,  based  on  the  postulate  of  absolute  Allied 
victory.  But  as  time  passed,  and  Teutonic  stay- 
ing-power became  plainer,  peace  talk  of  a  different 
sort  began.  It  was  clear  that  Germany  could  be 
crushed,  if  at  all,  only  after  a  long  war,  the  for- 
mula for  which  was  expressed  in  the  word  ''attri- 
tion." But  this  word  sounded  unpleasant  in 
many  ears,  for,  as  an  anonymous  wit  expressed  it, 
"it  meant  that  after  all  the  Huns  were  killed  off 
there  would  be  a  few  Allies  left."  So  the  year 
1916  saw  a  genuine  discussion  of  peace  possibili- 
ties— a  discussion  quickened  by  events  like  the 
German  chancellor's  olive-branch  speech  at  the 
close  of  the  year  and  President  Wilson's  pacific 
moves  at  the  beginning  of  1917. 

The  feeling  of  most  Englishmen  was  evidently 
hostile  to  a  compromise  peace.  British  anti- 
German  sentiment  has  been  so  fully  analyzed  that 
a  few  examples  of  this  majority  temper  should 
suffice.  To  begin  with.  Premier  Lloyd-George 
himself  had  early  taken  up  a  most  uncompromis- 
ing attitude.  Speaking  to  an  American  news- 
paper man  in  October,  1916,  Lloyd-George  said: 


ENGLAND  27 

''Britain  has  only  begun  to  fight;  the  British  Em- 
pire has  invested  thousands  of  its  best  lives  to 
purchase  future  immunity  for  civilization ;  this  in- 
vestment is  too  great  to  be  thrown  away.  .  .  .  The 
fight  must  be  to  the  finish — to  a  knockout." 
Whether  or  not  the  British  government  has  since 
modified  its  attitude,  certain  it  is  that  this  official 
declaration  elicited  the  warm  approval  of  a  ma- 
jority of  the  British  press,  and  no  diminution  of 
tliat  approval  is  visible  in  these  opening  months  of 
1917.  In  late  December  the  London  "Daily  Mail" 
remarked:  ''The  Allies  know  that  no  peace  with 
a  nation  of  tigers,  and  murderers,  and  statesmen 
who  regard  all  treaties  as  scraps  of  paper  would 
be  worth  the  paper  and  ink.  So  long  as  Germany 
has  not  been  completely  and  decisively  beaten,  no 
peace  witli  her  can  be  more  than  a  truce  whicli 
she  would  violate  the  first  moment  it  served  her 
purpose."  And  the  London  "Post"  asserted: 
"There  can  be  no  compromise,  and  the  war  is 
there  to  prove  it.  What  the  German  mind  is  at 
present  incapable  of  understanding  is  the  simple 
fact  that  German  arrogance,  German  militarism, 
German  ambition,  German  immorality,  masquer- 
ading as  the  Higher  Good,  and  German  cruelty, 
are  so  intolerable  to  the  civilized  nations  now  in 
arms  against  these  horrors  that  rather  than  accept 
them  the  Allies  prefer  death."  And  Lord  Cur- 
zon  remarked  in  mid- January,  1917,  "Our  spirit 
cannot  falter,  since  an  inconclusive  peace  or  a 
patched-up  ponce  means  for  us  not  only  humilia- 
tion, but  destruction." 


N» 


28  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

At  the  same  time  this  uncompromising  temper 
was  by  no  means  universal.  The  cost  of  "attri- 
tion" was  intolerable  to  many  persons,  who  ex- 
pressed their  belief  that  a  victory  gained  by  such 
means  would  involve  all  parties  in  a  common  ruin. 
Bertrand  Russell  wrote:  "If  the  war  lasts  long, 
all  that  was  good  in  the  ideals  of  Germany,  France, 
and  England  will  have  perished,  as  the  ideals  of 
Spartans  and  Athenians  perished  in  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  War.  All  three  races,  with  all  that  they 
have  added  to  our  civilization,  will  have  become 
exhausted,  and  victory,  when  it  comes,  will  be  as 
barren  and  as  hopeless  as  defeat."  That  an 
avowed  non-resister  like  Bertrand  Russell  should 
have  thus  written  is  no  surprise,  but  what  is  of 
greater  significance  is  the  fact  that  similar  senti- 
ments were  now  expressed  by  prominent  English- 
men like  Earl  Beauchamp,  Lord  Brassey,  and  Lord 
Loreburn,  men  not  identified  with  extreme  pacifist 
circles.  Lord  Loreburn,  in  the  London  "Econ- 
omist" of  June  10,  1916,  expressed  his  fear  that 
an  "attrition"  victory  would  mean  general  bank- 
ruptcy and  "such  a  destruction  of  the  male  youth 
of  Europe  as  will  break  the  thin  crust  of  civiliza- 
tion which  has  been  built  up  since  the  Dark  Ages. ' ' 
And  Lord  Loreburn 's  point  of  view  was  emphat- 
ically endorsed  by  the  editor  of  the  "Economist," 
the  well-known  economic  writer,  Francis  W.  Hirst, 
who  remarked:  "The  time  seems  to  have  come 
when  rulers  will  have  to  consider  the  true  inter- 
ests of  their  subjects  or  fellow-citizens  in  this  re- 
gard, and  when  the  State,  which  has  claimed  the 


ENGLAND  29 

right  to  exact  from  the  individual  his  life  or  his 
property,  will  have  to  reduce  its  pretensions  and 
abate  the  struggle  for  glory  and  prestige,  not  be- 
cause they  are  worthless  and  undesirable,  but  be- 
cause a  State  which  had  lost  its  men  and  its  money 
could  hardly  call  itself  victorious;  for  after  it 
had  imposed  peace  as  a  conqueror,  it  would  be 
compelled  for  years  to  play  second  fiddle  to  other 
powers.  ...  Of  course  you  want  to  crush  your 
enemy  in  war.  Of  course  you  want  victory.  Of 
course  you  wish  your  enemy  to  admit  that  he  is 
beaten,  and  to  sue  for  peace.  But  equally,  of 
course,  unless  you  are  misled  by  a  false  and  flimsy 
rhetoric,  you  do  not  want  to  destroy  the  society, 
the  traditions,  the  wealth,  and  the  happiness  of 
your  own  people.  You  do  not  want  to  see  your 
allies  ruined  for  the  sake  of  reducing  an  enemy 
to  abject  despair.  So  when  attrition  and  ex- 
haustion have  reached  a  certain  point,  you  are 
willing  to  discount  the  future  and  to  take  counsel 
with  the  still  small  voices  of  reason  and  common 
sense."  The  matter  was  put  more  pungently  by 
George  Bernard  Shaw,  who,  writing  in  an  Ameri- 
can periodical,  the  ''New  Republic,"  of  January 
6,  1917,  said:  "Non-German  Europe  is  not  go- 
ing to  spend  the  remainder  of  the  duration  of  this 
planet  sitting  on  Germany's  head.  A  head  with 
the  brains  of  sixty  millions  of  people  in  it  takes 
more  sitting  on  than  we  shall  have  time  for." 

Such  pronouncements,  however,  though  numer- 
ous and  weighty,  wore  those  of  a  minority,  and 
aroused  angry  retorts  from  the  bulk  of  English 


30  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

public  opinion.  In  many  quarters  they  were 
treated  as  near-treason  and  were  accused  of  being 
inspired  by  the  machinations  of  Judapo-German 
"High  Finance."  Mr.  Hirst's  attitude,  for  ex- 
ample, which  made  a  great  sensation,  cost  him  his 
editorship.  Typical  of  these  protests  against 
compromise  is  one  penned  by  L.  J.  Maxse,  editor 
of  the  influential  "National  Review":  "The 
main  object  of  peace  should  be  to  crush  and  per- 
manently cripple  Prussia,  not  only  because  she 
wantonly  provoked  war,  but  because  of  the  hor- 
rors perpetrated  wherever  a  Prussian  foot  has 
trod.  The  Prussians  and  their  miscreant  dy- 
nasty are  the  pariahs  and  lepers  of  civilization, 
and  as  such  are  unfit  to  be  a  Great  Power.  We 
might  as  well  enthrone  Satan  as  enable  them  to 
resume  their  bloodthirsty  career  whenever  it  suits 
the  worshipers  of  might  over  right.  On  this  all 
genuine  Pacifists  should  be  able  to  agree  with  all 
genuine  Militarists.  The  former  desire  to  pre- 
vent the  recurrence  of  war,  which  can  only  be 
done  by  destroying  the  Prussian  scorpion.  The 
latter  are  no  less  anxious  to  prevent  the  honor- 
able profession  of  arms  ever  being  again  de- 
graded as  in  the  present  war  by  these  cold- 
blooded murderers  of  women  and  children,  air- 
poisoners,  well-poisoners,  savages,  besides  whose 
record  all  recorded  savagery  pales.  To-day  all 
our  public  men,  after  their  wont,  shout  with  the 
largest  crowd,  and  the  largest  crowd  is  deter- 
mined to  do  justice  by  Prussia.  But  we  know  the 
Rt.  Hon.  Faintheart  and  the  Rt.  Hon.  Feebleguts 


ENGLAND  31 

too  well  to  suppose  that  the  mood  will  last  and 
that  he  will  remain  robust  when  the  Rhine  Whine 
sets  in.  Then  our  bleaters  will  give  tongue  and 
our  'blighters'  will  chip  in.  We  shall  see  the  old 
Potsdam  Press  in  full  working  order,  devoted 
by  day  and  by  night  to  the  sacred  cause  of  'letting 
off  the  Boche.'  Winners,  we  shall  be  told,  can 
afford  to  be  generous.  .  .  .  But  surely  if  the  Prus- 
sians lose  it  is  for  them  to  pay  and  for  the 
Allies  to  receive  the  milliards?  If  the  process  of 
payment  reduces  German  Kultur  to  be  a  hewer  of 
wood  and  drawer  of  water  for  the  rest  of  the  cen- 
tury for  European  civilization,  so  much  the  bet- 
ter for  the  world. ' ' 

Such  is  the  present  state  of  British  public  opin- 
ion toward  the  question  of  peace.  What  are  the 
real  beliefs  and  intentions  of  the  British  govern- 
ment we  of  course  do  not  know,  nor  for  our  pres- 
ent purpose  does  it  greatly  matter.  The  point  to 
be  noted  is  that  in  these  opening  months  of  1917 
British  public  opinion  is  still  predominantly  for 
war  and  ready  to  make  the  sacrifices  necessary 
to  its  continued  prosecution. 

Naturally  every  one  recognizes  that  the  strug- 
gle must  end  some  time,  and  this  raises  the  preg- 
nant query,  "After  the  war?"  But  in  treating 
this  vital  matter  we  must  carefully  delimit  the 
scope  of  our  inquiry.  A  full  analysis  of  Eng- 
land's attitude  toward  European  reconstruction 
would  carry  us  too  far  into  the  realm  of  specu- 
lation. Of  course  nearly  all  Englishmen  have 
very  definite  ideas  as  to  how  the  political  map  of 


32  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

Europe  should  be  redrawn,  but  since  the  specific 
points  of  that  redrawal  will  be  determined  by 
the  valor  of  armies  and  the  skill  of  diplomats 
rather  than  by  popular  passion,  extensive  discus- 
sion of  the  shifting  currents  of  contemporary 
public  opinion  thereon  would  be  a  rather  profit- 
less undertaking. 

Much  more  useful  is  it  to  understand  the  de- 
gree of  popular  sympathy  or  antipathy  which 
Englishmen  to-day  feel  toward  the  various  Euro- 
pean peoples.  This  is  a  matter  of  practical  im- 
portance. A  pronounced  trend  of  public  senti- 
ment regarding  any  foreign  nation  may  harden 
the  decisions  of  governments  and  influence 
statesmen  in  the  laying  out  of  future  policies. 

Of  course  the  main  line  of  cleavage  runs  be- 
tween friends  and  enemies.  The  war  has  natu- 
rally tended  to  draw  Englishmen  ever  closer  to 
their  Allies  and  to  sunder  them  ever  more  widely 
from  their  foes.  This  process  has,  however,  not 
operated  in  uniform  fashion.  Taking  first  the 
popular  status  of  Great  Britain's  allies,  the  out- 
standing feature  is  the  profound  English  sym- 
pathy for  France.  Anglo-French  relations  had, 
it  is  true,  been  cordial  since  1904,  but  the  heroism 
and  efficiency  of  France  in  the  present  war  have 
deepened  English  liking  into  an  enthusiastic  ad- 
miration which  appears  to  promise  lasting 
friendship  between  the  two  peoples.  Toward 
Russia,  British  feeling  has  sensibly  warmed,  and 
in  some  circles  this  rises  to  genuine  enthusiasm. 
But  English  philo-Russian  literature  bears  cer- 


ENGLAND  33 

tain  marks  of  artificial  stimulation,  and  British 
critics  accuse  the  extreme  pro-Russian  propa- 
ganda of  Mr.  Stephen  Graham  and  others  of  be- 
ing sicklied  o'er  with  sentimentality.  For  Italy, 
British  friendship  seems  rather  casual  and  not 
without  mental  reservations.  Belgium  has  re- 
ceived unstinted  praise,  and  the  traditional  Eng- 
lish policy  of  safeguarding  her  small  neighbor 
from  foreign  conquest  has  been  powerfully  re- 
inforced by  ties  of  warm  popular  affection.  As 
to  Serbia,  former  English  dislike  has  been  quite 
effaced  by  the  staunch  fighting  qualities  of  that 
little  nation. 

A  word  about  neutrals.  Convinced  as  they  are 
that  they  are  fighting  the  battle  of  civilization. 
Englishmen  believe  that  the  neutrals  should  be  in 
the  war  ''doing  their  bit,"  and  since  Englishmen 
are  inclined  to  ascribe  neutrality  either  to  selfish 
"profiteering"  or  to  cowardice,  the  predominant 
British  attitude  tends  to  be  a  compound  of  dis- 
like and  contempt.  Of  course  political  exigen- 
cies and  a  strict  censorship  suppress  the  more 
violent  manifestations,  but  Kipling's  phrase, 
"Damn  all  Neutrals!"  undoubtedly  expresses  the 
predominant  British  feeling. 

On  its  enemies  English  public  opinion  is  gen- 
erally severe,  though  the  degree  of  bitterness 
varies  considerably  with  the  specific  cases.  Tur- 
key was  from  the  start  condemned  to  death.  Bul- 
garia, while  usually  accorded  political  life,  is  to 
be  reduced  to  a  negligible  quantity.  British  dis- 
like of  Austria  has  waxed  greatly  with  the  course 


34  PRESENT-DAY  EUEOPE 

of  time.  At  the  beginning  of  tlie  war  Austria 
was  regarded  with  contemptuous  disdain  as  the 
senile  dupe  of  Prussian  militarism.  To-day, 
however,  many  Englishmen  regard  her  guilt  as 
equal  to  Germany's,  and  accordingly  demand  her 
political  extinction,  the  deposition  of  Hapsburgs 
and  Hohenzollerns  being  held  alike  necessary  to 
the  future  well-being  of  Europe. 

The  arch-enemy,  however,  continues  to  be  Ger- 
many, and  upon  Germany  British  wrath  remains 
unwaveringly  fixed.  The  desire  to  ''smash" 
Germany  is  as  keen  as  ever,  but  the  difficulty  of 
the  process  is  becoming  more  and  more  recog- 
nized. Most  thoughtful  Englishmen  now  admit 
that  the  undoing  of  German  unity  is  impossible, 
and  many  even  forecast  a  junction  of  the  Aus- 
trian Germans  with  their  racial  brethren.  Since, 
however,  they  fear  that  defeat  will  work  no 
change  of  heart  in  the  German  people,  English- 
men are  greatly  concerned  with  the  problem  of 
averting  a  German  war  of  revenge,  and  the  gen- 
eral opinion  seems  to  be  that  the  only  safe 
method  is  to  ''keep  Germany  down."  The  pop- 
ular plans  for  doing  this  are  of  course  both  nu- 
merous and  varied.  They  embrace  not  merely 
military  and  political  safeguards,  but  also  radical 
economic  measures,  such  as  Allied  boycotts  of 
German  goods,  commerce,  shipping,  etc.  This  in 
turn  involves  the  idea  of  the  permanency  of  the 
present  "Grand  Alliance"  and  a  general  pooling 
of  Allied  resources. 

English  hatred  of  Germany  and  English  friend- 


ENGLAND  35 

ship  for  France  are,  in  fact,  the  two  salient  fea- 
tures of  the  British  state  of  mind.  So  pro- 
nounced are  they  that  they  promise  to  be  import- 
ant factors  in  determining  the  course  of  European 
life  after  the  war.  To  be  sure,  several  influential 
elements  of  English  thought  refuse  to  contem- 
plate a  permanent  estrangement  of  the  British 
and  German  peoples,  but  the  bulk  of  British 
public  opinion  plainly  believes  that  any  immedi- 
ate healing  of  the  breach  is  impossible.  The 
eminent  English  essayist,  Edmund  Gosse,  re- 
marks: "I  cannot  imagine  that  the  passions 
which  the  war  stirs  up  can  have  any  other  effect 
but  of  deepening  and  widening  the  abyss.  I 
fancy  that  at  least  for  a  generation  no  intellect- 
ual relations  will  be  possible  between  France  and 
England  on  the  one  side  and  Germany  on  the 
other.  If  I  am  not  mistaken,  the  neutral  nations 
will  form  the  only  link  between  the  Allies  and 
Germany  after  the  war."  H.  G.  Wells,  in  his 
''What  is  Coming,"  undoubtedly  strikes  a  popu- 
lar chord  when  he  writes:  ''The  primary  business 
of  the  Allies  is  not  reconciliation  with  Germany. 
Their  primary  concern  is  to  organize  a  great 
league  of  peace.  .  .  .  There  will  be  a  bitterness 
in  the  memories  of  this  and  the  next  generation 
that  will  make  the  spectacle  of  ardent  French- 
men, or  Englishmen,  or  Belgians,  or  Russians  em- 
bracing Germans  with  gusto — unpleasant,  to  say 
tlie  least  of  it.  We  may  bring  ourselves  to  under- 
stand, we  may  bring  ourselves  to  a  cold  and  rea- 
sonable forgiveness,  but  it  will  take  sixty  or  sev- 


36  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

enty  years  for  the  two  sides  in  this  present  war 
to  grow  kindly  again.  Let  us  build  no  false  hopes 
nor  pretend  to  any  false  generosities.  These 
hatreds  can  die  out  only  in  one  way :  by  the  pass- 
ing of  a  generation,  by  the  dying  out  of  the 
wounded  and  the  wronged.  Our  business,  our  un- 
sentimental business,  is  to  set  about  establishing 
such  conditions  that  they  will  so  die  out.  And 
that  is  the  business  of  the  sane  Germans,  too. 
.  .  .  That  is  not  to  be  done  by  any  conscientious 
sentimentalities,  any  slobbering  denials  of  un- 
forgettable injuries.  We  want  no  pro-German 
Leagues  any  more  than  we  want  anti-German 
Leagues.  We  want  patience — and  silence.  My 
reason  insists  upon  the  inevitableness  and  neces- 
sity of  this  ultimate  reconciliation.  I  will  do  no 
more  than  I  must  to  injure  Germany  further,  and 
I  will  do  all  that  I  can  to  restore  the  unity  of 
mankind.  None  the  less  is  it  true  that  for  me  for 
all  the  rest  of  my  life  the  Germans  I  shall  meet, 
the  German  things  I  shall  see,  will  be  smeared 
with  the  blood  of  my  people  and  my  friends  that 
the  wilfulness  of  Germany  has  spilt." 

Many  Englishmen  take  an  even  more  pessi- 
mistic view.  The  eminent  British  scientist.  Sir 
William  Ramsay,  for  example,  believes  that  no 
intercourse  whatever  with  Germany  can  take 
place  under  a  century.  *'I  am  afraid,"  he  writes, 
**that  the  horror  of  the  whole  civilized  world  at 
the  moral  decay  of  the  Germans  makes  it  most 
unlikely  that  international  relations  with  individ- 
uals of  that  nation  will  be  resumed  before  several 


ENGLAND  37 

generations  have  passed.  Men  of  science  will 
always  recognize  scientific  achievements,  inde- 
pendent of  nationality.  But  should  any  attempt 
be  made  to  resume  friendly  relations  with  Ger- 
many and  Austria  by  means  of  invitations  to  sci- 
entific congresses,  we  shall  certainly  all  resent 
it." 

Indeed,  some  English  thinkers  almost  despair 
of  the  future  and  fear  a  permanent  breakdown  of 
European  solidarity  and  civilization.  In  April, 
1916,  the  London  ''Nation"  remarked  gloomily: 
"Europe  is  now  being  mentally  conceived  as 
inevitably  and  permanently  dual.  .  .  .  We  are 
ceasing  to  think  of  Europe.  .  .  .  The  normal  end 
of  war  (which  is  peace)  is  to  be  submerged  in  the 
idea  of  a  war-series  indefinitely  prolonged.  Soon 
the  entire  Continent  will  have  but  one  longing — 
the  longing  for  rest.  The  cup  is  to  be  dashed 
from  its  lips!  For  a  world  steeped  in  fear  and 
ruled  by  the  barren  logomachy  of  hate,  diplo- 
matic intercourse  would  almost  cease  to  be  possi- 
ble. ...  In  the  matter  of  culture.  Modern  Eu- 
rope would  tend  to  relapse  to  a  state  inferior  even 
to  that  of  Medieval  Europe,  and  to  sink  far  below 
that  of  the  Renaissance." 

These  are  serious  and  weighty  words  on  which 
we  will  do  well  to  ponder.  There  is  indeed  much 
to  arouse  anxiety  for  the  future  of  mankind. 
And  yet  before  we  a])andon  ourselves  to  melan- 
choly reveries  we  should  remember  certain  facts. 
For  one  thing,  England's  present  implacable  tem- 
per is  no  new  or  unprecedented  phenomenon  in 


38  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

the  history  of  British  national  psychology.  To 
him  who  doubts  this  assertion  I  recommend  a 
perusal  of  Burke's  ''Reflections  on  the  Revolu- 
tion in  France"  or  the  "Letters  of  a  Regicide 
Peace."  Assuredly  current  British  cartoons  of 
the  Kaiser  are  no  more  virulent  and  certainly  in 
better  taste  than  British  lampoons  on  the  Cor- 
sican  a  hundred  years  ago. 

Of  course  the  answer  to  this  is  that  Anglo- 
French  hatreds  took  nearly  a  century  to  die  away. 
That  is  true.  But  it  is  also  true  that  the  world 
moves  faster  now  than  ever  before.  Most  of  the 
Allies  of  to-day  were  enemies  a  generation  ago. 
A  couple  of  decades  hence  a  turn  of  Fate's  rap- 
idly revolving  wheel — pan-Russianism,  an  awak- 
ened Orient,  a  general  rising  of  the  colored  world, 
or  some  giant  evolution  as  yet  beyond  our  ken — 
may  force  Briton  and  Teuton  fair  into  each 
other's  arms.  Necessity,  like  politics,  makes 
strange  bedfellows.    Who  knows? 


CHAPTER  n 

FRANCE 

FRENCH  national  psychology  exhibits  a  strik- 
ing contrast  between  surface  variability  and 
underlying  permanence:  a  combination  of  mo- 
bility and  solidity — mobility  of  thought  and  feel- 
ing with  solidity  of  character.  This  comes  out 
strongly  in  the  field  of  politics.  Fickleness  for 
forms  is  coupled  with  instinctive  adhesion  to  tra- 
ditional tendencies  and  policies. 

During  the  generation  which  followed  the 
Franco-Prussian  War,  to  be  sure,  this  truth  was 
somewliat  obscured.  Eighteen  seventy — **The 
Terrible  Year" — acted  like  a  blow  in  the  solar 
plexus.  The  soul  of  France  was  temporarily 
paralyzed,  and  surface  variability,  freed  from  its 
stabilizer,  went  almost  unchecked,  acute  factional 
broils,  materialism,  and  pessimism  long  making 
France  an  uncertain  quantity  in  European  af- 
fairs. 

But  about  the  beginning  of  the  present  century 
France  recovered  from  the  shock  of  1870  and  de- 
termined to  play  a  positive  role  in  the  world. 
Two  general  attitudes  toward  foreign  policy  were 
visible — both  springing  from  the  historic  past. 
One  of  these,  flowing  from  the  humanitarian 
idealism  of  the  eighteenth  century  and  the  Revo- 

39 


40  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

lution,  sought  to  make  France  once  more  the  re- 
generative center  of  mankind  by  concentrating 
French  energy  upon  constructive  ideas  and  social 
reform.  Aggressive  foreign  policies  and  "re- 
venge" for  1870  were  to  be  eschewed.  An  exam- 
ple of  this  party's  attitude  toward  European  af- 
fairs is  Francis  Delaisi's  book,  **The  Inevitable 
War,"  which  appeared  in  1911.  Believing  an 
Anglo-German  war  certain,  Delaisi  saw  both 
sides  courting  France — Germany  for  money, 
England  for  men.  His  thesis  was  that  France 
should  aid  neither,  but  should  conserve  her 
strength  and  emerge  the  moral  arbiter  and  re- 
conciler of  Europe.  The  most  prominent  figure 
of  this  school  in  French  political  life  was  M. 
Joseph  Caillaux.  The  party's  adherents  were 
mostly  drawn  from  the  working  classes  of  the 
towns,  especially  the  great  labor  organization 
known  as  the  **C.  G.  T."  (Confederation  Generate 
du  Travail)  y  and  from  the  peasantry  of  the 
South — the  Midi. 

At  the  same  time,  however,  another  trend  of 
French  thought  had  become  evident;  one  based 
upon  traditions  even  older  in  the  history  of 
France.  The  French  have  always  displayed 
strong  likings  for  military  prowess  and  an  ex- 
pansive foreign  policy — especially  toward  the 
Rhine.  They  have  before  their  eyes  the  vision 
of  a  glorious  past  and  remember  that  up  to  the 
formation  of  German  and  Italian  unity  France 
was  unquestionably  the  first  Power  in  Europe — 
La  Grande  Nation.    Also,  for  many  Frenchmen, 


FRANCE  41 

the  humiliation  and  "mutilation"  of  1870  was  a 
perpetual  agony.  It  is  therefore  not  surprising 
that  the  reviving  spirit  of  France  expressed  it- 
self largely  in  terms  of  La  Grande  Nation,  re- 
venge upon  Germany,  and  the  recovery  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine.  The  Russian  alliance  and  the  entente 
with  England  powerfully  stimulated  this  feeling, 
while  the  various  colonial  disputes  with  Germany 
quickened  hostility  against  the  Teutons.  The 
chief  political  exponent  of  "The  New  France," 
M.  Thcophile  Delcasse,  worked  frankly  for  such  a 
diplomatic  isolation  and  encirclement  of  Germany 
that  she  would  one  day  be  faced  with  the  alter- 
native of  either  disgorging  Alsace-Lorraine  or  be- 
ing crushed  in  a  hopeless  war.  The  strength  of 
the  "Patriots"  lay  among  the  old  nobility,  the 
army,  the  bourgeoisie  and  intellectuals,  and  the 
peasantry  of  the  East  and  North.  Its  optimistic 
temper  is  revealed  by  an  abundant  literature  in 
the  years  preceding  the  present  conflict,  a  good 
example  being  Colonel  Arthur  Boucher's  "La 
France  victorieuse  dans  la  Guerre  de  Demain" 
(1911). 

The  opening  months  of  1914  saw  France  torn 
by  the  struggles  of  these  two  parties,  complicated 
by  manifestations  of  France's  rather  factious 
parliamentary  life  such  as  the  Affaire  Caillaux. 
The  temper  of  "New  France"  was  shown  in  the 
inaugural  address  of  the  eminent  French  writer, 
Maurice  Barres,  elected  president  of  tlie  Ligue 
des  Patriotes  .July  12,  1914,  after  the  death  of  the 
poet,  Paul  Deroulede.    On  that  occasion  M.  Bar- 


42  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

res  said:  '*We  shall  all  continue  his  (Derou- 
lede's)  task — the  union  of  all  Frenchmen  for  the 
reclaiming  of  the  lost  provinces.  The  first  act  of 
the  President  of  the  League  of  Patriots  will  be 
to  salute  next  Sunday  the  statue  of  Lorrainese 
Jeanne  d'Arc  on  the  very  spot  where  the  Saint 
of  the  Patrie  poured  out  her  blood,  and  to  bring 
flowers  of  remembrance  and  hope  to  the  statue  of 
Strasburg.  Vivent  l' Alsace  et  la  Lorraine,  quand 
memef 

Given  so  much  optimistic  sentiment,  it  is  not 
strange  that  the  rapid  German  invasion  of  Bel- 
gium and  France  in  what  Frenchmen  regarded  as 
a  brutal  attempt  to  dominate  Europe  and  crush 
France  into  lasting  insignificance,  should  have 
roused  the  deep  patriotism  of  the  French  people 
to  a  peculiarly  high  pitch  of  exaltation.  Before 
the  German  peril  France  rose  as  one  man  to  de- 
fend the  threatened  soil  of  the  Patrie. 

The  quick  thrust  of  the  French  armies  into 
Alsace  during  the  opening  days  of  the  war  evoked 
a  veritable  delirium  of  joy.  The  spirit  of  the 
nation  was  mirrored  in  the  proclamation  of  Gen- 
eral Joffre  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  invaded  prov- 
ince; ''Children  of  Alsace!  After  forty-four 
years  of  dolorous  waiting,  French  soldiers  again 
tread  the  soil  of  your  noble  land.  They  are  the 
first  laborers  in  the  noble  work  of  the  revenge! 
For  them,  what  emotion!  what  pride!  To  carry 
through  this  work  they  offer  their  lives;  the 
French  nation  is  behind  them  to  a  man,  and  in  the 
folds  of  their  battle  flags  are  inscribed  the  magic 


FRANCE  43 

words  of  Right  and  Liberty,  Vive  V Alsace!  Vive 
la  France!"  "At  last  it  dawns!"  cried  Maurice 
Barres.  "The  day  hoped  for  during  forty-four 
years!  The  red  trousers  appear  on  the  crest  of 
the  Vosges,  and  our  soldiers  reconcjuer  Alsace  dis- 
tracted with  joy ! ' '  And  on  August  10  he  wrote : 
"It  is  a  morning  landscape,  a  sky  of  gold,  silver 
and  azure.  August,  1914!  The  bugle  resounds 
among  the  hills ;  the  tricolor  flag  advances  among 
the  vineyards  and  woodlands;  Alsace  intones  the 
Marseillaise.  The  fetters  of  Alsace  are  broken. 
Deroulede,  we  are  at  Mulhouse!  Vive  la  Repub- 
lique  Frangaise!" 

This  jubilant  mood  was,  however,  of  short  du- 
ration. The  brilliant  sunrise  was  soon  overcast 
by  clouds.  The  mighty  German  tide  crashed  re- 
morselessly through  Belgium  and  surged  almost 
to  the  walls  of  Paris.  Yet  France  stood  firm.  In 
the  early  days  of  September,  it  is  true,  when 
things  looked  blackest,  there  seem  to  have  been 
a  few  French  politicians  who  were  ready  for  a 
separate  peace,  but  the  popular  watchword  was 
everywhere,  ''II  faut  tenir!" — "Hold  out!" 
France  held,  and  the  German  tide  was  borne  back 
from  the  Marne  to  the  Aisne. 

The  smoldering  hatred  for  the  Teuton  flared 
up  fiercely  from  the  first.  To  quote  two  of  the 
most  moderate  expressions  of  this  feeling,  the 
well-known  French  economist,  Paul  Leroy-Beau- 
lieu,  wrote  in  his  organ,  "L'Economiste  Fran- 
Qais,"  of  August,  1914,  "Such  is  the  greed  of  the 
German  ogre.    Is  it  not  quite  time  that  all  in- 


44  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

dependent  countries  of  Europe  united  in  order 
to  prevent  the  establishment  of  his  growing 
tyranny  and  to  stop  the  inroads  of  a  country 
which  is  none  other  than  a  beast  of  prey?"  And 
the  eminent  French  philosopher,  Henri  Bergson, 
exclaimed:  ''The  struggle  against  Germany 
which  is  now  going  on  is  no  more  or  less  than  a 
struggle  of  civilization  against  barbarism.  .  .  . 
The  German  ogre  must  be  placed  in  such  a  condi- 
tion that  it  will  be  impossible  for  him  to  devour  his 
neighbors. ' ' 

This  feeling  was  speedily  envenomed  by  the 
course  of  events.  The  huge  death  grapple  of  mil- 
lions of  fighting  men  over  France's  northern 
provinces  must  under  any  circumstances  have 
caused  immense  suffering  and  desolation.  But 
the  issue  was  now  complicated  by  charges  of 
wholesale  German  atrocities  which  the  French 
government  soon  formulated  in  a  series  of  offi- 
cial reports  that  roused  horror  and  fury  through- 
out the  country.  The  Paris  *' Temps"  called  on 
the  men  of  France  to  resist  to  the  death  this  at- 
tack ''directed  against  all  human  laws  by  the 
coalition  of  German  and  Austro-Hungarian  bar- 
barians raging,  in  a  sort  of  criminal  drunkenness, 
and  leagued,  like  the  Huns  of  Attila,  to  destroy 
the  invincible  supremacy  of  human  civilization." 
The  publication  of  the  first  official  atrocities'  re- 
port made  a  great  sensation.  Its  language  was 
severe,  the  preamble  stating:  "There  has  never 
been  a  war  between  civilized  nations  which  has 
been  of  such  a  savage  and  ferocious  nature.    Pil- 


FRANCE  45 

lage,  rape,  incendiarism,  and  murder  are  the 
practices  current  among  the  enemy."  The  press 
comment  may  be  judged  by  the  words  of  the  con- 
servative "Journal  des  Debats."  On  January 
15,  1915,  it  said:  "We  are  stricken  as  though  un- 
der the  blow  of  a  collective  dishonor  to  humanity 
by  the  mere  enumeration  of  all  these  acts  of  pre- 
meditated bestiality,  organized  sadism,  methodic 
rape,  which  appear  as  the  day's  work  of  the  Ger- 
man army." 

The  destruction  of  historic  monuments,  partic- 
ularly the  bombardment  of  Rheims  Cathedral, 
seemed  to  rouse  as  much  popular  fury  as  the  re- 
ported atrocities  upon  the  civilian  inhabitants. 
"La  France"  (Paris),  of  late  September,  1914, 
thus  expressed  the  nation's  "Public  horror  and 
wrath":  "Can  such  a  crime  be  pardoned?  No, 
a  thousand  times  no!  Let  there  be  a  holy  war 
that  shall  conquer  at  all  costs  and  wipe  out 
the  immoral  horde  of  Potsdam,  The  glorious 
chimes  of  Rheims  will  be  heard  no  more,  but  Nem- 
esis will  surely  come."  And  the  "Journal  des 
Debats"  of  September  25  exclaimed,  "After  Lou- 
vain,  after  Rheims,  what  vengeance  will  not  be 
permissible  to  make  these  barbarians  expiate  the 
shame  of  being  Germans!" 

"Barbarians"  was,  indeed,  the  word  most 
often  employed  by  Frenchmen  to  describe  the 
Germans,  just  as  the  word  "Hun"  was  rising  into 
popularity  across  the  Channel.  Insistence  was 
ever^'^where  laid  upon  the  savage  qualities  of  the 
Teutons.    In  an  article  entitled  ' '  Barbarians :  Past 


46  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

and  Present,"  the  "Journal  des  Debats"  of  Sep- 
tember 25,  1914,  remarked:  "Really,  there  is 
something  to  be  said  for  the  barbarians  of  old.  In 
any  case,  they  were  infinitely  better  than  their 
unworthy  descendants;  they  aspired  to  become 
civilized,  whereas  the  pseudo-civilized  barbari- 
ans of  to-day  reveal  the  mentality  of  the  cave-man 
beneath  the  masque  of  the  pedagogue." 

Many  Frenchmen  found  it  hard  to  believe  that 
their  Frankish  ancestors  were  of  Teutonic  blood, 
and  attempted  either  to  deny  it  or  to  apologize 
for  it,  ascribing  their  subsequent  improvement  to 
the  saving  grace  of  Latin  culture.  For  example, 
the  Abbe  Stephen  Coube,  canon  of  Orleans,  wrote : 
"You  tell  me  that  the  Franks  all  had  German 
blood  in  their  veins.  It  is  possible.  I  say,  *It  is 
possible,'  because  many  persons  deny  this,  and 
perhaps  they  are  right.  But  let  us  admit  it,  for 
the  sake  of  argument.  Well !  This  is  an  original 
sin,  which  we  must  confess  with  humility.  But 
happily  our  forefathers  were  quickly  purified  in 
the  baptism  of  Latin  civilization.  They  thereby 
cleansed  themselves  of  the  primitive  barbarism 
contracted  in  the  Hyrcynian  forest  and  de-Ger- 
manized themselves  so  well  that  the  Germans  have 
denied  and  cursed  them  ever  since." 

Others,  however,  asserted  positively  that 
Frenchmen  and  Germans  were  not  of  the  same 
race.  In  October,  1914,  a  writer  in  the  Clerical 
organ,  "La  Croix,"  denied  that  the  Prussians 
were  Arj^ans.  Instead,  they  were  descended  from 
"certain  nameless  prehistoric  tribes"  of  non-Eu- 


FRxVNCE  47 

ropean  origin.  Such  opinions  were  not  confined 
to  Clerical  writers.  In  the  spring  of  1915  the 
famous  savant  Camille  Flammarion  asserted  be- 
fore the  French  Astronomical  Society:  **A11  the 
evidence  tends  to  prove  that  this  race  is  in  its  very 
blood  the  implacable  enemy  of  our  laborious  and 
tranquil  civilization  which  can  develop  only  in 
labor  and  in  peace.  The  present  war  is  another 
stage  in  the  struggle  of  the  civilized  against  the 
barbarians,  begun  more  than  two  thousand  years 
ago.  We  are  even  justified  in  thinking  that  this 
race  differs  from  our  owti  in  origin  as  well  as  in 
type  of  evolution.  The  unity  of  the  human  spe- 
cies has  never  been  proven.  We  probably  do  not 
descend  from  the  same  race  of  simians,  and  fur- 
thermore we  bear  in  us  the  element  of  Greco-Latin 
civilization,  which  differs  sensibly  from  that  of  the 
Teutons.  An  abyss  separates  us,  despite  certain 
crossings  and  some  psychic  exceptions.  No.  Ger- 
mans and  Frenchmen  do  not  speak  the  same  in- 
tellectual language.  They  are  not  the  same  race. 
The  vulture,  bird  of  prey,  is  not  of  the  same  race 
as  the  skylark  which  soars  singing  into  the  lumi- 
nous azure.  .  .  .  This  is  a  question  of  life  or  death 
for  modern  civilization.  Here  is  a  beast  w^hich 
must  be  struck  down.     Delenda  est  Carthago!" 

Given  such  a  race  as  the  Germans,  w^ho  were  not 
merely  "barbarians"  but  ''uncivilizable"  barbari- 
ans, the  presence  among  them  of  any  true  culture 
was  obviously  unthinkable.  Accordingly,  a  wide- 
spread demand  arose  for  the  sundering  of  all  in- 
tellectual and  artistic  bonds  between  the  two  peo- 


48  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

pies,  since  such  contact  would  merely  corrupt 
French  culture  as  it  had  already  been  cor- 
rupted in  the  past.  Professor  Louis  Reynaud  of 
the  University  of  Poitiers  wrote  a  book  to  prove 
that  every  noteworthy  feature  in  German  life  was 
of  Latin,  especially  French,  origin  and  inspira- 
tion. *'The  sole  literary  interpreter  of  the  Ger- 
man spirit,  Maurice  Maeterlinck,  writes  in 
French,"  remarked  M.  Maurice  Barres.  **I 
should  never  bother  my  head  finding  out  what  the 
'intellectuals'  over  the  Rhine  were  thinking."  A 
''League  for  French  Culture"  was  formed,  sup- 
ported by  such  eminent  litterateurs  as  M.  Rene 
Doumic,  for  the  purification  of  the  national  genius 
and  its  future  development  along  genuine  French 
lines. 

For  that  matter,  many  persons  saw  in  the  war 
itself  one  of  the  main  causes  for  such  a  devel- 
opment. The  war's  regenerative  action  upon 
French  life  was  widely  noted.  "Ah!  How  beau- 
tiful she  is,  this  France  of  1914!"  exclaimed  Mau- 
rice Barres.  "What  a  universal  freshness!  It 
seems  that  all  souls  are  become  new  and  simple 
again.  Before,  we  had  known  only  the  chrysalis. 
To-day,  France  opens  her  wings!"  His  idea  of 
the  future  is  equally  optimistic:  "How  beautiful 
she  will  be  after  victory,  this  regenerated  France. 
It  is  a  new  world  which  begins."  M.  Georges  Oh- 
net  wrote  in  the ' '  Gaulois ' '  of  March,  1915 :  ' '  The 
virility  of  the  race,  the  self-abnegation  and  devo- 
tion of  the  people,  the  simple  heroism  of  our  sol- 
diers, the  proud  courage  of  our  women,  and  the 


FKANCE  49 

prudence  of  political  parties — in  a  word,  the 
whole  firm  and  healthy  national  organism,  justi- 
fies us  in  looking  forward  to  a  fruitful  and  magnifi- 
cent renaissance."  The  well-known  Protestant 
pastor,  Wilfred  Monod,  in  a  sermon  preached 
about  this  same  date  at  the  Oratoire,  Paris,  said: 
'*Who  will  deny  that  the  French  people  have 
passed,  during  the  last  months,  through  one  of 
those  moral  crises  which  can  end  in  a  radical  and 
healing  conversion?  Let  us  have  the  courage  to 
acknowledge  that  in  more  than  one  respect  our  na- 
tion offered  certain  alarming  symptoms  of  anemia, 
and  even  of  degeneracy.  .  .  .  Suddenly  the 
trumpet  sounded  ^To  arms!'  Then  were  mani- 
fested in  the  social  organism,  with  surprising  spon- 
taneity, those  phenomena  of  defense  which  appear 
in  sick  persons  reacting  toward  health.  .  .  .  The 
spectacle  was  wonderful.  Such  have  been  the 
fruits  of  the  trial. ' ' 

The  deep  emphasis  laid  upon  "Latinism,"  both 
as  regards  culture  and  blood,  accounts  for  the 
spirit  of  the  intense  propaganda  carried  on  dur- 
ing the  first  year  of  the  war  to  sweep  in  the  "Latin 
sister"  Italy.  This  appeal  made  a  profound  im- 
pression upon  Italian  public  opinion  and  was  un- 
questionably one  of  the  great  reasons  why  Italy 
joined  the  Allies  in  May,  1915.  The  effect  upon 
France  was  electrical.  The  utterances  of  her 
leaders  reflected  the  popular  emotion.  On  May 
25,  M.  Paul  Deschanel,  president  of  the  Chamber 
of  Deputies,  announced  Italy's  decision  as  follows: 
*' To-day,  as  fifty-six  years  ago,  Italy  is  with  us. 


50  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

.  .  .  France  salutes  fraternally  the  flight  of  the 
Roman  eagles.  .  .  .  And  now,  0  glorious  dead  of 
Magenta  and  Solf erino,  rise  and  fire  with  your  gen- 
erous breath  the  two  immortal  sisters,  in  justice 
forever  reunited!"  To  this  M.  Viviani  added: 
''In  the  name  of  the  Government  of  the  Republic,  I 
salute  the  Italian  nation  in  its  unshakable  firm- 
ness. ...  In  this  momentous  hour  France  turns 
her  gaze  and  her  heart  toward  that  august  land  of 
heroism  and  of  beauty.  Sons  of  the  same  race, 
let  our  lips  utter  the  cry  of  our  conscience  and  our 
heart — the  unanimous,  vibrating  cry,  ^Vive 
r Italic!  Vive  la  France!' "  "It  is  not  for 
naught  that  we  have  common  origins,"  said  the 
''Journal  des  Debats,"  September  10,  "that  cen- 
turies, yea,  millenniums,  of  incessant  interchange 
have  formed  the  genius  of  two  great  peoples ;  that 
they  have  the  same  intellectual  formation,  the 
same  sensibility,  the  same  qualities  and  sometimes 
also  the  same  defects.  Special  circumstances  may 
cause  family  disagreements;  but  in  critical  hours 
the  family  discovers  itself  and  the  bonds  are  re- 
knit  more  solidly  than  before. '  * 

In  a  previous  chapter  we  noted  the  optimistic 
spirit  of  England  during  the  first  half  of  1915. 
This  was  equally  true  of  France,  though  French 
optimism  was  of  a  sterner  and  more  exalted  type, 
since  France  was  suffering  more  directly  from 
the  war.  Save  for  a  handful  of  pacifists  like  Ro- 
main  Rolland,  public  opinion  was  unanimous  in 
demanding  a  fight  to  a  finish.  Indeed,  M.  Hol- 
land's pacific  utterances  drew  down  upon  him  a 


FRANCE  51 

storm  of  indignation.  In  his  organ  *'La  Revue" 
for  July,  1915,  the  distinguished  French  publicist 
Jean  Finot  furiously  denounced  all  pacifists  every- 
where and  stigmatized  pleas  for  mercy  toward  the 
Germans  as  practically  lese-humanite.  Accord- 
ing to  M.  Finot  the  Kaiser,  the  Crown  Prince  and 
all  the  German  leaders  must  be  tried,  condemned, 
and  hanged.  **What  a  moral  solace  for  all  to  be 
able  to  be  present  at  such  a  spectacle,"  M.  Finot 
concluded.  *'No  Frenchman  can  now  utter  the 
word  'Peace,*  "  asserted  M.  Paul  Sabatier.  '*To 
use  it  would  be  akin  to  treason.  ...  If  our  sol- 
diers go  down  to  the  last  man,  everybody  who  has 
not  yet  taken  up  arms  will  fight  to  the  last  car- 
tridge, to  the  last  stone  of  our  mountains  that  we 
can  hurl  against  a  'Kultur'  which  is  naught  save 
worship  of  the  sword  and  the  golden  calf."  M. 
Gabriel  Hanotaux,  in  the  "Revue  Hebdomadaire" 
of  January  2,  1915,  asserted  that  this  was  not 
merely  a  politico-economic  struggle  but  a  genuine 
religious  war.  Germany  must  therefore  be  beaten 
to  her  very  soul.  The  sentiment  of  the  northern 
provinces  was  voiced  by  the  "Petit  Calaisien" 
(Calais),  which  said,  in  April,  1915,  "This  war 
shall  continue  until  the  enemies  of  the  Triple 
Entente  have  been  crushed  into  the  dust."  M. 
Stephen  Pichon  in  his  organ,  the  Paris  "Petit 
Journal,"  thus  apostrophized  Germany:  "You 
will  have  to  reimburse  the  Allies  for  all  the  costs 
of  the  war,  and  this  will  be  an  enormous  sum. 
But  this  is  not  all.  You  will  have  to  pay  for  the 
cathedrals,  the  museums,  the  palaces,  the  huts. 


52  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

you  bombarded  and  burned,  the  butcheries  you 
committed,  for  the  widows  and  orphans  you  have 
made.  That  will  make  billions  and  billions  that 
you  will  have  to  pay  us.  Oh,  no!  Not  at  once, 
for  you  could  not  do  that.  ...  It  will  take  you  a 
long  time — ten  years,  twenty  years,  thirty  years. 
.  .  .  Until  Germany  lias  paid  this  off,  Russian 
garrisons  will  occupy  Breslau  and  Dresden,  Eng- 
lish garrisons  Hamburg  and  Frankfort,  a  Belgian 
garrison  shall  occupy  Cologne,  a  French  one  Cob- 
lenz  and  Mainz.  Only  after  the  last  penny  has 
been  paid  will  the  Allies  withdraw,  and  even  then 
not  until  after  they  have  blown  up  the  last  Ger- 
man fortress." 

With  regard  to  the  future  settlement  of  Ger- 
many, French  opinion  was  practically  unanimous 
in  demanding  that  not  merely  the  German  im- 
perial form  of  govermnent  but  also  German  po- 
litical unity  must  be  destroyed.  The  superior 
population,  wealth,  and  energy  of  Germany  had 
pressed  so  heavily  on  France  that  a  continuance 
of  such  conditions  was  deemed  intolerable.  A 
similar  fate  was  decreed  for  Austria-Hungary, 
while  Turkey  was  to  be  divided  up  among  the  Al- 
lied Powers,  Syria  falling  to  France.  A  typical 
pronouncement  is  that  of  the  ''Figaro,"  "The 
empires  of  the  barbarians  must  be  shattered." 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  destruction  of 
German  unity  was  generally  held  to  be  an  easy 
task,  owing  to  the  supposed  survival  of  Teutonic 
separatism.  In  October,  1914,  Maurice  Barres 
wrote,  ''The  German  power  will  be  broken,  di- 


FRANCE  53 

vided,  converted  to  reason,  and  the  Germans  them- 
selves, once  more  become  Saxons,  Bavarians, 
Badenese,  Protestants,  Catholics,  etc.,  will  kiss 
our  knees  as  they  tliank  us  for  having  cured  them 
of  their  costly  collective  delirium  of  pride." 

In  face  of  the  patent  solidarity  of  German  pub- 
lic opinion,  however,  such  optimism  quickly  van- 
ished. Nevertheless,  France  remained  convinced 
of  the  necessity  for  the  destruction  of  German 
unity,  and  the  only  result  was  that  popular  fury, 
hitherto  concentrated  upon  the  Prussians,  was 
broadened  to  include  all  Germans.  In  January, 
1915,  the  French  publicist  Jacques  Daugny  wrote 
an  impassioned  article  in  the  ''Nouvelle  Revue" 
to  disillusion  "those  naive  souls  who  imagine  that 
Germany,  once  purged  of  the  Hohenzollerns,  will 
become  again  the  patriarchal  and  romantic  land 
of  Goethe  and  Schiller.  .  .  .  The  German  soul  has 
been  poisoned  forever ;  it  dreams  of  nothing  but 
violence  and  domination.  Let  us,  then,  not  com- 
mit the  folly  of  leaving  in  the  hands  of  our  enemy 
the  fragments  of  his  sword.  Like  Siegfried,  he 
would  only  reforge  it  to  strike  us  once  more." 
The  violence  of  French  public  opinion  is  revealed 
by  the  words  of  the  well-known  French  author 
Onesime  Reclus.  In  his  book  *'Le  Rhin  Fran- 
Cais,"  published  in  the  summer  of  1915,  he  ex- 
claims: ''The  stinking  beast  is  down!  We  are 
going  to  divide  up  its  flesh  and  its  bones.  We  will 
make  of  it  [Germany]  an  insolvent  debtor,  a 
merchant  walled  off  by  prohibitive  tariffs,  an  ad- 
miral commanding  fishing  boats,  a  generalissimo 


54  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

with  not  even  a  ridiculous  national  guard  under 
his  orders." 

The  implacable  temper  displayed  toward  the 
German  people  is  strikingly  shown  by  an  article' 
of  Louis  Leger  in  the  "Revue  Hebdomadaire" 
for  December  18,  1915.  M.  Leger  is  a  distin- 
guished specialist  on  Slavic  affairs,  and  his  article 
recommends  the  lopping  off  of  all  eastern  Ger- 
many for  the  aggrandizement  of  powerful  Polish 
and  Bohemian  kingdoms  under  the  protection  of 
Russia.  The  suggested  pruning  of  Germany's 
eastern  frontier  is  drastic.  Slav  wedges  must  be 
driven  into  the  heart  of  Saxony  and  to  within  a 
short  distance  of  Berlin.  The  fate  of  the  annexed 
German  populations  is  not  left  in  doubt:  they 
must  be  incontinently  Slavized  or  exterminated. 
'  *  Well ! ' '  exclaims  M.  Leger,  ' '  as  to  the  Germans, 
who  have  in  the  past  Germanized  so  many  peoples 
— it  will  be  their  turn  to  be  Slavized.  If  they 
balk  at  this  metamorphosis  they  will  have  just  one 
thing  to  do — get  out,  slink  back  into  Germania's 
bosom,  or  go  settle  beyond  the  seas.  Their  reign 
has  lasted  long  enough.  But,  though  insolent  in 
success,  in  adversity  they  have  much  suppler 
backbones  than  most  people  think."  The  extir- 
pative note  comes  out  clearly:  "  ' Ausrotten'  ('root 
them  out')  once  cried  Bismarck  of  the  Poles  in 
Prussia.  Now,  in  our  turn,  let  us  cry  ^Ausrot- 
ten.'  .  .  .  All  these  regions  must  be  de-German- 
ized. When  a  tree  spreads  a  harmful  shade  we 
cut  it  down;  we  do  more — we  tear  it  up  by  the 
roots.    Well,  just  so  must  we  tear  up  the  Prussian 


FRANCE  55 

tree  by  the  roots.  The  regions  so  long  infected 
by  its  shade  must  be  colonized  by  Poles,  Russians, 
and  Lithuanians.  All  these  peoples  are  prolific 
enougli  to  quickly  fill  the  gaps  left  by  the  disap- 
pearance of  the  descendants  of  the  Teutonic 
knights  whose  successors  have  all  too  largely  re- 
venged themselves  for  the  vow  of  chastity  once 
professed  by  their  predecessors." 

Such  being  the  French  temper  toward  the  gen- 
eral post-war  settlement  of  Germany,  we  are  in  a 
position  to  appreciate  France's  attitude  toward 
the  re-drawing  of  Germany's  western  frontier. 
On  one  point  French  public  opinion  is  unanimous 
— Alsace-Lorraine  must  return  to  France.  About 
that  there  is  absolutely  no  discussion.  This  mat- 
ter once  settled,  however,  divergent  views  appear. 
Many  Frenchmen  declare  themselves  satisfied 
with  the  prospect  of  regaining  Alsace-Lorraine 
and  aver  that  the  destruction  of  German  unity 
would  furnish  sufiicient  guarantees  against  fur- 
ther trouble.  A  notable  example  of  this  way  of 
thinking  is  the  eminent  economist  Yves  Guyot. 

But  such  is  emphatically  not  the  opinion  held 
by  another  powerful  body  of  French  thought, 
which  demands  extensive  annexations  in  western 
Germany.  These  doctrines  require  our  attention. 
Of  course,  the  recent  trend  of  the  war  makes  an 
Allied  conquest  of  western  Germany  a  very  remote 
possibility.  Nevertheless,  Rhineward  expansion 
is  the  oldest  of  French  policies,  and  the  acquisi- 
tion of  the  whole  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  (includ- 
ing Belgium  and  Holland)  as  France's  ''natural" 


56  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

frontier  has  been  the  dream  of  Frenchmen  for 
nearly  a  thousand  years.  When  we  remember 
the  unchanging,  even  atavistic,  character  of 
French  basic  thinking,  we  must  realize  that  such 
historic  aspirations,  once  roused,  will  not  easily 
sink  to  sleep  again,  and  that  no  matter  how  cruelly 
these  hopes  may  be  deceived  by  the  present  course 
of  events  they  will  influence  French  national  sen- 
timent and  foreign  policy  for  a  long  time  to  come. 
The  philosophy  of  what  we  may  term  French 
Neo-Imperialism  is  admirably  set  forth  by  that 
able  specialist  on  world-politics.  Professor  Edou- 
ard  Driault,  in  his  recent  book  "La  France  et  la 
Guerre:  Les  Solutions  Frangaises"  (1916).  "We 
may  as  well  say  it,  since  we  are  at  the  end  of  the 
nightmare,"  he  begins.  "For  a  century  France 
was  a  conquered  nation."  The  weight  of  Water- 
loo bore  down  France's  spirit  even  before  Sedan, 
and  since  1870  the  best  proof  of  France's  moral 
abasement  is  the  way  she  fixed  her  gaze  upon  Al- 
sace-Lorraine, to  the  exclusion  of  her  older  and 
wider  dreams.  "How  much  more  magnificent, 
how  much  more  splendid  in  its  imaginative  flight, 
was  the  policy  of  Old  France.  Our  forefathers 
had  not  the  'souls  of  the  conquered.*  They  were 
naive  and  young.  They  did  not  trouble  them- 
selves with  political  philosophy,  principles  of  na- 
tionalities, etc.,  they  had  the  faith  which  moves 
mountains — which  moves  frontiers  over  moun- 
tains. What  will  give  us  back  the  faith  of  our 
fathers?"  M.  Driault 's  answer  is,  "The  image 
of  Ancient  Gaul";  that  is,  everything  west  of  the 


FRANCE  57 

Rhine.  ''Our  forefathers  remembered  it.  They 
had  in  their  blood,  in  their  very  nature,  the  concept 
that  Gaul,  the  image  and  model  of  France, 
stretched  to  the  Pyrenees,  to  the  Alps — to  the 
Rhine;  that  for  long  centuries  the  Romans  and 
Gallo-Romans  had  given  to  this  admirable  geo- 
graphical figure  a  unity  of  language,  institutions, 
and  culture  which  has  forever  given  its  popula- 
tions a  common  soul.  Gaul  was  then  closed  to  the 
Germans,  to  the  barbarians.  .  .  .  But  during  the 
century  since  Waterloo,  what  a  miserable  specta- 
cle !  On  the  word  of  historians  obsessed  by  defeat 
we  have  accepted  the  notion  that  the  final  frontier 
of  France  w^as  that  of  1789  .  .  .  a  false  impression, 
a  pitiable  doctrine  of  resignation!"  To-day 
France  is  broad  awake.  But  how  shall  this  ad- 
mirable spirit  be  sustained?  How  shall  France 
be  saved?  "She  will  be  saved  only  if  she  no 
longer  has  that  soul  of  the  vanquished  which  she 
got  from  Sedan  and  Waterloo;  only  if  she  takes 
up  again  the  glorious  tradition  of  Ancient  Gaul, 
of  Royal  France,  and  of  the  soldiers  of  the  First 
Republic. ' ' 

The  Neo-Imperialists  adduce  many  arguments 
for  their  proposed  annexations  of  German  soil. 
Some  lay  stress  on  strategic  necessities,  not  even 
Alsace-Lorraine  being  held  sufficient  to  prevent 
new  assaults  of  the  "barbarians."  M.  Driault 
holds  that  the  safety  of  all  western  Europe,  in- 
cluding England,  is  at  stake.  Other  writers  em- 
phasize economic  considerations.  The  vast  coal 
and  iron  deposits  of  western  Germany  must  pass 


58  PEESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

under  Frencli  control,  both  for  the  future  eco- 
nomic prosperity  of  France  and  to  prevent  Ger- 
many from  amassing  new  wealth  for  subsequent 
wars  of  revenge. 

The  objection  that  the  inhabitants  of  these  re- 
gions are  Germans  is  rebutted  either  by  assert- 
ing that  the  principle  of  nationality  cannot  be  set 
up  in  favor  of  a  people  which  has  trampled  the 
rights  of  others  under  foot,  or  by  asserting  that 
the  populations  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Ehine  are 
not  genuine  Germans  but  Teutonized  Gauls  whose 
German  veneer  would  quickly  rub  off  under 
French  rule.  Says  M.  Driault :  ''We  wish  to  rees- 
tablish the  century  old  traditions  of  France's  his- 
tory, momentarily  broken  by  the  Prussian  acci- 
dent. There  is  no  Prussian  'right'  to  the  left 
bank  of  the  Ehine ;  there  is  only  a  Prussian  usur- 
pation. We  have  here  a  Ehineland,  Celtic  at  bot- 
tom and  with  centuries  of  Gallo-Eoman  educa- 
tion." "The  occupation  of  the  left  bank  of  the 
Ehine  by  the  Germans  is  the  fruit  of  a  long  usur- 
pation," w^rites  Paul  Marmottan  in  his  "Notre 
Frontiere  Naturel"  (1915).  "Its  territories 
were  Gaulish.  The  Ehine  is  not  a  German  river." 
"We  are  merely  following  our  most  ancient,  im- 
mutable, and  glorious  national  tradition  in  claim- 
ing the  left  bank  of  the  Ehine,"  asserts  Professor 
J.  Dontenville  in  his  "Apres  la  Guerre"  (1915). 
While  Senator  Frank  Chauveau  in  "La  Paix  et 
la  Frontiere  du  Ehin"  (1915)  exclaims,  "These 
are  our  necessary  limits,  traced  by  nature  and  by 
history.  .  .  .  We  will  have  the  Ehine  frontier." 


FRANCE  59 

The  easy  assimilation  of  these  territories  is  em- 
phasized. "It  is  in  the  name  of  their  Latinism 
that  we  reclaim  them,"  insists  Onesime  Eeclus, 
and  further  remarks,  "Do  not  regard  the  Cisrhe- 
nanes  as  pure  Germans,  but  as  half  Frenchmen, 
half-brothers  who  wish  to  reenter  the  family." 
"On  these  Cisrhenanes,  men  of  a  civilization  at 
bottom  identical  with  our  own,"  writes  Professor 
Dontenville,  "the  charm  of  our  culture,  so  finely 
and  delicately  superior  to  Kultur,  will  soon  oper- 
ate irresistibly."  "The  French  nationality,  au- 
reoled  with  the  prestige  of  victory,"  says  M.  Dri- 
ault,  "will  radiate  as  in  former  days  to  the 
Ehine."  Some  writers  admit  that  there  will  be  a 
minority  among  the  annexed  populations  which 
will  prove  refractory  to  French  assimilation. 
For  such  recalcitrants  expulsion  is  widely  recom- 
mended. "Those  Germans  who  are  not  pleased 
with  the  new  French  supremacy  may  recross  the 
Rhine,"  writes  M.  Marmottan.  "We  shall  not 
stop  them."  And  Onesime  Reclus  asserts: 
"Never  will  France  have  a  better  occasion  of  say- 
ing to  the  Germans  of  Mainz,  Coblenz,  Cologne, 
Aix-la-Chapelle :  'This  is  my  house;  if  you  don't 
like  it,  get  out!'  "  M.  Reclus  is  also  hopeful  as  to 
the  effects  of  education:  "We  shall  not  neglect 
the  school,  as  we  did  too  often  in  Alsace-Lorraine ; 
especially  as  it  is  by  the  school  that  the  Germans 
have  been  turned  into  a  pack  of  wild  beasts.  We 
shall  teach  these  people  French." 

Tlie  final  argument  of  the  Neo-Imperialists  is 
the  doctrine  of  "compensations."    Since  all  her 


60  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

allies  will  get  something  by  the  war,  France  must 
not  be  left  out.  ''And  we!"  exclaims  Senator 
Chauveau,  "we,  who  have  suffered  the  most,  sac- 
rificed the  most,  risked  the  most:  we  shall  then 
have  nothing!"  "Go  to!"  cries  M.  Marmottan. 
"Are  we  going  to  let  Germany  be  divided  up  with- 
out cutting  our  slice  of  the  cake  1 ' ' 

The  annexation  of  the  whole  left  bank  of  the 
Rhine  naturally  involves  the  problem  of  France's 
future  relations  with  Belgium  and  Holland.  To 
be  sure,  Belgium  is  frequently  offered  the  terri- 
tories lying  between  her  present  frontier  and  the 
Rhine,  but  the  same  writers  invariably  claim  that 
the  presence  of  so  many  Germans  within  her  body 
politic  would  be  too  much  for  Belgian  digestion, 
so  Belgium  is  expected  to  refuse.  Belgium  is, 
however,  to  be  consoled  at  Holland's  expense  by 
the  acquisition  of  the  Maestricht  salient,  Dutch 
Flanders  at  the  mouth  of  the  Scheldt,  and  Hol- 
land's suzerainty  over  Luxemburg.  The  Dutch 
are  not  expected  to  object,  and  are  offered  Ger- 
man territory  as  compensation.  The  virtual  en- 
circlement of  Belgium  and  Holland  by  French 
territory  would  result  in  a  close  understanding 
between  the  three  nations.  Some  writers  call  this 
new  status  "Restored  Gaul,"  others  the  "Gaulish 
Region."  Perhaps  the  censorship  here  hinders 
speculation. 

The  final  problem  which  the  French  Neo-Imper- 
ialists  attempt  to  solve  is  the  attitude  which  their 
projected  Greater  France  is  to  assume  toward  the 
various  Germanic  states  beyond  the  Rhine.    Most 


FRANCE  61 

writers  think  that  these  should  constitute  a  French 
sphere  of  influence.  Some  writers  believe  that 
France  should  take  the  principal  strategic 
''bridge-heads"  on  the  right  bank,  while  one  Neo- 
Imperialist,  M.  Jacques  Daugny,  asserts  that  the 
French  frontier  should  go  far  beyond  the  Rhine 
to  the  crests  of  the  Black  Forest.  "Germans 
have  quite  sufficiently  told  us,"  writes  M.  Daugny, 
"that  the  Rhine  is  not  a  frontier.  It  is,  indeed, 
merely  a  marvelous  route  traced  by  Nature  be- 
tween two  fertile  plains  which  in  reality  form 
only  one  whole  from  the  Vosges  to  the  Black  For- 
est. To  be  developed  in  peace,  this  valley  must 
know  but  one  master.  Our  frontier  must,  there- 
fore, follow  the  crest  of  the  Black  Forest,  the 
watershed  between  the  basins  of  the  Rhine  and 
the  Danube." 

French  Neo-Imperialism  is  the  reflection  of  the 
optimistic  period  which  reached  its  climax  with 
Italy's  entrance  into  the  war  in  May,  1915.  How- 
ever, the  long  series  of  German  triumphs  and  Al- 
lied disasters  w^hich  began  in  June  gradually 
evoked  less  confident  notes  from  the  chorus  of 
French  public  opinion.  DoA\Tiright  pessimism 
was,  it  is  true,  sternly  repressed  by  the  rigid  cen- 
sorship, but  the  sense  of  strain  under  which 
France  was  laboring  could  not  be  entirely  denied 
a  voice.  "The  Allies  have  failed  since  the 
Marne,"  wrote  M.  Gustavo  Herve  in  his  organ 
the  "Guerre  Sociale"  of  early  July,  1915.  The 
paper  was  at  once  suppressed,  but  the  words  had 
been  written. 


62  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

So  profound  was  the  impression  made  by  Ger- 
man resisting  power  that  by  the  spring  of  1916  a 
new  thought-current  was  plainly  visible  in  French 
public  opinion.  Its  cardinal  tenet  was  revealed 
in  its  watchword,  "The  War  after  the  War!" 
Fundamentally,  its  aim  was  the  same  as  that 
of  the  Neo-Imperialists :  Germany  must  be 
** smashed,"  German  unity  must  be  destroyed,  and 
a  regenerated  France  must  take  a  leading  position 
in  the  world.  Hatred  of  the  Teuton  flamed  as 
hotly  as  ever  within  the  French  heart.  "The  en- 
tire universe  will  charge  the  beast  that  menaces 
the  universe,"  cried  Gabriel  Hanotaux  in  the 
"Revue  Hebdomadaire "  of  January  3,  1916. 
"The  chastisement  is  slow,  but  it  is  coming,  com- 
ing. You  have  lusted  after  material  well-being, 
booty,  gold,  women;  your  sadism  was  to  foul  the 
world  with  its  'eugenics.'  You  purposed  to  rape 
humanity  through  terror.  Wait!  This  terror  is 
coming  back  upon  you.  It  is  you  who  will  trem- 
ble, you  who  will  grow  pale.  Misery  and  despair 
will  destroy  in  you  the  last  vestige  of  your  pride ! " 

The  crushing  of  Germany  thus  remained  the 
cardinal  tenet  of  French  thought.  Nevertheless, 
many  Frenchmen  began  to  fear  either  that  Ger- 
many could  not  now  be  crushed  on  the  battlefield 
or  that  even  were  her  sword  shattered  in  the  pres- 
ent conflict  German  energy  would  quickly  amass 
fresh  wealth  and  forge  new  weapons  for  a  subse- 
quent war  of  revenge.  The  logical  conclusion 
was  that  Germany  must  be  permanently  kept 
down  by  a  standing  league  of  the  Allied  Powers 


FRANCE  63 

which  should  be  not  only  military  but  also  eco- 
nomic in  character.  Similar  opinions  were  of 
course  being  voiced  in  England,  but  ''War  after 
the  War"  projects  were  received  much  more  en- 
thusiastically in  France  than  across  the  Channel. 
For  this  there  were  several  reasons.  To  begin 
with,  France  had  shown  much  less  resisting  power 
to  Germany's  aggressive  economic  methods  than 
had  England,  and  French  industry  had  suffered 
severely  from  German  competition  in  the  years 
immediately  preceding  the  war.  Frenchmen 
therefore  felt  that  the  elimination  of  this  competi- 
tion was  necessary  for  the  security  of  their  indus- 
trial future.  Again,  the  political  destruction  of 
Germany  was  in  France  generally  held  to  be  im- 
perative, whereas  in  England  the  prevailing  opin- 
ion was  that  it  was  impracticable.  Lastly,  Pro- 
tectionist France  felt  no  such  wrench  as  did  tra- 
ditionally Free-trade  England  at  the  prospect  of 
far-reaching  international  tariff  agreements. 

From  the  very  beginning  of  the  war  an  active 
propaganda  had  been  carried  on  in  France  for  the 
permanent  exclusion  of  German  economic  activity 
within  the  boundaries  of  the  Republic  and  its  col- 
onies. Proposals  for  concerted  economic  discrim- 
ination against  Germany  by  all  the  Allies  thus 
found  the  ground  well  prepared.  The  French 
press  was  enthusiastic  from  the  first.  In  Decem- 
ber, 1915,  the  well-known  French  writer,  Jean 
Richepin,  announced  in  the  '  *  Figaro  " :  ' '  The  idea 
of  a  commercial  league  which  will  continue  after 
the  war  a  tireless,  merciless  struggle  against  Ger- 


64  PEESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

man  hegemony  after  breaking  it  by  force  of  arms, 
is  one  that  I  most  heartily  approve.  On  several 
occasions  I  have  treated  the  subject  under  the 
significant  title  of  'The  Second  War.'  I  shall  per- 
severe in  this  campaign  with  so  much  the  more  en- 
ergy now  that  I  perceive  the  unanimous  ardor  of 
all  the  Allies  in  their  determination  to  carry  out 
this  idea.  By  this  means  and  by  this  alone  will 
our  victory  be  completely  and  absolutely  consoli- 
dated." About  the  same  date  the  "Nouvelliste 
de  Bordeaux"  thus  outlined  the  measures  neces- 
sary to  secure  Germany's  economic  downfall:  "It 
is  quite  possible  now  to  indicate  some  of  the  meth- 
ods that  seem  essential :  absolute  refusal  of  natu- 
ralization to  all  Germans  in  the  conquering  coun- 
tries; refusal  to  allow  the  establishment  of  com- 
mercial agencies;  the  stock  exchanges  of  Paris, 
London,  and  Petrograd  pitilessly  closed  to  the 
stocks  from  beyond  the  Rhine.  Above  all,  the 
Allies  must  seize  by  right  of  conquest  certain  ter- 
ritories the  loss  of  which  will  mean  to  the  German 
provinces  a  notable  decrease  in  their  economic 
wealth."  M.  Sancholle-Heuraux,  in  '^La  Revue" 
for  May,  1916,  remarked,  ''At  its  last  congress  the 
French  Socialist  party  declared  that  it  did  not  de- 
sire the  economic  ruin  of  the  Central  empires. 
This  idealistic  affirmation  was  a  deplorable  er- 
ror. ' '  The  economic  conference  of  the  Allied  gov- 
ernments held  at  Paris  in  June,  1916,  and  its 
recommendation  for  future  economic  collabora- 
tion excited  the  warm  approval  of  nearly  all  the 


FRANCE  65 

French  press.  A  few  Free  Traders  like  Yves 
Guyot  looked  askance  on  principle,  and  other  eco- 
nomic writers  like  Max  Ploschiller  and  Henri 
Hauscr  doubted  its  practicability,  but  the  majority 
opinion  ran  obviously  the  other  way. 

An  interesting  pliase  of  this  trend  toward  per- 
manent politico-economic  action  against  Germany 
is  the  movement  known  as  "Pan-Latinism." 
This  movement  had  been  in  evidence  from  the 
very  beginning  of  the  war.  We  have  already  seen 
how  powerfully  French  appeals  to  ethnic  and  cul- 
tural solidarity  had  influenced  Italian  sentiment 
in  the  opening  months  of  1915.  But  this  propa- 
ganda had  been  only  a  part  of  a  still  wider  appeal 
addressed  to  the  whole  Latin  world.  As  early  as 
February,  1915,  a  ''Pan-Latin"  congress  had 
convened  at  the  Paris  Sorbonne,  where  prominent 
representatives  of  all  the  ''Latin"  nations,  in- 
cluding Latin  America  and  Greece,  affirmed  the 
ethnic  and  cultural  solidarity  of  the  Latin 
race  and  expressed  the  warmest  sympathy 
for  France.  The  French  attitude  was  well 
expressed  in  the  opening  speech  of  the  pre- 
siding officer,  M.  Paul  Deschanel,  president  of  the 
French  Chamber  of  Deputies:  "Behold,  in  our 
venerable  Sorbonne,  the  whole  Latin  family  re- 
united. ...  A  family,  one  in  its  magnificent  di- 
versity. One,  because  the  ancient  rivalries  be- 
tween Latin  peoples  have  no  longer  any  raison 
d'etre;  because  their  very  shadows  have  disap- 
peared; because  all  our  interests  are  inseparable. 


66  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

One,  because  throughout  the  ages  every  effort  of 
the  Hellenic  and  Latin  conscience  has  been  toward 
the  same  ideal :  Liberty  by  Right. ' ' 

Pan-Latin  sentiment  has  unquestionably  been 
of  great  benefit  to  France.  Besides  its  effect 
upon  Italy,  it  had  much  to  do  with  the  entrance 
of  Rumania  and  Portugal  into  the  war  on  the 
Allies'  side.  The  only  refractory  member  of  the 
Latin  confraternity  appears  to  be  Spain,  whose 
attitude  will  be  discussed  in  a  subsequent  chapter. 

The  philosophy  of  Pan-Latinism  is  ably  ex- 
pounded by  the  well-known  French  publicist, 
Louis  Bertrand,  in  the  ''Revue  des  Deux  Mondes" 
of  September  15,  1916.  He  regards  the  Teutonic 
peril  as  a  standing  menace  to  Latin  civilization  no 
matter  how  badly  Germany  may  be  defeated  in 
the  present  war.  For  that  reason  Latin  solidar- 
ity is  an  obvious  measure  of  racial  and  cultural 
self-preservation.  He  urges  Latinism's  best 
minds  to  an  immediate  working  out  of  both  theory 
and  practical  details.  **In  order  that  it  may  be 
possible,  it  must  be  believed  in  and  desired.  It 
must  constitute  a  faith.  Pan-Germanism  is,  at 
bottom,  nothing  but  a  mystic  will.  .  .  .  For  four 
hundred  years,  after  a  long  period  of  hesitation 
and  resistance,  the  Mediterranean  world  accepted 
the  'Pax  Romana,'  which  was  nothing  but  a  per- 
petual struggle  against  barbarism.  To-day,  in 
order  to  continue  this  struggle,  why  should  the 
Western  world  refuse  to  accept  the  'Latin 
peace"?" 

Other  French  thinkers  glimpse  even  broader 


FRANCE  67 

unions  against  Teutonism.  For  example,  M.  Jean 
Finot,  in  his  organ  **La  Revue"  for  December, 
1915,  recommends  a  lasting  Franco-Anglo-Italian 
cultural  solidarity.  ''In  the  great  reconstruction 
after  the  war  we  must,  first  and  foremost,  break 
with  the  pretended  German  civilization,  with  the 
inlkience  of  its  savants,  philosophers,  and  writers. 
Europe  must  renew  the  traditions  interrupted  at 
the  time  of  the  Renaissance.  In  the  intellectual 
and  moral  domain,  all  those  treasures  of  which 
humanity  is  so  proud  have  been  above  all  created 
by  the  three  peoples  to-day,  allies  and  friends: 
the  English,  the  French,  and  the  Italians.  But 
their  activity  has  always  lacked  cohesion  and 
unity.  The  Germans,  seizing  upon  the  conquests 
of  thought  and  imagination  made  by  those  three 
peoples,  have  made  the  world  believe  in  their  spe- 
cial genius  and  their  great  merits.  Being  merely 
propagators  of  others'  thought,  they  have  never- 
theless made  us  believe  that  they  were  its  authors. 
.  .  .  Under  the  beneficent  influence  of  these  three 
countries,  human  thought  and  inspiration  have 
developed  in  harmonious  fashion."  To  carry  on 
this  development,  conscious  cooperation  is  neces- 
sary for  the  fulfilment  of  the  "New  Renaissance" 
which  should  follow  the  war.  Of  course  this  does 
not  imply  discrimination  against  other  peoples. 
But  it  does  imply  a  virtual  "quarantine  of  the 
manifestations  of  'Kultur,'  which  will  doubtless 
continue  to  poison  the  universe  for  long  years  to 
come.  And  just  as  the  security  of  nations  must 
be  guaranteed  against  the  espionage  and  militar- 


68  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

ism  of  Germany,  so  the  conscience  of  peoples  must 
be  defended  against  the  moral  contagion  of  a  col- 
lectivity which  will  long  retain  the  evil  effects  of 
the  Great  War." 

After  all  this  we  are  not  surprised  to  find  most 
Frenchmen  frankly  pessimistic  concerning  the 
problem  of  future  relations  with  the  Teutonic 
Powers.  A  few  French  thinkers,  it  is  true,  like 
the  pacifist  Romain  Rolland,  assert  the  absolute 
necessity  of  speedily  re-knitting  the  broken  bonds 
of  European  solidarity,  and  predict  that  this  will 
take  place.  In  June,  1915,  M.  Rolland  wrote: 
''The  fate  of  mankind  is  above  that  of  all  patriots. 
The  intellectual  ties  between  the  hostile  nations 
are  bound  to  be  restored.  Those  who  differ 
simply  commit  suicide."  But  such  is  not 
the  opinion  of  most  Frenchmen.  Much  more 
representative  of  French  public  opinion  were 
the  words  of  Paul  Sabatier,  penned  at  about 
the  same  time:  ''It  does  not  seem  possible  that 
these  connections  can  ever  be  restored.  It  will 
hardly  be  possible  to  bridge  the  gap  which  has 
opened  between  French  and  German  scientists; 
the  grief  of  the  conquered  race  can  only  widen  it. 
Mutual  hatred  is  so  intense  that  it  is  to  be  feared 
that  both  Germans  and  Frenchman  will  see  only 
the  enemy  in  the  scientists  whom  they  have  to 
review  and  criticize." 

At  the  close  of  the  previous  chapter  we  dis- 
cussed the  possibility  of  a  fairly  rapid  subsidence 
of  the  present  Anglo-German  hatred.  Regarding 
the  future  of  Franco-German  relations,  however, 


FRANCE  69 

we  are  avowedly  pessimistic.  The  two  cases  are 
radically  dissimilar.  The  English  and  German 
peoples  have  many  common  ties  of  blood,  religion, 
and  culture.  This  is  their  first  real  war  with  one 
another,  and  the  present  struggle,  though  desper- 
ate, is  being  waged  at  arm's  length,  with  no  inva- 
sions of  home  territory  and  with  few  direct  in- 
juries inflicted  upon  the  civilian  populations. 
Also,  both  nations  possess  a  realistic  temper  open 
to  compromises  and  practical  solutions. 

The  French  and  German  peoples,  on  the  other 
hand,  have  never  been  good  neighbors.  They 
have  behind  them  a  record  of  rivalry  and  inter- 
mittent warfare  stretching  back  beyond  recorded 
history  which  has  left  an  evil  legacy  of  mutual 
wrongs  and  humiliations.  For  the  last  half  cen- 
tury their  relations  have  been  of  the  very  worst, 
1870  having  been  neither  forgiven  nor  forgotten. 
To  all  this  is  now  being  added  the  present  fright- 
ful war  with  its  burden  of  suffering,  destruction, 
and  death  unparalleled  in  modern  history.  All 
the  old  scars  have  been  ripped  wide  open,  and 
ideas  and  aspirations  thought  long  dead  stalk 
forth  into  the  light  of  day.  The  terrible  atrocity 
charges,  whether  exaggerated  or  no,  are  implic- 
itly believed  by  Frenchmen,  who  to-day  regard 
the  Germans  as  irreclaimable  savages.  The  na- 
tional temperaments,  manners,  and  customs  are 
alike  antipathetic,  while  material  interests  are 
generally  opposed. 

All  this  betokens  a  persistence  of  Franco-Ger- 
man hostility  into  the  indefinite  future,  especially 


70  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

when  we  remember  that  the  French  are  markedly 
traditionalist  in  their  thinking,  prone  to  fixed 
ideas,  and  instinctively  averse  to  sacrifice  cher- 
ished principles  in  realist  compromise.  As  things 
now  appear,  nothing  short  of  an  imminent  peril  to 
western  Europe  would  draw  the  two  peoples  to- 
gether. 


CHAPTER  in 

GERMANY 

THE  outstanding  feature  of  German  national 
psychology  is  its  extreme  complexity.  Ger- 
man unity  is  so  recent  and  so  federal  in  type  that 
there  is  no  cultural  or  intellectual  center  which 
sets  the  tone  for  the  whole  country  as  London 
and  Paris  do  for  England  and  France.  Of  course 
the  war  has  decisively  proved  that  all  Germans  are 
agreed  upon  certain  fundamentals,  such  as  the 
preservation  of  German  unity  and  the  mainte- 
ance  of  the  Empire's  territorial  integrity,  but  be- 
yond these  axioms  there  is  the  widest  diversity  of 
aim  and  outlook,  from  extreme  "Pan-German" 
imperialists  and  absolutist  Prussian  Junkers  to 
extreme  Social  Democrats  who  deplore  war  on 
principle  and  oppose  all  territorial  annexations. 

Matters  are  still  further  complicated  by  the  in- 
dividual German's  habit  of  introspection.  The 
mystical  strain  inherent  in  the  Teutonic  nature, 
the  tendency  toward  self-analysis,  and  the  will- 
ingness to  look  facts  in  the  face  no  matter  how 
disagreeable  the  conclusions,  all  lead  the  average 
German  to  react  to  a  particular  situation  without 
much  reference  to  the  past.  He  is  restrained 
neither  by  the  Latin  love  of  logical  continuity  nor 
by  the  Anglo-Saxon  fear  of  inconsistency,  and  he 

71 


72  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

will  therefore  talk  and  act  very  differently  on 
different  occasions.  This  comes  out  strikingly 
in  the  intellectual  development  of  thinkers  like 
Friedrich  Naumann  or  in  the  writings  of  a  strong 
personality  like  Maximilian  Harden. 

The  eve  of  the  Great  War  found  Germany  full 
of  unrest.  Her  astonishing  economic  transfor- 
mation had  raised  a  whole  series  of  internal 
problems  which  were  being  debated  with  great 
intellectual  intensity,  while  the  external  political 
situation  appeared  so  unfavorable  that  Germany's 
future  was  regarded  with  profound  apprehension. 
The  sense  of  isolation  and  impending  foreign  peril 
during  the  years  immediately  preceding  the  war 
produced  a  highly  alarmist  literature,  good  ex- 
amples being  Colonel  Frobenius's  "Germany's 
Hour  of  Destiny"  and  General  von  Bernhardi's 
*' Germany  and  the  Next  War." 

Under  these  circumstances,  the  effect  of  the 
Austro-Serbian  crisis  of  July,  1914,  upon  Ger- 
many was  electrical.  German  public  opinion  re- 
garded the  menace  to  Austria  as  deadly  and  de- 
manded that  Germany's  one  dependable  ally 
should  be  supported  at  all  costs.  Serbia  was  not 
only  thought  to  be  aiming  at  the  disruption  of 
Austria-Hungary  but  was  considered  a  mere  cat's 
paw  of  Russian  Pan-Slavism  and  lust  of  world  do- 
minion. At  the  beginning  of  the  crisis  the  nor- 
mally mild-spoken  Berlin  '^Vossische  Zeitung" 
exclaimed  warmly:  ''The  bloody  crime  of  Sera- 
jevo  was  only  one  link  in  the  long  train  of  assas- 
sination and  horror  by  which  the  revolutionary 


GERMANY  73 

propagandists  in  Belgrade  were  working  to  pro- 
mote the  official  policy  of  Serbia."  And  a  little 
later  the  Berlin  *'Kreuzzeitung"  declared:  "No 
great  Power  can  allow  an  insignificant  neighbor 
to  torment  and  injure  it,  especially  when  this 
insignificant  Power  relies  on  its  ability  to  rattle 
the  saber  of  another  great  Power."  The  Teu- 
tonic attitude  is  well  set  forth  in  an  article  by  the 
eminent  German  publicist  Hans  Delbriick,  printed 
in  an  American  periodical,  the  "Atlantic 
Monthly"  for  February,  1915,  but  written  during 
the  early  months  of  the  war.  Referring  to  the 
"Greater  Serbian"  peril  for  both  Austria  and 
Germany,  he  wrote :  '  *  The  danger  to  the  Austrian 
Empire  which  arises  from  it  is  very  considerable, 
not  only  because  Serbia  is  Serbia,  and  because 
she  has  partizans  in  the  Hapsburg  monarchy  it- 
self, but  because  she  is  the  advance  guard  of  the 
Pan-Slavic  idea  and  the  outpost  of  mighty  Russia. 
Nor  should  we  speak  of  Austro-Hungarian  craze 
for  dominion ;  it  is  the  instinct  for  self-preservation 
of  a  great  Power,  which  cannot,  without  despair- 
ing of  its  own  future,  tolerate  the  existence  of 
the  Greater  Serbian  idea  either  within  its  borders 
or  on  its  frontiers.  A  prospective  Greater  Serbia 
would  not  only  sever  large  tracts  of  territory  from 
the  Austrian  Empire,  but  would  cut  her  off  from 
the  sea,  which  in  these  days  means  death  to  a 
great  Power.  The  Greater  Serbian  idea  and 
Austria  cannot  exist  side  by  side.  Austria  would 
not  only  have  ceased  to  be  a  great  Power,  but  she 
would  have  been  dismembered  as  a  state,  if  she 


74  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

had  not  adopted  vigorous  measures.  For  the 
same  reason  it  is  a  matter  of  course  that  the  Ger- 
man Empire  should  stand  at  Austria 's  side.  Had 
we  tolerated  the  subjugation  and  dismemberment 
of  Austria  by  Russia  we  should  have  had  to  wage 
the  next  war  against  Russia  and  France  alone. 
Under  no  circumstances  could  we  leave  this  dan- 
ger to  our  descendants;  the  preservation  of  the 
Hapsburg  monarchy  was  therefore  a  vital  issue  for 
the  German  Empire." 

In  those  circles  which  had  long  held  a  European 
conflict  to  be  inevitable,  the  prospect  of  war  was 
hailed  as  the  best  way  out  of  an  intolerable  situa- 
tion. At  the  end  of  July  the  *  *  Militarische  Rund- 
schau" declared:  ''If  we  do  not  decide  for  war, 
that  war  in  which  we  shall  have  to  engage  at  the 
latest  in  two  or  three  years  will  be  begun  in  far 
less  propitious  circumstances.  At  this  moment 
the  initiative  rests  with  us:  Russia  is  not  ready, 
moral  factors  and  right  are  on  our  side,  as  well 
as  might.  Since  we  shall  have  to  accept  the  con- 
test some  day,  let  us  provoke  it  at  once.  Our 
prestige,  our  position  as  a  great  Power,  our  honor, 
are  in  question;  and  yet  more,  for  it  would  seem 
that  our  very  existence  is  concerned."  This, 
however,  does  not  represent  the  viewpoint  of  the 
mass  of  German  public  opinion.  The  German 
people  as  a  whole  showed  no  eagerness  for  war 
and  approved  their  government's  reserved  atti- 
tude until  the  Russian  mobilization  made  quick 
action  imperative. 

Once   the   die   was   cast,   however,   the   entire 


GERMANY  75 

German  people  rallied  round  the  Government  in 
a  passion  of  spontaneous  loyalty.  German  una- 
nimity is  well  shown  by  the  following  editorial  in 
*'Vorwarts,"  the  chief  organ  of  the  Social  Demo- 
crats :  **  We  were  always  open  enemies  of  the  mon- 
archic form  of  government,  and  we  always  shall 
be.  .  .  .  But  we  have  to  acknowledge  to-day  that 
William  II  has  shown  himself  the  friend  of  uni- 
versal peace." 

The  great  reconciler  of  the  traditionally  pacifist 
Social  Democrats  was  the  ''Russian  Peril."  On 
this  point  tlie  party  was  absolutely  united,  save 
for  a  handful  of  ultra-pacifists  like  Karl  Lieb- 
knecht  and  Rosa  Luxemburg.  ''War  in  our  coun- 
try," declared  the  Chemnitz  "Volksstimme," 
"compels  all  comrades  to  unite  against  the  foe. 
All  must  set  aside  the  aims  and  purposes  of  their 
party,  and  bear  in  mind  one  fact — Germany,  and 
in  a  larger  sense  all  Europe,  is  endangered  by 
Russian  despotism.  .  .  .  Germany's  women  and 
children  must  not  become  the  prey  of  Cossack 
bestiality;  the  German  country  must  not  be  the 
spoil  of  Cossacks ;  because  if  the  Allies  should  be 
victorious,  not  an  English  governor  or  a  French 
republican  would  rule  over  Germany,  but  the  Rus- 
sian Czar.  Therefore  we  must  defend  at  this  mo- 
ment everything  that  means  German  culture  and 
German  liberty  against  a  merciless  and  barbaric 
enemy."  Even  so  staunch  a  pacifist  as  the  So- 
cialist Deputy,  Haase,  made  in  the  Reichstag  the 
following  declaration:  "Germany  is  threatened 
with  annihilation  by  Russian  despotism,  and  to 


76  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

prevent  this  danger  the  Government  can  count  on 
the  support  of  the  Social  Democratic  party." 

Fear  and  abhorrence  of  Russia  were  well  nigh 
universal  throughout  Germany.  For  several 
years  past,  Russo-German  relations  had  not  been 
good,  while  the  rising  tide  of  Russian  nationalism 
had  quickened  the  traditional  dread  of  this  mighty 
neighbor  into  deep  alarm.  Hence  the  German 
people  entered  the  struggle  as  in  a  crusade  for  the 
defense  of  Western  civilization  against  Asiatic 
barbarism.  The  Teutonic  attitude  is  well  ex- 
plained by  the  eminent  German  psychologist,  Pro- 
fessor Hugo  Miinsterberg.  In  his  book,  ''The 
War  and  America,"  written  in  1914,  he  asserted: 
' '  Germans  know  what  a  German  defeat  must  mean 
to  the  ideal  civilization  of  the  world.  The  culture 
of  Germany  would  be  trampled  down  by  the  half- 
cultured  Tartars."  And  he  paints  this  truly 
gloomy  picture  of  the  results  of  Russian  victory: 
"If  Russia  wins  to-day  and  Germany  is  broken 
down,  Asia  must  win  sooner  or  later,  and  if  Asia 
wins,  the  achievements  of  the  Western  world  will 
be  wiped  from  the  earth  more  sweepingly  than 
the  civilization  of  old  Assyria.  The  anti-Asiatic 
work  will  and  must  appear  sinful  and  treacherous ; 
it  will  be  obliterated  from  the  globe  and  the  dark- 
ness of  old  will  reign  again." 

This  feeling  against  Russia  in  great  part  ex- 
plains the  subsequent  German  attitude  toward 
England.  At  the  outbreak  of  the  European  con- 
flict the  mass  of  the  German  people  regarded  it  as 
essentially  a  Russo-German  war  and  considered 


GERMANY  77 

themselves  the  champions  of  Western  culture.  In 
such  a  struggle  they  believed  that  England  must 
remain  neutral.  When,  therefore,  England  joined 
Russia,  the  German  people  took  it  as  the  vilest 
treachery  to  the  cause  of  civilization.  The  fact 
that,  despite  a  decade  of  Anglo-German  rivalry, 
many  Germans  still  regarded  the  English  as  Teu- 
tonic kinsfolk,  aggravated  f]ngland's  shame  of 
** cultural  apostasy"  by  the  guilt  of  ''race- 
treason." 

The  explosion  of  popular  fury  against  England 
was  therefore  instantaneous  and  general.  "What 
is  happening  to-day,"  asserted  Professors  Ernst 
Haeckel  and  Rudolf  Eucken  in  a  joint  manifesto, 
''will  be  inscribed  in  the  annals  of  history  as  an 
indelible  shame  to  England.  England  fights  to 
please  a  half-Asiatic  Power  against  Germanism. 
She  fights  not  only  on  the  side  of  barbarism,  but 
also  of  moral  injustice,  for  it  is  not  to  be  forgot- 
ten that  Russia  began  the  war  because  it  was  not 
willing  that  there  should  be  thorough  expiation  of 
a  wretched  murder.  It  is  the  fault  of  England 
that  the  present  war  is  extended  to  a  world  war, 
and  that  all  culture  is  thereby  endangered.  And 
why  all  this?  Because  she  was  envious  of  Ger- 
many's greatness,  because  she  wished  at  all  costs 
to  hinder  a  further  extension  of  this  greatness." 
Professor  Lamprecht  declared  that  the  war  would 
result  in  the  spread  of  German  culture  over  all 
the  world,  from  which  only  one  country  would  be 
excluded — England.  "The  German  world,"  he 
wrote,  "to-day  is  one.    There  is  only  one  renegade 


78  PEESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

brother.  Up  and  at  him!  English  culture  must 
be  in  a  bad  way  indeed  when  it  allies  itself  with 
the  Mongolians.  .  .  .  Germany  is  now  the  pro- 
tector of  European  civilization,  and  after  bloody 
victories  the  world  will  be  healed  by  being  Ger- 
manized." And  so  convinced  an  opponent  of 
Russia  as  Paul  Rohrbach  closed  his  book,  ''Der 
Krieg  und  die  deutsche  Politik"  (1914),  with  the 
following  words:  "Russia,  with  her  population 
of  one  hundred  and  seventy  million,  must  at  all 
hazards  be  reduced,  and  her  ability  to  attack  cen- 
tral Europe  diminished.  But  the  real  enemy  of 
Germany,  and  not  only  of  Germany  but  of  the 
culture  and  civilization  of  all  Europe — that  enemy 
is  England.  Peace  with  England  is  impossible 
until  her  power  to  do  harm  has  been  broken  for- 
ever. .  .  .  Then,  and  then  only,  Germany's  future 
will  be  assured.  To  display  leniency  toward 
England  is  now  but  to  commit  an  act  of  treason 
against  the  future  of  the  German  Empire." 

Reports  of  anti-German  outbursts  in  England 
lashed  the  waves  of  Teutonic  hate  to  even 
greater  fury.  ''Who  was  it  that  did  conspire  to 
bring  about  this  war?"  queried  the  eminent  dram- 
atist, Gerhart  Hauptmann,  in  early  October,  1914, 
"who  even  whistled  for  the  Mongolian,  for  the 
Jap,  that  he  should  come  to  bite  viciously  and  cow- 
ardly at  Europe's  heels?  It  is  with  great  pain 
and  bitterness  that  I  pronounce  the  word  'Eng- 
land.' I  belong  to  those  barbarians  upon  whom 
the  English  University  of  Oxford  bestowed  the 
degrees  of  doctCr  honoris  causa.  .  .  .  Haldane, 


GERMANY  79 

former  English  minister  of  war,  and  with  him 
numerous  Englishmen,  undertook  regular  pil- 
grimages to  the  small  barbarian  city  of  Weimar, 
whore  the  barbarians,  Goethe,  Schiller,  Herder, 
Wieland,  and  others,  have  exerted  themselves 
for  the  humanity  of  the  whole  world."  *'It  is 
a  fight  between  England  and  .  Germany  to 
the  bitter  end — to  the  last  German  if  need 
be,"  declared  Herr  Witting,  head  of  the 
Deutsche  Bank,  to  an  American  journalist  in 
late  October,  1914.  ''It  is  a  war  of  annihilation 
between  two  countries  and  nations.  England  has 
wanted  it,  so  let  it  be.  We  want  no  quarter  from 
England ;  we  shall  give  none.  We  shall  never  ask 
England  for  mercy;  we  shall  extend  no  mercy 
to  her.  England  and  England  alone  brought  on 
this  criminal  war  out  of  greed  and  envy,  to  crush 
Germany,  and  now  it  is  death,  destruction,  and 
annihilation  for  one  or  the  other  of  the  two  na- 
tions. Tell  your  American  people  that,  and  say 
that  these  words  do  not  come  from  a  fanatic,  but 
from  a  quiet  business  man  who  knows  the  feeling 
of  his  people  and  who  knows  what  is  at  stake  in 
this  titanic  struggle  brought  on  by  that  criminal 
nation.  I  tell  you  that  it  is  a  fight  to  the  finish. 
God !  How  we  hate  England  and  the  English,  that 
nation  of  hypocrites  and  criminals  which  has 
brought  this  misery  upon  us  and  upon  the  world. 
And  for  what?  For  greed,  greed  and  envy,  to 
crush  the  German  nation  because  she  found  her- 
self decadent  and  felt  her  dominance  and  dom- 
ineering   in    the    world    endangered.     For    the 


80  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

French  there  is  no  feeling  in  Germany  except  pity 
and  regret.  We  must  fight  them,  of  course,  but 
we  have  no  feeling  against  France.  She  was 
forced  into  it.  The  feeling  against  Russia  is  sub- 
siding. But  against  England  there  is  growing 
among  low  and  high  the  most  fanatical  hatred  and 
contempt  that  one  nation  ever  had  toward  an- 
other. Tell  America  not  to  be  misled  by  peace 
talk.  There  is  not  going  to  be  any  peace — not 
for  a  long  time.  We  are  prepared  for  three 
years.  In  the  end  it  will  develop  into  a  struggle 
between  England  and  Germany.  The  English  are 
determined  to  destroy  the  Fatherland.  We  have 
accepted  the  challenge." 

Herr  Witting  seems  to  have  accurately  gaged 
the  German  national  temper  in  the  autumn  of  1914. 
To  this  period  belongs  the  famous  popular  shib- 
boleth, ''Gott  strafe  England!"  At  this  time 
also  Ernst  Lissauer  wrote  his  famous  "Hymn  of 
Hate,"  with  its  implacable  closing  lines: 

"You  will  we  hate  with  a  lasting  hate, 
We  will  never  forego  our  hate. 
Hate  by  water  and  hate  by  land, 
Hate  of  the  head  and  hate  of  the  hand, 
Hate  of  the  hammer  and  hate  of  the  crown, 
Hate  of  seventy  millions,  choking  down. 
We  love  as  one,  we  hate  as  one, 
We  have  one  foe,  and  one  alone — 
England!" 

And  Lissauer 's  hymn  was  not  an  isolated  phe- 
nomenon.   It  was  merely  one  of  a  whole  poetic 


GERMANY  81 

cycle,  and  was  by  no  means  the  bitterest  in  tone, 
as  witness  this  poem  by  Heinrich  Vierordt,  enti- 
tled, ''Germany,  Hate!": 

"Oh,  Germany!     Hate  in  cold,  in  icy  blood, 
Kill  millions  on  millions  of  the  devilish  brood. 
Let  the  bodies  heap  up  mountain  high 
And  the  smoke  of  the  flesh  ascend  to  the  sky. 

"Oh,  Germany  I     Hate  now,  let  this  be  your  test — 
The  bayonet  thrust  in  the  enemy's  breast. 
Take  no  one  a  prisoner,  strike  every  one  dead. 
And  draw  round  the  wastelands  a  girdle  of  red." 

This  wave  of  hate  seems  not  to  have  been  con- 
fined to  the  civilian  population  at  home  but  to 
have  also  affected  the  armies  at  the  front.  In 
March,  1915,  the  **Liller  Kriegszeitung,"  a  sol- 
diers' paper  published  in  the  occupied  French  city 
of  Lille,  contained  the  following  article  entitled 
*'Fire,"  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Kaden:  "  'Gott 
strafe  England!'  'May  He  punish  her!'  This  is 
tlie  greeting  that  now  passes  when  Germans  meet. 
The  fire  of  this  righteous  hate  is  all  aglow !  You 
men  of  Germany,  from  East  and  West,  forced  to 
shed  your  blood  in  the  defense  of  your  homeland 
through  England's  infamous  envy  and  hatred  of 
German  progress,  feed  the  flame  that  burns  in 
your  souls.  We  have  but  one  war  cry — 'Gott 
strafe  England!'  Hiss  this  to  one  another  in  the 
trenches,  in  the  charge ;  hiss  as  it  were  the  sound 
of  licking  flames.  Behold  in  every  dead  comrade 
a  sacrifice  forced  from  you  by  this  accursed  peo- 


82  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

pie.  Take  tenfold  vengeance  for  each  hero's 
death ! 

"You  German  people  at  home,  feed  this  i5re  of 
hate!  You  mothers,  engrave  this  in  the  heart  of 
the  babe  at  your  breast !  You  thousands  of  teach- 
ers, to  whom  millions  of  German  children  look 
up  with  eyes  and  hearts,  teach  HATE !  unquench- 
able HATE !  You  homes  of  German  learning, 
pile  up  the  fuel  on  this  fire !  Tell  the  nation  that 
this  hate  is  not  un-German,  that  it  is  not  poison 
for  our  people.  Write  in  letters  of  fire  the  name 
of  our  bitterest  enemy.  You  guardians  of  the 
truth,  feed  this  sacred  HATE!  You  German 
fathers,  lead  your  children  up  to  the  high  hills  of 
our  homeland,  at  their  feet  our  dear  country 
bathed  in  sunshine.  Your  women  and  children 
shall  starve:  bestial,  devilish  conception.  Eng- 
land wills  it!  Surely,  all  that  is  in  you  rises 
against  such  infamy!  Listen  to  the  ceaseless 
song  of  the  German  forest,  behold  the  fruitful 
fields  like  rolling  seas :  then  will  your  love  for  this 
wondrous  land  find  the  right  words : — HATE !  un- 
quenchable HATE!  Deutschland,  Deutschland 
liber  alles ! ' ' 

Toward  France,  on  the  other  hand,  as  Herr  Wit- 
ting had  remarked,  no  popular  hatred  was  visible 
in  Germany.  To  be  sure,  there  were  numerous 
half -contemptuous  quips  at  France's  supposed 
decadence,  but  there  were  also  many  testimonials 
of  whole-hearted  esteem.  "I  say  it  frankly.  We 
have  and  we  had  no  hatred  against  France,"  re- 
marked  Gerhart   Hauptmann   in   October,   1914. 


GERMANY  83 

"We  have  idolized  the  plastic  art,  sculpture,  pic- 
torial art,  and  the  literature  of  that  country.  .  .  . 
It  is  to  be  greatly  regretted  that  Germany  and 
France  could  not  be  political  friends.  They 
should  have  been,  since  they  are  the  adminis- 
trators of  the  continental  productions  of  the  mind, 
and  since  they  are  the  two  great  cultured  Euro- 
pean master-nations.  Fate,  however,  would  not 
have  it  so."  **It  is  one  of  the  most  painful  neces- 
sities in  the  present  situation,"  wrote  Professor 
Heinrich  Schrors  of  the  Catholic  University  of 
Bonn  in  the  '*  Internationale  Monatsschrift"  of 
October,  1914,  ''that  we  have  to  draw  the  sword 
against  nations  such  as  France,  with  whom  we 
are  united  by  the  highest  cultural  interests,  and 
for  whose  science  we  have  the  deepest  regard. 
We  should  greatly  deplore  the  humiliation  of 
France  or  the  impairing  of  its  position  as  a  civ- 
ilized nation.  If  in  tbe  present  war  we  could  de- 
tect any  such  object  on  the  part  of  the  German 
Government,  even  as  a  secret  tendency,  we  should 
be  the  first  to  oppose  it." 

Toward  Belgium  the  German  public  seems  at 
first  to  have  felt  unmixed  pity,  but  later  on  Ger- 
man official  assertions  regarding  the  Belgian  Gov- 
ernment's unneutral  conduct  before  the  war  and 
its  inciting  of  the  Belgian  civilian  population  to  a 
franc-tireur  warfare  against  the  German  troops 
changed  German  sentiment  to  one  of  hostility  to- 
ward the  Belgian  governing  class,  while  reports 
of  Belgian  civilian  atrocities  committed  on  Ger- 
man soldiers  tended  to  broaden  this  new  feeling 


84  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

to  include  the  whole  Belgian  people.  In  late 
September,  1914,  a  manifesto  of  leading  German 
Protestant  theologians  thus  referred  to  these 
Belgian  atrocity  charges:  ''Unnamable  horrors 
have  been  committed  against  Germans  living 
peaceably  abroad — against  women  and  children — 
against  wounded  and  physicians — cruelties  and 
shamelessness  such  as  many  a  heathen  and  Mo- 
hammedan war  has  not  revealed.  .  .  .  Even  the 
not  unnatural  excitement  of  a  people  whose  neu- 
trality— already  violated  by  our  adversaries — 
could  under  the  pressure  of  implacable  necessity 
not  be  respected,  affords  no  excuse  for  inhumani- 
ties, nor  does  it  lessen  the  shame  that  such  could 
take  place;  in  a  land  long  ago  Christianized." 
Regarding  the  burning  of  Louvain,  the  Berlin 
''Vossische  Zeitung"  remarked:  *'The  art  treas- 
ures of  the  old  town  exist  no  more.  It  is  true 
that  art  lovers  will  grieve,  but  there  was  no  other 
way  of  punishing  this  population,  whose  devilish 
women  poured  boiling  oil  from  their  windows 
upon  the  passing  German  soldiers.'*  And  the 
"Lokal  Anzeiger"  hoped  the  world  would  "real- 
ize that  the  blame  for  all  the  suffering  of  Louvain 
rests  with  the  half-civilized  men  and  women  who 
live  there." 

Regarding  Allied  counter-charges  of  atrocities 
committed  by  German  troops,  the  German  press 
entered  a  sweeping  and  indignant  general  denial. 
"  'Teutonic  Barbarians!  Vandals!'  "  exclaimed 
the  "Kolnische  Zeitung"  scornfully.  "Such  are 
the  terms  which  French  and  English  speaking- 


GERMANY  85 

trumpets  are  shrieking  into  the  ears  of  the  world. 
After  lies  comes  calumnious  opprobrium!  .  .  . 
The  irony  of  history,  which  is  now  dealing  so  terri- 
ble a  blow  to  English  hopes,  will  also  clear  up  these 
lying  calumnies  against  the  *  Teutonic  barbarian.' 
.  .  .  Two  things  speak  for  us:  The  German  good 
conscience,  and — the  convincing  might  of  the  Ger- 
man fist."  The  famous  manifesto  of  the  German 
intellectuals  asserted :  ' '  Germany  will  fight  to  the 
end  as  a  cultured  nation,  which  has  the  might  of 
Goethe,  Beethoven,  and  Kant,  who  are  to  it  just 
as  holy  as  its  hearths  and  homes.  .  .  .  Can  any 
one  point  to  an  example  of  our  ferocity?  But  in 
the  East  the  earth  has  drunk  the  blood  of  hosts  of 
women  and  children  slain  by  the  Russians.  In 
the  West  dumdum  bullets  tear  open  the  breasts  of 
our  warriors.  Those  who  associate  with  Russians 
and  Serbians  and  offer  to  the  world  the  spectacle 
of  letting  loose  mongrels  and  niggers  on  the  white 
race  have  the  least  right  to  call  themselves  de- 
fenders of  European  civilization."  Gerhart 
Hauptmann  remarked  in  an  angrj^  open-letter  to 
the  French  pacifist,  Romain  Rolland,  ''The  Ger- 
man soldier  is  unsullied  by  the  loathsome  and 
puerile  were-wolf  tales  which  your  lying  French 
press  so  zealously  spreads  abroad.  .  .  .  Let  the 
idle  Englisliman  call  us  'Huns';  you  may,  for  all 
I  care,  characterize  the  warriors  of  our  splendid 
landwehr  as  'sons  of  Attila.'  It  is  enough  for 
us  if  this  landwehr  shatters  to  bits  the  ring  of  its 
merciless  enemies.  Far  better  that  you  call  us 
'sons  of  Attila,'  cross  yourself  in  fear — and  re- 


86  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

main  outside  our  borders,  than  that  you  indict 
tender  inscriptions  upon  the  tomb  of  our  German 
name,  calling  us  'the  beloved  descendants  of 
Goethe.'  The  epithet  'Huns'  is  coined  by  people 
who,  themselves  Huns,  find  themselves  disap- 
pointed in  their  criminal  attacks  on  the  life  of  a 
sound  and  valorous  race,  because  this  race  knows 
how  to  parry  a  fearful  blow  with  still  more  fearful 
force.     The  impotent  take  refuge  in  curses." 

For  Allied  charges  of  vandalism  at  the  destruc- 
tion of  historical  monuments  such  as  the  Rheims 
cathedral,  the  Germans  had  slight  patience.  That 
works  of  art  should  be  destroyed  was  generally 
deplored,  but  that  Germany  should  modify  her 
campaign  because  of  this  was  held  ridiculous. 
"They  call  us  barbarians.  What  of  it?"  wrote 
Major  General  von  Ditfurth  in  the  "Hamburger 
Nachrichten. "  "We  scorn  them  and  their  abuse. 
For  my  part,  I  hope  that  in  this  war  we  have 
merited  the  title  of  barbarians.  War  is  war,  and 
must  be  waged  with  severity.  The  commonest, 
ugliest  stone  placed  to  mark  the  burial-place  of  a 
German  grenadier  is  a  more  glorious  and  vener- 
able monument  than  all  the  cathedrals  in  Europe 
put  together.  Let  neutral  peoples  and  our  ene- 
mies cease  their  empty  chatter,  which  may  well  be 
compared  to  the  twitter  of  birds.  Let  them  cease 
their  talk  of  the  Cathedral  of  Rheims  and  of  all 
the  churches  and  all  the  chateaux  in  France  which 
have  shared  its  fate.  These  things  do  not  interest 
us.  Our  troops  must  achieve  victory.  What  else 
matters?" 


GERMANY  87 

Toward  the  subject  of  the  war  in  general,  most 
Germans,  as  we  have  seen,  maintained  that  it  was 
a  purely  defensive  struggle  forced  upon  Germany 
by  a  league  of  malevolent  foes.  "Undoubtedly 
this  is  the  most  stupid,  senseless  and  unnecessary 
war  of  modern  times,"  exclaimed  the  German 
Crown  Prince  to  an  American  journalist  in  De- 
cember, 1914.  '^It  is  a  war  not  wanted  by  Ger- 
many, I  can  assure  you,  but  was  forced  on  us." 
**We  are  fighting  not  only  for  the  intellectual 
heritage  of  our  fathers,  but  we  fight  for  European 
culture,  its  very  existence,  and  its  future,"  as- 
serted Prince  von  Biilow  to  the  Norwegian  publi- 
cist, Bjorn  Bjornson.  ''Victory  for  the  German 
arms  guarantees  law  and  order,  prosperity  and 
civilization,  for  Europe  and  the  whole  world." 
But  here  and  there  a  bolder  note  was  heard.  In 
November,  1914,  Maximilian  Harden  thus  apos- 
trophized German  apologists:  "Cease  your  piti- 
ful attempts  to  excuse  Germany's  action.  No 
longer  wail  to  strangers  who  do  not  care  to  hear, 
telling  them  how  dear  to  us  were  the  smiles  of 
peace  we  had  smeared  like  rouge  upon  our  lips. 
.  .  .  Because  our  statesmen  failed  to  discover  and 
foil  shrewd  plans  of  deception  is  no  reason  why 
we  may  hoist  the  flag  of  most  pious  morality. 
Not  as  weak-willed  blunderers  have  we  undertaken 
the  fearful  risk  of  this  war.  We  wanted  it.  Be- 
cause we  had  to  wish  it  and  could  wish  it.  May 
the  Teuton  devil  throttle  those  whiners  whose 
pleas  for  excuses  make  us  ludicrous  in  these  hours 
of  lofty  experience.    We  do  not  stand,  and  shall 


88  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

not  place  ourselves,  before  the  court  of  Europe. 
Our  might  shall  create  new  law  in  Europe.  Ger- 
many strikes.  If  it  conquers  new  realms  for  its 
genius,  the  priesthoods  of  all  the  gods  will  sing 
songs  of  praise  to  the  good  war. ' ' 

Even  more  than  in  France  was  emphasis  laid 
upon  the  war's  deep  regenerative  effects.  In 
many  quarters  German  materialism  and  moral 
shortcomings  before  the  war  were  frankly  ac- 
knowledged, but  nearly  all  asserted  that  the  open- 
ing months  of  the  struggle  had  wrought  profound 
changes  in  the  German  character.  ''Gone  is  all 
the  worship  of  Mammon,"  exclaimed  Professor 
Georg  Simmel  in  the  ''Internationale  Monats- 
schrift"  of  November,  1914.  "Gone  is  the  fetish 
of  external  success  which  finds  expression  only  in 
money.  The  self-seeking  of  individuals  and  of 
classes,  to  whom  the  collective  whole  was  but  a 
chimera,  has  disappeared.  ...  To  be  sure,  these 
our  failings  will  reappear  in  some  form  or  other 
in  the  future.  We  shall  not  be  angels.  But  for 
the  present  the  causes  or  the  results  of  cynicism 
have  been  eradicated  from  German  life."  "All 
weeping  and  sorrow,  all  regret,  are  swallowed  up 
by  the  mighty  stream  of  a  new  national  life  which 
has  gushed  forth  over  our  German  Fatherland," 
wrote  Professor  Theodor  Elsenhans  in  the  "Illus- 
trirte  Zeitung"  of  mid-November,  1914.  Dr.  Lud- 
wig  Schiiller,  in  a  sermon  preached  at  Cologne 
early  in  1915,  said :  * '  Suddenly  the  lightning  fell. 
The  war  came.  The  hour  of  decision  for  our 
people  was  at  hand.    Now  it  was  either  into  perdi- 


GERMANY  89 

tion  or  back  to  the  living  God.  And  our  people 
have  chosen  the  good  part.  We  bowed  under  the 
miglity  liand  of  God.  The  breaking  out  of  the 
war  suddenly  found  a  praying  people.  It  was 
such  a  change  in  the  innermost  soul  of  the  Ger- 
man people  as  we  all  have  never  yet  experienced. ' ' 
In  previous  chapters  we  have  already  noted  the 
optimism  which  prevailed  in  France  and  England 
during  the  opening  months  of  1915.  It  is,  there- 
fore, not  surprising  to  discover  that  the  reverse 
was  true  of  their  opponents,  and  that  German 
public  opinion  at  that  time  showed  a  tendency  to- 
ward pessimism.  The  Germans  were  abandoning 
their  hopes  of  an  early,  triumphant  peace  and 
were  settling  down  to  the  prospect  of  a  long  war. 
Save  in  extreme  Social  Democratic  circles  there 
was,  it  is  true,  no  hint  that  Germany  would  accept 
any  peace  except  one  which  offered  ample  guaran- 
tees for  future  security,  but  the  German  press  now 
frankly  admitted  that  these  guarantees  could  be 
won  only  after  a  prolonged  and  desperate  strug- 
gle. Maximilian  Harden,  in  his  organ,  **Die 
Zukunft,"  struck  a  distinctly  pessimistic  note 
sharply  at  variance  with  his  bold  optimism  of  the 
preceding  autumn.  "Beat  us!"  he  cried  in 
February,  1915,  "drive  us  into  the  sea  or  into 
the  Rhine !  Starve  us  into  submission !  We  shall 
die  honorably,  die  standing  up  with  clean  arms. 
We  do  not  know  whether  we  shall  win,  but  we  do 
know  we  shall  not  end  unworthily.  We  are  con- 
serving both  our  confidence  and  our  nourishment 
for  a  very  long  struggle ;  yet,  in  a  year  we  may  be 


90  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

using  thorns  and  thistles  for  a  time,  instead  of 
bread.  We  are  quieter  than  in  the  first  torrent  of 
war's  enthusiasm,  but  not  more  cowardly;  nor  are 
we  to  be  intimidated.  In  prayer  we  are  ever  joy- 
ful, and  we  still  hark  to  the  German  maxim; 
'Rely  only  on  thyself;  then  wilt  thou  never  de- 
ceive thyself.'  "  Most  press  comment  was,  how- 
ever, more  optimistic.  In  the  Berlin  ''Tageszeit- 
ung, ' '  Count  zu  Reventlow  wrote :  '  *  Germans  will 
do  much  more  than  persevere.  They  will  fight  un- 
til everything  complies  with  their  will — a  will  that 
vehemently  and  without  scruple  puts  all  means 
into  its  service  by  which  it  desires  to  arrive  at  its 
aim.  Any  termination  of  the  war  except  by  Ger- 
man victory  is  unthinkable." 

As  may  have  been  inferred  from  Herr  Harden 's 
words,  German  public  opinion  was  earnestly  dis- 
cussing the  effects  of  the  Allied  naval  blockade 
which  had  practically  isolated  Germany  since  the 
beginning  of  the  war.  Even  before  the  war  this 
matter  had  been  seriously  considered,  a  notable  in- 
stance being  a  controversy  between  Count  von 
Moltke  and  the  economist  Karl  Ballod  carried  on 
in  the  columns  of  the  "Preussische  Jahrbficher" 
of  June  and  July,  1914.  Count  von  Moltke  had 
been  most  optimistic,  but  Herr  Ballod 's  reply  was 
couched  in  a  frankly  pessimistic  vein.  He  as- 
serted that  a  prolonged  dislocation  of  Germany's 
industrial  system  would  put  back  her  recent  eco- 
nomic development  two  hundred  years,  and  wrote 
in  regard  to  the  food  question,  ''It  is  a  terrible 
self-deception  to  make  out  that  the  German  people 


GERMANY  91 

could  get  along  eleven  months  in  the  year  with 
the  grain  which  they  themselves  raise  for  bread." 
Such  being  the  divided  state  of  mind  before  the 
war,  the  practical  confronting  of  the  test  naturally 
evoked  sharp  divergences  of  opinion.  The  official 
view  breathed  assured  self-confidence.  **The 
war,"  wrote  Dr.  Bernhard  Dernburg  in  the 
''American  Review  of  Reviews"  for  November, 
1914,  ''will  bring  out  any  number  of  devices — 
])rocesses  that  have  been  too  .expensive  so  far  in 
competition — which  will  be  taken  up  and  made 
more  perfect.  Products  will  be  turned  to  use  that 
have  never  been  thought  of  before.  Like  a  good 
housewife  who  must  get  along  suddenly  upon  a 
limited  stipend  per  week  because  some  hardship 
has  befallen  her  husband,  so  a  nation  convinced  of 
its  good  cause,  and  fairly  successful  in  the  arts  up 
to  the  present,  will  find  its  way  and  be  able  to  buck 
up  against  the  humanitarian  English  proposal  of 
starving  it  out."  And  this  optimism  was  sliared 
by  much  unofficial  German  public  opinion.  In  late 
November,  1914,  the  well-informed  "Frankfurter 
Zeitung"  remarked:  "We  breathe  freely  and  fully 
as  ever.  Our  provision  warehouses  are  filled,  and 
in  our  coffers  lie  billions  of  good  money  which  all 
of  us  have  given  and  which  is  only  a  small  part 
of  wliat  our  people  are  prepared  to  give  and  will 
give  if  the  first  is  spent.  Our  entire  national  life 
in  our  besieged  land  has  become  one  single  great 
organization — an  organization  of  battle,  an  organ- 
ization of  sustenance,  of  credit,  of  peaceful  work, 
and  of  providence."    "We  are  well  provided  with 


92  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

the  means  of  living,"  wrote  the  "Vossische  Zeit- 
ung"  in  March,  1915,  ''and  our  financial  and  indus- 
trial armor  is  as  sound  as  ever.  .  .  .  We  may  truly 
say  that  there  is  no  crisis."  And  Maximilian 
Harden  asserted  breezily,  "All  twaddle,  this  star- 
vation talk.  .  .  .  Female  busybodies  with  an  itch 
for  notoriety  tell  us  what  a  delightful  morsel  can 
be  made  from  the  eye  and  tail  of  a  herring  {Gott 
strafe  England).  Eat  your  mess  yourself,  you 
advertising  chatterbox.  All  this  twaddle  injures 
Germany.  Are  we  in  danger  of  famine?  This 
fireband  was  merely  meant  to  inflame  the  hatred 
against  England.  .  .  .  Hundreds  of  thousands  live 
to-day  more  lavishly  than  in  peace  times.  They 
live  even  disgustingly  well.  In  peace  times  the 
husband  drank  or  loafed.  Now  he  is  with  the  col- 
ors and  sends  home  the  pay  he  cannot  use,  while 
the  landlord  and  many  a  creditor  must  wait  for 
their  money.  .  .  .  Plenty  of  employment.  Food- 
stuffs packed  to  the  ceiling.  Cakes  enough  to 
withstand  a  siege  of  children.  .  .  .  All  the  streets 
are  bright.  All  the  cafes  are  full  at  4  p.m.  Two 
dozen  theaters  open.  Hundreds  of  movies.  Con- 
certs, circus.  Spring  jackets  and '  between-season' 
hats.  Why,  the  thing  is  like  a  fair.  And  yet  Ger- 
man lips  prattle  about  famine ! ' ' 

Here  and  there,  however,  less  optimistic  notes 
were  heard.  In  the  late  winter  of  1914-15,  General 
von  Blume  wrote  in  the  Berlin  ''Allgemeine  Zeit- 
ung  " :  "  Germany  is  now  confronted  nationally  by 
problems  hitherto  solved  only  within  the  narrow 
limits    of   besieged    fortresses.  ...  No    military 


GERMANY  93 

success  will  avail  to  save  Germany  unless  the  men- 
ace of  starvation  is  averted."  And  the  '*K6l- 
nische  Zeitung"  remarked,  "All  depends  now  on 
the  proof  of  who  can  hold  out  longer.  In  any  case 
nothing  else  remains  for  us  but  to  defend  ourselves 
to  the  utmost."  "Tlie  last  months  before  the  new 
liarvest  are  upon  us,"  said  the  "Frankfurter  Zeit- 
ung" of  late  May,  1915;  and  Professor  Harms 
wrote  in  tlie  "Berliner  Tageblatt,"  "Do  not  let  a 
crumb  of  bread — that  gift  of  God  be  wasted.  Eat 
only  war-bread.  Regard  the  potato  as  a  means 
to  assist  us  to  victory.  Blush  for  shame  if  your 
desire  for  luxuries  tempts  you  to  eat  pies  and 
pastry.  Look  with  contempt  on  those  who  are 
so  immoral  as  to  eat  cake  and  so  by  their  greedi- 
ness imperil  our  supply  of  flour." 

Germans  were  practically  a  unit  in  believing 
that  the  only  hope  of  breaking  the  English  block- 
ade was  the  German  submarine  fleet.  Hence 
their  government's  declaration  of  a  submarine 
blockade  of  the  British  Isles  at  the  beginning  of 
1915  aroused  general  popular  enthusiasm.  ' '  From 
Great  Britain's  method  of  warfare  of  starving 
Germany,"  w^rote  the  "Kolnische  Zeitung,"  "we 
must  conclude  that  the  entire  British  people  is  our 
enemy,  and  a  submarine  war  against  British  mer- 
chantmen must  be  begun  and  carried  through  reck- 
lessly. .  .  .  We  must  try  to  hit  the  vital  point  of 
Great  Britain — namely,  her  merchant  fleet." 
"At  last,"  exclaimed  the  "Hamburger  Nach- 
richten,"  "what  we  have  so  long  hoped  for  is  being 
done."    "Great  Britain  wants  war  to  the  knife," 


94  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

cried  the  ''Kolnische  Zeitung"  of  late  February, 
1915.  ''She  shall  have  it!"  In  mid-May,  Count 
zu  Reventlow  wrote  in  the  "Deutsche  Tageszeit- 
ung,"  **The  newspapers  of  our  enemies,  as  well 
as  those  of  neutrals,  ought  to  grasp  the  simple 
logic  that  the  German  Empire  and  its  statesmen 
and  its  navy  would  be  exposed  to  the  ridicule  and 
contempt  of  the  whole  world  if  it  did  not  carry  out 
this  trade  war.  ...  If  this  trade  war  were,  out 
of  fear  for  the  United  States,  to  become  a  farce, 
it  would  smash  beyond  repair  the  prestige  of  the 
German  Empire."  ''Every  means  that  art  and 
nature  offer  to  overpower  the  enemy  we  shall  in-  ' 
exorably  and  unshakenly  use,"  asserted  the 
"Hamburger  Korrespondenz."  "It  is  laughable 
to  suppose  that  we  are  under  any  obligation  to 
cease  our  submarine  war  if  England  should  find  it 
to  her  interests  to  return  to  the  old  paths  of  inter- 
national law.  No  compassion  for  passengers 
should  weaken  our  strong  duty."  The  German 
Government's  compromise  with  the  United  States 
over  the  submarine  issue  was  almost  universally 
regretted  in  Germany. 

Italy's  entrance  into  the  war  on  the  Allies'  side 
naturally  provoked  a  storm  of  wrath  in  the  Ger- 
man press.  Many  German  writers  had  never 
ceased  to  hope  that  what  they  held  to  be  the  com- 
mon aims  of  Italy  and  Germany  would  keep  Italy 
neutral.  "Both  peoples  have  the  task  of  breaking 
a  path  to  light  and  air  against  the  resistance  of  the 
old,  possessing  Powers,"  asserted  Dr.  E.  W. 
Mayer  in  the  "Preussische  Jahrbiicher"  of  April, 


GERMANY  95 

1915.  **  There  are  geographical  and  historical  re- 
lations more  potent  than  ties  of  institutions  or  of 
blood."  This  helps  to  explain  German  bitterness 
at  Italy's  final  decision.  ''If  war  with  Italy 
comes,"  cried  the  "Kolnische  Zeitung"  on  the  eve 
of  the  crisis,  "Germany's  hatred  of  England  will 
be  nothing  compared  with  her  hatred  of  Italy. 
Pier  treache^-ous  conduct  is  unparalleled  in  his- 
tory. ' '  The  actual  rupture  evoked  not  merely  fury 
but  a  spirit  of  grim  determination.  "This  war  by 
Italy  against  her  former  allies,"  exclaimed  the 
"Frankfurter  Zeitung,"  "is  one  of  the  most  abom- 
inable examples  of  perfidy  that  history  knows. 
We  shall  now  have  one  more  war-zone.  Cer- 
tainly, that  is  no  light  matter,  but  it  will  only  in- 
crease our  resolution  not  to  allow  ourselves  to  be 
beaten."  And  the  "Vossische  Zeitung"  wrote: 
*  *  On  our  part,  every  word  forced  from  our  choking 
throats  by  moral  disgust  would  be  too  much.  Let 
us  not  utter  words  of  complaint,  but  grind  our 
teeth  and  use  other  weapons  than  words  to  the  new 
enemy. ' ' 

After  this  rather  trying  period,  the  uninter- 
rupted series  of  triumphs  for  German  arms  which 
extended  through  the  entire  second  half  of  the  year 
1915  naturally  awakened  intense  popular  enthusi- 
asm and  hope.  Specific  discussion  of  Germany's 
permanent  gains  was  frowned  upon  by  the  authori- 
ties, but  popular  expectations  could  readily  be 
glimpsed  from  a  reading  of  the  press. 

The  optimistic  note  was  strong.  After  the 
crushing  of  Serbia  in  the  autumn  of  1915,  the  Ber- 


96  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

lin  "Lokal  Anzeiger"  wrote:  ''The  neutral  peo- 
ples would  be  blind  indeed  if  they  did  not  see  over 
whose  standards  the  goddess  of  victory  is  moving. 
Nations  who,  after  a  fight  of  fifteen  months  against 
a  world  in  arms,  are  able  with  such  great  certainty 
to  lead,  at  a  moment's  notice,  a  new  army  to  vic- 
tory, cannot  be  defeated.  This  is  the  truth  that 
our  new  victories  disclose  with  absolute  clearness 
even  to  the  most  incredulous."  The  Stuttgart 
''Tageblatt"  thus  expressed  its  ideas  as  to  the  end- 
ing of  the  European  struggle:  ''He  who  wishes 
peace,  let  him  make  himself  feared.  True  peace  is 
only  the  highest  form  of  war.  True  peace  rests 
on  the  power  of  the  strong,  the  mere  sight  of  whom 
is  enough  to  beat  the  enemy.  He  is  not  ready  for 
peace  who  fears  war,  but  only  he  who  has  nothing 
to  fear  from  war.  It  is  such  a  peace  we  must  or- 
ganize; a  peace  rendered  possible  by  the  most 
intense  exertion  of  German  strength."  "We  may 
see  the  red  of  morning  follow  the  blood  and  mist 
of  the  twilight,"  exclaimed  Maximilian  Harden. 
"If  our  enemies  wish  to  erect  a  barrier  for  all  time 
between  us  and  the  rest  of  the  world,"  stated 
Chancellor  Bethmann-Hollweg  in  early  December, 
"I  should  not  be  surprised  if  we  arranged  our 
future  accordingly."  And  the  usually  reserved 
"Vossische  Zeitung"  wrote,  "As  we  are  the  su- 
preme people,  our  duty  henceforth  is  to  lead  the 
march  of  humanity  itself.  ...  It  would  be  a  sin 
against  our  mission  to  spare  the  peoples  who  are 
inferior  to  us." 

The  question  of  future  diplomatic  alignments  be- 


GERMANY  97 

gan  to  be  widely  discussed,  and  among  these  there 
appeared  a  certain  decrease  of  hatred  against  Eng- 
land with  a  correlative  increasing  coolness  toward 
France.  Of  course  the  popular  cliorus  against 
England  was  still  loud  and  bitter,  but  in  reflective 
circles  dissenting  voices  were  occasionally  to  be 
heard.  In  that  thoughtful  periodical,  the 
"Deutsche  Revue"  for  August,  1915,  an  anony- 
mous writer  handled  the  question  with  surprising 
frankness.  According  to  his  contention,  France 
and  Russia  were  the  traditional  constants  in  the 
anti-German  coalition,  England  being  only  the  re- 
cent variable.  It  was  therefore  Germany's  inter- 
est to  come  to  terms  with  her  temporary  enemy 
instead  of  trv'ing  to  placate  her  natural  foes. 
*  *  Friendship  with  England ! "  he  continued.  ' '  The 
word  burns  German  ears  and  appears  impossible 
for  all  time.  Ten  times  rather  an  understanding 
with  France,  say  we.  But  is  not  that  exagger- 
ated ?  We  see  to-day  only  the  repellant  side  of  the 
English  state  system  and  forget  that  its  inner 
side  has  many  sound  elements  with  which  the 
French  cannot  be  compared.  We  swear  the  down- 
fall of  Britain  as  the  Greeks  did  that  of  Ilium,  but 
we  keep  very  still  about  the  rottenness  of  the 
French  republic  and  the  dark  depths  of  Russia's 
political  immorality ;  we  also  keep  silence  regard- 
ing the  weighty  fact  that  the  service  of  Mammon 
is  an  ill,  not  of  England  alone,  but  of  the  twenti- 
eth century.  In  all  our  present  talk  there  speaks 
more  the  vengeful  wrath  of  ermbittered  hearts 
than  the  cool  reason  of  political  heads.    One  thing 


98  PKESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

is  certain:  Europe  can  never  raise  herself  once 
more  on  a  heap  of  ruins.  .  .  .  The  words  'Anni- 
hilation or  Dictatorship,'  applied  to  Great  Powers, 
are  mere  foolishness." 

There  were  also  distinct  signs  of  a  revulsion 
against  the  cult  of  hate.  As  early  as  March,  1915, 
the  moderate  Socialist  Deputy,  Haenisch,  said  in  a 
public  speech :  ' '  The  firm  resolve  to  hold  out  and 
to  win,  which  must  also  live  in  our  children,  ought 
not  to  become  wild  hate  against  enemy  nations. 
However  artistic  Lissauer's  ''Chant  of  Hate"  may 
be,  and  however  valuable  as  an  expression  of  tem- 
per of  the  moment,  it  would  nevertheless  be  deeply 
deplorable  if  sentiments  expressed  in  it  were  to 
work  themselves  into  the  hearts  of  our  children  and 
foster  long  hatred  after  the  war.  Far  better  were 
it  if  they  were  told  of  the  miseries  in  East  Prussia, 
Galicia,  Poland,  Belgium,  and  Northern  France, 
and  were  filled  with  deep  sorrow  at  the  destruction 
of  so  many  young  and  hopeful  lives,  of  so  many 
material  and  ideal  values."  "Whoever  thinks 
that  he  can  help  the  Fatherland  by  encouraging 
this  sort  of  German  hatred  may  do  so  at  his  own 
risk,"  wrote  a  Catholic  theologian  in  the  Hanover 
* '  Deutsche  Volkszeitung ' '  of  mid- July,  1915.  * '  On 
our  side,  however,  we  should  be  guilty  of  neglect 
if  we  did  not  raise  a  warning  voice  against  it.  A 
hatred  such  as  is  now  being  preached  is  unchris- 
tian and  unworthy  of  the  German  nation."  Pro- 
fessor Ernst  Troeltsch,  in  the  "Frankfurter  Zeit- 
ung,"  asserted:  "Hate  may  at  first  inspire  cour- 
age and  energy  in  attack,  but  in  the  long  run  it  is 


GERMANY  99 

bad  politics.  It  leads  to  a  troubled  and  fantastic 
policy  of  sentiment  which  afterward  cannot  be  car- 
ried out.  .  .  .  JCspccially  is  hate  a  bad  counselor 
in  the  case  of  England.  It  prevents  us  from  ap- 
preciating the  position  correctly;  it  leads  to  an 
underestimation  of  the  enemy's  strength,  and  ren- 
ders difficult  the  renewed  and  unavoidable  contact 
after  the  war.  But  apart  from  all  this,  one  thing 
is  certain:  all  systematic  substitution  of  our  old 
German  humanity  by  simple  national  egotism,  all 
permanent  concentration  of  our  feelings  upon  an- 
tagonism, are  dangerous  to  ourselves."  Profes- 
sor Wilhelm  Ilerzog,  in  *'Das  Forum"  (Munich), 
queried :  '  *  Did  we,  and  do  we,  hate  England  I  Is 
there  any  such  a  hate  outside  the  ranks  of  profes- 
sional lyric  poets  and  other  intellectuals  of  the 
same  stamp?  We  hate  neither  the  English,  nor 
the  French,  nor  the  Russian  people.  We  only  hate 
those  who  are  responsible  for  the  present  war. 
There  are  everywhere  erratic  'idealists';  it  is  they 
who  exhaust  themselves  in  sentiments  of  national 
hostility."  And  Professor  Heinrich  Morf,  on 
opening  his  course  in  French  philologj'',  uttered 
this  noble  tribute  to  the  spirit  of  scientific  truth: 
'*You  have  come  together  with  me  here  to  pursue 
a  work  of  peace.  .  .  .  When  your  teacher  has 
mounted  this  rostrum  and  the  outer  doors  of  this 
auditorium  are  closed,  we  must  and  will  compel 
our  thoughts  to  turn  aside  for  an  hour  from  what 
elsewhere  daily  and  nightly  oppresses  every  heart. 
.  .  .  The  passions  of  the  day  shall  not  enter  here. 
We  will  leave  them  without.    Science  demands  of 


100  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

us  this  act  of  self-conquest  and  self-discipline. 
Whoso  finds  this  impossible  cannot  serve  her,  and 
can  find  no  intimate  communion  with  her  soul. 
Such  an  one  will  remain  unsatisfied  within  these 
walls.  .  .  .  There  will  be  no  change,  therefore,  in 
the  scientific  character  of  these  lectures.  Now,  as 
heretofore,  I  will  try  to  school  your  historic  think- 
ing to  dispassionate  conception  and  judgment  of 
the  things  of  the  past  and  of  foreign  lands.  Such 
scientific  labor  does  not  sunder — it  unites.  It 
teaches  to  perceive,  to  understand ;  not  to  despise." 
During  this  period  the  question  of  German  un- 
popularity in  the  world  at  large  was  also  widely 
discussed.  The  fact  of  this  unpopularity  was  uni- 
versally admitted,  but  the  reasons  assigned  for  its 
prevalence  varied  greatly.  Some  laid  it  to  the 
foreigner's  envy  of,  or  inability  to  comprehend, 
the  peculiar  character  and  superiority  of  German 
Kultur.  ''We  had  too  little  pride  and  too  much 
kindness  of  heart,"  asserted  "Der  Tag,"  (Berlin), 
in  September,  1915.  "We  gave  ourselves  without 
reserve  and  made  generous  presents  from  our  su- 
perfluous riches.  We  showed  only  too  plainly  our 
appreciation  of  foreign  ways  and  laid  too  little 
stress  on  our  own  qualities.  This  will  and  must 
be  changed.  We  shall  never  obtain  recognition 
for  Germanism  except  by  national  pride  and  cold 
reserve."  Others,  however,  considered  Germans 
themselves  largely  responsible,  and  dilated  upon 
national  shortcomings  such  as  tactlessness,  bad 
manners,  aggressiveness,  and  the  inferior  social 
standing  of  German  sojourners  abroad.    "In  his 


GERMANY  101 

personal  behavior  to  strangers,"  wrote  the  "K61- 
nische  Zcitung,"  *'the  German  gives  cause  for  mis- 
trust and  dislike.  ...  If  a  German  of  this  kind 
sees  a  French  regiment  marching  past  at  a  review 
with  its  normal  step  and  not  with  the  thunder- 
clap of  the  German  parade-march,  he  laughs,  and 
is  so  amused  that  he  says  what  he  thinks  to  his 
French  neiglibor.  The  same  person,  when  he  sees 
an  English  railroad  station,  remarks  upon  the  dirt, 
the  stuffy  waiting-rooms,  the  mass  of  vulgar,  col- 
ored advertisements,  and  says  to  his  English  com- 
panion that  he  would  like  him  to  see  one  of  the 
great  new  German  stations  that  are  as  clean  and 
bright  as  a  new  pin.  ...  So  the  German  gets  the 
reputation  of  being  a  childish  braggart."  In  an 
unusually  thoughtful  article  in  the  ''Preussische 
Jabrbiicher"  for  February,  1915,  Felix  Stahl, 
while  admitting  the  above  failings  as  contributary 
causes,  found  the  real  secret  of  German  unpopu- 
larity in  the  speeding-up  process  which  German 
efficiency  had  produced  throughout  the  entire  eco- 
nomic world,  thus  raising  the  ire  of  peoples  with 
assured  prospects  and  satisfied  with  a  less  strenu- 
ous pace. 

All  this  need  not  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
Germans  were  abandoning  themselves  to  philo- 
sophic speculation.  On  the  contrary,  the  triumphs 
of  1915,  with  their  conquests  of  Poland,  Courland, 
and  Serbia,  the  winning  over  of  Bulgaria,  and  tlie 
opening  of  the  highroad  to  Turkey  and  the  Moslem 
East,  roused  an  ever-growing  discussion  concern- 
ing the  multitudinous  problems  of  the  morrow. 


102  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

We  have  already  noted  the  less  hostile  attitude 
toward  England  which  was  becoming  manifest  in 
many  quarters.  We  must  now  consider  the  grow- 
ing coolness  toward  France.  At  the  beginning  of 
the  war,  it  will  be  remembered,  no  anti-French 
feeling  had  been  visible  in  Germany.  But  as  time 
passed  the  implacable  temper  of  the  French  people 
with  its  call  for  the  destruction  of  German  unity, 
produced  a  feeling  of  exasperation  and  convinced 
many  Germans  that  this  irreconcilable  foe  must 
be  finally  crushed.  Typical  of  this  new  feeling  is 
a  petition  addressed  to  the  imperial  chancellor  by 
a  distinguished  gathering  of  German  intellectuals 
at  Berlin  in  the  summer  of  1915.  **  After  being 
threatened  by  France  for  centuries,"  reads  this 
document,  **and  after  hearing  the  cry  of  'Re- 
vanche' from  1815  till  1870,  and  from  1871  till 
1915,  we  wish  to  have  done  with  the  French  men- 
ace once  and  for  all.  All  classes  of  our  people  are 
imbued  with  this  desire.  There  must,  however, 
be  no  misplaced  attempts  at  reconciliation,  which 
have  always  been  opposed  by  France  with  the  ut- 
most fanaticism;  and  as  regards  this  we  would 
utter  a  most  urgent  warning  to  Germans  not  to 
deceive  themselves.  Even  after  the  terrible  les- 
son of  this  unsuccessful  war,  France  will  still 
thirst  for  revenge  in  so  far  as  her  strength  per- 
mits. For  the  sake  of  our  own  existence  we  must 
ruthlessly  weaken  her  both  politically  and  eco- 
nomically, and  we  must  improve  our  military  and 
strategical  position  with  regard  to  her.  For  this 
purpose,  in  our  opinion,  it  is  necessary  radically 


GERMANY  103 

to  improve  our  whole  Western  front  from  Belfort 
to  the  coast." 

Tlie  same  document  gives  an  insight  into  Ger- 
man public  feeling  about  Belgium.  '*0n  Bel- 
gium," it  declares,  '*on  the  acquisition  of  which  so 
much  of  the  best  German  blood  has  been  shed,  we 
must  keep  firm  hold,  from  the  political,  military, 
and  economic  standpoints,  despite  any  arguments 
which  may  be  urged  to  the  contrary.  On  no  point 
are  the  masses  more  united,  for  without  the  slight- 
est possible  doubt  they  consider  it  a  matter  of 
honor  to  hold  onto  Belgium.  ...  In  time  also  she 
may  entail  a  considerable  addition  to  our  nation, 
if  in  course  of  time  the  Flemish  element,  which 
is  so  closely  allied  to  us,  becomes  emancipated 
from  the  artificial  grip  of  French  culture  and  re- 
members its  Teutonic  affinities."  The  fate  of  Bel- 
gium had,  indeed,  greatly  interested  Germans  from 
the  first.  At  the  very  beginning  of  the  war  Pro- 
fessor Hermann  Losch  had  predicted,  ''The  war 
between  the  three  west  European  Powers  will  be 
fought  not  only  in  Belgium,  but  for  Belgium. ' '  In 
the  spring  of  1915,  Count  zu  Reventlow  wrote: 
"The  absolute  and  permanent  withdrawal  of  Bel- 
gium from  all  British  and  French  influence  is  a 
vital  matter  for  Germany's  future.  .  .  .  Belgium 
can  never  again,  with  the  best  will  in  the  world, 
become  independent.  A  restoration  of  Belgium  to 
its  former  political  state  is  a  phantom,  a  Utopia." 
Annexation  of  both  Belgian  and  French  territory 
was,  however,  hotly  combatted  by  Social  Demo- 
crats of  all  shades. 


104  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

And  this  feeling  against  annexations  in  western 
Europe  was  not  confined  to  Socialists;  it  was 
shared  by  ardent  expansionists  as  well.  Many 
Germans  had  now  become  convinced  that  a  com- 
plete Teutonic  triumph  was  impossible.  Since 
this  was  so,  these  people  held  that  Germany  must 
choose  her  compensations  either  East  or  West. 
And  while  some  persons  held  Western  gains  the 
more  important,  a  larger  number  believed  that 
Germany's  true  line  of  expansion  lay  toward  the 
east.  The  crushing  of  Serbia  and  the  opening  up 
of  the  highroad  to  the  Ottoman  Empire  had  at 
last  realized  the  great  Teutonic  dream,  "Berlin- 
Bagdad,  ' '  and  the  maintainance  of  this  connection 
appeared  to  wide  circles  of  German  thought  an 
imperative  necessity.  But  the  retention  of  Bel- 
gium obviously  involved  a  finish  fight  with  Eng- 
land. Could  Germany  hold  both  Bagdad  and  Ant- 
werp against  the  world?  Would  it  not  be  wiser 
to  surrender  Antwerp  as  the  price  of  English 
assent  to  ''Berlin-Bagdad'"?  This  was  the  opin- 
ion of  moderate  German  imperialists  of  the 
"Eastern"  school. 

Germany's  Oriental  hopes  had  been  high  from 
the  first.  Turkey's  adherence  to  the  Teutonic 
cause  in  November,  1914,  had  been  enthusiastically 
hailed  by  every  section  of  the  German  press. 
"Over  there  in  Turkey,"  wrote  the  well-known 
German  publicist,  Ernst  Jackh,  in  a  pamphlet  pub- 
lished at  that  moment,  "stretch  Anatolia  and  Mes- 
opotamia: Anatolia,  the  'Land  of  the  Sunrise'; 
Mesopotamia,   the    region    of   ancient   paradise. 


GERMANY  105 

May  these  names  be  to  us  a  sign :  may  this  world- 
war  bring  to  Germany  and  Turkey  the  sunrise  and 
the  paradise  of  a  new  time ;  may  it  confer  upon  an 
assured  Turkey  and  a  Greater  Germany  the  bless- 
ing of  a  fruitful  Turco-Teutonic  collaboration  in 
peace  after  a  victorious  Turco-Teutonic  collabora- 
tion in  war." 

German  expectations  were  still  further  excited 
by  the  Turkish  proclamation  of  the  **Holy  War" 
in  mid-November,  1914.  **The  false  moves  of 
Grey  have  brought  all  the  Moslems  into  line,"  as- 
serted the  "Frankfurter  Zeitung."  ''Indians, 
Eg^-ptians,  and  Persians  recognize  the  English  as 
foes.  The  blows  that  Grey  has  rained  upon  the 
Moslem  world  have  roused  it,  nolens  volens, 
from  its  deep  sleep.  The  two  great  Moslem 
sects,  the  Shiites  and  the  Sunnites  have  sunk 
their  differences  and  become  brothers.  No 
power  in  the  world  can  ever  again  make  Turkey 
and  Persia  break  away  from  each  other.  The 
Egyptians,  Indians,  Chinese,  and  Africans  will  en- 
ter into  a  holy  league.  The  Moslems  living  in 
the  English  and  French  colonies  can  no  longer  be 
true  to  their  allegiance,  nor  can  those  of  the  Cau- 
casus, Turkestan,  and  Transcaucasia  remain  loyal 
to  Russia.  If  Afghanistan,  India,  Egypt,  Mo- 
rocco, Tunis,  and  Algeria  join  themselves  to  the 
two  Moslem  Powers,  Turkey  and  Persia,  can  the 
Triple  Entente  continue  their  war  against  Ger- 
many and  Austria?" 

Disappointed  at  that  moment,  these  hopes  re- 
vived a  year  later  after  Serbia's  fall.    ''Persia  is 


106  PRESENT-DAY  EUEOPE 

beginning  to  shake  the  shackles  of  the  Anglo- 
Russian  treaty,"  wrote  the  "Vossische  Zeitung" 
in  November,  1915.  *' Persia  is  beginning  to  arm 
and  defend  herself.  Afghanistan  will  never  go 
with  Russia  and  England.  In  Africa  the  Senussi 
are  stirring;  their  influence  extends  over  Egypt 
and  Tripoli,  including  the  Hinterland.  In  Egypt 
the  English  have  so  far  been  able  to  repress  ten- 
dencies to  revolt,  but  they  cannot  prevent  hostile 
agitation  from  penetrating  like  a  dynamite  car- 
tridge. In  Tunis  and  Morocco  also  there  are  ways 
and  means  of  letting  the  population  know  of  the 
French  and  English  defeats  at  the  Dardanelles. 
We  are  only  at  the  beginning  of  the  effects  of  the 
Islamic  ferment. ' ' 

The  scope  of  German  Asiatic  aspirations  is  re- 
vealed in  an  article  by  the  learned  Orientalist, 
Professor  Berhardt  Molden,  which  appeared  in 
the  **Preussische  Jahrbiicher"  for  December, 
1914.  Germany's  aid  to  Turkey,  contends  Profes- 
sor Molden,  is  only  symptomatic  of  her  policy  to 
raise  the  other  Asiatic  peoples  now  crushed  be- 
neath English  and  Russian  domination.  Thus 
Germany  will  create  puissant  allies  for  the  "Sec- 
ond Punic  War"  which  England  may  well  wage 
if  the  present  conflict  should  end  in  a  deadlock. 
Therefore,  Germany  must  strive  to  solidify  that 
great  Central  Asian  block — Turkey,  Persia,  Af- 
ghanistan, China — all  of  whose  members  are  men- 
aced by  the  Anglo-Russo-Japanese  robber-league. 
Only  Germany  can  save  the  threatened,  from 
Stockholm  to  Pekin.    Professor  Molden  urges  a 


GERMANY  107 

*' Pan- Asian  railroad"  from  Stambul  to  Pekin. 
This  would  bo  especially  alluring  for  xVfghanistan, 
which  would  thus  become  one  of  the  great  world- 
pivots  of  politics  and  trade.  In  fine,  ''Germany 
must  free  Asia."  This  is  the  keynote  of  all  the 
German  waitings  on  tliis  point.  ''To  renovate 
the  East,"  such  is  Germany's  mission,  wrote 
Friedrich  Delitzsch  in  the  "Deutsche  Revue"  for 
January,  1916. 

To  many  Germans  the  great  obstacle  to  Teu- 
tonic ascendancy  in  the  Balkans  and  Asia  was  not 
so  much  England  as  Russia.  In  fact,  the  existence 
of  any  sort  of  "Greater  Germany"  was  considered 
menaced  by  the  "Russian  Peril."  The  fear  of 
Russia,  so  prominent  at  the  outbreak  of  war,  had 
been  temporarily  submerged  by  the  flood  of  hatred 
against  England,  but  Russian  resilience  under  the 
most  shattering  blows  and  Austrian  weakness  be- 
fore Muscovite  assaults  gradually  brought  the 
Russian  danger  again  to  the  fore.  Of  course,  cer- 
tain reactionary  Junkers  might  regret  the  old  inti- 
macy between  the  Prussian  and  Russian  courts, 
and  the  hotter  advocates  of  a  finish  fight  against 
England  might  recommend  generous  terms  to  pur- 
chase a  Russian  separate  peace,  but  most  Ger- 
mans plainly  believed  that  the  Russian  colossus 
must  be  definitely  broken  if  Germany  were  not  to 
be  overshadowed  in  course  of  time. 

"Can  Russia  remain  a  European  Power  in  the 
former  sense  of  the  word,  if  our  future  is  to  be 
secure?"  asks  the  noted  German  publicist,  Paul 
Rohrbach,  at  the  beginning  of  his  book,  "Russland 


108  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

und  Wir,"  published  in  the  summer  of  1915.  His 
answer  is  an  emphatic  '*No!"  He  concludes  his 
book  as  follows:  ''There  you  have  present-day 
Russia!  'Scratch  a  Russian  and  you  find  a  Tar- 
tar' has  long  been  a  true  proverb.  As  soon  as  the 
superficial  veneer  of  external  civilization  peels  off, 
modern  Muscovitism  reveals  the  same  wild,  bar- 
baric traits  as  it  did  centuries  ago  under  Ivan  the 
Terrible.  ...  As  in  Livonia  in  1558,  so  in  East 
Prussia  in  1914  and  1915!  The  Muscovite  is  a 
Muscovite  still.  Only  he  who  does  not  know  him 
can  imagine  that  the  Muscovite  is  capable  of  living 
as  a  Kultur-nation  in  lasting  communion  with  the 
European  world.  He  cannot  do  it,  for  he  has  an- 
other soul.  .  .  .  With  this  state  it  is  very  difficult 
to  conclude  a  real  peace  according  to  the  accepted 
canons  of  international  law.  Reckless  barbarity, 
criminal  lust  of  conquest,  and  destruction  of  all 
human  culture  founded  upon  freedom  are  the  very 
essence  of  its  being.  He  who  thinks  about  the 
peace  which  is  to  follow  this  war  must  first  of  all 
visualize  the  inner  nature  of  his  Russian  opponent. 
...  He  who  has  any  regard  for  the  soul  and  the 
future  of  Germanism  and  human  civilization  will 
thereupon  lay  down  one  inflexible  condition:  No 
compromise  peace  with  Russia ! ' '  This  conclusion 
is  heartily  endorsed  by  Otto  Hoetsch,  Ernst  Jackh, 
and  other  leading  German  political  writers.  Karl 
Leuthner,  in  his  recent  book,  "Russischer  Volks- 
imperialismus "  (1916),  draws  a  truly  alarming 
picture.  According  to  him,  the  Russian  masses 
are  taking  up  the  old  imperialistic  programs  of 


GERMANY  109 

Tsars,  bureaucrats,  and  artistic  thinkers,  and  are 
''going  them  one  better,"  just  as  the  imperialism 
of  the  French  revolution  surpassed  that  of  Louis 
XIV.  The  liberal,  democratic,  cosmopolitan  op- 
position party  in  Russia  was  only  a  superficial  cur- 
rent engendered  by  the  excesses  of  Autocracy:  it 
is  fast  bowing  dowTi  to  Panslavism's  Holy  Trinity 
— Tsar,  Great-Russian  People,  Orthodoxy.  "We 
Germans,"  concludes  Herr  Leuthner,  **must  look 
this  reality  in  the  face.  In  the  whole  realm  of 
politics  there  is  for  us  nothing  more  weighty.  Not 
the  Russian  Tsar  alone,  whose  tyranny  we  ab- 
horred, but  also  the  Russian  people,  for  whose 
freedom  we  have  waxed  enthusiastic,  stands  with 
all  the  traditional  lust  of  conquest  and  subjuga- 
tion upon  our  borders.  Those  whom  we  believed 
spiritually  near  to  us  have  become  our  readiest 
and  bitterest  foes.  All  illusions,  all  empty  hopes 
of  reconciliation,  are  shattered.  We  must  prepare 
our  souls  either  to  undergo  the  fate  involved  in 
propinquity  to  a  rapacious  world-empire,  or  re- 
solve to  avert  that  fate  by  this  war. ' '  These  Ger- 
man apprehensions  have  been  steadily  increased 
by  the  momentous  internal  changes  which  have 
transpired  in  the  Russian  Empire.  In  the ' '  Preus- 
sische  Jahrbiicher ' '  for  November,  1916,  Dr.  Hans 
Delbriick  maintains  that  Russia's  restoration  of 
her  army  after  the  debacle  of  1915,  the  prohibition 
of  vodka,  and  the  construction  of  the  Murman  rail- 
way to  the  Arctic  Ocean  in  the  midst  of  war,  are 
sucli  miglity  achievements  as  prove  conclusively 
that  Russia  is  to  Germany  a  foe  far  more  menac- 


110  PKESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

ing  than  England.  General  von  Hindenburg 
seems  to  have  put  this  feeling  in  a  nutshell  when 
he  remarked  during  a  recent  interview,  "We  hate 
the  English — the  future  danger  to  Germany  lies 
in  the  East." 

All  this  accounts  for  the  German  Government's 
reconstruction  of  Poland,  and  for  German  popu- 
lar demands  for  similar  action  in  Lithuania,  the 
Russian  Baltic  provinces,  and  the  Ukraine. 

Such  were  the  complex  thought-currents  which 
first  appeared  upon  the  surface  of  German  na- 
tional consciousness  during  the  closing  months  of 
1915.  But,  as  the  new  year  drew  nigh,  those  prob- 
lems which  had  engrossed  German  thought  in  the 
earlier  phases  of  the  war  came  once  more  to  the 
fore.  The  Allies  steadily  refused  to  make  peace 
on  a  ''war-map"  basis,  while  the  English  blockade 
drew  ever  tighter  around  beleaguered  Central  Eu- 
rope. By  the  end  of  1915,  Germany  was  plainly 
feeling  the  pinch.  ''While  our  troops  are  fighting 
like  the  heroes  of  the  classical  ages,"  wrote  the 
"Frankfurter  Zeitung"  in  November,  "want  is 
growing  acute  at  home,  where  the  people  are  be- 
ginning to  interpret  the  miserable  existing  condi- 
tions as  the  defeat  of  the  Empire.  We  jeered  at 
the  blockade,  but  to-day  we  laugh  no  longer.  The 
sinister  aspect  of  things  certainly  provides  no 
food  for  laughter."  A  Socialist  memorial  to  the 
imperial  chancellor  read:  "In  Berlin  to-day  the 
poorer  people  very  rarely  see  either  meat  or  any 
fat  food;  that  means  that  they  are  not  receiving 
enough   albuminous   nourishment   to  meet   their 


GERMANY  Ul 

needs.  The  complaints  we  receive  from  the  fam- 
ilies of  mobilized  men  are  fearful.  Their  position 
is  rapidly  becoming  one  of  despair."  This  food 
shortage  appears  to  have  reached  its  climax  just 
before  the  harvest  in  the  summer  of  1916.  Since 
then  things  seem  to  have  been  somewhat  easier, 
though  the  situation  is  still  far  from  ideal  and 
complaints  are  widespread.  For  example,  in 
early  January,  1917,  tlie  Berlin  ''Vorwiirts"  said: 
'*We  are  all  reasonable  enough  to  look  facts  in 
the  face  and  to  bear  the  inevitable  with  dignity. 
We  also  know  that  a  German  defeat  would  take 
not  only  the  last  scraps  of  butter  from  our  bread, 
but  take  the  bread  also.  But  apart  from  a  needy 
future  after  the  war,  we  have  only  been  told  that 
we  have  no  improvement  of  rations  to  expect,  and 
that  on  the  contrary  the  difficulties  will  increase, 
especially  after  Easter." 

Hunger  and  the  Allies '  implacable  temper  natu- 
rally roused  a  fresh  wave  of  fury  in  Germany. 
**We  have  not  yet  succeeded  in  forcing  our  ene- 
mies to  peace,"  wrote  the  ''Kolnische  Zeitung"  in 
late  1915.  ''The  hopes  of  the  enemy  are  still 
strong.  They  are  showing  more  and  more  arro- 
gance. Every  man  and  every  woman  in  Germany 
must  be  impressed  by  the  fact  that  this  war  is  a 
question  of  life  or  death.  It  would  be  vain  to  hope 
for  mercy  if  our  enemies  succeed  in  their  plans. 
There  is  nothing  left  for  us  but  to  fight  with  our 
backs  to  the  wall  until  such  victory  be  achieved 
that  we  can  force  peace  on  our  foes.  In  this  our 
only  hope  lies — in  the  grimmest  warfare  at  the 


112  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

front,  supported  by  our  resistance  at  home  and 
by  our  iron  will  to  hold  out.  To  him  who  can  best 
hold  his  nerves  in  rein  will  be  the  victory. 
Successes  we  have  in  plenty.  What  we  have 
left  to  do  is  to  dictate  peace.  Deutschland 
iiber  AUes!"  The  latent  desire  for  peace 
showed  in  comments  like  that  of  *'Vor- 
warts"  at  the  close  of  1916:  "If  we  are  going 
to  drag  this  war  out  indefinitely,  all  Europe  will  be 
bled  to  death,  and  America  and  colored  people  will 
be  our  heirs.  But  we  want  Europe  to  live.  We 
see  France  bleeding  white,  but  we  have  never  hated 
her.  We  want  peace  for  Germany,  France,  Eng- 
land and  Russia — peace  for  the  whole  blood- 
stained world. ' ' 

However,  the  Allies'  uncompromising  rejection 
of  German  peace  offers  at  the  opening  of  1917 
spurred  the  entire  German  people  to  desperate 
wrath.  "Peace  talk  must  now  cease,"  asserted 
the  "Tagliche  Rundschau";  while  the  "Kolnische 
Zeitung"  exclaimed  hotly,  "We  have  now  learned 
that  our  enemies  do  not  want  peace,  but  war  to 
the  knife;  so  we  must  abandon  all  considerations 
and  grasp  all  the  means  of  war  at  our  disposal." 
Kaiser  Wilhelm  undoubtedly  voiced  the  feelings 
of  his  people  when  he  asserted  in  his  proclama- 
tion of  late  January,  1917:  "Our  enemies  have 
dropped  the  mask.  After  refusing  with  scorn  and 
hypocritical  words  of  love  for  peace  and  humanity 
our  honest  peace  offer,  they  have  now,  in  their 
reply  to  the  United  States,  gone  beyond  that  and 
admitted  their  lust  for  conquest,  the  baseness  of 


GERMANY  113 

which  is  further  enhanced  by  their  calumnious  as- 
sertions. Their  aim  is  the  crushing  of  Germany, 
the  dismemberment  of  the  Powers  allied  witli  us, 
and  the  enslavement  of  the  freedom  of  Europe  and 
the  seas  under  the  same  yoke  that  Greece,  with 
gnashing  teeth,  is  now  enduring.  But  what  they 
could  not  achieve  in  thirty  months  of  the  bloodiest 
fighting  and  unscrupulous  economic  war  they  will 
also  fail  to  accomplish  in  the  future.  .  .  .  Burning 
indignation  and  holy  wrath  will  redouble  the 
strength  of  every  German  man  and  woman, 
whether  it  be  devoted  to  fighting,  to  work,  or  to 
suffering.    We  are  ready  for  all  sacrifices." 

This  iron  mood  was  accompanied  by  a  sharp  re- 
crudescence of  the  former  intransigeance  against 
England.  "The  majority  of  our  people  still  have 
no  conception  of  the  consequences  which  would 
follow  if  we  were  defeated,  and  defeated  by  such 
an  enemy  as  England,"  asserted  the  *'Kolnische 
Zeitung."  ''It  is  a  dangerous  mistake  to  regard 
English  speeches  as  vain  boasting.  .  .  .  For  God's 
sake  let  us  not  deceive  ourselves  about  England's 
determination  so  to  force  Germany  to  her  knees 
that  she  must  accept  England's  conditions  with- 
out resistance  and  be  wiped  out  forever  as  a  com- 
petitor in  the  world's  markets.  All  classes  of  that 
people  are  united  in  this  resolve,  from  the  First 
Sea  Lord  to  the  humblest  dock-laborer  at  New- 
castle-on-T}Tie.  It  cannot  be  too  firmly  insisted 
that  such  a  victory  for  England  would  mean  an  ir- 
reparable catastrophe  for  the  German  Empire. 
Not  only  would  the  German  Empire  be  dissolved, 


114  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

but  our  people  itself  would  be  seriously  threatened 
with  extinction,  especially  in  view  of  the  Russian 
torrent  pouring  in  from  the  east." 

The  logical  conclusion  was  that  England  must 
be  crushed,  and  the  advocates  of  a  finish  fight 
against  Britain  asserted  that  her  destruction  could 
be  accomplished  by  means  of  ruthless  submarine 
warfare.  From  the  autumn  of  1916  on,  increasing 
pressure  was  brought  to  bear  upon  the  German 
Government  to  repudiate  its  compromise  with  the 
United  States  and  plunge  unreservedly  into  the 
fray.  *'Down  with  England!"  cried  a  popular 
pamphlet;  "England  is  not  only  our  most  danger- 
ous, but  also  our  most  vulnerable,  enemy,  because 
an  island  lives  and  dies  with  its  shipping.  Can  we 
conquer  England  on  the  sea?  Yes.  The  deeds 
and  experiences  of  our  navy  give  a  sure  guarantee 
of  this."  "If  we  are  to  win  a  victory,"  declared 
Dr.  von  Heydebrand,  Conservative  leader  in  the 
Prussian  Diet,  at  the  beginning  of  1917,  "it  is  ab- 
solutely imperative  to  use  the  weapons  which  give 
us  the  possibility  of  winning  a  victory  against  the 
toughest  and  strongest  adversary — England.  .  .  . 
The  German  and  Prussian  people  will  be  prepared 
to  bear  the  consequences. "  And  Count  von  West- 
arp.  Conservative  leader  in  the  Reichstag,  as- 
serted: "Our  utmost  strength  must  now  be 
thrown  into  the  scales.  There  is  no  weapon  of 
warfare  which  we  dare  withhold."  The  imperial 
chancellor's  announcement  of  ruthless  submarine 
warfare  at  the  beginning  of  February  was  hailed 
throughout  Germany  with  a  unanimous  shout  of 


GERMANY  115 

joy,  ''Now  our  enemies  will  leam  what  the 
U-boat  terror  really  is,"  cried  the  Berlin  ''Lokal 
Anzeiger";  while  the  "Borsen  Zeitung"  exclaimed 
defiantly,  ''Eight  or  wrong:  victory!"  The  rup- 
ture with  America  produced  no  perceptible  effect 
in  the  popular  attitude. 

Such  is  Germany's  present  war  temper.  Re- 
garding "after  the  war"  problems,  it  is  not  sur- 
prising to  find  the  widest  variety  of  viewpoints. 
In  general,  we  may  say  that  the  more  bellicose  ele- 
ments have  always  maintained  that  Germany's  fu- 
ture attitude  toward  foreign  peoples  must  be,  in 
case  of  victory,  the  haughty  aloofness  of  the  con- 
queror for  his  inferiors;  in  case  of  temporary 
stalemate  the  wrathful  aloofness  of  the  master- 
folk  bracing  itself  with  the  will  to  conquer.  A 
good  example  of  this  militaristic  thought  school  is 
an  article  in  the  "Liller  Kriegszeitung"  of  late 
1916:  "Michel,  listen!  To  understand  is  to  for- 
give. But  nobody  understands,  nobody  wishes  to 
understand,  our  nature,  our  ways,  our  striving  to- 
ward good,  or  our  honesty.  Hence  the  irreconcil- 
able hostility  of  the  whole  world  against  every- 
thing German.  Give  up,  therefore,  dear  Michel, 
the  vain  and  dangerous  pursuit  of  grasping  your 
enemies'  point  of  view.  Thus  only  will  you  suc- 
ceed in  acquiring  the  ruthless  temper  which  is 
necessary  in  order  to  attain  victory.  .  .  .  Every- 
body considers  you  a  'dirty  pig,'  dear  Michel. 
You  cannot  alter  that.  Then  have  the  courage  to 
make  up  your  mind  about  it.  .  .  .  It  is  impossible 
for  us  to  come  to  any  understanding  with  our  ene- 


116  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

mies  throughout  this  and  the  following  genera- 
tion." Among  these  prophets  of  evil  there  runs 
a  good  deal  of  pessimism.  The  noted  historian, 
Professor  Eduard  Meyer,  in  his  book,  '*  Germany 
and  England,"  predicts  that  the  present  struggle 
is  only  the  first  of  a  long  series  of  Anglo-German 
"Punic"  wars  in  which  modern  civilization  will 
retrograde  to  a  condition  of  semi-barbarism.  Ger- 
many will  be  the  victor,  but  a  Pyrrhic  victor,  for 
the  colored  races,  taking  advantage  of  white  deca- 
dence, will  destroy  European  supremacy. 

Other  Germans,  however,  including  many  lead- 
ing intellectuals  and  the  entire  Social  Democratic 
group,  take  a  much  more  cheerful  view.  Dr.  Hans 
Delbriick  thinks  a  perpetuation  of  present  hatreds 
impossible.  "The  various  states,"  he  writes, 
"cannot  surround  themselves  with  Chinese  walls, 
but  must  resume  the  exchange  of  merchandise  and 
ideal  values.  A  nation  not  doing  so  would  only 
harm  itself."  The  Socialist  Deputy,  Haenisch, 
remarks :  "There  has  even  been  some  talk  that  in 
future  German  science  and  art  must  lead  their 
own  life.  .  .  .  This  is  sheer  rubbish.  After  the 
war  the  nations  will  be  still  more  dependent  upon 
one  another  than  before,  and  without  the  fructify- 
ing influence  of  foreign  countries  our  national  cul- 
ture will  wither. ' ' 

Between  these  two  extreme  viewpoints  lies  an 
indeterminate  mass  of  public  opinion  which  has 
inclined  first  to  one  side  and  then  to  the  other  ac- 
cording to  the  fortunes  of  war;  intransigeant  at 
the  start,  more  conciliatory  during  the  optimistic 


GERMANY  117 

second  half  of  1915,  hardening  again  under  the 
stress  of  deferred  peace  and  the  rigorous  blockade. 

One  thing,  however,  can  be  said:  the  German 
people,  though  prone  to  passionate  outbursts,  is 
extremely  attentive  to  the  utterances  of  its  politi- 
cal and  intellectual  leaders.  And  these  leaders 
are  to-day  generally  avowed  realists;  ^'Realpoliti- 
ker,"  as  they  pride  themselves.  It  is,  therefore, 
unlikely  that,  in  the  future,  Germany  will  follow  a 
policy  of  sentiment  or  nurse  old  grudges  where 
nothing  practical  is  to  be  gained.  Of  course,  a 
humiliating  peace  would  probably  inspire  a  policy 
of  "revenge,"  but  the  underlying  motive  for  this 
policy  would  be,  not  so  much  rancor  at  the  past 
as  confidence  in  German  ability  to  upset  a  settle- 
ment dictated  by  a  hostile  world.  Thus,  Ger- 
many's future  relations  with  her  present  foes 
should  depend  primarily  on  the  actual  course  of 
events.  Those  nations  whom  German  statesmen 
consider  a  menace  to  German  aims  will  remain 
popular  bugbears.  Those  with  whom  accommo- 
dation is  deemed  desirable  will  be  looked  upon 
with  popular  favor.  In  all  this,  sentiment  ob- 
viously plays  a  slight  part. 

Of  course,  the  war  has  drawn  Germany  and  her 
allies  increasingly  together.  For  Bulgaria  and 
Turkey,  Teutonic  friendship  is  not  without  mental 
reservations,  but  w4th  Austria-Hungary  the  bonds 
are  extremely  close.  In  this  case  practical  con- 
siderations are  reinforced  by  deep-going  ties  of 
sentiment  and  racial  affinity,  owing  to  the  Ger- 
manic character  of  the  llapsburg  Monarchy  and 


118  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

the  fraternal  feelings  of  the  Austrian  Teutons. 
Most  Germans  believe  that  the  alliance  between 
the  two  empires  must  henceforth  be  unbreakable, 
and  Germany's  ablest  thinkers  are  to-day  busy 
working  out  a  permanent  solution.  Typical  of 
these  efforts  is  Friedrich  Naumann's  book,  "Mit- 
teleuropa"  (''Central  Europe").  Naumann  pro- 
poses a  * '  Superstate, ' '  Austro-German  in  the  first 
instance,  yet  so  federative  in  character  that  all 
the  minor  nations  of  the  Central  European  zone, 
from  Scandinavia  to  Turkey,  may  ultimately  be 
included.  Here  again  the  realistic  note  is  clear. 
With  the  exception  of  Austria,  sentiment  does  not 
deeply  color  German  speculation  regarding  future 
friends. 


CHAPTER  IV 

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 

IP  German  national  consciousness  may  be  con- 
sidered a  diversified  unity,  Austria-Hungary's 
appears  as  a  dualized  diversity.  The  theory  un- 
derlying Austria-Hungary's  "Dualist"  Consti- 
tution of  1867  was  that  the  Germans  of  Austria 
and  the  Magyars  of  Hungary  should  rule  their  re- 
spective halves  of  the  empire  and  keep  the  various 
minor  races  in  due  subordination.  But  this  theory 
never  worked  well  in  practice.  The  Germans  and 
Magyars,  though  unquestionably  the  empire's  two 
leading  races,  are  not  in  a  numerical  majority.  Of 
the  twenty-nine  million  inhabitants  of  Austria, 
only  ten  millions  are  Germans  (with  two  millions 
more  in  Hungary),  while  the  Magyars  constitute 
but  ten  million  of  the  twenty-one  million  souls 
which  make  up  Hungary's  total  population.  As  a 
result,  German  hegemony  in  Austria  broke  down 
long  ago,  while  in  Hungary  Magyar  supremacy 
has  been  maintained  only  at  the  cost  of  increas- 
ingly dangerous  protests  from  the  non-Magyar 
nationalities.  The  last  half-century  of  Austria- 
Hungary's  history  has,  in  fact,  been  the  record  of 
the  struggles  of  its  minor  nationalities  to  attain 
complete  self-realization,  either  by  gaining  full 
partnership  within  the  empire  or  by  secession  to 

119 


120  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

racial  kinsmen  outside  the  empire's  frontiers. 
The  consequence  has  been  chronic  race  friction 
which  has  led  many  observers  to  predict  the  em- 
pire's complete  dissolution. 

These  race  problems  are  of  such  vital  signifi- 
cance for  an  understanding  of  Austria-Hungary's 
present  condition  and  future  prospects  that  a  brief 
summary  of  their  status  in  July,  1914,  is  necessary. 
Despite  their  complexity,  a  glance  at  a  race  map 
of  Austria-Hungary  reveals  a  certain  fundamental 
simplicity.  Roughly  speaking,  the  empire  divides 
into  three  great  race  zones,  running  east  and  west : 
to  the  north,  a  broad  band  of  Slavs ;  to  the  south, 
a  shorter  and  thicker  band  of  Slavs;  between  the 
two,  a  wide  belt  of  non-Slavs;  in  the  west,  Ger- 
mans ;  in  the  center,  Magyars ;  in  the  east,  a  mix- 
ture of  Germans,  Magyars,  and  Rumanians.  This 
non-Slavic  middle  zone  fills  the  broad  Danubian 
plain  and  completely  severs  the  Slav  belts  froni 
each  other.  This  central  position  is  one  of  the 
great  reasons  why  the  Germans  and  Magyars  have 
always  dominated  the  empire. 

Another  reason  for  Germano-Magyar  predom- 
inance is  the  extreme  disunion  which  prevails 
among  the  empire's  Slav  peoples.  Statistically, 
they  number  nearly  half  the  total  population,  but 
they  are  sundered  from  one  another  not  merely 
geographically  but  also  by  a  variety  of  linguistic, 
religious,  and  cultural  barriers  which  have  always 
made  united  action  impossible. 

The  northern  Slav  belt  is  composed  of  the  Czechs 
of  Bohemia  and  Moravia,  the  Poles  of  West  Gali- 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  121 

cia,  and  the  Ruthenians  of  East  Galicia  and  the 
Bukovina.  The  Czechs,  numbering  some  six  and 
one-half  millions,  are  the  most  solid  and  progress- 
ive branch  of  the  Slav  race.  Together  with  their 
two  million  Slovak  kinsmen  in  the  neighboring 
Carpathian  uplands  of  Northern  Hungary,  they 
constitute  a  powerful  ethnic  group.  The  five  mil- 
lion Poles  of  West  Galicia  represent  Austria's 
share  of  the  defunct  kingdom  of  Poland.  The  four 
million  **  Ruthenians "  are  merely  the  western 
vanguard  of  a  race  group  totaling  nearly  thirty- 
three  million  souls — the  so-called  ''Ukrainians"  or 
''Little  Russians,"  the  bulk  of  whom  live  within 
the  confines  of  the  adjacent  Russian  Empire. 

The  South  Slavs,  though  racially  and  linguisti- 
cally much  more  homogeneous,  are  deeply  divided 
by  differences  of  religion  and  culture.  They  oc- 
cupy practically  the  entire  southwest  corner  of  the 
empire,  nearly  everything  south  of  the  river  Drave 
being  "Yugo-Slav."  The  great  majority  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Yugo-Slavs  belong  to  the  Croa- 
tian branch  of  the  race,  and  having  been  civilized 
and  Christianized  from  the  West,  these  Croats  are 
Roman  Catholic  in  religion  and  west  European  in 
culture.  In  the  southern  portion  of  the  Yugo-Slav 
belt,  however,  especially  in  Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
dwell  some  two  million  "Serbs";  in  blood  and 
speech  closely  akin  to  the  Croats,  but  Greek  Or- 
thodox in  faith  and  with  a  culture  inherited  from 
the  Byzantine  East.  The  situation  is  still  further 
complicated  by  tlie  presence  in  Bosnia-Herzego- 
vina of  some  seven  hundred  thousand  Mohammed- 


122  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

ans.  Bosnia-Herzegovina  is  indeed  a  land  of  re- 
ligious and  cultural  conflict,  the  balance  of  its 
population  being  made  up  of  eight  hundred  and 
fifty  thousand  Orthodox  Serbs  and  four  hundred 
and  fifty  thousand  Catholic  Croats.  A  final  com- 
plication is  added  by  the  thin  fringe  of  Italian 
population  which  clings  to  the  towns  and  islands 
of  the  Adriatic  coast,  thus  partially  shutting  off 
the  Yugo-Slavs  from  racial  access  to  the  sea. 

It  is  of  course  universally  admitted  that  the 
spark  which  ignited  the  present  European  confla- 
gration was  the  Austro-Serbian  imbroglio,  and  it 
is  generally  recognized  that  Serbia's  defiance  of 
her  huge  neighbor  was  only  a  move  in  the  gigantic 
political  duel  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Rus- 
sia. But  few  persons  realize  how  bitter  and  far- 
reaching  that  Austro-Russian  duel  was.  Its  ob- 
jectives were  not  merely  Serbia  or  even  the  Bal- 
kans. They  embraced  both  Russian  imperialism's 
determination  to  annex  the  Galician  Ruthenians 
and  to  erect  Czech  and  Yugo-Slav  national  states 
on  Austria-Hungary's  ruins,  and  Austrian  impe- 
rialism's counter-determination  to  bring  all  the 
Serbs  into  a  Yugo-Slav  block  beneath  the  Haps- 
burg  scepter  while  erecting  Polish  and  Ukrainian 
national  states  at  a  mutilated  Russia's  expense. 
To  this  Austrian  imperialistic  school  Archduke 
Franz-Ferdinand  unquestionably  belonged.  All 
this  explains  the  unscrupulous  ruthlessness  of  both 
Russian  and  Austrian  policy  during  the  years  pre- 
ceding the  war.  It  also  accounts  for  the  Arch- 
duke's assassination. 


AUSTKIA-HUNGARY  123 

The  murder  of  Franz-Ferdinand  was  generally 
hailed  by  Austrians  as  the  beginning  of  the  end. 
Serbia's  grandiose  dreams,  incited  as  these  had 
been  by  Russia,  and  the  success  of  the  Serbian  se- 
cessionist propaganda  among  the  empire's  Yugo- 
slav populations,  convinced  most  Austrians  that 
this  "Balkan  Piedmont"  must  be  crushed  at  once 
if  the  empire  were  not  to  lose  its  southwestern 
provinces  as  it  had  lost  Italy.  If  war  with  Russia 
should  ensue,  Austrians  thought  it  had  better  be 
fought  now  rather  than  later  on  when  Austria's 
position  might  have  changed  infinitely  for  the 
worse. 

From  the  very  beginning  of  the  Austro-Serbian 
crisis,  those  natural  pillars  of  the  empire,  the  no- 
bility, the  army,  the  bureaucracy,  and  the  Church, 
together  with  the  German  and  Magyar  popula- 
tions, rallied  enthusiastically  round  the  Govern- 
ment and  the  Hapsburg  throne.  The  almost  pas- 
sionate phraseology  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum  to 
Serbia,  so  unusual  in  a  diplomatic  document  of  this 
nature,  was  an  accurate  reflection  of  the  popular 
mood.  The  Viennese  press  unanimously  demand- 
ed decisive  measures.  *'The  situation  between 
our  Government  and  that  of  King  Peter  has 
become  intolerable,"  asserted  the  **Neue  Freie 
Presse."  **Our  ultimatum  has  been  the  natural 
result."  The  *'Reichspost"  urged  the  Govern- 
ment to  take  decisive  measures  against  the  Serbian 
foe,  **who  is  as  implacable  and  relentless  as  he  is 
dastardly."  The  formal  outbreak  of  hostilities 
was  hailed  witli  jubilation.     ''When  we  consider 


124  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

the  provocations  of  which  Serbia  has  been  guilty 
for  so  many  years,"  exclaimed  the  "Tageblatt," 
''the  solemn  pledges  made  and  broken,  the  defi- 
ance which  we  have  put  up  with  from  an  unscru- 
pulous neighbor  whom  no  kindness  can  appease, 
we  experience  a  sense  of  relief  on  this  outburst 
of  war." 

Hungarian  sentiment  was  even  more  enthusi- 
astic. ''The  whole  nation  joyfully  hastens  to  fol- 
low the  call  of  his  Majesty  to  the  flag,"  cried  Pre- 
mier Tisza  amid  the  frantic  cheers  of  the  Hun- 
garian deputies.  "If  we  had  stood  these  condi- 
tions any  longer,"  exclaimed  Count  Albert  Ap- 
ponyi,  head  of  the  Opposition,  "we  would  have 
reached  the  point  where  Europe  would  have  called 
us  her  second  'Sick  Man.'  "  "It  is  peace  and  not 
war  that  we  want ;  but  a  peace  which  leads  to  life, 
not  to  death,"  asserted  the  Archbishop  of  Esz- 
tergom,  Roman  Catholic  primate  of  Hungary. 
' '  There  are  situations  in  political  life, ' '  said  Count 
Julius  Andrassy,  "that  can  be  likened  only  to  the 
encircling  of  Sedan,  which  demoralizes  and  van- 
quishes the  surrounded  foe  before  the  first  shot 
is  fired.  Such  would  have  been  our  fate  if,  after 
the  continued  vexations  of  years,  after  the  expen- 
diture of  many  millions,  caused  by  Serbia,  we 
should  have  continued  to  submit  to  the  invidious 
attacks  of  Russian-protected  Serbia.  .  .  .  Had  we 
waited  longer,  our  self-esteem,  our  self-trust, 
would  have  been  torn  to  shreds,  and  so  would  our 
power  of  resistance,  our  inner  unity,  our  integ- 
rity."   The  Magyar  press  displayed  a  decidedly 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  125 

bitter  tone  against  the  enemy.  That  leading  Bud- 
apest paper,  the  "Pester  Lloyd,"  wrote,  "The 
Serbian  Government  will  be  shown  up  as  a  nest  of 
pestilential  rats  which  come  from  their  territory 
over  our  border  to  spread  death  and  destruction." 
The  broadening  of  the  conflict  into  a  war  with 
Russia  caused  no  surprise,  since  Serbia  had  from 
the  first  been  considered  merely  the  cat's  paw  of 
Russian  imperialism.  "The  true  cause  of  the 
war,"  asserted  Count  Julius  Andrassy,  "is  the 
Eastern  ambition  of  Russia,  which  is  as  old  as  her 
position  as  a  great  Power,  and  which  has  long  been 
hanging  over  us  like  a  sword  of  Damocles."  Dr. 
Dumba,  Austro-IIungarian  ambassador  to  the 
United  States,  undoubtedly  voiced  the  prevailing 
Austrian  opinion  when  he  wrote  in  the  "North 
American  Review"  for  September,  1914:  "The 
war  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Russia  may 
well  be  said  to  be  the  outcome  of  conflicting  civili- 
zations and  conflicting  aims.  The  controversy  be- 
tween the  Dual  Monarchy  and  the  Serbian  King- 
dom is  only  an  incident  in  the  greater  struggle 
between  German  civilization  as  represented  by 
Austria-Hungary,  and  Russian  aspirations  as  rep- 
resented by  Serbia,  the  Russian  outpost  on  the 
southern  frontier  of  the  Dual  Monarchy.  .  .  .  The 
Serbian  Kingdom  is  the  torpedo  which  Russia  has 
launched  at  the  body  of  Austria."  Hungarian 
opinion  tended  to  give  the  war  an  even  broader 
interpretation.  "Pan-Russianism,  that  is  the 
word!"  exclaimed  the  "Revue  de  Hongrie"  (Bud- 
apest).   "No!     The  present  war  is  not,  as  certain 


126  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

persons  assert,  a  war  of  Slavism  against  German- 
ism. It  is  a  war  of  a  great  part  of  civilized  Eu- 
rope against  Russian  autocracy  and  Serb  terror- 
ism. ...  If  the  Triple  Entente  (in  which  the  em- 
pire of  the  Tsars  holds  a  preponderant  place), 
should  win  in  this  war,  it  would  mean  the  Euro- 
pean sluice-gates  open  to  Muscovite  autocracy,  to 
Cossack  militarism,  to  all  sorts  of  political  and 
religious  heresies.  The  dyke  once  broken,  it 
would  be  the  end  of  European  civilization. ' ' 

Such  was  the  temper  of  the  governing  classes 
and  of  the  German  and  Magyar  populations.  The 
attitude  of  the  minor  nationalities  varied  greatly, 
but  on  the  whole  it  proved  the  insight  of  those  ob- 
servers who  had  maintained  that  the  empire  was 
not  in  the  hopeless  internal  situation  asserted  by 
the  prophets  of  Austrian  dissolution.  Unques- 
tionably there  was  much  disloyalty  among  certain 
racial  groups.  The  Serb  element  of  the  Yugo- 
slavs, in  particular,  appears  to  have  been  honey- 
combed with  secessionism,  and  even  among  the 
Croats  many  malcontents  were  discovered.  Some 
of  these  escaped  abroad,  notably  the  Croat  deputy, 
Hinkovitch,  and  these  exiles  presently  founded  the 
''South  Slav  Committee"  in  London,  to  influence 
Entente  public  opinion. 

But  the  bulk  of  the  Croat  population  remained 
loyal.  The  Croats,  though  desirous  of  Yugo- 
slav unity,  generally  wished  it  in  the  "Austrian" 
sense;  i.e.,  the  supremacy  of  the  Croat  over  the 
Serb  element  in  any  future  Yugo-Slav  state.  Such 
a  solution  had,  it  was  believed,  been  the  dream  of 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  127 

Franz-Ferdinand,  and  the  Archduke's  murder  by- 
Serbian  fanatics  accordingly  roused  a  wave  of 
indignation  throughout  Croatia.  Croat  mobs 
marched  through  the  streets  crying,  "Death  to  the 
Serbs!"  Serb  shops  were  sacked  and  Serb  lead- 
ers roughly  handled.  The  Croat  deputy.  Dr.  Sus- 
tersics,  voiced  the  feelings  of  the  great  majority 
of  his  people  when  he  declared:  "Grand  Duke 
Francis  Ferdinand  was  bound  to  come  to  this  end, 
especially  as  he  was  the  friend  of  the  southern 
Slavs.  Imperialistic  Serbia  saw  with  alarm  the 
rise  of  this  potent  personality,  this  knight  'with- 
out fear  and  without  reproach,'  who  showed  both 
the  will  and  the  power  to  promote  peaceful  rela- 
tions between  the  southern  Slavs  and  the  Haps- 
burg  dynasty."  The  Croats  thus  entered  the  war 
against  their  Serbian  kindred  in  a  far  more  loyal 
frame  of  mind  than  would  have  been  possible  un- 
der any  other  circumstances. 

Turning  now  to  the  northern  Slavs :  the  Czechs 
displayed  neither  the  indignant  loyalty  nor  the 
bitter  secessionism  of  the  Yugo-Slav  populations. 
The  prevailing  temper  among  the  Czechs  was  a 
lukewarm  or  sullen  aloofness.  The  fierce  strug- 
gles which  had  long  raged  in  Bohemia  between  the 
Czechs  and  the  large  German  minority  constantly 
protected  by  Vienna  had  engendered  widespread 
Czech  resentment  against  the  Austrian  Govern- 
ment. Russian  propaganda  had  of  course  made 
the  most  of  this  golden  opportunity,  and  for  some 
years  previous  to  the  war  a  genuine  secessionist 
party  had  existed  among  the  Czechs,  with  the  erec- 


128  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

tion  of  a  Czch-Slovak  national  state  under  Russian 
protection  as  its  goal.  But  these  extremists  were 
comparatively  few  in  number,  and  drastic  govern- 
ment measures  at  the  outbreak  of  war  quickly 
broke  up  their  party  organization.  Some  of  their 
leaders,  like  Professor  Masaryk,  escaped  abroad; 
others,  such  as  Dr.  Kramar,  were  imprisoned.  A 
few  were  shot  for  high  treason.  The  most  serious 
result  of  Czech  discontent  was  the  poor  spirit 
shown  by  Czech  troops,  whole  regiments  surren- 
dering to  the  enemy  with  practically  no  resistance. 
On  the  other  hand,  there  existed  a  fairly  strong 
loyalist  minority  which  disliked  the  thought  of 
Austrian  disruption  and  feared  the  results  of  Rus- 
sian victory.  Typical  of  Czech  loyalist  press  com- 
ment are  the  words  of  the  ''Hlas  Naroda" 
(Prague) :  ''The  crime  of  Serajevo  revealed,  as 
by  a  lightning  flash,  the  monarchy's  deplorable 
situation.  .  .  .  But,  at  one  stroke,  all  dissension 
disappeared.  In  vain  did  the  enemy  make  ad- 
vances to  the  non-German  nationalities."  ''We 
are  all  glad  to  assert  the  close  union  of  nationali- 
ties. .  .  .  All  the  nationalities  are  defending  the 
throne  and  the  empire,"  declared  the  "Hlasyz 
Hane"  of  Prossnitz.  "We  belong  voluntarily  to 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy,"  said  the 
"Cesky  Dennin"  of  Pilsen,  "that  monarchy  be- 
neath whose  protection  the  Czech  people  has  ar- 
rived at  its  present  maturity." 

The  attitude  of  the  second  north  Slavic  group, 
the  Poles,  was  not  left  for  a  moment  in  doubt. 
Almost   without    exception,    the   Austrian   Poles 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  129 

proved  loyalist  to  the  core.  For  many  years  the 
Poles  of  Galicia  had  enjoyed  complete  local  self- 
government  and  full  cultural  liberty — a  situation 
doubly  appreciated  by  contrast  to  the  depressed 
condition  of  their  kinsmen  under  Russian  and 
Prussian  rule.  Galicia  was  full  of  Polish  refugees 
from  Russian  persecution.  The  Austrian  Poles, 
therefore,  hailed  the  war  as  a  crusade  for  the 
liberation  of  their  race  from  Russian  domination. 
The  exiles  at  once  raised  several  Polish  legions, 
20,000  strong,  which,  under  their  gifted  leader, 
Josef  Pilsudski,  fought  with  fanatical  bravery 
against  the  Russian  troops. 

The  attitude  of  the  Austrian  Poles  comes  out 
strongly  in  the  manifesto  of  the  National  Polish 
Committee  issued  at  the  beginning  of  the  war: 
*' Should  Russia  keep  Russian  Poland,  and  add 
Galicia  and  Posen  thereto,  Europe  would  be  ex- 
posed to  the  infiltration  of  Russian  despotism  and 
Byzantinism.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  Poland  is 
torn  from  Russia,  it  will  mean  a  guarantee  for 
the  progressive  expansion  of  Western  civilization 
toward  eastern  Europe,  as  well  as  protection 
against  the  introduction  of  Cossack  principles  into 
modern  life.  .  .  .  Let  no  one  accuse  the  Poles  now 
fighting  in  the  legions  side  by  side  with  the  Aus- 
trian armies  of  being  unfaithful  to  their  historic 
traditions.  Russia  was  Poland's  arch-enemy  in 
the  past,  and  will  be  in  the  future.  It  is  precisely 
their  part  in  Western  civilization  and  the  national 
individuality  of  their  country  that  the  Poles  are 
now  defending  against  the  Russians,  contemners 


130  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

of  the  one  and  persecutors  of  the  other."  In  an 
appeal  addressed  to  Poles  throughout  the  world, 
the  noted  Polish  poet,  George  Zulawski,  wrote: 
**We  stand  to-day  by  Austria,  and  do  not  doubt 
for  a  moment  her  goodwill.  Let  the  Grand  Duke 
Nicholas  juggle  with  promises  never  meant  to  be 
kept;  we  know  how  we  are  treated  here.  After 
having  lost  our  liberty  we  have  found  in  this  mon- 
archy, the  most  liberal  in  Europe,  shelter  and  pro- 
tection. We  are  full-fledged  citizens;  we  enjoy 
here  the  liberty  of  autonomy  and  of  our  national 
advance.  We  like  to  consider  past  deeds,  for  they 
are  the  best  securities  for  the  future.  .  .  .  To-day, 
God  has  entrusted  the  honor  of  the  Polish  nation 
to  us  Polish  volunteers,  and  we  will  return  it  into 
the  hands  of  God  alone."  ''The  historic  mission 
of  the  Poles  throughout  the  whole  course  of  Polish 
history,"  wrote  Professor  Josef  Buzek  in  the 
''Oesterreichische  Rundschau"  of  September, 
1914,  **  consists  in  the  protection  they  have  af- 
forded as  foreposts  of  the  Occident  to  the  Western 
civilization  founded  upon  the  principles  of  the 
Catholic  Church,  against  attack  by  the  Byzantine 
Orient.  ...  A  similar  task  has  been  allotted  by 
God  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy.  In  the 
present  world- war  the  Poles  will  take  up  once  more 
their  historic  mission  in  closest  union  with  Austria- 
Hungary.  Their  struggle  will  concern  the  driving 
of  the  hereditary  Russian  foe  from  Polish 
ground. ' ' 

So  strong  was  Polish  fear  and  hatred  of  Russia 
that  the  outbreak  of  war  and  the  example  of  their 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  131 

Galician  kinsmen  swept  even  the  Prussian  Poles 
into  the  stream,  notwithstanding  the  bad  relations 
which  had  existed  between  Poles  and  Germans  for 
many  years.  Accordingly,  most  of  the  Prussian 
Polish  leaders  endorsed  the  pastoral  letter  of 
Monsignor  Likowski,  archbishop  of  Gnesen  and 
primate  of  Poland,  issued  August  9,  1914,  which 
accused  Russia  of  being  the  provoker  of  the  war 
and  the  persecutor  of  the  Catholic  Church,  and  ex- 
horted the  Poles  to  tight  valiantly  for  the  king  of 
Prussia — "for  it  is  he  who  will  free  from  the  yoke 
our  oppressed  brethren  beyond  the  frontier." 

Almost  identical  was  the  attitude  of  the  third 
group  of  Austria's  northern  Slavs — the  Ruthen- 
ians.  For  many  years  the  Ruthenians  of  East- 
ern Galicia  had  regarded  their  province  as  a 
"Piedmont" — the  nucleus  of  a  future  Ukrainian 
national  state  carved  out  of  South  Russia ;  much  as 
the  Serbs  had  regarded  Serbia  as  the  nucleus  for 
a  future  Yugo-Slav  state  carved  out  of  Southwest 
Austria-Hungary.  To  the  Ruthenians,  there- 
fore, the  war  appeared  as  a  golden  opportunity, 
and  the  extent  of  their  hopes  can  be  judged  from 
the  words  of  the  proclamation  issued  by  the 
Ukrainian  National  Committee,  composed  both  of 
Ruthenians  and  exiles  from  the  Russian  Ukraine. 
"Unless  the  Ukrainian  provinces  are  separated 
from  Russia,"  runs  this  manifesto,  "even  the  most 
crushing  defeat  for  that  country  will  be  but  a 
feeble  blow,  from  which  Czarism  would  recover 
in  a  few  years,  to  take  up  again  its  ancient  role  of 
a  disturber  of  the  peace  of  Europe.    Only  a  free 


132  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

Ukraine,  which  should  be  supported  by  the  Triple 
Alliance  [i.e.,  the  Central  Powers],  could  form, 
with  its  extensive  domain,  reaching  from  the  Car- 
pathians to  the  Don  and  to  the  Black  Sea,  the 
necessary  protective  wall  between  Europe  and 
Russia,  a  bulwark  that  would  defeat  forever  the 
greed  for  expansion  on  the  part  of  Czarism,  and 
free  the  Slavic  world  from  the  baneful  influence  of 
Pan-Muscovitism. ' ' 

Such  optimistic  notes  were,  however,  quickly 
stilled  by  the  crushing  series  of  disasters  that  now 
overtook  the  Hapsburg  Monarchy.  The  failures 
in  Serbia,  the  Russian  conquest  of  Eastern  Galicia, 
and  the  destructive  Cossack  raids  into  Northern 
Hungary,  spread  consternation  and  alarm  through- 
out the  empire.  The  disloyal  rejoiced,  and  only 
the  severest  military  repression  prevented  sedi- 
tious disturbances  among  the  Serbo-Croats  of  the 
south  and  in  Bohemia.  The  Entente  press  was 
full  of  rumors  that  Austria-Hungary  meditated  a 
separate  peace,  but  such  rumors  seem  to  have  been 
without  serious  foundation.  Undoubtedly  the  em- 
pire was  pessimistic,  but  it  was  a  pessimism  of 
desperate  resolution,  not  of  abject  despair.  The 
Magyars,  to  whom  rumor  had  assigned  the  leading 
peace  role,  breathed,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  only  de- 
fiant fury.  At  the  end  of  1914,  the  "Pester 
Lloyd"  exclaimed  hotly,  "Let  our  opponents  un- 
derstand once  and  for  all :  We  are  going  to  hold 
out  to  the  end,  and  we  have  not  for  a  single  mo- 
ment meditated  a  separate  peace  with  any  one." 
In  the   "Revue   de   Hongrie"   for   March,   1915, 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  133 

Count  Albert  Apponyi  sketched  out  various  bene- 
fits wbicli  victory  would  confer  upon  Hungary. 
"But,"  he  added,  "these  are  the  problems  of  to- 
morrow; and  for  us  there  will  be  no  to-morrow  if 
we  do  not  resolutely  accomplish  our  present  task 
— to  conquer.  All  possibilities  are  open  to  us  if 
we  succeed ;  all  are  closed  if  we  succumb.  If  Mus- 
covite aggression  wins,  it  is  the  end  of  our  his- 
toric mission ;  if  it  breaks  before  our  energy,  it  is 
that  mission's  apotheosis." 

At  first  sight,  one  might  have  thought  that 
Italy's  declaration  of  war  upon  the  empire  in 
May,  1915,  would  have  greatly  accentuated  the 
prevailing  gloom.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  did  more 
than  anything  else  to  solidify  patriotic  feeling  and 
rouse  Austria  to  fresh  exertions.  The  whole  em- 
pire quivered  with  furious  wrath  and  scornful  con- 
tempt for  Italy,  the  "traitor"  nation.  Emperor 
Franz- Joseph's  proclamation  to  his  people,  with 
its  stinging  words — "Perfidy  whose  like  history 
does  not  know" — was  an  accurate  reflection  of  the 
popular  emotion.  "If  war  be  indeed  only  a  con- 
tinuation of  political  policy  with  different  means," 
wrote  that  leading  Austrian  publicist,  Freiherr  von 
Chlumecky,  in  the  "Oesterreichische  Rundschau," 
"then  Italy  can  point  to  the  fact  that,  free  from 
all  scruples  of  political  faith  and  morality,  she  has 
consistently  pursued  a  course  in  the  world  war 
which  she  followed  in  peace  for  many  years.  To 
be  at  once  Austria's  ally  and  her  most  malignant 
foe — that  has  for  decades  been  Italy's  policy.  .  .  . 
Italy  dares  the  war,  not  so  much  for  territorial  ag- 


134  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

grandizement  as  for  the  realization  of  the  aim  she 
pursued  in  peace  as  well  with  all  the  means  at  her 
command — to  hurl  Austria  from  her  position  of  a 
great  Power.  .  .  .  Against  this  design,  however, 
the  whole  Empire  will  rise  to  defend  itself  as  one 
man.  Austrian  blood  is  not  easily  stirred,  but  now 
when  we  are  threatened  by  cowardly  brigands  with 
a  dagger  thrust  in  the  back,  now  will  our  wrath 
rise  to  a  mighty  flame,  and  all  Austria  echo  the  cry, 
'Down  with  the  traitors ! '  Now  we  know  where  to 
find  our  most  malignant  foe,  who  wore  the  mask  of 
friendship,  and  when  she  had  grown  great  by  our 
favor  and  that  of  Germany,  turned  out  to  be  an  ac- 
complice of  our  enemies.  No  Austrian  will  ever 
forgive  this,  no  Hungarian  will  ever  forget  it.  Re- 
venge for  a  breach  of  faith  unexampled  in  history 
— that  will  continue  to  be  the  watchword ;  and  we 
shall  not  rest,  nor  our  children,  or  children's  chil- 
dren, if  that  be  necessary,  until  a  people  devoid  of 
all  political  and  moral  loyalty  shall  have  paid  a 
heavy  penalty  for  the  crime  committed  against  our 
sovereign  and  our  country!" 

Hungarian  opinion  equaled  Austrian  in  its  fury. 
**We  are  persuaded,"  exclaimed  the  ''Revue  de 
Hongrie"  of  June,  1915,  "that  the  Italian  Govern- 
ment 's  breach  of  plighted  faith  will  be  stigmatized 
by  posterity,  and  that  without  distinction  of  na- 
tions. But,  in  awaiting  this,  we  Hungarians,  who 
formerly  fought  for  Italian  independence  under 
Garibaldi,  will  take  care  that  the  infamy  of  Sa- 
landra  and  his  ilk,  who  seek  to  revive  the  epoch  of 
the  Borgias,  shall  not  pass  unavenged.    We  shall 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  135 

not  wait  for  history  to  punish  them;  we  shall 
charge  ourselves  with  that  duty." 

Much  more  significant,  however,  was  the  attitude 
of  the  Slavs.  Italy's  avowed  intention  to  seize, 
not  only  Italian-speaking  Trentino  and  Trieste, 
but  also  large  tracts  of  territory  inhabited  by  a 
Serbo-Croat  population,  roused  all  the  Austrian 
Slavs  to  wrathful  indignation.  Even  the  Czech 
press  warmed  to  unwonted  interest  and  loyalty. 
"The  peoples  of  Austria-Hungary,"  asserted  the 
"Hlas  Naroda"  of  Prague,  "prefer  war  with  Italy 
to  a  boughten  peace,  precarious  and  uncertain." 
''Because  of  the  perfidy  of  Italian  policy,"  wrote 
tlie  "Cech"  (Prague),  bitterly,  '*a  war  to-day 
breaks  out  which  is  just  another  raid  of  the  brig- 
ands of  the  Abruzzi."  And  the  *'Proudy"  of 
Olmiitz  exclaimed  defiantly,  ''One  more  or  less; 
what  does  it  matter!" 

It  was,  however,  the  Serbo-Croats  of  the  South 
who  manifested  the  hottest  indignation.  "Not  an 
inch  of  Austro-Hungarian  territory  to  these  per- 
fidious 'Allies'!"  exclaimed  the  "Hrvatska"  of 
Agram.  "The  solid  fists  of  the  Croats  and 
Slovenes  will  be  plenty  strong  enough  to  smash 
any  Italian  attempt  to  grab  our  littoral. "  "  There 
is  not  a  Croat,  not  a  south  Slav,"  asserted  the 
"Obzor"  (Agram),  "who,  in  this  moment  when 
Italy  falls  in  arms  upon  our  country,  does  not 
swear  solemnly  to  defend  with  his  heart's  blood 
Croatia  and  the  south  Slav  territories  from 
Italian  invasion."  "We  pray  with  all  our  heart 
for  the  crushing  of  Italy  and  the  complete  failure 


136  PEESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

of  its  vile  speculations,"  wrote  the  ''Hrvatski 
Pokret"  (Agram),  ''and  we  are  convinced  that 
our  Croatian  and  Slovene  soldiers  will  have  a  good 
big  share  in  bringing  this  about." 

Very  interesting  was  the  attitude  of  the  Austrian 
Italians.  These  people,  numbering  about  800,000, 
are  divided  into  three  geographically  separate 
groups :  the  Trentino  district  of  South  Tyrol ;  the 
Istrian  region  at  the  head  of  the  Adriatic,  center- 
ing about  the  city  of  Trieste;  and  the  isolated 
colonies  of  the  islands  and  port  towns  of  the 
Dalmatian  coast.  The  longing  of  Italian  ''Ir- 
redentists" to  "redeem"  these  race  brethren  by 
incorporating  them  into  the  kingdom  of  Italy  was 
undoubtedly  shared  by  a  majority  of  the  Austrian 
Italians,  and  the  Austrian  military  authorities  had 
to  take  sharp  measures  to  check  disloyalty. 
Nevertheless,  the  loyalist  minority  was  larger 
than  is  generally  supposed,  and  on  this  occasion 
did  not  fail  to  express  their  sentiments.  In 
Trentino,  loyalist  addresses  were  signed  by  lead- 
ing notables,  including  five  Italian  members  of  the 
Tyrolese  Provincial  Diet,  while  the  "Risveglio" 
of  Trent  asserted:  "No  one  has  ever  solicited 
Italy's  intervention.  This  war  serves  particular 
interests  which  are  absolutely  opposed  to  the  in- 
terests of  Italian  Tyrol."  In  Istria,  Reichsrat 
deputy  Bugatto,  of  Gorizia,  wrote,  in  an  address 
entitled,  "Italy  tramples  upon  Italian  Honor": 
"That  part  of  the  Italian  collectivity  which  forms 
an  independent  state,  and  which  therefore  ought  to 
protect  the  good  name  of  Italianism,  to-day  covers 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  137 

this  good  name  with  eternal  shame.  Become  blind 
or  mad,  Italy  commits  the  crime  of  treason,  ex- 
poses lierself  to  the  danger  of  a  disastrous  war, 
renders  inevitable  the  ruin  of  Italian  citizens,  of 
Italian  lands.  Never  had  we  expected  such  an 
ignominy ;  never  was  such  dolorous  injury  done  our 
national  pride.  .  .  .  All  that  we  can  do  is  to  declare 
in  the  face  of  Italy  and  the  w^orld  that  the  Italians 
of  Austria  condemn  and  spurn  Italy's  action.  .  .  . 
Italians  of  Austria!  Let  us  veil  our  faces  in 
shame!"  In  Dalmatia,  ''II  Dalmata"  of  Zara 
wrote:  ''The  Dalmatians  of  Italian  speech  de- 
clare in  this  solemn  hour  that  they  will  make  every 
sacrifice  asked  of  them.  .  .  .  Dalmatian  fidelity  is 
traditional.  We  have  inherited  it  from  our  fath- 
ers, and  we  will  give  a  new  proof  of  it  by  attesting 
our  loyalty  both  to  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  and 
to  the  institutions  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  state." 

The  Italian  declaration  of  war  proved  to  be  for 
Austria  the  traditional  darkest  hour  before  the 
da\\Ti.  A  fortnight  later  began  that  great  Austro- 
German  "drive"  against  the  Russian  armies, 
w^hich  never  slackened  till  Galicia  was  reconquered 
and  all  Russian  Poland  lay  within  the  Teutonic 
grasp. 

The  joy  of  the  Poles  can  be  imagined.  After  the 
fall  of  Warsaw,  the  "Nowa  Reforma"  of  Cracow 
wrote:  "That  which  to-day  fills  Polish  hearts  is 
something  far  beyond  the  bounds  of  ordinary 
human  delight.  Entire  generations  of  Poles  have 
not  been  permitted  to  experience  this  sentiment, 
which  only  a  Pole  can  understand.     The  solid  walls 


138  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

of  our  prison  have  crumbled  into  dust.  They  have 
been  cast  down  by  the  mighty  breath  of  civiliza- 
tion." The  "Czas"  said:  "Russia  to-day  suf- 
fers a  hard  and  merited  chastisement.  The  loss  of 
Warsaw  is  the  first  step  in  her  downfall."  The 
Ruthenian  press  joined  in  this  chorus  of  jubila- 
tion, which  was  further  swelled  by  the  voices  of 
the  loyalist  Czechs.  The  '*Hlas  Naroda"  of 
Briinn  wrote:  "All  the  peoples  of  our  monarchy 
are  to-day  filled  with  enthusiasm.  The  Czech  na- 
tion turns  grateful  eyes  upon  its  valorous  sons 
who,  with  the  other  Austro-Hungarian  nations, 
bring  liberty  to  the  Polish  nation.  Not,  be  it 
noted,  the  liberty  promised  by  the  false  friends  of 
Slavism  at  Petersburg,  nor  the  liberty  of  the 
Chinovniks  of  Moscow,  but  a  liberty  based  upon 
civilization,  morality,  and  conscience.  The  Rus- 
sian despotism  reaps  the  first-fruits  of  the  seeds 
which  it  has  sown."  The  "Lidone  Noviny"  re- 
marked: "Under  Russian  rule,  the  Poles  knew 
only  servitude.  Equally  lamentable  is  the  fate  of 
the  Ukrainians.  Under  the  pretext  of  liberating 
the  Balkan  states,  the  empire  of  the  Tsars  wished 
only  to  engulf  them  in  its  tyranny.  It  even  allies 
itself  with  the  Italians — those  declared  adversa- 
ries of  Slavism — in  order  jointly  to  enslave  the 
Slovenes  and  Croats." 

As  in  Germany,  so  in  Austria-Hungary,  the 
second  half  of  the  year  1915  saw  a  flood  of  discus- 
sion concerning  the  problems  of  the  morrow. 
Even  more  than  in  Germany  was  the  question  of 
Austro-German  future  relations  debated,  the  over- 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  139 

wholmins^  verdict  being  that  the  present  alliance 
slioukl  be  made  permanent  and  unbreakable. 
Eminent  Austrian  writers  like  the  economist 
Eugen  von  Philippovitch  and  the  historian  Dr. 
Friedjung,  and  Hungarian  writers  like  Eduard 
Palyi,  warmly  endorsed  the  "Central  Europe" 
idea.  Most  Austrian-Germans  appeared  more 
interested  in  the  political  than  in  the  economic 
connection.  In  a  public  address  delivered  in 
February,  1916,  Prince  Alois  Liechtenstein  said: 
"Austria-Hungary  will  firmly  and  forever  remain 
faithful  to  the  alliance  with  the  German  Empire. 
Leaning  upon  the  German  Empire  and  covered  by 
it,  our  fatherland  came  into  existence  and  has 
grown  great.  .  .  .  "We  German-Austrians  are  the 
pledge,  the  indestructible  link  of  the  alliance  of 
the  two  states."  Dr.  Weisskirchner,  mayor  of 
Vienna,  remarked  in  the  autumn  of  1915 :  "After 
the  battles  in  which  the  Germans  of  the  empire 
and  the  sons  of  the  Danubian  Monarchy  have 
fought  side  by  side,  we  wish  the  political  alliance 
to  become  closer,  and  we  desire  that  an  economic 
agreement  of  the  two  Central  empires  should 
facilitate  our  victory  after  and  in  the  peace." 
And  Cabinet  Minister  Dr.  Franz  Klein  asserted: 
"A  closer  union  will  have  to  be  concluded  as  a 
guarantee  for  the  security  of  both  states.  Those 
citizens  of  Austria  whose  sympathies  are  else- 
where will  have  to  put  up  with  it." 

Hungarian  opinion  showed  some  shrinking  at 
the  prospect  of  a  "Central  Europe"  so  obviously 
under    Teutonic    hegemony.    Nevertheless,    the 


140  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

ever-present  Slav  peril  has  reconciled  most  Mag- 
yars to  the  prospect.  The  Hungarian  Premier, 
Tisza,  has  formally  recognized  its  necessity,  and 
another  Magyar  leader,  Count  Andrassy,  re- 
marked at  the  close  of  1915,  "The  natural  ally  of 
the  Hungarians  is  the  German  element  in  Austria, 
and  behind  them,  the  German  Empire."  In  fact, 
the  Magyars  seem  to  be  even  more  cordial  toward 
the  Germans  of  the  Empire  than  toward  the  Aus- 
trian-Germans. 

Another  much  debated  question  has  been  the 
future  status  of  Poland.  All  parties  agree  that 
no  Polish  territory  must  return  under  Russian 
domination.  **  Poland  will  never  be  given  back 
to  the  Russians,"  asserted  the  Vienna  "Neue 
Freie  Presse"  in  the  summer  of  1916.  "Russia 
must  never  again  rule  in  Warsaw;  and  history 
must  not  move  backwards."  Most  Austrian 
Poles  desire  an  autonomous  Polish  state,  includ- 
ing both  Russian  Poland  and  Galicia,  under  the 
Hapsburg  scepter.  In  this,  both  the  Austrian- 
Germans  and  the  Magyars  heartily  agree.  The 
Germans,  especially,  are  utterly  opposed  to  a 
simple  incorporation  of  Russian  Poland  within  the 
present  Austrian  political  system,  since  this  would 
swing  the  parliamentary  balance  definitely  in 
favor  of  the  Slav  elements.  The  great  reason  why 
Galicia  was  not  formally  added  to  the  Polish  state 
set  up  by  the  Austro-Germans  in  Russian  Poland 
in  the  autumn  of  1916  is  the  unsettled  status  of 
the  Ukrainian  question.  It  must  never  be  forgot- 
ten that  Eastern  Galicia  is  not  Polish  but  Ukrain- 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  141 

ian  in  nationality,  and  tliat  if  the  Austro-German 
armies  should  overrun  Southern  Russia  as  they 
have  Russian  Poland,  the  establishment  of  a 
Ukrainian  national  state  would  become  a  matter  of 
practical  politics.  In  that  case  Galicia  would  be 
divided  on  race  lines,  the  western  portion  falling 
to  Poland,  the  eastern  part  going  to  the  new 
Ukrainia.  Such  is  evidently  the  Austrian  plan. 
Whether  it  ever  materializes  depends  upon  the 
fortunes  of  war. 

In  Austria-Hungary,  as  in  Germany,  the  optimis- 
tic wave  of  later  1915  gradually  ebbed  during  the 
opening  months  of  the  ensuing  year.  The  Allied 
blockade  hit  both  empires  severely,  and  in  Austria 
especially  the  food  shortage  was  becoming  acute. 
The  growing  pessimism  was  sharply  accentuated 
by  the  Russian  ''drive"  which  began  in  June,  1916, 
and  popular  apprehension  reached  its  climax  with 
Rumania's  sudden  attack  at  the  beginning  of  Sep- 
tember. This  naturally  brought  up  the  question 
of  the  three  million  Rumans  of  Transylvania  and 
Eastern  Hungary.  The  Hungarian  Government's 
persistent  attempts  to  "Magyarize"  these  popula- 
tions had  made  much  bad  blood,  and  there  can  be 
little  doubt  that  a  majority  of  the  Hungarian 
Rumans  desired  annexation  to  the  neighboring 
kingdom  of  Rumania.  At  the  same  time,  this  se- 
cessionist feeling  seems  to  have  been  of  a  rather 
passive  character,  militant  disloyalty  being  rare. 
It  was  also  partially  counteracted  by  a  traditional 
attachment  to  the  Hapsburg  dynasty  and  by  wide- 
spread fear  of  Russia.    Many  Rumanians  felt  that 


142  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

they  formed  the  eastern  link  in  the  German- 
Magyar-Ruman  race-dyke  which  sundered  the  two 
halves  of  the  Slav  ocean,  and  dreaded  lest  a  Rus- 
sian victory  might  mean  the  drowning  of  all  three 
races  beneath  the  Pan-Slav  waves.  Typical  of 
such  apprehensions  is  the  open-letter  of  the  Tran- 
sylvanian  Ruman  author,  Emil  Isac,  to  friends  in 
the  kingdom  of  Rumania  who  wished  to  join  the 
Allies  and  attack  Austria-Hungary.  Writing  in 
the  spring  of  1915,  M.  Isac  says:  "You  reproach 
me  with  having  denied  my  Latin  origin  by  attack- 
ing Russia.  I  would  have  you  know  that  it  is  pre- 
cisely to  defend  Latin  culture  that  I  act  thus.  .  .  . 
We  should  recognize  that  Rumania,  by  its  geo- 
graphical situation  at  the  gateway  to  the  Balkans, 
is  as  great  an  obstacle  to  Russia's  ambitions  as  is 
Germany  or  Austria-Hungary.  ...  Do  you  really 
wish  us  to  sign  our  own  death-warrant  ?  .  .  .  I  de- 
clare to  you  frankly  that  I  would  rather  make  a 
pact  with  the  devil  than  an  alliance  with  autocratic 
Russia."  Such  sentiments  probably  explain  the 
surprisingly  lukewarm  reception  accorded  the 
Rumanian  armies  during  their  invasion  of  Tran- 
sylvania in  September,  1916. 

The  speedy  expulsion  of  these  invaders  and  the 
subsequent  overrunning  of  Rumania  itself  by  the 
Austro-Germans  did  much  to  dispel  the  gloom 
which  had  fallen  upon  the  empire  during  the  sum- 
mer of  1916.  The  death  of  the  aged  Emperor 
Franz  Joseph  produced  no  bad  effects  upon  public 
confidence.  His  death  had  long  been  anticipated, 
and    his    youthful    successor,    Charles    Francis 


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY  143 

Joseph,  was  generally  popular.  Of  course,  Aus- 
tria-Hungary is  suffering  acutely  under  tlie  strain 
of  war;  far  more  so,  indeed,  than  its  German  ally. 
Nevertheless,  there  is  no  popular  cry  for  "peace  at 
any  price,"  and  Austrian  detennination  to  fight  to 
the  end  has  been  greatly  strengthened  by  the  En- 
tente's plan  for  European  reconstruction  an- 
nounced early  in  January,  1917.  This  program 
involves  the  practical  destruction  of  Austria -Hun- 
gary, and  the  Austro-Hungarian  press  has  defi- 
antly stated  that  such  proposals  can  be  answered 
only  on  the  battle-field. 

This  threat  of  national  disruption  has  thrown 
Austria-Hungary  more  absolutely  than  ever  into 
Germany's  arms.  It  is,  therefore,  certain  that  a 
Teutonic  victory,  and  perhaps  even  more  a  gen- 
eral stalemate,  would  see  a  firmly  knit  ''Central 
Europe,"  dominating  the  Balkans  and  closely  al- 
lied to  Turkey  and  Bulgaria.  Such  is  the  solution 
dictated  by  Austria's  vital  interests,  and  such  the 
outcome  especially  desired  by  the  Austrian-Ger- 
mans. 

Toward  present  enemies  the  Austro-Hungarian 
attitude  differs  sensibly  from  the  German.  In 
Austria-Hungary  tliere  is  no  real  hostility  against 
either  England  or  France.  The  wrath  of  the  Aus- 
trian-Germans is  concentrated  on  Italy,  while  the 
old  Magyar  hatred  of  Russia  has  been  still  fur- 
ther exacerbated.  Neither  of  these  hatreds  will  be 
easily  allayed.  They  are  bound  up  with  conflicts 
of  interest,  with  instinctive  racial  antipathies,  and 
with  sentimental  considerations — which  last  sway 


144  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

Austro-Hungarians   much   more   than    Germans. 

Assuming  that  Austria-Hungary  survives,  its 
most  pressing  problems  will  undoubtedly  be  in- 
ternal. We  have  seen  that  the  empire  met  war's 
test  surprisingly  well  and  that  there  was  much 
more  patriotic  feeling  than  most  foreign  observers 
had  imagined.  At  the  same  time,  the  internal 
situation  is  still  serious  and  the  outlook  by  no 
means  rosy.  In  the  preceding  pages  we  have 
sbown  that  there  aue  respectable  loyalist  minori- 
ties among  even  the  most  disloyal  of  the  empire's 
racial  elements.  But  we  do  not  wish  to  leave  the 
impression  that  disloyalty  has  been  eliminated. 
On  the  contrary,  a  majority  of  the  empire's  Serbs, 
Czechs,  Rumans,  and  Italians  are  still  probably 
at  least  passively  disloyal,  though  voiceless  under 
the  censorship,  while  the  Croats  were  converted 
only  through  hatred  of  Italy. 

Now  all  this  is  well  known  to  the  ruling  Ger- 
mans and  Magyars,  who  are,  therefore,  to-day  in- 
censed against  the  "traitors"  and  predisposed  to 
wreak  summary  vengeance  after  the  war.  But 
any  wholesale  reprisals  would  sharpen  race  preju- 
dices, and  might  drive  the  present  loyalist  minori- 
ties into  the  secessionist  camp.  In  that  case,  the 
empire 's  condition  would  be  worse  than  before.  It 
is  plain  that  much  coolness,  tact,  and  judicious 
f orgetfulness  will  be  needed  in  the  years  to  come. 


CHAPTER  V 

ITALY 

ITALY  is,  in  many  respects,  a  land  of  violent 
contrasts.  This  is  certainly  true  of  its  politi- 
cal life,  which  resembles  one  of  those  curious 
apartment  houses  of  its  great  cities  where  wealth 
ostentatiously  flaunts  itself  on  the  first-floor  front 
while  poets  starve  in  the  garrets  above  and  vicious 
poverty  festers  in  the  cellars  below. 

In  fact,  modern  Italy  shows  certain  disquieting 
signs  of  fragility.  Italian  political  unit}^  was  ef- 
fected in  1870,  but  Italian  moral  unity  was  not 
thereby  completed.  The  Pope  absolutely  refused 
to  recognize  the  new  state  of  things,  and  his  de- 
mand for  a  restoration  of  the  papal  state  (which 
would  of  course  involve  the  undoing  of  Italian  un- 
ity), was  supported  by  a  minority  of  pious  Cath- 
olics throughout  the  peninsula.  Another  irrecon- 
cilable element  were  the  Republicans,  who  con- 
tinued to  dream  the  dreams  of  Mazzini,  denounced 
the  Savoyard  Monarchy,  and  asserted  that  a  re- 
public was  the  only  way  to  achieve  lasting  Italian 
unity.  Finally,  there  were  the  Anarchists,  more 
numerous  in  Italy  than  in  any  other  European 
country,  who  condemned  all  established  forms  of 
government. 

Up  to  the  last  few  years,  it  is  true,  the  Italian 

145 


146  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

political  edifice  was  not  seriously  endangered. 
The  irreconcilable  groups  were  so  mutually  antag- 
onistic that  they  could  never  combine  for  united 
action,  and  all  political  power  was  in  the  hands 
of  the  upper  and  middle  classes,  entrenched  be- 
hind a  limited  parliamientary  franchise.  Had 
these  classes  used  their  power  wisely,  Italian 
moral  unity  would  probably  have  been  long  since 
attained.  Unfortunately,  they  employed  their 
privileged  position  to  exploit  the  poverty-stricken 
lower  classes,  while  their  parliamentary  repre- 
sentatives (a  virtual  caste  of  political  war  horses), 
invented  the  system  of  trasformismo,  a  sublimated 
*' pork-barrel"  which  ate  the  heart  out  of  Italian 
political  life  and  disgusted  everybody  with  the 
whole  existing  regime.  So  angry  became  the  cry 
of  discontent  that  the  governing  class  reluctantly 
granted  the  popular  panacea  of  universal  manhood 
suffrage  in  the  year  1912. 

The  first  parliamentary  elections  held  under  uni- 
versal suffrage  in  1913  revealed  the  extent  of  the 
latent  dangers  which  menaced  the  existing  political 
and  social  order.  All  the  extremist  parties  made 
astonishing  gains.  And  these  parties  were  more 
numerous  than  of  yore.  Besides  the  old  irrecon- 
cilable Catholic,  Republican,  and  Anarchist  groups, 
two  new  extreme  parties  now  came  to  the  front: 
the  Revolutionary  Socialists  or  "Syndicalists" 
and  the  "Nationalists" — partizans  of  a  jingo  im- 
perialism. Both  were  recent  political  phenomena. 
The  Syndicalists  were  a  late  offshoot  of  Orthodox 
Marxian  Socialism.    Repudiating  the  Marxist  doc- 


ITALY  147 

trine  of  social  regeneration  by  peaceful  evolu- 
tionary nietliods,  the  S3nidicalists  preached  a  vio- 
lent social  revolution.  Their  progress  had  been 
extremely  rapid,  and  by  1914  they  had  gained  con- 
trol of  the  great  Italian  labor  organization,  the  As- 
sociazione  Generale  del  Lavoro.  In  working  alli- 
ance with  the  older  revolutionary  groups  (the 
Republicans  and  the  Anarcliists),  the  Syndicalists 
were  to  show  their  power  in  alarming  fashion  on 
the  very  eve  of  the  European  w^ar. 

The  rise  of  the  Nationalist  party  had  been  no 
less  meteoric — and  startling.  Of  course  there  had 
always  been  a  moderate  imperialist  group  known 
as  the  "Irredentists,"  whose  program  had  been 
the  ''redemption"  of  Italic  lands  by  annexation 
to  Italy,  especially  the  Italic  districts  of  Austria- 
Hungary.  But  about  the  beginning  of  the  present 
century  a  school  of  Italian  thinkers  evolved  a  body 
of  doctrine  which  went  far  beyond  the  old  irre- 
dentist aspirations.  This  new  doctrine  called  it- 
self ''Nationalism,"  but  was  in  reality  a  subli- 
mated imperialism.  Unlike  the  Irredentists,  w^ho 
had  practically  limited  their  hopes  to  Austrian 
Trentino,  Istria,  and  Dalmatia,  the  Nationalists 
frankly  urged  the  annexation  of  French  Corsica, 
Savoy,  Nice,  and  Tunis ;  English  Malta ;  and  Sw^iss 
Ticino.  And  that  was  not  all.  Irredentism  had 
aspired  to  Adriatic  dominion.  A  Nationalist 
watcliword  pronounced:  "The  Adriatic  is  bitter: 
the  Mediterranean  not  less  bitter!"  In  fine,  the 
Nationalist  goal  was  a  revived  Roman  Empire 
dominating  the  entire  Mediterranean  basin,  where- 


148  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

in  the  half-million  surplus  Italians  now  annually 
forced  to  seek  alien  lands  might  transform  region 
after  region  into  new  Italics.  The  Tripolitan  War 
of  1911  (preeminently  a  Nationalist  undertaking), 
had  electrified  Italian  public  opinion,  which  had 
thereafter  been  steadily  nationalized.  The  Na- 
tionalists had  always  been  uncompromising  in 
their  methods.  At  the  time  of  the  Tripolitan  War 
they  had  not  hesitated  to  threaten  revolution  if 
the  Government  refused  to  sanction  their  impe- 
rialistic designs. 

A  final  illustration  of  Italy's  unstable  political 
equilibrium  had  been  furnished  by  the  famous 
* '  Red  Week ' '  of  June,  1914.  A  ' '  General  Strike ' ' 
proclaimed  by  the  Syndicalists  had  terrorized  the 
peninsula,  and  in  many  districts  of  Central  Italy 
the  whole  fabric  of  society  had  temporarily  broken 
down,  with  the  red  flag  of  anarchy  waving  over 
Ancona  and  surrounding  towns.  Students  of  Ital- 
ian affairs  were  seriously  alarmed,  as  competent 
a  critic  as  Professor  George  B.  McClellan  observ- 
ing, ' '  The  strike  was  a  grim  warning  to  the  Gov- 
ernment and  to  the  nation  that  under  favorable 
conditions  it  is  quite  possible  that  a  minority  of 
the  people  may  destroy  the  whole  social  and  po- 
litical fabric  of  modern  Italy." 

Such  was  the  volcanic  state  of  Italian  national 
psychology  at  the  outbreak  of  the  Great  War.  It 
is,  therefore,  not  surprising  that  the  Italian  Gov- 
ernment, despite  its  alliance  with  the  Teutonic 
Powers,  declared  Italian  neutrality  and  adopted  a 
waiting  attitude.     The  Government  was  obviously 


ITALY  149 

watcliiiig  to  see  not  only  how  tlie  war  would  go 
but  also  how  Italian  public  opinion  would  crys- 
tallize. 

This  crystallization  was,  however,  of  a  most  com- 
plicated character.  The  old  constitutional  middle- 
class  groups  which  still  controlled  the  parlia- 
mentary machine  (''Conservatives,'*  ** Liberals," 
"Radicals,"  etc.),  took  their  cue  from  the  Govern- 
ment and  adopted  no  positive  attitude  one  way 
or  the  other. 

Of  the  extremist  parties,  the  Nationalists  took 
a  similar  position.  In  fact,  during  the  first  weeks 
of  the  war,  they  inclined  toward  the  Teutonic  Pow- 
ers. The  Nationalists  had  always  emphasized 
their  uncompromising  ''realism."  A  few  months 
before  the  war,  the  Nationalist  leader,  Federzoni, 
had  stated,  '  *  Our  party  holds  a  purely  realist  and 
integral  valuation  of  international  relations,  in  ab- 
solute antithesis  to  the  sentimental  tendencies  of 
the  old  Radical  and  Republican  irredentism,  which 
looked  to  the  abandonment  of  the  Triplice  and  the 
rapprochement  of  Italy  with  the  parliamentary 
Powers  of  the  West."  And  at  the  beginning  of 
1914,  he  stated  in  an  address  before  the  Catholic 
University  Circle  of  Rome:  "I  observe  that  the 
Catholics  are  favorable  to  the  alliance  with  the 
empires  of  Central  Europe  and  sympathetic  to- 
ward Austria.  That  is  too  naive  a  viewpoint.  It 
springs  from  a  superficial  and  partizan  admiration 
for  the  neighboring  monarchy  because  it  is  tradi- 
tionalist and  hierarchical.  For  precisely  opposite 
reasons,  our  Democrats  are  often  anti-Triplician 


150  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

and  gravitate  toward  Republican,  Masonic,  and 
Radical-Socialist  France.  We  repudiate  all  these 
a  priori.  Nationalism,  in  regard  to  the  system  of 
alliances,  is  inspired  only  by  the  positive  interests 
of  Italy,  without  regard  to  the  preferences  which 
its  party  members  may  feel  for  the  internal  physi- 
ognomy of  this  or  that  state. ' '  During  the  month 
of  August,  1914,  most  Nationalists  thought  that 
Germany  was  about  to  win  a  sweeping  victory. 
Accordingly,  they  tended  plainly  to  favor  active 
aid  to  the  Central  Powers  in  order  to  earn  a  claim 
to  the  Italic  possessions  of  England  and  France. 
After  the  German  check  before  Paris  in  early  Sep- 
tember, however,  and  especially  after  Austria's 
revelation  of  her  military  weakness  in  Galicia,  the 
Nationalists  rapidly  changed  front. 

Signor  Federzoni's  utterances  in  early  1914  are 
of  peculiar  interest.  They  forecasted  accurately 
both  the  attitude  of  the  Italian  Government  and 
the  lines  of  cleavage  of  Italian  public  opinion  dur- 
ing the  early  stages  of  the  European  War.  The 
head  of  the  Italian  Government,  Premier  Salan- 
dra,  at  once  announced  the  line  of  Italian  policy. 
That  line  was  ' '  Sacred  Egoism" :  In  other  words, 
a  policy  of  pure  realism  guided  solely  by  national 
self-interest.  The  line-up  of  the  various  political 
parties  also  rapidly  became  clear.  The  Catholics 
and  Conservatives  were  pro-German  and  pro- 
Austrian.  The  Republicans,  Radicals,  and  Syn- 
dicalists were  strongly  pro-Ally,  with  the  Nation- 
alists plainly  veering  in  the  same  direction.  The 
great  Liberal  hloc,  which  controlled  the  Chamber 


ITALY  151 

of  Deputies,  was  for  strict  neutrality.  This  was 
also  true  of  the  Marxian  or  Regular  Socialists, 
thougli  a  minority  tended  to  become  increasingly 
pro- Ally.  Since  this  early  line-up  is  of  such  vital 
importance  for  an  understanding  of  succeeding 
events,  the  party  attitudes  must  be  considered  in 
detail. 

The  Catholics,  although  avowedly  sjinpathetic 
toward  the  Central  Powers  and  not  disinclined  to 
see  Italy  ranged  actively  on  their  side,  were  for 
temporary  neutrality,  and  their  neutralism  in- 
creased in  fervor  as  the  strength  of  pro-Ally  feel- 
ing in  other  parties  made  any  question  of  an  Ital- 
ian attack  on  the  Entente  Powers  less  and  less  a 
matter  of  practical  politics.  This  neutralist  atti- 
tude was  definitely  adopted  at  the  party  congress 
held  at  Milan,  September  24,  1914.  Addressing 
the  congress,  the  Catholic  leader,  Signor  Meda, 
said:  ''To  aid  France,  we  should  have  to  declare 
war  on  Germany.  But  what  pretext  should  we 
invoke?  How  has  Germany  harmed  usf  We  are 
still  her  ally.  ...  To  march  against  Austria,  we 
must  have  something  with  which  to  reproach  her. 
What?  Austria  has  not  troubled  the  Balkan  equi- 
librium except  in  so  far  as  her  operations  against 
Serbia  made  this  necessary.  It  is  not  said  that 
she  wishes,  after  the  war,  to  keep  or  occupy  posi- 
tions which  would  displease  us.  Neither  will  the 
recalling  of  past  wrongs  suffice.  If  we  intend  to 
provoke  her  to  march  against  us  and  thereby  per- 
mit us  to  conquer  Trent  and  Trieste,  that  would 
be  a  disloyal  and  dangerous  war  which  the  great 


152  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

bulk  of  the  country  does  not  want. ' '  And  the  con- 
gress itself  voted  the  following  resolution:  ''In 
this  historic  hour  Italy's  role  is  to  exercise  an 
equilibrating  mission  which  all  the  belligerent  Pow- 
ers will  appreciate.  Indeed,  there  may  be  reserved 
for  Italy  a  peace-making  mission  more  lofty  and 
glorious  than  military  victory.  The  Catholics 
decide  to  adhere  with  entire  confidence  to  Italy's 
declaration  of  complete  neutrality;  they  see  in  it 
the  surest  means  of  safeguarding  the  country's 
interests  and  those  of  civilization,  amid  the  politi- 
cal and  economic  rivalries  of  the  present  hour." 
And  on  November  5,  1914,  that  leading  Catholic 
organ,  the  **Unita  Cattolica,"  declared  that  if 
Italy  declared  war  on  Austria,  the  Catholics  would 
march  "without  enthusiasm,  without  energy,  with- 
out being  able  to  say  'God  is  with  us';  but  like 
victims  to  the  slaughter."  The  sentiments  of  the 
Conservatives  were  much  the  same  as  those  of  the 
Catholics,  though  more  restrained  on  account  of 
their  Government  affiliations. 

Besides  this  definite  party  feeling  there  was  a 
good  deal  of  loose  anti-Ally  bias  discernible  here 
and  there  in  the  currents  of  general  public  opinion. 
Many  imperialists  feared  France  as  the  main  ob- 
stacle to  their  Mediterranean  ambitions.  England 
came  in  for  considerable  sharp  criticism.  In  the 
"Mattino"  of  Naples,  the  well-known  Italian  jour- 
nalist, Scarf oglio,  wrote:  "Germany  has  con- 
quered the  commercial  markets  of  the  world ;  Italy 
the  labor  markets.  What  the  traveling-salesman 
does  for  Germany,  that  the  peasant  and  workman 


ITALY  153 

do  for  Italy.  What  a  magnificent  prospect  for 
these  two  creative  nations  it'  they  shouhl  collabo- 
rate in  their  work  of  civilization !  Unfortunately, 
there  is  in  our  midst  a  pro-British  prejudice  which 
opposes  this  collaboration.  An  absurd  prejudice, 
for  Italy  owes  nothing  to  England.  Rather  has 
she  been  duped  by  England,  like  so  many  other 
peoples."  Early  in  1915,  another  Italian  writer, 
Signor  Bandini,  remarked:  ''What  English  Lib- 
eralism aims  at,  what  it  will  certainly  carry  out 
if  it  is  successful  in  the  present  war,  is  the  com- 
pression of  European  non-English  races  within  the 
boundaries  of  Europe;  and  within  those  bound- 
aries, the  suppression  of  any  nationality  which 
might  show  signs  of  possessing  native  energy  cap- 
able of  breaking  through  the  imposed  bonds  and 
of  endangering  English  exclusive  possession  of 
the  world  at  large.  Only  obstinate,  cowardly  opti- 
mists can  fail  to  see  that  the  ultimate  consequence 
of  this  English  triumph  would  be  the  slow  death 
of  all  European  non-English  nations."  And  a 
little  later,  the  ''Corriere  d 'Italia"  (Rome), 
wrote:  **We  write  whole  books  on  German  mili- 
tarism, but  we  never  think  or  speak  of  English  na- 
valism.  And  yet,  for  us,  the  latter  is  much  more 
dangerous,  because  whenever  it  is  a  question  of 
the  Mediterranean,  Italy's  principal  vital  inter- 
ests are  at  once  put  in  jeopardy." 

This  anti-Ally  and  pro-German  section  of  Italian 
public  opinion,  though  influential,  was  not  numer- 
ous. The  mass  of  the  Italian  people  was  unques- 
tionably for  strict  neutrality.     The  two  political 


154  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

exponents  of  Italian  neutralism  were  of  course  the 
Liberals  and  the  Regular  Socialists.  The  Liber- 
als represented  in  the  broadest  sense  the  Italian 
middle  classes — shopkeepers,  factory  owners,  inde- 
pendent farmers,  business  men,  professional  men, 
etc.  These  classes  were  keenly  responsive  to 
economic  arguments,  and  most  of  such  arguments 
made  for  continued  peace.  It  was  obvious  that 
Italy  was  conserving  her  resources  while  her  neigh- 
bors were  wasting  theirs  in  war,  and  furthermore 
that  after  the  war  a  neutral  Italy,  with  unimpaired 
capital,  untouched  factories,  and  intact  working- 
staffs,  would  have  a  great  advantage  in  the  inevi- 
table scramble  for  the  disorganized  markets  of  the 
world.  Typical  of  this  viewpoint  is  an  article  in 
that  leading  Italian  periodical,  the  ' '  Nuova  Anto- 
logia,'*  of  December,  1914.  ''Our  material  inter- 
ests and  the  lives  of  our  countrymen  are  not  risked 
in  the  bloody  venture  of  battles,"  it  states  with 
evident  satisfaction, ' '  and  we  have  reason  to  hope 
that  the  indispensable  continuity  of  our  national 
labor  will  not  be  interrupted.  .  .  .  We  have  no 
lack  of  laborers  to  raise  and  reap  our  crops,  to  till 
and  sow  our  fertile  fields ;  almost  all  our  factories 
are  still  in  operation,  and  slowly  but  surely  the 
delicate  strands  of  credit,  so  rudely  snapped  asun- 
der by  the  outbreak  of  the  world-war,  are  being 
re-knit.  .  .  .  Neutrality,  therefore,  has  proved  an 
effectual  defense  for  our  economic  interests  against 
greater  and  worse  evils,  and  from  a  political  stand- 
point it  has  procured  for  us  the  signal  advantage 
of  inducing  many  foreigners  justly  to  estimate 


ITALY  155 

the  worth  of  Italian  friendship  and  of  Italian 
power."  And  in  January,  1915,  another  writer 
remarked  in  the  same  periodical:  "Very  few 
among  us  believe  that  our  land  could  embark  in  a 
war  without  undergoing  grave  financial  and  eco- 
nomic disturbances;  it  is  enough  for  us  to  reflect 
ui)on  what  has  already  happened,  even  after  our 
wise  declaration  of  neutrality." 

As  for  the  Regular  Socialists,  they  maintained 
unwavering  fidelity  to  their  anti-militarist  Marx- 
ian principles.  Their  party  manifesto,  dated  Sep- 
tember 22,  1914,  read:  ** Workers!  The  pre- 
texts with  which  some  are  trying  to  lead  you  to 
the  slaughter  are  not  worth  the  cost  of  life  and 
treasure  which  war  entails.  .  .  .  Proclaim  that 
Italy,  the  only  great  European  Power  outside  the 
struggle,  hereby  declares  its  mission  of  mediator 
between  the  belligerents.  In  the  name  of  the  In- 
ternational, in  the  name  of  Socialism,  0  Proletari- 
ans of  Italy,  we  invite  you  to  maintain  and  accen- 
tuate your  irreconcilable  opposition  to  war." 

Although  the  mass  of  the  Italian  people  was 
thus  for  neutrality,  a  large  and  rapidly  growing 
minority  had  from  the  first  stood  squarely  for 
intervention  in  favor  of  the  Allies.  That  this  was 
so  was  due  mostly  to  widespread  sympathy  for 
France.  To  Italian  Republicans,  Radicals,  and 
many  Socialists,  the  Anti-Clerical,  Radical-Social- 
ist French  Republic  was  a  cherished  ideal  which 
must  be  supported  at  all  costs  if  liberty  were  not 
to  give  place  everywliere  to  Prussian  absolutism. 
The  Italian  Republicans  proved  the  faith  that  was 


156  PEESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

in  them  by  promptly  raising  a  large  ' '  Garibaldian 
Legion"  which  fought  heroically  on  the  battle- 
fields of  France. 

At  the  same  time,  these  political  reasons  were 
powerfully  reinforced  by  instinctive  promptings 
of  racial  and  cultural  solidarity.  We  have  al- 
ready noted  the  able  *' Pan-Latin"  propaganda 
waged  by  French  litterateurs  and  journalists  to 
gain  Italy  to  the  Allied  cause,  but  one  reason  why 
it  succeeded  so  widely  was  the  fact  that  many 
Italians  met  it  half  way.  As  an  Italian  Radical 
leader,  Signor  Fera,  remarked  to  a  French  jour- 
nalist early  in  1915:  *'A11  Italians  recognized 
from  the  start  that  the  war  was  in  reality  a  strug- 
gle of  two  civilizations,  of  two  states  of  mind. 
Italy  could  not  fight  for  a  civilization  antipathetic 
to  her  own.  That  is  why  public  sentiment  is  with 
us  so  hostile  to  the  Austro-German  hloc.'*  At 
about  the  same  date.  Professor  Giulio  Natali  drew 
great  applause  from  a  Genoese  audience  when  he 
remarked:  ''In  Italy  the  great  majority  is  Fran- 
cophile. To  feel  that  sentiment  is  not  to  forget 
our  real  interests:  it  is  simply — and  our  people 
has  intuition — to  defend  our  civilization,  Latin 
civilization.  Rome  and  Paris  are  the  fatherlands 
of  all  free  and  intelligent  men. "  As  early  as  Sep- 
tember, 1914,  the  noted  Italian  poet,  Gabriele 
d'Annunzio,  had  uttered  a  burning  appeal  to  his 
fellow  countrymen,  exhorting  them  to  stand  by 
the  ''Latin  sister's"  side.  "Nature  herself,"  he 
cried,  "makes  Italy  one  with  France.  Upon  both, 
as  upon  all  the  Mediterranean  peoples,  is  laid  the 


ITALY  157 

duty  of  sustaining  the  supreme  struggle  against 
an  imminent  menace  of  servitude  and  extinction." 
And  at  a  banquet  held  in  Paris  early  in  January, 
1915,  he  said:  "I  announce  to  you  a  certainty,  to 
me  as  inevitable  as  the  coming  of  spring  or  the 
sun's  entrance  into  the  sign  Aries — the  certainty 
of  our  war;  that  war  which  I  have  preached  for 
twenty-five  years.*'  At  the  ''Pan-Latin"  con- 
gress held  at  the  Paris  Sorbonne,  February  12, 
1915,  the  eminent  Italian  historian,  Guglielmo 
Ferrero,  remarked:  ''For  us  all,  children  of 
Greece  and  Rome  that  we  are,  and  bound  to  France 
by  the  sacred  ties  of  language  and  culture,  there 
arises  a  grave  matter  of  conscience.  ...  In  this 
terrible  struggle,  blood,  sacrifice,  long  tenacity, 
will  be  required.  Can  we  let  France  bear  alone 
to  the  end  this  terrible  and  glorious  task  from 
which  the  genius  of  our  race  will  come  forth  grown 
young  once  more?" 

As  the  war  went  on,  anti-German  sentiment  be- 
came more  manifest  in  Italy.  "In  the  Germanic 
imagination,"  wrote  Guglielmo  Ferrero  in  the 
"Secolo"  (Milan),  "there  is  something  mon- 
strous, unbalanced,  excessive,  which  recalls  the 
Indians,  the  Persians,  the  Assyrians,  the  Babylon- 
ians, and  the  other  Eastern  peoples;  something 
which  leads  the  Germans  to  exaggerate  to  absurd- 
ity every  principle  however  sacred  and  vital  in 
itself."  German  destruction  of  works  of  art  in 
Belgium  and  Northern  France  evoked  angry  pro- 
tests throughout  Italy,  while  German  metliods  of 
warfare  called  forth  bitter  condemnation.    "They 


158  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

punish  the  cathedrals  because  they  are  a  force; 
the  belfries  because  they  are  a  symbol ;  the  monu- 
ments because  they  are  not  German,"  exclaimed 
Luigi  Barzini  in  the  "Corriere  della  Sera"  of  mid- 
December,  1914.  **  Every  land  which  guards  jeal- 
ously the  treasures  of  its  civilization  should  trem- 
ble before  these  proceedings  of  destruction,  be- 
fore this  new  fashion  of  making  war."  '*If  de- 
cisive events  do  not  occur  before  long,"  wrote 
Ettore  Janni,  ''scientific  barbarism  will  be  the 
outstanding  characteristic  of  the  present  war. 
And  for  this,  Germany  will  be  responsible.  It 
was  she  who  initiated  it.  .  .  .  But — how  short- 
sighted of  Germany!  Ordinarily,  the  aversions 
and  even  the  hatreds  engendered  by  war  are  of 
short  duration.  But  this  time  Germany  has 
transgressed  too  far  the  limits  permitted  by  war'§ 
necessities;  she  has  shown  an  absolute  contempt 
for  all  law,  for  all  sentiment  of  humanity.  She 
has  glorified  as  a  supreme  virtue  the  fact  of  re- 
nouncing every  virtue.  She  seems  to  have  nailed 
Jesus  anew  upon  the  cross.  ...  Of  the  princi- 
ples of  civilization,  she  has  made  a  litter  for  the 
horses  of  her  Uhlans.  All  this  it  will  be  difficult 
to  forget;  and,  so  long  as  men  remember,  it  will 
be  difficult  not  to  act  toward  Germany  in  accord- 
ance with  these  exasperating  memories.  Germany, 
who,  after  the  war,  can  have  no  hope  other  than 
the  dissolution  of  the  present  league  against  her, 
is  doing  everything  possible  to  cement  this  league 
for  the  future.  .  .  .  Europe  may  form  a  circle  of 
hell  such  as  even  Dante  could  not  have  dreamed. 


ITALY  159 

.  .  .  The  blind  leaders  of  Germany  are  exciting 
the  whole  world  against  their  country.  Tliose 
who  formerly  kept  pensive  silence  to-day  shout 
the  war-cry  of  assault  and  extermination.  The 
force  of  hate  has  banished  weariness ;  the  desire  of 
vengeance  thrills  those  who  faltered.  They  have 
given  to  Europe  the  terrible  soul  of  a  justiciar." 

By  the  early  spring  of  1915,  Italian  sentiment 
had  thus  undergone  a  marked  change.  The  mass 
of  the  nation  was  still  for  neutrality,  but  the  ac- 
tive pro-Germans  had  almost  disappeared.  They 
were  now  neutralists,  while  many  who  had  been 
neutralists  at  the  start  of  the  war  had  become 
partizans  of  Italian  intervention  on  the  Allies' 
side.  A  similar  shift  had  been  going  on  inside 
the  Italian  Cabinet,  several  neutralists  having 
been  displaced  by  men  of  more  pro-Ally  com- 
plexion. This  was  notably  true  of  the  new  Italian 
minister  for  foreign  affairs,  Baron  Sydney  Son- 
nino,  Scotch  on  the  distaff  side  and  of  known  pro- 
British  sympathies.  As  early  as  November,  1914, 
the  semi-official  ''Tribuna"  (Rome),  had  re- 
marked editorially:  ''This  is  not  a  war  of  gov- 
ernments, but  of  nations — of  races.  It  may  last 
for  a  year  or  years.  Therefore  Italian  neutrality 
is  a  transitory  condition,  due  to  circumstances 
which  may  change  at  any  moment.  There  is  thus 
necessity  for  military,  economic,  and  diplomatic 
preparation  on  the  part  of  the  Government,  and 
of  moral  and  political  preparation  on  the  part  of 
the  public." 

Under   these   altered   circumstances   it   is   not 


160  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

strange  that  the  strong  imperialistic  tendencies 
latent  in  wide  circles  of  Italian  thought  crystal- 
lized with  extreme  rapidity.  The  old  Irredentist 
hatred  of  Austria  and  desire  to  annex  the  Italic 
regions  of  the  eastern  Adriatic  littoral  flamed  up 
hotly  in  vehement  demands  for  war  against  the 
"hereditary  foe."  The  Italian  public  was  daily 
reminded  that  the  Adriatic — "Our  Sea" — had 
been  a  Roman  and  a  Venetian  lake,  that  the  pres- 
ent opportunity  for  satisfying  Italy's  "vital" 
aspirations  might  never  again  recur,  and  that  the 
Italians  of  the  East  Adriatic  shore  were  so  rap- 
idly yielding  before  the  combined  pressure  of  the 
Austrian  Government  and  awakening  Slavism 
that  quick  action  was  imperative  if  those  lands 
were  not  to  be  lost  to  Italianism  forever.  "With- 
in fifty  years,"  asserted  Guglielmo  Ferrero,  "the 
Slavic  language  w^ll  be  the  speech  of  Trieste  and 
the  Istrian  cities,  unless  we  conquer  Istria;  and 
every  memory  of  Italy  will  fade  from  those  lands 
which  since  the  days  of  Augustus  have  always 
been  Latin.  It  would  be  like  unmaking  the  his- 
tory of  Italy.  ...  It  is  very  difficult  in  these  days 
for  the  Italian  language  to  conquer  new  terri- 
tories. So  much  the  more  is  it  our  duty  to  see 
that  none  of  the  territories  in  which  Italian  is 
spoken  shall  to-day  forget  it.  We  shall  be  over- 
whelmed with  shame  if  we  allow  the  speech  of  our 
fathers  to  be  corrupted,  little  by  little,  by  a  new 
people."  That  important  Milanese  journal,  the 
"Corriere  della  Sera,"  urged  the  Government 
"to  achieve  the  unity  of  our  country,  to  gain  pos- 


ITALY  161 

session  of  frontiers  which  will  permit  us  to  be 
pacific  with  dignity,  to  rid  our  Adriatic  of  the 
domination  of  an  enemy — an  essential  and  eternal 
enemy;  a  domination  which  to-day  makes  us 
strangers  without  security  in  that  sea  which 
touches  most  vitally  our  national  life."  And  in 
February,  1915,  the  ''Popolo  d 'Italia"  of  Milan 
wrote:  ''We  wish  the  end  of  maritime  Austria. 
Austria  has  no  sea.  Neither  has  Hungary.  That 
sea,  to-day  Austrian,  is  an  Italian  sea.  Hun- 
gary's Adriatic  outlet  is  a  usurpation.  .  .  .  Let 
Austria  be  a  great  Switzerland ;  and  just  as  Swit- 
zerland does  not  claim  Genoa,  so  let  Austria-Hun- 
gary not  pretend  either  to  Trieste  or  Fiume." 

Of  course,  most  Italians  recognized  that  the 
Italic  population  of  the  Eastern  Adriatic  was  con- 
fined to  the  coast  towns  and  littoral,  the  hinterland 
being  Yugo-Slav.  In  fact,  the  Italian  element  in 
the  province  of  Istria  is  about  45  per  cent.,  while 
in  Dalmatia  it  is  only  3  per  cent.  But  the  Italian 
claim  was  that  the  whole  culture  and  civilization 
of  these  regions  was  Italian;  that  the  Adriatic 
Slavs  possessed  no  true  national  consciousness  of 
their  o-^ti;  and  that  the  apparent  national  con- 
sciousness of  this  folk — due  to  artificial  Austrian 
stimulation — would  quickly  yield  to  Latinism 
once  the  Adriatic  Slavs  were  under  Italian  rule. 
The  Serbian  claim  to  these  coasts  and  the  possi- 
bility of  a  Yugo-Slav  Empire  planted  solidly  on 
the  Adriatic  angered  and  alarmed  Italian  public 
opinion.  English  and  French  approval  of  Yugo- 
Slav  aspirations  caused  deep  consternation,  and 


162  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

Italian  publicists  hastened  to  lay  their  side  of  the 
question  before  the  Allied  peoples.  In  the  "Lon- 
don Nation"  of  April  3,  1915,  the  well-known  Ital- 
ian journalist,  Arundel  del  Re,  made  light  of  re- 
cent Slav  gains  in  Istria  and  about  Trieste  at  the 
expense  of  the  Italian  element.  *'With  reference 
to  the  Slovene  advance,"  he  wrote,  *'the  problem 
is  due  mainly  to  political  causes.  Left  to  them- 
selves, the  Slovenes  and  the  Italians  would  freely 
intermingle,  and  the  former  would  inevitably  be 
absorbed  by  the  latter."  Regarding  Dalmatia 
he  is  even  more  positive.  ''I  do  not  know  what 
constitutes  a  claim  to  nationality,"  he  wrote  on 
February  6, 1915,  ''unless  indeed  it  means  the  sum 
total  of  the  spirit,  the  culture,  the  intellectual  and 
artistic  manifestations  of  a  people,  and  the  con- 
tinuity of  its  tradition.  On  these  grounds  I  can- 
not see  how  Serbia  can  lay  claim  to  Dalmatia. 
Not  only  does  it  historically  belong  to  Latin  civili- 
zation, of  which  it  is  the  outpost  across  the  Adri- 
atic as  well  as  the  national  boundary,  but  the  ar- 
chives of  the  Dalmatian  coast  towns,  their  laws,  in- 
stitutions, culture,  and  language  are  Italian,  just 
as  much  as  are  those  on  the  other  side  of  the  Adri- 
atic. .  .  .  Dalmatia  not  only  is  essentially  a  part 
of  Italy,  but  it  is  important  to  her  strategically 
if  she  is  to  remain  mistress  of  the  Adriatic.  .  .  . 
How  have  the  Serbo-Croats  acquired  a  numerical 
advantage  in  Dalmatia?  Merely  through  a  forced 
and  unnatural  immigration  and  persecution  pro- 
voked deliberately  by  Austria  with  the  purpose  of 
destroying  and  suffocating  the  Italian  element. 


ITALY  163 

That  this  has  resisted  so  long,  and,  though  out- 
numbored,  still  dominates  the  spirit  and  the  cul- 
ture of  Dalniatia,  is  in  itself  a  proof  of  its  right 
to  existence  and  domination. 

Turning  to  tlie  Italian  press,  we  find  widespread 
condemnation  of  proposals  to  be  content  with  the 
acquisition  of  Istria,  either  as  the  result  of  a 
peaceful  agreement  with  Austria  or  in  conse- 
quence of  a  successful  war.  The  imperialists 
were  a  unit  in  demanding  Austria-Hungary's 
whole  east  Adriatic  coast,  no  matter  what  the  ob- 
jections of  the  Yugo-Slavs.  Particularly  signifi- 
cant is  the  following  editorial  of  the  semi-official 
"Giornale  d 'Italia":  "The  result  of  this  system 
would  be  a  slight  improvement  of  our  Adriatic 
position,  thanks  to  the  acquisition  of  Trieste  and 
Pola,  but  the  general  strategic  position  at  sea 
would  continue  to  be  difficult  for  us  if  that  sea 
should  belong,  not  only  to  us  but  also  to  an  inde- 
pendent Croatia  and  to  a  Greater  Serbia — two 
states  whicli  would  probably  be  in  the  orbit  of 
Russia.  What  would  happen,  then,  would  be,  no 
longer  a  great  Austrian  naval  power,  but  two 
small  states  under  the  tutelage  of  a  formidable 
naval  and  military  power — Russia.  Now,  Italy's 
principal  objective  in  the  Adriatic  is  to  settle  once 
and  for  all  the  politico-strategic  questions  of  a  sea 
which  commands  our  eastern  coast,  and  such  a 
problem  can  be  solved  only  in  one  way :  by  eliminat- 
ing every  other  navy.  From  the  economic  point 
of  view  Italy  desires  the  greatest  liberty  and  will 
put  no  difficulties  in  the  way  of  economic  outlets 


164  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

for  the  populations  of  the  east  Adriatic  hinter- 
land. But  from  the  military  viewpoint,  Italy  can- 
not give  way  an  inch.  In  the  Adriatic  (Austria 
having  disappeared),  there  must  be  neither  port, 
nor  submarine,  nor  torpedo  which  is  not  Italian. 
Otherwise,  the  present  difficult  situation  would  be 
perpetuated  and  would  even  grow  more  grave 
with  the  course  of  time."  That  the  Italian  Gov- 
ernment was  preparing  for  all  eventualities  was 
definitely  shown  by  its  occupation  of  the  Albanian 
port  of  Valona  (Avlona),  at  the  close  of  1914.  In 
fact,  Albania  was  another  region  insistently 
claimed  by  Italian  public  opinion. 

But  these  were  by  no  means  the  limits  to  Italian 
expansion,  as  the  imperialists  saw  it.  The  Na- 
tionalist viewpoint  was  ably  set  forth  by  Deputy 
Giuseppe  Bevione  in  a  series  of  articles  printed  in 
the  great  Turin  organ,  **La  Stampa,"  toward  the 
close  of  1914.  Assuming  that  Italy  must  join  the 
Allies,  Signer  Bevione  asserted  that  the  war  must 
end  with  the  Adriatic  wholly  an  Italian  sea.  The 
only  way  to  accomplish  this  was  the  occupation  of 
Albania  and  the  conquest  of  Austria's  Adriatic 
coast,  thus  forestalling  an  invasion  by  the  Serbs 
and  confronting  Europe  at  the  peace  congress 
with  the  logic  of  an  accomplished  fact.  Other- 
wise, Russia,  through  her  Yugo-Slav  tools,  would 
gain  that  Adriatic  predominance  so  vital  to  Italy. 
But  besides  all  this,  Italy  must  take  part  with  the 
Allies  in  all  future  Balkan  and  Near  Eastern  oper- 
ations, thus  earning  permanent  possession  of 
Rhodes  and  the  ^gean  islands  now  occupied  by 


ITALY  165 

her  troops  since  1912,  as  well  as  a  full  share  of 
Asia  Minor  in  any  partition  of  the  Ottoman  Em- 
pire. *'We  trust,"  said  the  *'Rassegna  Nazio- 
uale"  (Rome),  in  the  spring  of  1915,  "that  there 
will  be  reserved  for  us,  in  the  Mediterranean,  in 
the  -^gean,  and  in  Asia  Minor,  a  share  propor- 
tionate to  the  requirements  of  our  position." 
And  an  Italian  writer  remarked  in  the  English 
"Edinburgh  Review,"  "There  is  only  one  land 
wherein  Italy  can  still  hope  to  found  colonies  of 
Italian  laborers,  and  that  is  Asiatic  Turkey." 

Toward  Austria,  as  might  be  imagined,  the  Ital- 
ian press  was  taking  an  increasingly  menacing 
tone.  This  first  quarter  of  1915  was  the  period  of 
the  Italian  Government's  long  dicker  with  the 
Central  Powers  over  cessions  of  Austria's  Italic 
territories,  and  the  Italian  semi-official  papers  in 
particular  were  not  slow  to  inform  the  Teutonic 
Powers  of  what  might  be  expected  in  case  of  re- 
fusal to  comply  with  Italy's  demands.  Early  in 
March,  the  "Giornale  d 'Italia"  wrote:  "The 
time  has  come  to  make  clear  to  the  people  that 
the  present  state  of  things  cannot  last  indefinitely. 
Italy  cannot  emerge  from  the  terrible  European 
crisis  as  she  is  to-day.  She  must,  therefore,  be 
ready,  for  it  would  be  suicide  to  let  this  crisis 
pass  without  improving  her  frontiers,  realizing 
her  aspirations,  raising  her  prestige,  and  assur- 
ing her  future.  Action  is  life."  And  a  month 
later  it  remarked,  "Italy  will  do  what  her  inter- 
ests counsel,  and  while  we  do  not  take  it  upon  us 
to  predict  even  the  near  future,  we  are  in  a  posi- 


166  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

tion  to  affirm  that  she  will  reach  her  goal  at  any 
cost." 

When  we  review  such  semi-official  press  utter- 
ances as  the  above,  together  with  the  numberless 
imperialistic  incitements  to  war  like  those  already 
quoted,  it  is  difficult  not  to  believe  that  the  Sa- 
landra  Cabinet  had  already  made  up  its  mind  on 
intervention,  and  that  it  was  using  the  negotia- 
tions with  the  Teutonic  Powers  as  part  of  a  clever 
comhinazione  to  extract  the  largest  possible  con- 
cessions from  the  Allied  Powers  with  whom  par- 
allel negotiations  were  going  on  at  the  same  time. 
One  thing  is  certain.  On  April  25,  1915,  a  whole 
w^eek  before  Italy  took  her  first  warlike  step  by 
denouncing  the  Triple  Alliance  with  Austria  and 
Germany,  the  Salandra  Government  signed  an  in- 
strument with  the  Allied  Powers.  The  exact  con- 
tent of  this  document  has  never  been  divulged, 
but  the  semi-official  Italian  press  has  asserted  pos- 
itively that  it  realized  Italy's  Adriatic  aspirations 
while  holding  open  the  door  in  the  Near  East. 

All  this  tends  to  explain  the  inner  significance 
of  the  great  political  crisis  which  preceded  Italy's 
entrance  into  the  European  War  at  the  end  of 
May,  1915.  If  the  Government  had  indeed  deter- 
mined upon  war,  it  was  to  carry  its  point  only 
after  a  hard  struggle.  For,  despite  the  growing 
current  of  pro- Ally  feeling  and  the  rising  imper- 
ialistic tide,  neutralism  was  still  strong  in  Italy. 
The  commercial  and  industrial  classes,  whether 
factory  owners,  shopkeepers,  or  business  men, 
were  generally  averse  to  war,  and  the  same  was 


ITALY  167 

true  of  the  Catholics  and  the  Socialistic  workmen. 
So  strong,  in  fact,  appeared  this  neutralist  bloc 
that  as  ardent  an  interventionist  as  Guglielmo 
Ferrero  admitted  in  the  early  spring  of  1915, 
"Italy  hesitates,  and  while  she  sides  with  the 
coalition,  while  she  desires  that  England,  France, 
and  Russia  may  be  victorious,  she  leans  more  to 
neutrality  and  peace  than  to  intervention  and  war. 
The  majority  hope  and  desire  that  Italy  may 
watch  the  terrible  conflict  with  folded  arms,  to  the 
end."  And  in  his  indignant  pessimism  he  con- 
cluded menacingly:  ''I  do  not  know  what  may 
happen  on  that  day  when,  in  the  midst  of  a  Europe 
rent  by  war  and  restless  in  the  face  of  such  ruin, 
the  Italian  people  become  persuaded  that  the  mon- 
archy, by  the  mistakes  of  its  foreign  policy,  has 
prevented  Italy  from  taking  the  Italian  provinces. 
It  is  even  possible  that  the  monarchy's  last  hour 
will  strike." 

The  neutralists  were,  however,  to  show  their 
strength  in  dramatic  fashion.  The  Government's 
denunciation  of  the  Triple  Alliance  treaty  on  May 
3  had  seemed  to  assure  war,  and  the  interven- 
tionists were  already  shouting  victory.  But  at 
this  eleventh  hour  there  entered  the  arena  Gio- 
litti,  the  maestro  of  Peninsular  politics,  the  "Ital- 
ian Clemengeau,"  who  for  more  than  fifteen  years 
had  held  the  parliamentary  chamber  in  the  hollow 
of  his  hand  and  upset  cabinets  at  his  will.  Gath- 
ering behind  him  all  the  varied  forces  of  neutral- 
ity, Giolitti  dashed  into  the  lists  waving  the  ban- 
ner of  peace.    "Italy  can  have  from  Austria  im- 


168  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

portant  and  sufficient  concessions  without  making 
war,"  was  his  rallying  cry.  Austria  had,  indeed, 
just  offered  Italy  the  Trentino,  the  west  bank  of 
the  Isonzo,  special  privileges  and  full  cultural 
guarantees  for  all  Italians  left  under  Austrian 
rule,  and  a  free  hand  for  Italy  in  Albania.  With 
these  Austrian  offers  Giolitti  declared  himself 
satisfied,  and  added  that  were  Italy  to  conquer  all 
those  territories  to  which  the  war-party  aspired, 
their  numerous  Slav  and  German  inhabitants 
would  saddle  Italy  with  * '  a  problem  of  inverse  ir- 
redentism  worse  even  than  has  been  the  German 
problem  of  Alsace-Lorraine."  To  break  with  her 
allies  of  nearly  thirty  years  on  such  grounds 
would  be  an  act  of  shameless  perfidy  which  would 
leave  Italy  diplomatically  bankrupt  in  the  alliance 
market  of  the  world.  Even  if  victorious,  the 
strain  on  Italy's  finances  and  the  disorganization 
of  her  industrial  life  would  put  back  her  economic 
progress  for  a  generation.  **If  Italy  goes  to 
war,"  concluded  Giolitti,  **the  results,  whatever 
the  outcome,  are  bound  to  be  most  sad."  These 
were  telling  arguments,  and  so  powerful  was  the 
influence  of  Giolitti 's  personality  that  the  Cham- 
ber showed  unmistakable  signs  of  bowing  once 
more  to  the  maestro' s  will. 

But  the  interventionists,  now  openly  supported 
by  the  Government,  wrought  no  less  desperately 
for  war.  A  host  of  fervid  orators  headed  by  Ga- 
briele  d'Annunzio  inflamed  the  public  against  Aus- 
tria and  intoxicated  it  with  memories  of  imperial 
Rome.    Typical  of  this  campaign  was  d'Annun- 


ITALY  1G9 

zio's  speech  from  the  Garibaldi  monument  at  the 
Quarto,  Genoa:  ''To-day,  gentlemen,  your  vic- 
torious will  stands  armed  and  ready  for  the  fray. 
In  looking  at  you  and  contemplating  you,  Italy 
reveals  herself  to  me  as  a  virgin  land,  just  as  it 
appeared  to  Achates,  and  as  it  was  when  for  the 
first  time  there  rang  across  the  Tyrrhenian  Sea 
the  rapturous  melody  of  her  divine  name.  To- 
night, before  the  dawn,  many  of  you  will  set  out 
for  the  land  that  shines  from  afar.  Your  hearts 
are  messengers  of  faith,  ah,  pilgrims  of  love! 
The  same  fire  that  kindled  youth  that  night  at  the 
rock  of  Quarto  flames  anew  in  your  breasts.  If 
it  be  true,  as  I  swear  it  is,  that  we  Italians  have 
relighted  this  fire  on  the  altar  of  Italy,  then  take 
fagots  from  it  in  your  hands  and  blow  upon 
them.  Shake  them,  brandish  them  wherever  you 
go,  and,  my  young  companions,  thus  sow  the  fire 
of  war  all  about  you  and  be  the  intrepid  firebands 
of  Greater  Italy.  .  .  .  Sow  the  fire,  that  by  to- 
morrow the  souls  of  all  shall  be  enkindled,  and 
the  voices  of  all  a  clamor  of  flame  for  Italy! 
Italy!" 

Equally  typical  of  the  war-party's  denuncia- 
tions of  the  neutralists  is  this  speech  by  d'Annun- 
zio  upon  his  arrival  at  Rome  on  the  12th  of  May: 
"Since  three  days,  I  do  not  know  what  odor  of 
treason  begins  to  suffocate  us.  No,  no !  We  will 
not  be  a  museum,  a  hotel,  a  winter  resort,  a 
horizon  painted  in  Prussian  blue  for  international 
honeymoons!  .  .  .  Sweep  away,  sweep  away  all 
this   filth!    Cast   into    the   sewers   all   putrified 


170  PEESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

things!    Long  live  Rome  without  shame!    Long 
live  great  and  pure  Italy. ' ' 

The  Government  was  now  determined  to  force 
the  issue,  for  on  May  13th  the  Salandra-Sonnino 
ministry  resigned,  and  immediately  thereafter  a 
wave  of  pro-war  demonstrations  swept  over  Italy. 
At  first  these  demonstrations  merely  roused  the 
neutralists  to  scornful  or  angry  contempt.  "II 
Mattino"  of  Naples,  one  of  the  leading  news- 
papers of  Southern  Italy,  scored  "the  forty  or 
fifty  thousand  fools  or  rascals  who  wish  to  hurl 
into  the  abyss  the  country  and  the  thirty-six  mil- 
lion Italians  who  do  not  want  war,  having  every- 
thing to  lose  and  nothing  to  gain  from  such  a 
criminal  adventure."  The  Socialists  were  es- 
pecially determined.  They  organized  counter- 
demonstrations  throughout  Northern  Italy  which 
paraded  the  streets  shouting:  "Down  with  the 
Ministry !  We  want  no  war ! ' '  The  chief  Social- 
ist organ,  the  "Avanti,"  of  Milan,  exclaimed  in  a 
vitriolic  leader  of  May  16 :  "What  signs  of  deca- 
dence and  moral  baseness!  In  Milan  we  must 
witness  callow  youths  parade  in  triumph  the  ex- 
pelled or  deserters  of  all  parties.  In  Rome  the 
mob  of  hirelings  fed  from  the  bureaucratic  trough 
gets  itself  drunk  on  the  ear-splitting  harangues 
of  Gabriele  d'Annunzio.  And  what  harangues! 
Incitements  to  crime  in  all  its  forms.  D'Annun- 
zio as  leader  and  inspirer  of  the  national  con- 
sciousness !  Shame  brings  the  blush  hot  into  the 
cheeks.  Truly,  the  most  fearful  disillusionments 
are  in  store.    This  bacchanalia  of  the  patriots 


ITALY  171 

symbolized  by  d'Annunzio  is  only  the  outward 
sign  of  loug-staiidiug  ills.  And  il'  now  the  war 
does  come;  if  sorrow,  want,  and  suffering  settle 
down  upon  our  land  and  aggravate  still  further 
the  sad  lot  in  which  our  poor  working-folk  groan ; 
the  people  will  have  to  bear  all  the  consequences. 
The  poet  will  have  long  since  crossed  the  Alps 
once  more,  to  enjoy  comfortably  and  carnally 
among  foreigners  the  fruits  of  that  calculated 
frenzy  of  his  which  pushed  into  the  blood-bath  the 
Italian  people." 

However,  after  a  couple  of  days  of  the  pro-war 
demonstrations,  the  peace  party  began  to  lose  its 
nerve.  The  Government  did  nothing  to  check  the 
mobs  and  afforded  the  neutralists  no  assurance  of 
police  protection.  Giolitti,  threatened  with  death, 
hastily  left  Rome.  On  May  16  the  King  invited 
Salandra  to  resume  office.  This  was  decisive. 
The  war-party  celebrated  with  frenzied  enthusi- 
asm and  the  neutralist  opposition  went  completely 
to  pieces.  On  May  23,  Italy  formally  declared 
war  on  Austria-Hungary. 

One  of  tlie  chief  effects  of  Italy's  entrance  into 
the  war  was  a  further  strengthening  of  Italian  im- 
perialistic aspirations.  Typical  of  the  wide  hori- 
zons now  glimpsed  by  many  Italians  is  the  follow- 
ing article  by  Senator  Alessandro  Chiappelli 
which  appeared  in  the  ''Rassegna  Nazionale"  at 
the  close  of  1915:  *'The  sphere  of  action  of  a 
great  nation  like  Italy  should  not  be  con- 
fiiKMJ  to  tlie  difficult  and  glorious  task  of 
winning    the    territory    on    the    Adriatic.    The 


172  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

war  that  is  being  fought  out  to-day  on  the 
European  continent  will  find  its  realization  in 
Africa  and  in  Asia,  as  well  as  in  the  eastern  Med- 
iterranean, for  the  conquest  of  the  trade  routes 
and  the  markets  of  the  world.  Neither  would 
domination  over  the  Adriatic  alone  resolve  this 
difficult  problem  for  us,  because  it  would  open  for 
us  but  few  trade  routes,  even  should  we  conquer 
the  whole  Dalmatian  coast.  .  .  .  Our  allies  would 
in  the  meanwhile  plant  their  flags  on  new  and  ex- 
tensive colonial  territory,  and  would  open  up  for 
their  own  exclusive  advantage  new  commercial 
outlets,  so  that  when  peace  has  been  signed  we 
would  indeed  find  ourselves  masters  of  the  re- 
deemed districts  and  in  control  of  the  Adriatic, 
but  as  though  imprisoned  in  a  land-locked  lake; 
better  off,  indeed,  as  to  frontiers,  but  in  the  midst 
of  victorious  nations  grown  stronger  through  the 
war.  And  already,  as  I  have  said,  this  has  to  some 
extent  been  realized.  The  German  domains  in 
Africa  and  Asia  have  almost  all  fallen  under  the 
sway  of  England,  France,  or  Japan,  thus  aug- 
menting their  already  rich  colonial  possessions. 
It  is  small  consolation  that  in  the  case  of  England 
and  France  we  have  to  do  with  democratic  and 
liberal  peoples.  For,  although  incontrovertible 
reasons  make  the  civilized  world  willing  to  accept 
English  maritime  supremacy  while  it  would  ex- 
clude German  supremacy,  it  is  just  as  true  that 
the  slave  is  no  less  a  slave  if  his  master  is  humane 
instead  of  brutal  and  violent." 
Such  utterances  show  that  Italy  does  not  see 


ITALY  173 

things  quite  eye  to  eye  with  her  allies.  The  dif- 
ference in  viewpoint  comes  out  most  sharply  in 
the  various  Balkan  problems.  To  begin  with, 
England,  France,  and  Russia  all  wish  to  see  a 
powerful  Yugo-Slav  state  possessed  of  the  whole 
Adriatic  coast  from  Istria  to  southern  Albania. 
Italy,  however,  wishes  nothing  of  the  kind,  and 
Italian  writers  have  warned  their  allies  frankly 
that  Italy  will  tolerate  no  such  settlement,  but 
will  hold  her  partners  strictly  to  their  promises 
made  at  the  time  of  Italy's  entrance  into  the  war. 
As  the  Italian  publicist,  Antonio  Cippico,  re- 
marked in  the  London  ''Fortnightly  Review"  of 
August,  1915,  **Dalmatia  and  Istria  have  never, 
either  in  geography  or  in  history,  belonged  to 
the  Balkans.  Secluded  by  nearly  impervious 
mountain-chains,  they  will  be,  as  they  have  always 
been,  the  natural  bridges  between  Italy  and  the 
Balkan  peoples,  between  the  Western  civilization 
and  the  East. ' '  The  ' '  restoration ' '  of  these  lands 
to  Italy,  asserts  Signor  Cippico,  "is  not  territor- 
ial aggrandizement,  for  Italy  is  recovering  what 
she  has  been  mistress  of  for  twenty  centuries." 
And  he  concludes  with  this  very  plain  speaking  to 
his  English  readers:  "Any  further  discussion  of 
this  matter,  based  on  more  or  less  inaccurate  in- 
formation, can  only  be  of  harm  to  the  united  cause 
of  the  Allies.  .  .  .  Anybody  daring  to  discuss  or 
proposing  to  violate  the  agreement  between  Italy 
and  the  Entente,  which  has  brought  Italy  into  the 
war  on  the  side  of  the  Allies — would  prove  to  be  an 
enemy  not  only  of  Italy,  but  of  his  own  country." 


174  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

As  regards  Greece,  also,  the  Italian  attitude  dif- 
fers from  that  of  the  Western  Powers.  For  some 
years  previous  to  the  war,  Italy  and  Greece  were 
on  distinctly  bad  terms  owing  to  politico-economic 
rivalries  in  the  Balkans  and  the  Near  East. 
Greece's  failure  to  join  the  Allies  has  given  Ital- 
ian publicists  full  rein  to  display  their  anti-Greek 
feelings,  and  numerous  have  been  the  drastic  pro- 
posals against  the  recalcitrant  Hellenes.  Many 
Italians  feel  that  their  troops  should  at  least  oc- 
cupy the  Greek  province  of  Epirus  and  the  Ionian 
Islands,  notably  Corfu,  which  Italian  Nationalists 
have  long  termed  ^'Isola  nostra" — ''Our  Isle." 

Toward  Bulgaria,  however,  Italians  refuse  to 
entertain  the  bitter  feeling  displayed  by  the  other 
Allied  Powers  since  her  adhesion  to  the  Teutonic 
cause  in  the  autumn  of  1915.  Italian  writers  are 
continually  advocating  considerate  treatment  of 
Bulgaria  and  urge  fresh  attempts  to  win  her  to 
the  Allies'  side. 

In  fact,  what  most  Italians  would  apparently 
like  would  be  Italy  firmly  planted  in  the  Balkans 
from  Istria  to  Albania,  joining  hands  with  an  en- 
larged and  friendly  Bulgaria,  and  thus  holding 
both  Greece  and  Serbia  firmly  in  check.  This  is 
of  course  diametrically  opposed  to  the  intentions 
of  her  Allies,  England,  France,  and  Russia,  and 
may  yet  be  the  cause  of  serious  complications  in 
any  attempted  Balkan  settlement  should  the  Al- 
lies be  victorious. 

France  is,  indeed,  the  only  one  of  her  present 
allies  for  whom  Italy  feels  any  deep-going  cor- 


ITALY  175 

diality.  Anglo-Italian  friendship  is  not  without 
mental  reservations  on  both  sides,  while  toward 
Russia  there  is  merely  an  Italian  official  warmth 
which  has  no  roots  in  popular  sentiment.  Against 
the  ''hereditary  foe"  Austria,  the  traditional  en- 
mity has  waxed  greatly  during  the  war,  and  this 
feeling  is  enhanced  by  the  knowledge  that  Austria 
is  thirsting  for  vengeance  against  ''traitorous" 
Italy.  Anti-German  sentiment  has  slowly  in- 
creased, and  since  Germany  seems  irrevocably  al- 
lied to  Austria,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  the  former 
Italo-German  good-will  can  be  restored. 

The  war-temper  of  Italy  has  differed  widely 
from  that  of  either  England  or  France.  At  the 
time  of  Italy's  entrance  in  the  European  conflict, 
the  nation,  as  we  have  seen,  was  by  no  means 
unanimous  for  war,  and  this  division  of  sentiment 
has  persisted  to  the  present  day.  As  soon  as  the 
die  was  cast,  it  is  true,  active  opposition  disap- 
peared and  all  parties  tendered  the  Government 
their  formal  support.  But  this  support  was  in 
some  cases  a  regretful  bowing  to  stern  necessity. 
Many  of  the  former  partizans  of  neutrality  still 
believe  that  Italy's  action  was  a  mistake.  The 
Socialist  deputies  in  the  chamber  have  often  op- 
posed the  Government's  measures,  the  Catholics 
are  lukewarm,  and  the  Giolittian  press  has  main- 
tained an  attitude  of  reserved  criticism.  The  bad 
economic  conditions  prevailing  in  Italy,  including 
financial  stringency,  industrial  depression,  high 
food-prices  and  an  acute  shortage  of  coal,  have 
caused  much  suffering  and  pessimism,  while  the 


176  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

mediocre  success  of  domestic  war-loans  shows  that 
the  moneyed  classes  are  not  opening  their  purse 
strings. 

Another  factor  tending  to  dampen  popular  en- 
thusiasm has  been  the  absence  of  any  striking  mili- 
tary or  naval  success.  Despite  exceedingly  heavy 
losses  the  Italian  armies  have  not  yet  broken  the 
iron  girdle  of  Austria's  land  defense,  while  the 
Italian  navy  has  suffered  seriously,  with  few  tan- 
gible results.  The  irredentist  lands  are  still  *' un- 
redeemed." 

All  this  is  not  without  significance  for  Italy's 
domestic  future.  The  Government  openly  advo- 
cated Italian  intervention  and  is  primarily  re- 
sponsible for  the  present  situation.  If  the  Allies 
win  and  Italy  achieves  her  desired  objectives,  well 
and  good.  The  Government  will  then  have  justi- 
fied itself  and  will  undoubtedly  be  accorded  gen- 
eral popular  approval.  But  should  the  war  end 
even  in  a  stalemate  with  no  rewards  commensu- 
rate to  Italian  suffering  and  sacrifice,  there  will  be 
trouble.  The  irreconcilables,  especially  the  revo- 
lutionists, are  still  there.  The  Republicans  may 
have  entered  the  war  as  a  crusade  for  liberty  incar- 
nated by  France,  but  the  Syndicalists  and  An- 
archists were  animated  by  very  different  motives. 
Unlike  Marxian  Socialism,  Syndicalism  believes 
in  foreign  as  well  as  class  war.  In  1911  the  Syn- 
dicalists, much  to  the  scandal  of  orthodox  Social- 
ists, supported  the  Tripoli  expedition  on  the 
ground  that  war  of  any  kind  tends  to  quicken 
that    spirit    of   violence    indispensable    to    Syn- 


ITALY  177 

dicalist  aspirations.  Tlie  Syndicalists  are  to- 
day plainly  fishing  in  troubled  waters.  Even 
victory  would  leave  Italy  impoverished  and 
burdened  with  debt — excellent  for  Syndicalist 
propaganda,  while  Italian  disappointment  or 
disaster  would  so  discredit  the  ruling  regime 
as  to  offer  Syndicalism  a  golden  opportunity. 
The  Syndicalists  showed  their  strength  in  the 
''Red  Week"  of  June,  1914.  If  ever  their  day 
dawns,  they  will  use  it — for  they  have  no  scruples. 


CHAPTER  VI 

BUSSIA 

THE  outstanding  feature  of  the  decade  of  Rus- 
sian history  lying  between  the  Revolution 
and  the  European  War  is  the  growth  of  Russian 
imperialism.  This  movement,  whose  complex 
character  is  as  yet  insufficiently  appreciated,  is  of 
capital  importance  for  an  understanding  both  of 
Russia's  present  position  and  of  Europe's  pros- 
pects in  the  years  to  come. 

When  the  great  Revolution  broke  out  in  the 
autumn  of  1904,  Russia  stood  at  a  momentous 
crossroads  in  her  history.  The  disastrous  Jap- 
anese war  had  exposed  with  terrible  clearness  the 
shortcomings  of  the  old  absolutist,  bureaucratic 
regime.  Every  one  was  crying  for  reform,  and  in 
this  universal  ferment  the  Russian  Intelligentsia 
sprang  forward  as  self-appointed  champions  of 
the  New.  This  Intelligentsia  occupied  a  very  spe- 
cial position  in  the  semi-Oriental,  caste-like  hier- 
archy of  Russian  society.  Its  ordinary  transla- 
tion, ''The  Intellectuals,"  would  much  better  be 
rendered,  ''The  Civilized."  The  Intelligentsia 
was,  in  fact,  the  ensemble  of  those  persons 
from  all  the  regular  social  classes  who  believed 
themselves  "enlightened"  in  contradistinction  to 
"those  who  do  not  know."    Their  creed  consisted 

178 


RUSSIA  179 

of  two  articles :  hatred  of  tlie  ruling  regime,  aiul 
boundless  faith  in  tiieir  ability  to  regenerate  and 
"civilize"  their  country. 

The  Intelligentsia  were  not  very  numerous,  but 
their  political  importance  in  1904  was  out  of  all 
proportion  to  their  numbers.  It  was  they  who 
had  hitherto  constituted  the  sole  opposition  party 
in  Russia.  It  was  their  fighting  wing,  the  Nihil- 
ists, which  had  waged  truceless  war  against  the 
bureaucracy  in  the  darkest  hours  of  absolutism. 
Accordingly,  now  that  the  whole  country  was  at 
last  stirring  against  absolutism  and  bureau- 
cracy, the  discontented  everywhere  looked  to  the 
Intelligentsia  as  the  natural  leaders  toward  the 
better  morrow. 

Thus  was  the  Intelligentsia  "clothed  with  a  lit- 
tle brief  authority."  But  the  Russian  Revolution 
IS  the  story  of  the  Intelligentsia 's  lamentable  fail- 
ure. They  were  tried  and  found  wanting.  The 
reason  was  that  their  program  was  a  purely  neg- 
ative and  destructive  one.  A  mere  ensemble  of 
individuals  from  all  classes,  they  possessed  no  set- 
tled, positive  philosophy,  and  on  their  first  attempts 
at  constructive  measures  they  fell  apart  like  a 
rope  of  sand.  Also,  the  old  regime  found  a  man 
— P.  A.  Stolypin — whose  iron  hand  bent  Russia 
once  more  to  the  yoke  of  established  order  and 
authority.  In  less  than  three  years  the  Revolu- 
tion was  over. 

Of  course,  Russia  had  not  simply  returned  to 
the  old  groove.  "Revolutions  never  move  back- 
wards"— and  Russia  had  been  through  a  real  rev- 


180  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

olution.  Henceforth  she  was  obviously  going  to 
move  both  fast  and  far.  The  question  was, 
whither?  And  that  question  had  already  been  an- 
swered by  the  Revolution's  outcome.  If  the  Intel- 
ligentsia had  won,  Russia  would  probably  have 
followed  a  path  of  external  peace  and  internal  lib- 
eral reform.  However  they  might  differ  over 
details,  the  Intelligentsia  were  usually  disciples 
of  West  European  culture  and  believers  in  West- 
ern institutions.  They  were  also  opposed  to  the 
old  bureaucratic  centralization  and  "Russifica- 
tion"  of  the  empire's  non-Russian  peoples. 
Their  ideal,  however  vague,  was  a  parliamentary, 
federalized  Russia,  avoiding  foreign  adventures 
and  with  internal  liberty  for  all. 

The  significance  of  such  a  possibility  for  Rus- 
sia's future  becomes  doubly  apparent  when  we 
realize  that,  as  a  result  of  the  Revolution's  uni- 
versal quickening,  the  great  peasant  mass  was  at 
last  awakening  to  political  consciousness  and  pre- 
paring to  play  its  part  in  the  national  life.  Ob- 
viously, the  peasant  would  adopt  as  his  own  the 
dominant  political  philosophy  of  the  day,  and  so 
enormous  was  his  mass  that  his  political  conversion 
must  decide  Russia's  political  Orientation  for 
many  years  to  come.  If  the  Intelligentsia  had  won 
the  Revolution  they  would  have  converted  the  peas- 
ants to  their  political  philosophy  and  Russia  would 
have  been  pledged  to  internal.  Westernizing  re- 
form and  external  peace.  But  fate  willed  it  oth- 
erwise. The  Intelligentsia  went  down  in  discred- 
ited failure,  and  the  strong  arm  of  P.  A.  Stolypin 


RUSSIA  181 

thrust  Russia  past  the  crossroads  into  the  path 
of  aggressive  imperialism. 

Imperialism  had  of  course  always  been  in  the 
blood  of  Russia's  rulers  and  statesmen.  It  was 
thus  that  a  petty  princedom  on  the  banks  of  the 
Moskva  had  swelled  into  a  mighty  empire  cover- 
ing one-seventli  of  the  land  surface  of  the  globe. 
To  the  Muscovite  Tsars,  *'IIoly  Russia"  had  for 
centuries  been  the  ''third  Rome,"  destined  to  con- 
quer and  absorb  the  whole  earth.  As  the  above 
terms  indicate,  this  imperialistic  concept  had  a 
religious  as  well  as  a  political  complexion,  being 
fully  shared  by  the  Russian  orthodox  clergy.  It 
w^as  also  the  faith  of  the  middle  classes  and  most 
of  the  nobility.  Muscovite  imperialism  is  well 
summed  up  in  the  words  of  the  late  M.  Pobiedo- 
nostsev:    "Russia  is  not  a  state:  it  is  a  world!" 

Although  Russian  imperialists  agree  in  the  ulti- 
mate objective  of  world  dominion,  they  differ  as 
to  the  path  they  should  follow.  Russian  imper- 
ialism is  therefore  divided  into  what  is  knowm 
as  the  ''Western"  and  "Eastern"  schools.  The 
former  maintains  that  Russia's  first  duty  is  to 
free  and  unite  the  whole  Slav  race,  seat  herself 
at  Constantinople  ("New  Rome"),  and  thereafter 
purge  and  absorb  the  "rotten  West."  The  latter 
holds  that  Russia's  primary  duty  is  toward  Asia. 
Herself  more  than  half  Asiatic,  Russia's  immedi- 
ate mission  is  to  awaken  Asia  from  its  deathlike 
stupor  to  a  new,  Russian  life.  It  is  the  alternat- 
ing ascendancy  of  these  two  imperialistic  schools 
which  gives  the  key  to  Russian  foreign  policy. 


182  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

At  the  beginning  of  the  present  century  the 
Eastern  school  was  at  the  helm.  The  persuasive 
teachings  of  Prince  Ukhtomsky,  Yushakov,  and 
others,  had  converted  Tsar  Nicholas  II  to  East- 
ernism.  Accordingly,  Russian  policy  looked  to- 
ward Asia,  while  the  Balkans  were  neglected  and 
Russia's  western  borders  secured  by  cultivating 
good  relations  with  her  western  neighbors,  Ger- 
many and  Austria-Hungary.  Then  came  the  Jap- 
anese war,  which  heartily  sickened  Russians  of 
Eastern  adventures,  while  the  ensuing  Revolution 
drove  all  thoughts  of  foreign  policy  temporarily 
from  men's  minds. 

But  not  for  long.  By  1907  the  Stolypin  re- 
action enabled  Russia  to  look  abroad  once  more, 
and  her  gaze  now  fixed  itself  upon  the  Balkans  and 
the  Near  East.  She  found  the  ground  well  pre- 
pared. In  June,  1903,  a  dynastic  revolution  in 
Serbia  had  replaced  the  Austrophile  King  Alex- 
ander by  the  Russophile  Peter  Karageorgevitch, 
and  the  Serbians,  a  people  small  in  numbers  but 
with  great  ambitions,  offered  themselves  as  will- 
ing allies  in  any  Russian  ''forward"  policy  to- 
ward the  West.  The  Austrian  imperialists  saw 
what  was  coming,  and  their  annexation  of  Bosnia- 
Herzegovina  in  1908  dashed  Serb  ambitions  and 
defied  Russian  Pan-Slavism  at  one  and  the  same 
time.  Russia,  still  weak  from  her  recent  misfor- 
tunes, swallowed  her  wrath  but  vowed  vengeance. 
From  that  moment  the  great  Austro-Russian  duel 
was  on,  both  parties  openly  preparing  for  war 
and  seeking  to  undermine  the  other's  position  by 


RUSSIA  183 

every  means  in  their  power.  The  most  unscrup- 
ulous methods  were  used,  especially  as  regards 
rival  propagandas  among  disaffected  domestic 
elements. 

And  the  Austrian  propaganda  found  within  the 
Russian  borders  much  fertile  soil.  The  rising 
tide  of  Muscovite  imperialism  had  caused  a  rapid 
growth  of  "Nationalist"  sentiment  among  the 
"Great  Russians."  The  Great  Russians,  who 
form  the  real  racial  cement  of  the  Russian  Em- 
pire, number  only  seventy  millions  of  the  em- 
pire's one  hundred  and  seventy  million  inhabit- 
ants. Before  the  Revolution,  when  the  yoke  of 
autocracy  pressed  equally  upon  all,  many  Great 
Russians  had  made  common  cause  with  the  non- 
Muscovite  nationalities,  and  these  latter  had  ex- 
pected from  the  Revolution  a  decentralized  fed- 
eralism which  should  ensure  them  local  autonomy 
and  cultural  life.  But  the  Great  Russians,  now 
admitted  through  the  Duma  to  a  share  in  direct- 
ing the  empire's  destinies,  promptly  became  Na- 
tionalists and  took  up  the  old  bureaucratic  pro- 
gram of  "Russifying"  the  minor  nationalities. 
Furious  at  this  disappointment  of  their  dearest 
hopes,  the  minor  nationalities  fell  into  sullen  dis- 
affection. The  thirty  million  "Little  Russians" 
of  the  Ukraine,  in  particular,  lent  a  willing  ear  to 
Austrian  promptings  to  sedition  and  separatism. 

But  this  merely  increased  the  anger  of  the  Rus- 
sian imperialists,  who  sharpened  their  Russifica- 
tion  program  and  pressed  their  military  prepara- 
tions.   And    these    preparations    were    directed 


184  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

against  Germany  as  well  as  against  Austria- 
Hungary.  In  1908  Germany  had  shown  her 
determination  to  back  her  Austrian  ally  to  the 
last,  and  she  was  now  openly  rejuvenating  Tur- 
key, the  ultimate  prey  of  Muscovite  Western  im- 
perialism. This  provoked  the  bitterest  anti- 
German  feeling  in  Russia,  and  the  years  preceding 
the  European  War  witnessed  a  Russo-German 
press  campaign  of  truly  extraordinary  virulence. 
As  the  Russian  publicist,  Paul  Mitrofanov  warned 
the  Germans  in  June,  1914,  *'The  road  to  Con- 
stantinople now  goes  through  Berlin.  Vienna  has 
become  a  secondary  factor."  The  Russian  Gov- 
ernment was  preparing  feverishly  for  any  eventu- 
ality. The  Duma  voted  huge  army  increases  in 
1913  and  a  network  of  new  strategic  railways  was 
begun  all  along  the  German  border.  Russia  was 
to  be  fully  prepared  by  1916. 

Western  imperialism,  under  the  masterful  head- 
ship of  the  Grand  Duke  Nicholas  Nicholaievitch, 
thus  dominated  the  councils  of  the  empire,  and 
even  Intelligentsia  leaders  like  Peter  Struve  and 
Paul  Miliukov  were  going  with  the  tide.  Never- 
theless, the  voice  of  the  Eastern  school  was  by  no 
means  stilled.  Just  as  the  Western  Pan-Slavists 
had  backed  the  Serbian  revolution  at  the  very 
height  of  the  Japanese  war,  so  the  Easterners  now 
warned  against  plunging  Russia  into  a  European 
Armageddon  and  urged  an  understanding  with 
the  Teutonic  Powers  and  reconcentration  toward 
Asia.  Such  was  the  theme  of  Baron  Rosen's  fa- 
mous ''Secret  Memoir"  of  early  1914,  such  the 


RUSSIA  185 

advice  of  General  Kuropatkin  and  of  publicists 
like  Michael  Pavlov  itch  and  Prince  Kotchubey. 
Throughout  the  opening  months  of  1914  there  was 
sharp  clashing  between  the  two  schools.  Then 
came  Serajevo  and  the  Great  War. 

The  outbreak  of  hostilities  caused  an  outburst  of 
popular  enthusiasm  and  a  general  rallying  of  op- 
position forces  round  the  Government  and  the 
Tsar.  During  the  early  part  of  1914  there  had 
been  a  good  deal  of  political  discontent  and  social 
unrest,  but  most  of  this  disappeared  in  the  wave 
of  patriotic  loyalty  which  now  swept  the  country. 
A  prominent  leader  of  the  Intelligentsia,  V.  Na- 
bokov, wrote  in  the  Petrogad  "Eyetch":  ''The 
imperial  manifesto  invites  us  to  forget  our  in- 
ternal conflict.  .  .  .  Uniting  with  all  those  to 
whom  the  life  of  our  country  is  dear,  we  do  not 
give  up  a  single  one  of  our  slogans,  do  not  forget 
a  single  one  of  our  idealistic  problems,  do  not 
abandon  a  single  one  of  our  positions.  .  .  .  But 
we  are  filled  with  the  consciousness  that  above 
individual  political  ideals  .  .  .  stands  one  thing 
.  .  .  the  life  and  greatness  of  the  Fatherland.  At 
present  it  is  in  danger.  And  all  of  us,  her  sons, 
are  needed  by  her  wholly,  without  reserve.  All  of 
us,  without  regard  to  political  faith  and  sect,  each 
one  in  his  place  .  .  .  will  serve  to  the  full  extent  of 
our  strength  and  ability."  The  only  discordant 
notes  were  those  of  the  extremely  class-conscious, 
revolutionary  Laborites  and  Social-Democrats, 
who  refused  to  indorse  the  war  and  stood  sullenly 
aloof. 


186  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

Such  voices  were,  however,  lost  in  the  thunder- 
ous chorus  of  loyalty  and  enthusiasm.  The  liberal 
"Russkoye  Slovo"  of  Moscow  cried:  "Rise,  ye 
great  Russian  people!  History  is  calling  you  to 
perform  a  great  feat  before  which  all  that  the 
world  has  ever  seen  will  pale.  .  .  .  The  road  will 
be  difficult,  the  sacrifices  will  be  heavy,  but  the 
recompense  will  be  great."  Germany  was  every- 
where stigmatized  as  the  arch-enemy.  The  noted 
imperialist  organ,  ''Novoye  Vremya,"  asserted 
furiously:  *'The  breeding-place  of  international 
violence  will  be  crushed  by  the  gigantic  strength 
of  the  Northern  people,  the  life  of  nations  will 
enter  upon  the  course  of  justice  and  humanity. 
...  In  all  Europe  since  the  time  of  Prince  Bis- 
marck there  has  been  only  one  center  of  militar- 
ism— Berlin."  And  its  brilliant  leader-writer, 
Menshikov,  pronounced  that,  as  a  result  of  the 
war,  all  Eastern  Germany  must  become  Slav  to 
the  very  gates  of  Berlin.  Among  the  peasantry 
the  war  was  thoroughly  popular.  The  traditional 
hatred  for  the  Niemetz — the  German — flamed  up 
hotly,  and  the  peasant  reservists  marched  joyfully 
to  crush  the  "impious"  Westerners,  "the  Devil's 
spawn,"  who  had  dared  assail  "Little  Mother 
Russia"  in  such  sacrilegious  fashion. 

The  early  stages  of  the  war  did  much  to  con- 
firm this  Russian  optimism.  The  disasters  in 
East  Prussia  were  forgotten  in  the  glorious  tid- 
ings of  the  Austrian  collapse  at  Lemberg  and  the 
overrunning  of  all  eastern  Galicia  by  the  Russian 
armies.    At  last  that  nest  of  Ukrainian  separat- 


RUSSIA  187 

ism  which  had  weighed  so  intolerably  upon  Mus- 
covite public  confidence  was  in  the  Russian  grasp ! 
The  drastic  "Russification"  of  the  Ruthenians 
which  now  began  was  but  the  Government's  an- 
swer to  insistent  popular  clamor.  Numerous 
plans  were  sketched  out  for  the  summary  partition 
of  both  the  Central  Empires.  *'It  is  highly  de- 
sirable for  Russia,"  wrote  Menshikov  in  the 
"Xovoye  Vrem5'a,"  *Ho  surround  herself  with 
buffers,  with  a  network  of  political  organisms, 
harmless  to  Russia  yet  capable  of  opposing  re- 
sistance to  others'  aggressions.  If  we  succeed 
in  making  Germany  and  Austria  into  Balkan-like 
groups  of  peoplets,  then  we  can  at  last  sleep  safe 
o'  nights  about  our  western  border." 

In  Russia,  as  in  other  countries  during  the  early 
months  of  the  struggle,  great  stress  was  laid  upon 
the  war's  regenerative  effects.  The  good  results 
of  the  Government's  prohibition  of  drink  were  es- 
pecially emphasized.  "Our  country  is  passing 
through  an  epoch  fraught  with  the  greatest  sig- 
nificance," wrote  K.  Voboryov  in  the  Petrogad 
"Ryetch."  ''The  spiritual  elevation  the  people 
have  experienced  since  the  declaration  of  war, 
added  to  the  sobriety  that  began  at  the  same  time, 
has  wrought  a  profound  change  in  the  life  of  the 
country  right  before  our  eyes.  The  stoppage  of 
drink  has  revolutionized  the  Russians  psycholog- 
ically, economically,  and  socially.  The  results 
of  the  change  are  already  apparent  throughout  the 
empire,  especially  in  the  villages.  The  Russian 
village  in  this  brief  period  has  been  so  transformed 


188  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

that  it  is  unrecognizable. "  ' '  There  is  great  hope, ' ' 
wrote  Mensbikov  in  the  ' '  Novoye  Vremya, "  '  *  that 
if  the  experiment  in  involuntary  temperance  con- 
tinues as  successfully  as  in  the  past  months,  the 
Government  authorities  may  gather  sufficient  cour- 
age to  put  an  end  to  this  inveterate  public  evil. 
Oh,  what  a  great,  saving  deed  that  would  be !  It 
would  be  more  than  throwing  off  the  Tartar  yoke, 
or  the  abolition  of  serfdom;  it  would  be  the  de- 
struction of  the  devil's  power  over  Russia.  .  .  . 
We  do  not  yet  know  what  the  Russian  nation  is 
as  a  sober  nation.  .  .  .  From  time  immemorial  has 
alcohol  been  poisoning  our  blood.  What  will  our 
future  be,  then,  if  our  Government  shall  under- 
take the  pious  feat  and  actually  sober  the 
people?" 

Turkey's  entrance  into  the  war  on  the  Teutonic 
side  in  November,  1914,  was  greeted  by  Russia 
with  a  general  shout  of  glee.  Ever  since  the  be- 
ginning of  the  war  influential  circles  of  Russian 
public  opinion  had  demanded  that  Russia  should 
in  any  event  obtain  Constantinople  and  the  Straits 
as  part  of  the  prize  of  victory,  and  Turkey's  ac- 
tion was  therefore  hailed  as  a  welcome  means  of 
satisfying  Russia's  age-long  aspirations.  What 
these  aspirations  were  was  readily  discernible 
from  a  survey  of  the  Russian  press.  Even  before 
the  formal  rupture  with  Turkey,  the  ''Petrograd 
Bourse  Gazette"  had,  in  October,  1914,  conducted 
an  inquiry  on  the  topic:  "The  Sick  Man  is  dy- 
ing. What  shall  be  done  with  his  heritage?"  To 
this  question  a  few  voices,  such  as  Professor 


RUSSIA  189 

Alexeiev  of  Moscow,  had  recommendGd  that  the 
Straits  be  placed  under  international  control,  with 
Constantinople  a  free  city.  But  the  great  major- 
ity had  asserted  that  Constantinople  and  the 
Straits  must  pass  entirely  under  Russian  con- 
trol, while  many  had  also  asserted  that  Russia 
must  obtain  complete  Balkan  supremacy.  For 
example,  Professor  Kotliarievsky  of  Moscow  con- 
tended, **The  Straits  must  and  shall  belong  to  us.** 
And  the  *' Bourse  Gazette"  itself  remarked  edi- 
torially: **We  are  the  natural  heirs  of  European 
Turkey.  We  must  at  last  become  a  Balkan 
Power.  The  growth  of  Russia  to  a  Balkan  Power 
must  be  accompanied  simultaneously  by  the  con- 
clusion with  the  other  states  of  the  Peninsula  of 
a  customs  union  and  a  military  convention  on  the 
model  of  that  by  which  Prussia,  after  1866, 
founded  the  Germanic  Confederation  and  later 
transformed  it  into  the  German  Empire.  .  .  . 
Only  such  a  task  is  worthy  of  Russia  and  of  the 
sacrifices  which  this  war  will  entail." 

These  sentiments  were  naturally  intensified  by 
Turkey's  entrance  into  the  war.  The  Tsar  ac- 
curately reflected  the  feelings  of  his  subjects  when 
he  stated  in  his  war  manifesto :  ' '  Together  with 
the  whole  Russian  people,  we  firmly  believe  that 
Turkey's  insensate  intervention  in  the  war  will 
hasten  the — to  her — fatal  course  of  events  and 
will  open  out  to  Russia  a  way  to  the  solution  of 
those  historical  problems  on  the  shores  of  the 
Black  Sea  bequeathed  by  our  ancestors."  And 
the    **Novoye    Vremya"    exclaimed    exultantly: 


190  PKESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

"The  war  with  Turkey  must  be  considered  desir- 
able, however  inconvenient  it  may  be  to  divert  a 
part  of  our  forces  from  the  main  front,  because  it 
gives  us  the  opportunity  of  settling,  with  one 
supreme  effort,  the  'Eastern  Question.'  .  .  . 
There  has  never  been  in  the  past,  and,  may  be, 
never  in  the  future  will  there  be,  such  a  happy 
combination  of  circumstances  for  the  liquidation 
of  Turkey,  at  least  as  a  European  Power.  This 
occasion  must  be  utilized,  no  matter  how  difficult 
and  what  its  cost.  If  we  win,  there  will  spread 
before  us  the  grand  prospect  of  realizing  the  great- 
est and  perhaps  the  ultimate  ideals  of  the  Slav 
races." 

Russian  public  opinion  took  Anglo-French  ut- 
terances about  an  internationalization  of  the 
Straits  with  very  bad  grace.  In  March,  1915,  the 
well-known  publicist,  Prince  Eugene  Troubetzkoi, 
wrote  in  the  ''Russkaya  Vyedomosti"  of  Mos- 
cow: '*Our  allies,  like  our  enemies,  should  know 
the  Russian  popular  point  of  view.  There  is  only 
one  solution  of  the  problem  which  corresponds  to 
our  national  interests:  Constantinople  and  the 
Straits  must  become  Russian.  Any  other  solu- 
tion is  inacceptible  for  us."  And  in  April,  1915, 
the  influential  congress  of  nobles  passed  the  fol- 
lowing emphatic  resolution:  ''The  congress,  con- 
vinced with  the  Russian  people  that  the  world- 
war  will  end  by  the  complete  victory  of  Russia 
and  her  glorious  allies,  thinks  that  one  of  the  in- 
evitable results  of  this  victory  must  be  the  acquisi- 
tion of  Constantinople  by  the  Russian  Empire. 


RUSSIA  191 

In  the  popular  conscience  there  lies  profoundly 
rooted  the  conviction  that  the  Russian  Tsar  is 
alone  predestined  by  the  AVill  of  God  to  plant  the 
Cross  on  Saint  Sophia  and  restore  in  its  ancient 
splendor  the  altar  of  the  Universal  Orthodox 
Church."  **To  Russia  a  free  outlet  to  the  Medi- 
terranean is  an  absolute  necessity,"  asserted  the 
*'Novoye  Vremya."  "She  has  waited  for  it  for 
centuries  and  she  can  wait  no  longer.  Constan- 
tinople must  be  Russian,  and  it  will  make  no  differ- 
ence if  England  and  France  are  the  first  in  seizing 
it." 

Such  w^as  Russia's  hopeful  mood  in  the  spring 
of  1915.  With  her  armies  breasting  the  Carpa- 
thian mountain  crests  overlooking  the  Hungarian 
plain,  and  her  Western  Allies  hammering  at  the 
Dardanelles,  a  happy  ending  to  the  war  seemed 
almost  in  sight.  One  of  the  few  clouds  upon  the 
popular  horizon  was  a  certain  disappointment  at 
the  general  loyalty  of  the  Austrian  Slavs.  Many 
Russians  had  apparently  expected  that  the  Aus- 
trian armies  would  disintegrate  at  the  mere  sight 
of  the  Russian  standards.  Accordingly,  the  stub- 
born Austrian  defense  on  the  Carpathians  and  at 
the  Dunajec  caused  some  disagreeable  surprise  in 
the  Russian  press.  "The  Austrian  Slavs,"  wrote 
the  "Birzhevia  Vyedomosti"  ruefully,  "have 
fought  very  well  against  us,  and  do  so  still.  The 
cause  of  their  attitude  is,  in  our  opinion,  very 
simple :  they  do  not  wish  to  be  delivered  by  us  Rus- 
sians." But  this,  after  all,  was  merely  the  tra- 
ditional fly  in  the  ointment.    In  the  spring  of 


192  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

1915,  Russian  public  opinion  was  thoroughly  op- 
timistic and  expectant  of  speedy  victory. 

Into  this  confident  optimism  broke  the  great 
Austro-German  ''drive"  which  never  slackened 
till  it  had  torn  Galicia  and  Russian  Poland  from 
the  Muscovite  grasp  and  had  conquered  Courland 
and  Lithuania  as  well.  The  Russian  press  made 
no  attempt  to  minimize  the  seriousness  of  the  sit- 
uation. In  July,  1915,  the  ''Russkoye  Slovo"  re- 
marked: "We  must  not  light-heartedly  shut  our 
eyes  to  the  significance  of  the  successes  of  our 
stubborn  enemy  and  console  ourselves  with  the 
usual  phrases  about  the  losses  suffered  by  them 
and  about  the  worthlessness  of  the  territory  lost 
by  us.  It  is  much  better  to  weigh  the  situation 
created  and  not  blind  our  eyes  to  the  possible  con- 
sequences of  our  ill  success."  And  a  month  later 
the  ''Novoye  Vremya"  wrote:  **We  must  look 
at  things  soberly.  To  defeat  the  Germans  is  no 
longer  a  luxury  which  we  could  afford  to  deny 
ourselves  if  we  wished.  Under  our  present  condi- 
tions victory  is  a  necessity  which  we  must  purchase 
at  whatever  cost,  for  without  it  there  will  be  no 
Russia.  The  Germans  would  gladly  make  peace 
with  us  in  order  to  protect  their  rear,  but  they 
would  demand  impossible  cessions  of  territory,  an 
enormous  war-indemnity,  and  a  humiliating  com- 
mercial treaty.  Such  a  peace  would  place  in  serf- 
dom an  empire  of  one  hundred  and  eighty  million 
Russian  people." 

But    the    deepest    causes    of    discouragement 


RUSSIA  193 

sprang  from  within.  The  Russian  people  knew 
that  German  genius  w^as  not  the  sole  reason  for 
Russian  failure.  There  were  ugly  charges  of  gov- 
ernment inefficiency,  wastefulness,  graft,  and 
dowTiright  treason.  These  charges  involved  the 
highest  quarters.  The  very  minister  of  war, 
Soukhomlinov,  was  presently  put  on  trial  and  dis- 
graced. 

And  this  was  not  all.  Many  Russians  felt  that 
the  ruling  regime  was  deliberately  using  the  war 
to  rivet  unrelieved  autocracy  upon  the  empire 
once  more.  Even  before  the  war  all  the  liberal 
elements  had  been  protesting  against  the  Govern- 
ment's increasingly  arbitrary  measures,  and  these 
liberal  protests  had  been  steadily  sharpened  by 
the  subsequent  course  of  events.  At  the  outbreak 
of  hostilities  the  Government  had,  it  is  true,  issued 
a  ringing  proclamation  urging  forgetfulness  of 
domestic  issues  in  the  common  cause  of  the  threat- 
ened P^atherland.  But  the  Government's  subse- 
quent actions  had  shown  that  it,  at  least,  did  not 
propose  to  forget.  Almost  its  first  move  had  been 
to  gag  the  entire  Russian  radical  press,  w^hile  all 
non-Russian  newspapers  throughout  the  empire 
except  a  few  Conservative  Polish  organs  had  been 
suppressed  at  a  blow.  In  regions  like  Finland  and 
the  Ukraine,  "Russification"  was  speeded  up  in 
the  most  ruthless  fashion,  the  last  local  liberties 
being  relentlessly  swept  away.  Revolutionists 
like  Vladimir  Bourtzev,  hastening  home  from  exile 
in  response  to  their  country's  call,  were  thrown 


194  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

into  prison,  while  the  entire  group  of  labor 
deputies  in  the  Duma  was  incontinently  shipped 
off  to  Siberia. 

All  this  naturally  evoked  a  rising  wave  of  angry 
discontent.  Of  course  the  iron  censorship  long 
checked  even  the  faintest  mutterings  in  the  Rus- 
sian home  press,  but  Russian  papers  printed 
abroad  told  startling  tales.  Most  significant  of 
the  growing  unrest  was  the  movement  known  as 
the  "Dread  of  Victory."  Just  as  in  the  Japanese 
war,  many  radicals  began  to  fear  that  a  Russian 
triumph  would  rivet  the  chains  of  despotism  for- 
ever upon  their  country.  As  early  as  October, 
1914,  the  Russian  Socialist  leader  Lenin  wrote  in 
the  "Sotzial  Demokrat"  of  Geneva,  Switzerland: 
"In  the  actual  state  of  affairs  it  is  impossible, 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  international  pro- 
letariat, to  say  which  would  be  the  lesser  evil 
for  Socialism — an  Austro-German  defeat,  or  a 
Franco-Russo-English  defeat.  But  for  us,  Rus- 
sian Social-Democrats,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that, 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  toiling  masses  of  all 
the  Russian  peoples,  the  lesser  evil  would  be  a 
defeat  of  the  Tsarist  monarchy,  which  is  the  most 
reactionary  and  the  most  barbarous  of  govern- 
ments, and  which  oppresses  the  largest  number  of 
nationalities  and  the  largest  mass  of  population 
in  Europe  and  Asia."  And  in  February,  1915,  he 
wrote :  * '  "We  say :  Yes,  we  hope  for  the  defeat  of 
Russia  because  it  will  facilitate  the  internal  vic- 
tory of  Russia — the  abolition  of  her  slavery,  her 
liberation  from  the  chains  of  Tsarism. ' '    The  Rus- 


RUSSIA  195 

sian  Social  Democrats  certainly  proved  the  faith 
that  was  in  them.  There  was  continual  shirking, 
striking  and  sabotage  in  Russian  munitions  fac- 
tories, and  it  was  notorious  that  many  town  regi- 
ments did  not  fight  well. 

It  is  true  that  this  positively  seditious  attitude 
was  confined  to  the  working-folk  of  the  towns. 
Most  of  the  Intelligentsia  were  for  the  war,  while 
the  great  peasant  mass  was  heartily  in  favor  of 
the  struggle  against  the  German.  Nevertheless, 
the  Government's  internal  policy  caused  wide- 
spread dissatisfaction  and  pessimism.  In  April, 
1915,  the  *'Novy  Mir,"  a  radical  paper  published 
in  New  York  city,  which  possessed  good  sources 
of  information,  painted  a  decidedly  gloomy  pic- 
ture of  political  conditions  within  the  Russian  Em- 
pire. **\\Tien  the  w^ar  was  declared,"  it  wrote, 
''voices  were  lieard  from  all  sides  urging  the  ne- 
cessity of  'ceasing  the  strife.'  'United  Russia' — 
such  was  the  slogan.  It  still  remains  the  slogan 
even  now,  but  its  falseness  is  already  felt  by  many. 
The  point  is,  the  strife  has  been  ceased  by  one 
side,  but  the  other  does  not  even  think  of  stop- 
ping ;  on  the  contrary,  it  is  on  its  guard  more  than 
ever.  .  .  .  Meanwhile,  the  oppression  is  quite 
merciless.  One  thing  is  clear — the  enthusiasm  is 
rapidly  declining." 

If  such  was  the  situation  in  the  spring  of  1915, 
it  is  easy  to  imagine  the  effect  of  the  summer's 
disasters  upon  public  opinion.  Indeed,  so  loud  be- 
came the  cry  of  discontent  that  the  Duma  was  con- 
voked at  the  beginning  of  August.     But  Liberal 


196  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

demands  for  sweeping  investigation  and  reform  so 
alarmed  the  ruling  regime  that  in  mid-September 
the  Duma  was  hastily  dissolved  and  the  Govern- 
ment reorganized  in  more  reactionary  fashion  than 
before.  "Victory  first:  reform  after!"  was  the 
ofiScial  slogan;  a  sentiment  heartily  endorsed  by 
the  reactionary  press.  The  "  Petrogradskiya 
Vyedomosti"  wrote:  "The  legislative  chamber 
has  adopted  utterly  unacceptable  slogans  which 
have  nothing  to  do  with  the  problems  of  the 
quicker  and  better  mobilization  of  the  country  for 
the  achievement  of  victory,  which  undermine  the 
confidence  in  the  authorities  appointed  by  the 
Tsar,  and  create  among  the  population  restlessness 
and  mental  anarchy.  As  in  the  days  of  the  revolu- 
tionary Dumas,  the  representatives  in  this  one  be- 
gan to  threaten  the  Government  and  public  order 
with  street  demonstrations.  Political  passions  are 
being  aroused  and  .  .  .  the  unity  so  necessary  to 
the  country  is  being  destroyed.  The  Government, 
which  has  manifested  extreme  benevolence  toward 
the  participation  of  all  political  parties  in  the 
work  of  victory  .  .  .  cannot  remain  indifferent 
and  nonresistant  to  the  destructive  program  in 
which  the  so-called  'progressive  forces'  have  en- 
gaged." And  the  Clerical  "Kolokol"  (Petro- 
grad),  after  vigorously  condemning  any  reform 
agitation,  asserted,  "In  the  higher  governmental 
spheres  .  .  .  there  is  not  the  least  thought  of  giv- 
ing 'radical'  concessions." 

By  wide  circles  of  Russian  thought,  however,  the 
dismissal  of  the  Duma  was  keenly  felt.     Despite 


RUSSIA  197 

the  iron  censorship,  expressions  of  dissatisfac- 
tion could  not  entirely  be  restrained.  "The  pro- 
rogation of  the  Duma,"  wrote  the  ''Russkoye 
Slovo,"  *' cannot  but  produce  a  most  painful  im- 
pression." The  Conservative  ''Kievlanin"  re- 
marked pessimistically :  "And  so,  those  who  have 
remained  indifferent,  who  saw  nothing  and  heard 
nothing,  have  pushed  aside  those  who  have  been 
so  responsive  to  the  needs  of  the  army,  whose 
hearts  bled  for  it.  .  .  .  Nothing  can  be  added  to 
this.  Tlie  Government  has  assumed  a  terrible  re- 
sponsibility. God  grant  that  it  may  never  regret 
this  step." 

Russian  papers  printed  abroad  were  much  more 
outspoken.  "This  means,"  wrote  the  New  York 
"Novj^  Mir,"  "that  the  Russian  Government  will 
continue  to  rule  as  hitherto,  with  the  nagaika  and 
the  knout,  disregarding  the  people's  representa- 
tives and  the  demands  of  the  various  Russian  or- 
ganizations and  societies.  As  until  now,  the  Gov- 
ernment will  continue  to  kill  every  manifestation 
of  popular  self-activity.  ...  As  hitherto,  it  will 
imprison  or  send  to  Siberia  all  those  who  dare 
to  express  dissatisfaction.  It  will  continue  to  per- 
secute the  Poles  and  the  Armenians,  and  to  stir 
up  the  dark,  ignorant  masses  against  the  Jews. 
It  will  continue  its  policy  of  fanning  the  flame  of 
race  hatred  by  pitting  one  nation  of  the  empire 
against  another." 

Whether  caused  by  the  prevailing  pessimism  or 
due  to  other  factors,  the  wave  of  social  regenera- 
tion so  pronounced  at  the  beginning  of  the  war 


198  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

was  now  obviously  on  the  wane.  This  was  par- 
ticularly true  of  the  drink  question.  Although 
the  sale  of  intoxicants  was  legally  forbidden,  the 
illegal  distilling  and  sale  of  spirituous  liquors 
was  spreading  at  a  prodigious  rate.  Most  of  this 
''moonshine"  liquor  was  of  distinctly  inferior 
quality,  and  its  consumption,  together  with  crude 
substitutes  like  furniture  polish,  flavoring  ex- 
tracts, and  even  wood  alcohol,  was  seriously  im- 
pairing the  health  of  the  people.  Delirium  tre- 
mens, deaths  from  alcoholic  poisoning,  and  kindred 
ills,  were  shown  by  official  reports  to  be  rapidly 
increasing.  In  the  spring  of  1915,  Dr.  Novoselski 
wrote  in  the  ''Russki  Vratch"  (Petrograd) : 
' '  The  constant  rise  in  the  mortality  figures,  which 
bears  testimony  to  the  growing  numbers  of  con- 
sumers of  different  substitutes  for  vodka,  shows 
that  these  are  used,  not  only  by  confirmed  drunk- 
ards, but  generally  by  those  classes  who,  before  the 
prohibition  law,  used  to  drink  moderately."  A 
writer  in  the  "Petrograd  Ryetch"  painted  this  de- 
cidedly gloomy  picture  of  conditions  in  Western 
Russia:  ''The  sun  of  sobriety  has  set  before  it 
reached  the  zenith.  The  first  two  months,  drunk- 
enness was  not  really  noticeable.  In  the  villages 
the  fact  that  the  law  came  into  force  at  the  busy 
season  contributed  largely  toward  abstinence  from 
drink.  In  the  cities  isolated  cases  of  the  use  of 
poisonous  imitations  of  alcoholic  beverages  ended 
so  deplorably  that  there  was  a  fair  prospect  of  get- 
ting rid  of  incurable  drunkards.  But  here  the  field 
work  came  to  an  end,  the  organism  partly  adapted  it- 


RUSSIA  199 

solf  to  tlie  harmful  imitations,  partly  adapted  them 
to  itself,  and  'life  entered  upon  its  normal  course.' 
The  village  folk  had  hardly  time  to  wear  out  the 
boots  in  which  they  marched  after  the  coffin  of 
'the  monopoly'  when  tens  of  thousands  of  illicit 
liquor  distilleries,  factories  of  all  kinds  of  strong 
drinks,  came  into  existence.  It  must  be  said  that 
the  fight  against  the  producers  of  such  drinks  is 
being  waged  energetically.  .  .  .  But,  in  the  place 
of  those  suppressed,  new  ones  spring  into  exist- 
ence, and,  besides,  the  manufacture  of  alcoholic 
beverages  is  being  practised  in  private  dwellings. 
.  .  .  There  also  come  reports  that  the  village  folk 
are  becoming  addicted  to  gambling,  and  that  a 
passion  for  it  is  seizing  the  whole  mass  of  peas- 
antry. In  short,  everything  points  to  the  fact  that 
the  sobering  of  the  people  cannot  be  accomplished 
by  the  simple  discontinuance  of  the  traffic  in 
liquor." 

In  the  upper  classes  also,  the  stem  enthusiasm 
of  the  early  days  seemed  to  have  yielded  to  a  less 
Spartan  mood.  Writing  in  the  Petrograd  "Lye- 
topsis"  in  the  summer  of  1916,  the  noted  Russian 
author,  Maxim  Gorky,  remarked  caustically  upon 
the  current  wave  of  extravagance  and  high  living. 
''Making  big  fortunes  without  any  effort,"  he 
wrote,  "these  rogues  display  an  almost  patholog- 
ical yearning  for  pleasure  and  dissipation.  The 
theaters  and  restaurants  are  full  to  overflowing. 
The  jewelers  are  doing  a  roaring  trade.  There 
are  some  people  who  console  themselves  by  the 
reflection  that  a  similar  orgy  reigns  both  in  the 


200  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

countries  of  our  enemies  and  in  those  of  our 
friends.  These  people  should  remember  the  wise 
Russian  saying:  'A  fool  in  a  strange  family  is 
good  fun;  a  fool  in  your  own — a  disgrace.'  " 

It  was  during  the  period  of  depression  and  dis- 
content at  the  close  of  1915  that  voices  began  to 
be  heard  calling  for  peace.  Outside  of  Russia,  this 
peace  movement  has  been  usually  termed  "pro- 
German.'*  That,  however,  is  a  very  inadequate 
explanation.  Unquestionably  there  are  zealous 
pro-Germans  in  Russia,  especially  at  the  imperial 
court  and  among  officials  of  Baltic  Province  Ger- 
man extraction.  But  these  "hyphenates"  are  in- 
fluential only  because  their  feelings  happen  to 
coincide  with  the  aims  of  powerful  circles  of  genu- 
ine Russian  opinion. 

These  Russian  peace  advocates  fall  into  several 
distinct  categories.  In  the  first  place,  most  Re- 
actionaries and  many  Conservatives  have  never 
liked  their  country's  alliance  with  liberal  England 
and  Radical-Socialist  France.  These  people  are 
not  generally  "pro-German."  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  many  of  them  hold  Germans  in  personal 
detestation.  Nevertheless,  they  have  long  believed 
that  an  understanding  with  the  conservative  Teu- 
tonic Powers  would  be  Russia's  best  safeguard 
against  a  "Red"  revolution  which  might  plunge 
the  backward,  polyglot  empire  into  hopeless  chaos 
and  disintegration.  The  rising  tide  of  popular 
discontent  which  we  have  already  noted  simply 
confirmed  both  their  fears  and  their  convictions. 
Accordingly,  they  began  boldly  to  speak  their 


RUSSIA  201 

minds.  A  good  example  of  this  plain  speaking  is 
an  utterance  of  M.  Maklakov  (minister  of  the  in- 
terior at  the  outbreak  of  the  war),  before  the  con- 
gress of  the  "Right"  (Conservative  party),  at 
Nizhni  Novgorod  in  December,  1915.  On  that  oc- 
casion M.  Maklakov  declared  amid  loud  applause : 
**I  am  quite  at  a  loss  to  understand  why  Russia 
ever  went  to  war  with  Germany.  Both  states  de- 
pend upon  each  other,  and  their  historical  de- 
velopment shows  that  they  must  live  in  close 
friendly  relations." 

Another  powerful  element  favoring  a  speedy 
end  of  the  war  is  Russian  **big  business" — the 
great  financial  and  industrial  magnates  of  the  em- 
pire. Russia's  industries  are  recent,  hot-house 
growths,  created  by  Count  Witte's  protective  sys- 
tem and  dependent  upon  high  tariff  walls  for  con- 
tinued existence.  Furthermore,  the  Russian  home 
market  is  still  too  backward  to  absorb  even  their 
present  output.  In  order  to  ensure  its  present 
prosperity  and  future  development,  therefore, 
Russian  industry  feels  that  it  must  secure  fresh 
protected  markets  and  believes  that  such  mark- 
ets are  to  be  gained  only  by  acquiring  new  pro- 
tectorates and  "spheres  of  influence"  in  Asia. 
Once  such  Asiatic  fields  are  safely  inside  the  Mus- 
covite tariff  wall,  Russian  industrial  magnates 
see  priceless  markets  for  their  output,  while  Rus- 
sian finance  sees  limitless  profits  in  government 
contracts  and  concessions  for  the  development  of 
vast  untouched  natural  resources.  The  regions 
especially   desired   for   exploitation   are    Persia, 


202  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

Mongolia,  and  Interior  China.  Toward  the  ac- 
quisition of  Persia  and  Mongolia,  the  Russian  Gov- 
ernment had,  in  fact,  already  taken  long  strides 
shortly  before  the  outbreak  of  the  European  War. 
It  is  thus  easy  to  realize  the  anger  of  Russian 
*'big  business"  at  the  spectacle  of  national  en- 
ergies lavished  on  a  Western  war  which  an  un- 
derstanding with  Germany  would  have  conserved 
for  the  conquest  of  the  fabulous  East. 

Russian  **big  business"  therefore  forms  one 
wing  of  the  Eastern  school  of  Russian  imperial- 
ism. We  have  already  seen  how  insistent  the 
Easterners  were  becoming  on  the  eve  of  the  Eu- 
ropean War.  The  disastrous  course  of  the  strug- 
gle naturally  gave  them  a  splendid  chance  to  say, 
*'I  told  you  so,"  and  they  were  not  slow  to  take 
advantage  of  their  opportunity.  Henceforth,  the 
Russian  peace  party  was  to  form  a  constant  fac- 
tor in  the  background  of  contemporary  Russian 
life,  thus  far  unable  seriously  to  influence  the 
course  of  events  but  ready  under  favorable  cir- 
cumstances to  play  a  leading  part.  Their  most 
notable  achievement  was  the  Russo-Japanese 
agreement  of  July  3, 1916. 

Meanwhile,  the  Western  imperialists,  most  of 
the  Intelligentsia,  and  the  middle  classes  and  peas- 
ants, remained  zealous  for  war.  But  fresh  disap- 
pointments were  in  store.  By  September,  1915, 
it  is  true,  the  great  Austro-German  ''drive"  into 
Russia  was  obviously  at  an  end.  Yet  the  victori- 
ous Teutonic  legions  were  already  massing  for 
another    campaign — a    supreme    effort    to    blast 


RUSSIA  203 

throuub  Serbia  and  open  a  road  to  Turkey  and 
the  Near  East.  For  Russia  this  was  an  alarm- 
ing prospect.  It  was  primarily  for  the  Balkans 
and  Constantinople  that  she  had  entered  the  war. 
With  both  these  points  firmly  in  the  Teutonic 
grasp,  her  hopes  might  be  indefinitely  postponed. 
At  the  beginning  of  the  European  War,  Russia's 
Balkan  hopes  had  run  high.  Serbia  was  of 
course  with  her  from  the  first.  Greece  and  Ru- 
mania both  seemed  ready  to  fall  into  line.  It 
looked  almost  like  a  new  ** Balkan  League"  bring- 
ing a  million  fresh  bayonets  to  the  Allies  and  deal- 
ing death-blows  to  Turkey  and  Austria-Hungary. 
So,  at  any  rate  it  appeared  to  Russian  eyes.  In 
the  optimistic  spring  of  1915  M.  Sazonov,  minister 
of  foreign  affairs,  had  thus  mirrored  the  Russian 
point  of  view:  ''A  most  happy  day  will  dawn 
for  us  when  the  Balkan  League  is  reestablished, 
the  League  of  the  Orthodox  Balkan  States.  Rus- 
sian diplomacy  is  bending  all  its  efforts  to  con- 
vince the  Balkan  nations  of  the  necessity  of  mak- 
ing certain  sacrifices  for  the  sake  of  a  higher  aim. 
The  Balkan  nations  must  not  forget  the  burdens 
which  Russia  has  always  borne  and  is  bearing  for 
their  good.  We  are  participating  in  this  war  in 
the  name  of  the  well-being  and  existence  of  one 
of  the  Balkan  nations.  Therefore  sacrifices  must 
be  made  by  the  Balkan  peoples,  too.  No  matter 
how  painful  that  may  be  to  them  now,  the  results 
will  compensate  a  hundredfold  for  all  the  sacri- 
fices, and  will  yield  ample  fruit  for  their  common 
good." 


4 
204  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

Yet  time  passed,  and  the  Balkan  League  did  not 
materialize.  The  stumbling-block  was  obviously 
Bulgaria.  Furious  at  her  recent  humiliation  in 
the  Second  Balkan  War  of  1913  and  inconsolable 
over  lost  Macedonia,  Bulgaria  refused  to  move  an 
inch  unless  her  national  aspirations  were  first  sat- 
isfied— a  thing  which  her  Serbian,  Greek,  and 
Ruman  despoilers  unanimously  declared  impossi- 
ble. Russia  sharply  reminded  Bulgaria  of  her 
''duty  to  Slavism,"  but  this  Turanian  cuckoo  in 
the  Slavonic  nest  merely  answered  tartly,  as  she 
had  on  previous  occasions,  that  she  did  not  care  a 
fig  for  Slavism  except  in  so  far  as  Slavism  co- 
incided with  Bulgarian  national  interest. 

Thereupon  adjuration  gave  place  to  threats, 
and  Bulgaria  was  given  plainly  to  understand  how 
a  victorious  Russia  would  deal  with  a  ''Slav"  na- 
tion which  should  be  guilty  of  "race-treason." 
*'I  have  begotten  thee:  I  will  kill  thee!"  ex- 
claimed the  "Novoye  Vremya,"  quoting  the  words 
of  the  Tolstoyan  hero.  And  a  little  later  it  wrote : 
"Bulgaria  cannot  remain  neutral  at  a  moment 
when  the  'ancient  oppressor  of  the  Christian  faith 
and  all  Slav  peoples'  has  dared  to  raise  a  hand 
against  the  liberator.  .  .  .  The  guilt  of  Bulgaria 
before  Russia  is  great,  but  Russia  will  not  remem- 
ber evil;  she  will  even  forget  everything  if  the 
rulers  of  Bulgaria  will  now,  even  at  this  late  hour, 
lead  their  people  on  the  only  road  which  lies  be- 
fore them.  But  should  Bulgaria  commit  such  a 
hideous  deed  as  to  side  with  the  Turk,  her  political 
existence  would  cease  after  the  victorious  conclu- 


RUSSIA  205 

sion  of  the  war  by  Russia.  Bulgaria  is  now  given 
a  last  opportunity  to  realize  her  national  hopes." 
Equally  menacing  was  the  attitude  of  the 
"Ryetch,"  which  wrote:  ''Turkey  is  the  enemy 
of  Russia.  Greece,  like  Serbia,  may  any  day  be- 
come the  ally  of  Russia.  If  Bulgaria  will  continue 
to  consider  herself  a  friend  of  Turkey  and  an 
enemy  of  Greece  and  Serbia,  what  will  she  be 
with  regard  to  Russia?  .  .  .  Upon  the  answer  to 
this  question — and  a  prompt  answer  at  that — de- 
pends Bulgaria's  whole  future  and  national  as- 
pirations." 

Bulgaria's  answer  was  not  long  in  coming,  but  it 
was  of  a  nature  quite  the  opposite  of  that  awaited 
by  the  Muscovite  press.  Among  this  stubborn 
Bulgar  folk,  smarting  under  past  wrongs  and 
fanatically  resolved  to  risk  life  itself  in  the  at- 
tainment of  national  hopes,  Russian  threats 
merely  awakened  defiant  fury.  Accordingly,  the 
Austro-German  ''drive"  into  Serbia  in  the 
autumn  of  1915  saw  Bulgaria  throw  off  her  neu- 
trality and  link  her  destinies  with  those  of  the 
Teutonic  Powers.  There  followed  the  utter  ship- 
wreck of  Russia's  Balkan  expectations.  Greece 
refused  to  stir,  Rumania  did  not  move,  and  Ser- 
bia, abandoned  to  her  fate,  fell  prostrate  in  the 
dust.  Before  the  menace  of  Teutonic  howitzers, 
the  Anglo-French  armies  abandoned  their  precari- 
ous foothold  at  Gallipoli.  Russia's  dream  of  a 
speedy  entry  into  Constantinople  had  vanished 
into  thin  air. 

The  closing  months  of  1915  witnessed  the  nadir 


206  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

of  Russian  dejection.  The  brilliant  capture  of 
Erzerum  in  February,  1916,  and  the  subsequent 
seizure  of  Trebizond,  did  much  to  restore  self-con- 
fidence and  hope.  With  all  Turkish  Armenia 
firmly  in  Muscovite  hands,  the  Russian  press  began 
to  talk  of  a  speedy  mastery  of  the  Near  East. 
After  the  capture  of  Trebizond,  the  ''Petrograd- 
skiya  Vyedomosti"  asserted  confidently:  "We 
may  consider  one  of  our  enemies  finished.  The 
taking  of  Trebizond  has  so  disorganized  the  Turk- 
ish defensive  that  all  that  remains  for  her  is  to  lay 
down  her  arms  and  ask  for  mercy.  .  .  .  Turkey's 
hour  has  struck,  and  it  is  not  improbable  that  she 
will  in  the  near  future  entirely  disappear  from 
the  map." 

The  extent  of  Russian  hopes  in  the  Near  East 
may  be  judged  from  the  claims  now  put  forth  in  the 
Russian  semi-official  press  to  virtually  all  Asiatic 
Turkey,  most  of  Persia,  and  an  outlet  to  the  In- 
dian Ocean  on  the  Persian  coast.  This  was  obvi- 
ously an  attempt  to  reconcile  the  Eastern  imperial- 
ist school  to  a  continuance  of  the  war,  since  the 
acquisition  of  Asiatic  Turkey  and  Persia  might 
well  induce  the  Easterners  to  forego  their  Mon- 
golian and  Chinese  aspirations.  The  Persian 
question,  in  particular,  had  long  been  actively  dis- 
cussed in  the  Russian  press.  As  early  as  the 
spring  of  1915,  the  Petrograd  "Novoye  Zveno" 
had  asserted:  ''The  Persian  question  must  be 
solved  simultaneously  with  the  French.  The 
name  of  Russia  and  the  sacred  right  of  her  clients 
must  be  sacred  and  inviolable  in  Iran.     This  must 


RUSSIA  207 

be  established  not  on  paper  but  in  reality.  If  the 
Persians  are  not  capable  of  understanding  it  them- 
selves, the  fate  of  Turkey  must  overtake  them." 
A  year  late,  this  rather  vague  talk  had  hardened 
into  definite  demands.  In  the  early  summer  of 
1916,  that  leading  Russian  economic  thinker.  Pro- 
fessor Miguline,  wrote  in  the  '*Novy  Ekonomist": 
**  Russia  must  secure  corresponding  material  com- 
pensations for  the  losses  which  she  has  incurred. 
It  is  time  to  give  up  finally  her  quixotic  policy. 
Russia  has  lost  enough  power  and  blood  for  for- 
eign interests  and  for  foreign  freedom.  There  is 
still  a  great  deal  too  much  talk  to-day  about  the 
liberation  of  oppressed  nationalities  as  the  chief 
object.  .  .  .  But  where  can  Russia  obtain  corre- 
sponding compensations?  Not  on  the  Western 
frontier.  Russia  must,  therefore,  have  an  outlet 
in  Southern  waters.  She  must  secure  the  freedom 
of  the  Dardanelles,  and  an  access  to  the  Mediter- 
ranean not  only  by  sea  but  by  land.  We  must 
come  to  an  arrangement  with  Great  Britain  to 
have  an  outlet  to  the  Persian  Gulf.  England  and 
Russia  must  act  together  in  Asia  as  in  Europe. 
There  must  be  no  more  talk  of  any  'area  of  con- 
flict' between  the  two  countries.  Asia  Minor, 
Mesopotamia,  Northern  Persia,  and  the  neutral 
zone  of  Persia  must  all  be  ceded  to  Russia.  When 
Russia  occupies  the  Dardanelles,  Alexandretta, 
and  the  Persian  Gulf,  she  will  protect  for  England 
the  way  to  India  and  to  Egypt  instead  of  threaten- 
ing it. ' '  Such  utterances,  of  whicli  Professor  Mig- 
uline's  is  merely  typical,  are  symptomatic  of  the 


208  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

distinct  cooling  of  Anglo-Russian  cordiality  which 
has  been  taking  place  for  the  past  year. 

It  must  not  be  thought  that  Russian  public  opin- 
ion was  centering  its  interest  exclusively  upon  the 
Near  East.  Russia's  Western  problems  were  also 
much  discussed,  particularly  the  problem  of  Po- 
land. For  some  years  previous  to  the  war  the 
Western  imperialists  had  been  striving  to  effect  a 
Russo-Polish  reconciliation  on  a  Pan-Slav  basis, 
and  many  Conservatives  in  Russian  Poland, 
headed  by  the  Polish  thinker,  Roman  Dmowski, 
had  met  them  half  way,  offering  to  give  up  the 
dream  of  Polish  independence  and  accept  local 
autonomy  under  the  Tsar  if  Russia  would  agree 
to  effect  the  annexation  of  Austria's  and  Prussia's 
Polish  provinces  to  Russian  Poland.  To  Roman 
Dmowski  and  his  followers  Germanism  was  the 
great  stumbling-block  to  Polish  reunion,  and  it  was 
to  them  that  the  Grand  Duke  Nicholas's  proclama- 
tion of  August  14,  1914,  was  especially  addressed. 
The  Polish  Conservatives  reciprocated  in  the  most 
cordial  fashion,  their  party  manifesto  expressing 
the  hope  ''that  the  blood  shed  by  the  sons  of  Rus- 
sia in  the  struggle  against  the  common  enemy  will 
cement  the  friendship  of  the  two  Slav  races." 
And  the  Polish  Conservative  group  in  the  Russian 
Duma  stated:  ''Please  God,  Slavism,  under  the 
supremacy  of  Russia,  will  deal  the  Teutons  such  a 
blow  as  was  dealt  them  at  Griinwald  five  hundred 
years  ago  by  Poland  and  Lithuania.  May  the 
blood  we  shall  spill  and  the  horrors  of  a  war  which 
for  us  is  fratricidal  lead  to  the  reunion  of  the 


RUSSIA  209 

three  portions  of  tlio  sundered  Polish  people." 
The  intensity  of  anti-German  feeling  among  Polish 
Conservatives  may  be  judged  from  the  following 
open-letter  of  Professor  Wincenty  Lutoslawski: 
"Tlie  Prussians  are  Germanized  Slavs,  the  mor- 
ally worst  of  their  race,  who  have  denied  their 
ancestors  through  fear  of  force  and  have  now 
themselves  become  the  exponents  of  force. 
Gurkhas  are  noble  troops  of  an  ancient  race  who 
are  glad  to  fight  with  such  barbarians.  .  .  .  The 
Prussians  are  Northern  Janizaries  and  are  filled 
with  the  spirit  of  Islam — fury  of  destruction, 
predatory  greed,  breach  of  faith.  .  .  .  The  parti- 
tion of  Poland  will  be  annulled  after  the  war — 
we  shall  obtain  not  only  all  our  lands  that  we 
possessed  in  1771,  but  also  Silesia  and  Pomerania 
and  East  Prussia.  These  we  shall  righteously 
govern,  and  in  a  single  generation  all  the  Ger- 
manized Poles  who  dwell  therein  shall  reawake  to 
their  national  consciousness."  By  this  party  the 
loyalism  of  the  Galician  Poles  was  severely  repro- 
bated, and  they  were  accused  of  treason  to  the 
cause  of  true  Polonism. 

But  the  other  Polish  parties  showed  no  such 
enthusiasm  for  the  Russian  side.  The  popular 
groups  were  especially  cool.  They  greeted  the 
Grand  Duke's  proclamation  with  eloquent  silence, 
and  later  on  even  ventured  to  issue  a  manifesto 
declaring  that  in  their  opinion  Nicholas's  procla- 
mation was  merely  a  strategic  document,  and  that 
there  was  no  other  solution  for  the  Polish  question 
than  the  erection  of  Poland  into  a  neutral  buffer 


210  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

state.  This  was  apparently  the  opinion  of  many 
Polish  Conservatives  as  well.  Count  Charles 
Potulicki,  president  of  the  ''Pro  Polonia"  Com- 
mittee, issued  a  statement  maintaining  that  for  the 
future  peace  of  Europe  there  must  be  an  inde- 
pendent Polish  state  as  a  barrier  between  Pan- 
Slavism  and  Pan-Germanism.  ''Placed  between 
Russia  and  Prussia — those  two  incarnations  of  ex- 
pansive, aggressive  nations,"  he  wrote,  "the  Poles 
have  always  been,  and  always  will  remain,  refrac- 
tory alike  to  the  blandishments  of  Pan-Slavism  and 
the  threats  of  Pan-Germanism." 

The  effect  of  Poland's  attitude  upon  Russian 
public  opinion  was  a  varied  one.  At  first,  the 
strong  Pan-Slav  and  anti-German  statements  of 
the  Polish  Conservatives  were  taken  to  represent 
the  sentiments  of  the  whole  Polish  people  and 
naturally  evoked  great  enthusiasm.  Popular  sub- 
scriptions were  started  throughout  Russia  to  aid 
the  numerous  Polish  refugees  fleeing  before  the 
early  Teutonic  invasions  of  Russian  Poland,  and 
the  Russian  press  asserted  that  these  were  but  the 
outward  tokens  of  lasting  Russo-Polish  fraterni- 
zation. "When  we  saw  how  all  classes  of  Polish 
society  united  for  the  defense  of  our  common  wel- 
fare," wrote  the  Petrograd  "Ryetch";  "when  we 
saw  with  how  firm  a  belief  in  the  coming  of  the 
promised  future  our  Polish  brothers  advanced  to 
meet  it,  we  could  not  help  feeling  that  that  some- 
thing so  dismal  and  fatal  which  has  separated  us 
for  so  long  is  now  melting,  that  the  misunderstand- 
ings and  prejudices  of  the  past  are  disappearing. 


RUSSIA  211 

and  that  we  are  becoming  nearer  and  dearer  to 
each  other,  not  only  in  thought,  but  also  in  feel- 
ing." 

In  Russian  Poland,  however,  this  Muscovite  en- 
thusiasm aroused  a  certain  amount  of  uneasiness. 
Many  Poles  feared  lest  the  Russians  were  misread- 
into  Polish  approval  of  the  struggle  against  Ger- 
manism an  abandonment  of  Polish  ideals  and  a 
readiness  to  be  absorbed  into  the  stream  of  Rus- 
sian life.  Such  persons  did  not  fail  to  disabuse 
the  Russians  of  their  error.  For  example,  the 
Warsaw  "Dziennik  Polski"  remarked  warningly: 
' '  Old  sins  cannot  be  blotted  out  by  an  outburst  of 
compassion  nor  by  the  most  generous  financial  as- 
sistance. Russian  patriots  take  too  superficial  a 
view  of  our  sympathy  with  the  Russian  army  if 
they  see  in  it  a  proof  of  our  union  with  the  Rus- 
sian people.  .  .  .  The  Poles  are  fighting  for  Rus- 
sia in  this  war,  but  they  have  not  changed  their 
fatherland.  A  Russian  victory  would  be  in  the 
interest  of  Poland,  and  the  present  conduct  of  the 
Polish  nation  is  influenced  by  the  hope  of  future 
autonomy.  Russian  jjublicists  must  not  see  in  it 
any  proof  of  a  desire  for  union  with  Russia." 

Such  utterances,  especially  when  coupled  with 
the  bitterly  anti-Russian  attitude  of  the  Austrian 
Poles,  rapidly  cooled  the  warmth  of  Russian  en- 
thusiasm for  their  Polish  relatives.  Meanwhile, 
in  Poland,  a  corresponding  process  of  disillusion- 
ment was  going  on.  In  his  proclamation  of 
August,  1914,  the  Grand  Duke  Nicholas  had  made 
many  promises  such  as,  "A  United  Poland  under 
the  scepter  of  the  Russian  Tsar,  .  .  .  free  in  her 


212  PEESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

religion,  free  in  her  language,  and  free  in  her  self- 
government. "  But  as  month  after  month  passed 
by  and  no  modification  of  the  existing  oppressive 
regime  materialized,  the  Poles  began  to  clamor 
for  a  redemption  of  the  Russian  promises,  recit- 
ing their  heavy  sacrifices  and  asserting  that  these 
merited  an  immediate  reward.  But  all  that  the 
Russian  authorities  could  be  induced  to  grant  was 
a  restricted  measure  of  municipal  self-government, 
while  the  Russian  imperialist  press  told  the  Poles 
that  this  concession — which  was  not  to  take  effect 
till  1916 — was  all  that  Poland  could  expect  in  the 
immediate  future.  ''About  further  reforms,'* 
wrote  the  *'Novoye  Vremya"  in  the  spring  of 
1915,  **it  will  be  time  enough  to  speak  in  the  days 
when  the  general  hopes  of  victory  over  the  com- 
mon enemy  are  crowned  with  complete  success." 
Among  the  Poles  this  produced  lively  dissatisfac- 
tion and  pessimism.  One  of  the  Polish  deputies 
to  the  Duma  wrote  dejectedly  in  the  Petrograd 
' '  Ryetch  " :  * '  The  Duma  in  general  has  not  shown 
any  interest  in  the  Poles.  But  what  individual 
political  groups  have  expressed  augurs  little  good. 
In  September  they  framed  a  project  of  a  real 
political  union ;  in  October  they  spoke  about  Polish 
autonomy  with  legislative  chambers;  in  Novem- 
ber about  the  possibility  of  administrative  self- 
government  ;  and  in  December  they  already  found 
that  'more  or  less'  self-government  must  suffice." 
So  things  stood  when,  in  the  summer  of  1915, 
the  Austro-German  armies  expelled  the  Russians 
from  Poland  and  took  possession  of  the  country. 


RUSSIA  213 

Under  the  circumstances,  it  was  scarcely  surpris- 
ing that  the  invaders  met  with  little  popular  op- 
position and  were  even  greeted  with  some  sporadic 
enthusiasm.  The  Teutons'  strenuous  endeavors 
to  reorganize  Poland  and  their  w^ide  concessions  to 
Polish  national  feeling,  culminating  in  their  formal 
establishment  of  a  Polish  state  in  the  autumn  of 
1916,  aroused  much  uneasy  comment  in  Russia. 
In  the  summer  of  1916  the  Moscow  "Russkoye 
Slovo"  admitted  frankly:  ''In  the  Polish  cities 
self-government  has  been  introduced;  the  Polish 
language  is  used  in  the  courts  to  a  very  great  ex- 
tent; Polish  children  are  studying  under  a  na- 
tional educational  system,  at  the  head  of  which  is 
the  University  of  Warsaw;  Polish  cultural  and 
educational  institutions  which  had  been  closed  by 
the  Russian  authorities  have  renewed  their  activi- 
ties. The  Germans  are  trying  by  every  means  to 
win  the  Poles  over  to  their  side,  and  they  have 
chosen  the  right  course  for  it."  After  the  Aus- 
tro-German  proclamation  of  a  restored  Polish 
state  the  noted  Russian  Liberal,  V.  A.  Maklakov, 
wrote  in  the  Petrograd  "Ryetch":  "I  know  not 
how  the  Poles  will  regard  the  new  act.  But,  in 
any  event,  it  will  be  hard  for  us  to  blame  them. 
.  .  .  We  must  recognize  that  we  are  guilty  of 
much,  that  we  ourselves  helped  the  Germans  to 
deceive  the  Poles.  Our  guilt  is  in  the  fact  that 
after  the  Grand  Duke's  manifesto  we  behaved  as 
if  desiring  to  show  that  it  should  not  have  been 
taken  seriously.  We  not  only  did  not  begin  to 
elaborate  the  plans  for  the  future  restoration  of 


214  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

Poland,  but  even  forbade  the  use  of  the  word 
autonomy  in  this  connection.  We  covered  our- 
selves with  eternal  shame  by  our  administration 
of  the  region.  We  allowed  an  opportunity  to  pass 
us  which  can  not  be  returned."  Other  Russians, 
however,  did  not  display  such  broad  generosity. 
A  second  writer  in  the  same  journal  sternly  warned 
the  Poles  of  the  consequences  of  ''treason." 
"Those  Poles,"  he  wrote,  "who  from  the  very  be- 
ginning of  the  war  banded  themselves  together  of 
their  own  free  will  into  Polish  legions  and  fought 
side  by  side  with  the  Germans  against  the  French, 
English,  Belgian,  Serbian,  and  Russian  soldiers, 
are  traitors  to  the  cause  of  democracy  and  human- 
ity. And  should  Poland's  independence  be 
bought,  in  the  case  of  German  victory,  at  the  price 
of  such  treason,  then — finis  Polonice!" 

So  stands  the  Polish  question  at  this  present 
hour.  The  solution  of  the  thorny  problem  obvi- 
ously depends  primarily  upon  the  fortunes  of 
v/ar. 

This  Russian  uneasiness  over  the  Polish  ques- 
tion was  only  one  phase  of  the  gathering  cloud  of 
gloom  and  pessimism  which  overshadowed  the  em- 
pire toward  the  close  of  1916.  The  hopeful  feel- 
ings evoked  by  the  conquest  of  Turkish  Armenia 
in  the  spring,  reinforced  by  the  successful  Galician 
' '  drive ' '  in  June,  and  still  further  strengthened  by 
Rumania's  adhesion  to  the  Allies  at  the  beginning 
of  September,  were  rudely  dissipated  by  Ru- 
mania's rapid  collapse  under  the  powerful  Teuton 
counterstroke.     Public  confidence  was  still  further 


RUSSIA  215 

undermined  by  the  internal  situation.  The  Intel- 
ligentsia and  the  workingmen  of  the  towns  were 
increasingly  exasperated  by  the  Government's  re- 
actionary measures,  while  the  war-party  was 
alarmed  by  the  growing  activity  displayed  by  the 
partizans  of  a  separate  peace,  especially  during 
the  premiership  of  Boris  Stiirmer. 

So  loud  grew  the  cry  of  discontent  that  the 
Duma  was  again  summoned,  and  after  stormy 
scenes  Premier  Stiinner  was  forced  to  resign  at 
the  end  of  November,  1916.  How  serious  was  the 
crisis  may  be  judged  from  Russian  press  comment 
which  not  even  the  censorship  was  able  wholly  to 
keep  down.  For  example,  the  Moscow  ''Russkiya 
Vyedomosti ' '  wrote :  ' '  We  do  not  live  in  a  time  of 
political  crisis  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  word, 
but  in  a  time  much  more  serious — a  crisis  which 
touches  the  whole  life  of  the  empire.  .  .  .  The 
Government  does  not  believe  in  the  same  measures 
as  do  the  people.  In  this  lies  the  greatest  internal 
danger.  This  cannot  go  on  longer.  Without 
harmony  between  the  Government  and  the  country 
we  cannot  be  victorious  or  preserve  our  internal 
life  from  disorder.  Only  a  public-spirited  and 
responsible  ministry  will  be  able  to  hold  back  the 
empire  from  the  precipice." 

The  fall  of  Premier  Stiirmer  was  unquestionably 
a  Liberal  victory.  But  the  tragi-comedy  of  the 
year  before  was  soon  repeated.  Encouraged  by 
tlieir  success,  the  Liberal  groups  in  the  Duma  pro- 
ceeded to  further  attacks  on  the  ruling  regime, 
while  terrorism  also  made  its  appearance,  notably 


216  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

in  the  assassination  of  the  mystic  reactionary 
Gregor  Rasputin.  The  political  weakness  of 
Russian  Liberalism  was  now,  however,  again 
shown.  The  Conservatives  and  Reactionaries 
quickly  closed  ranks  and  without  encountering 
any  effective  opposition  installed  a  new  cabinet 
under  Prince  Golytzin,  a  reactionary  of  the  purest 
water.  The  present  Government  is  apparently 
the  most  reactionary  in  years.  Its  probable  policy 
may  be  gaged  from  the  oft-quoted  saying  of  Pre- 
mier Golytzin:  ''The  Duma  will  keep  quiet  as 
soon  as  it  gets  a  beating."  How  Russian  Liberal- 
ism regards  the  new  Government  is  shown  by  the 
caustic  comments  of  the  New  York  *'Novy  Mir." 
Toward  the  end  of  January,  1917,  this  radical  or- 
gan wrote :  "It  seems  to  us  that  the  appointment 
of  Golytzin  is  the  end  of  all  attempts  at  deception. 
By  this  act  the  ruling  Russia  threw  a  challenge 
to  the  popular  masses.  A  notorious  reactionary, 
an  open  enemy  of  the  people  and  of  any  progres- 
sive movement,  Golytzin  will  not  be  able  to  put  on 
even  temporarily  a  mask  of  virtue.  He  will  be 
from  the  first  day  an  enemy  with  whom  the  people 
will  have  to  struggle  fiercely.  That  this  will  be 
so,  his  first  declaration  shows:,  'Everything  for 
the  war,  everything  for  victory.  We  cannot  now 
think  of  internal  reforms.  *  Clear  and  outspoken ! 
No  hope  for  the  alleviation  of  the  condition  of  the 
one  hundred  and  seventy  millions  of  Russia's  pop- 
ulation which  is  groaning  under  the  yoke  of  con- 
stables, district  police  captains,  governors,  and 
plain  untitled  but  dread  personalities.    As  before, 


RUSSIA  217 

the  people  will  be  robbed;  as  before,  the  people 
will  holjile^sly  starve." 

Such  is  the  state  of  affairs  in  Russia  to-day — a 
situation  obviously  uncertain  and  capable  of  vio- 
lent fluctuations.  For  tlie  world  at  large,  the  mat- 
ter of  immediate  importance  is  the  question  of  a 
separate  peace.  Here,  however,  party  lines  are 
much  mixed.  The  Imperialists,  who  include 
nearly  all  the  upper  and  middle  classes  besides 
such  special  categories  as  the  army,  the  bureau- 
cracy, and  the  Church,  continue  to  be  sharply 
divided  into  the  Western  and  Eastern  imperialist 
schools:  the  predominant  Westerners  resolved  on 
war  to  the  knife,  the  powerful  Eastern  opposition 
urging  withdrawal  from  the  war  and  an  under- 
standing with  the  Teutonic  Powers.  The  Intel- 
ligentsia, embracing  most  Liberals  and  a  few  Rev- 
olutionists, are  strongly  for  continued  war,  both 
out  of  hatred  of  Prussianism  and  liking  for  the  al- 
liance with  the  Liberal  Western  Powers.  The 
revolutionary  workingmen  of  the  towns  are 
divided,  some  following  the  Intelligentsia,  others 
desiring  peace  in  order  to  start  an  immediate  rev- 
olution and  dreading  lest  a  Russian  victory  might 
so  increase  the  Government's  prestige  that  a  suc- 
cessful revolution  would  be  thenceforth  impossible. 
The  peasants  are  still  mostly  for  war  through 
hatred  of  the  Niemetz  (the  German)  and  fanatical 
hopes  of  gaining  Constantinople,  the  Orthodox 
''Holy  City."  Under  these  tangled  circum- 
stances, prediction  is  impossible.  Very  likely  the 
outcome  will  depend  upon  the  course  of  the  pend- 


218  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

ing  military  operations.  Allied  successes  in  tlie 
coming  campaign  would  naturally  entrench  the 
war-party  in  its  hold  upon  the  Government  and 
keep  Russia  in  the  European  struggle.  Allied  dis- 
asters might  so  strengthen  the  peace-party  that 
they  would  come  to  power  and  engineer  a  Russian 
withdrawal  from  the  war. 

Assuming  that  Russia  escapes  revolution  and 
emerges  from  the  war  without  serious  territorial 
losses,  what  will  be  the  Russian  popular  temper 
toward  foreign  nations?  This  also  is  a  complex 
question.  The  Intelligentsia  are,  and  will  con- 
tinue, warmly  cordial  toward  England  and  France. 
But  the  Intelligentsia  form  only  a  fraction  of  the 
Russiari  people,  and  the  prevailing  popular  senti- 
ment is  an  increasing  dislike  of  all  foreigners. 
France,  to  be  sure,  is  regarded  with  a  slightly 
patronizing  sympathy,  ''Poor  little  France"  being 
a  common  phrase.  But  pro-English  feeling,  never 
widespread  in  Russia,  is  rapidly  decreasing  all  the 
time.  The  great  imperialist  classes  unite  in  dis- 
like and  distrust  of  Britain.  The  Westerners  feel 
that  she  will  certainly  oppose  those  acquisitions 
of  Asiatic  Turkey,  Persia,  and  an  outlet  on  the 
Indian  Ocean  on  which  they  have  set  their  hearts 
fully  as  much  as  upon  Constantinople;  the  East- 
erners know  she  will  try  to  block  that  partition  of 
China  foreshadowed  by  the  recent  treaty  with 
Japan.  Hence,  Britain  is  regarded  as  a  future 
enemy. 

The  current  English  cult  of  things  Russian  is 
viewed    with    cynical    amusement.    Toward    the 


RUSSIA  219 


close  of  1916  the  noted  Russian  journalist,  M, 
Zhukovski,  wrote  in  the  "Russkoye  Slovo": 
**Once  again  the  deluge  has  come;  all  England  is 
flooded  with  books  about  Russia.  It  has  rained 
not  40,  but  440  days,  and  the  downpour  still  goes 
on ;  and  who  shall  say  what  will  happen  if  this  phe- 
nomenon continues?  Here,  for  instance,  we  read 
of  'Glorious  Russia';  in  another  book  about  'Con- 
temporary Russia';  elsewhere  of  'Armed  Russia'; 
here  is  'Friendly  Russia,'  and  so  on  they  go.  No 
one  in  the  world  has  ever  been  so  infatuated  with 
us  as  the  English  are  at  present." 

Regarding  future  relations  with  Germany,  it  all 
depends  upon  whether  one  takes  the  long  or  the 
short  view.  To-day,  many  inOucntial  sections  of 
Russian  opinion  desire  peace  and  understanding 
with  the  Teutonic  Powers.  But  any  lasting  Russo- 
German  friendship  is  impossible.  The  two  peo- 
ples are  utterly  unsympathetic  by  nature  and  re- 
gard each  other  witli  mutual  hatred  and  contempt. 
Those  very  Easterners  now  so  ardently  working 
for  a  Russo-German  entente  wish  it  solely  in  order 
to  safeguard  their  western  border,  keep  down  do- 
mestic disaffection,  and  thus  concentrate  Russia's 
energies  for  the  mastering  of  Asia.  That  done, 
they  would  eagerly  join  their  imperialist  comrades 
against  tlie  "Rotten  West."  Upon  the  brow  of 
Russian  imperialism  burns  ever  Pobiedonostsev's 
trenchant  dictum:  "Russia  is  not  a  State:  it  is  a 
World!" 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE   BALKANS 

THE  Balkan  peoples  are  victims  of  a  com- 
mon mania,  the  "Great  Idea."  The  "Great 
Idea"  means  the  "reunion"  of  all  the  members  of 
a  particular  Balkan  race  into  a  single  state,  and 
since  these  races  are  widely  scattered  and  inter- 
mingled, the  political  union  of  any  one  of  them 
would  imply  the  erection  of  a  powerful  "empire," 
dwarfing  all  the  others  to  a  position  of  hopeless 
inferiority.  The  realization  of  this  fact  makes 
all  the  Balkan  peoples  ready  to  fight  each  other's 
imperialistic  aspirations  to  the  death. 

The  driving  power  behind  these  aspirations 
comes  from  the  peculiar  circumstances  of  Balkan 
history.  In  the  Middle  Ages  the  Balkan  peoples 
fought  one  another  much  as  they  do  to-day,  and 
during  this  long  period  each  of  them  gained  a 
transient  Balkan  supremacy.  Then  came  the 
Turkish  conquest,  which  involved  them  all  in  a 
common  ruin.  For  centuries  they  lay  helpless 
beneath  the  Turkish  yoke.  But  Turkish  dominion 
bore  within  itself  the  seeds  of  its  own  dissolution. 
Most  terrible  of  conquerors,  the  Turks  were  the 
poorest  of  assimilators.  They  remained  a  mere 
Asiatic  army  camped  on  European  soil  and  never 
succeeded  in  Ottomanizing  or  Islamizing  their 

220 


THE  BALKANS  221 

Christian  subjects.  Tlicreforc,  when  the  Turkish 
flood  began  to  recede  from  the  Balkans  about  a 
century  ago.  the  old  landmarks  reappeared  virtu- 
ally unchanged  and  the  Christian  Balkan  peoples 
resumed  tlieir  old  national  lives  once  more. 

They  "resumed"  their  national  lives.  Note 
that  well.  It  is  the  key  to  the  whole  story.  The 
Balkan  peoples  are  not  ''young,"  as  most  Western 
observers  think.  They  are  very  old;  in  fact,  so 
many  Rip  Van  Winkles  aroused  from  a  long  sleep 
with  all  their  medieval  racial  characteristics  and 
national  aspirations  virtually  unchanged.  For 
thoin  the  last  five  centuries  have  been  a  dream — 
or  a  nightmare.  One  thing  only  do  they  remember 
— their  glorious  pasts;  and  they  are  each  deter- 
mined that  their  special  past  shall  live  again.  Of 
course  they  clothe  their  thoughts  in  modern  speech 
— ''rights  of  nationalities,"  "race  unity,"  etc.; 
but  the  basic  ideas  are  those  of  the  medieval  long 
ago.  This  comes  out  clearly  in  their  rival  claims 
to  Balkan  dominion.  Because  a  province  belonged 
to  a  certain  medieval  Balkan  empire  it  must  go 
to  the  particular  state  which  to-day  bears  the 
same  name,  and  since  some  districts  have  belonged 
to  all  those  empires  in  turn,  the  rival  claims  form 
a  veritable  Gordian  knot  severable  only  by  the 
sword  of  war.  Truly,  among  these  peoples  "a 
thousand  years  is  but  a  day  " ! 

The  arrested  development  of  the  Balkan  races 
shows  not  only  in  their  national  aspirations  but 
also  in  the  whole  popular  temper.  Among  the 
educated  elite,  to  be  sure,  tliere  are  as  cultured 


222  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

gentlemen  as  any  in  the  world,  but  the  popular 
masses  are  thinly  veneered  barbarians  with  the 
virtues  and  vices  belonging  to  that  stage  of  human 
evolution.  Generally  good-natured,  honest  and 
hospitable  in  peace  times,  these  primitive  natures 
are  yet  capable  of  volcanic  outbursts  of  boundless 
fanaticism  and  savage  cruelty.  Also,  these  trans- 
formations occur  with  a  suddenness  and  intensity 
unknown  among  more  developed  peoples. 

All  this  gives  the  key  to  the  inner  significance  of 
the  great  Balkan  upheaval  of  1912-13.  In  1912  the 
Christian  Balkan  states  at  last  succeeded  in  com- 
bining against  the  hereditary  Turkish  enemy.  But 
no  sooner  was  the  battle  won  than  the  victors  quar- 
reled hopelessly  over  the  spoils.  There  followed 
the  Second  Balkan  War — a  ferocious  race-struggle 
which  resulted  in  the  despoiling  and  humiliation 
of  Bulgaria,  hitherto  the  leading  Balkan  nation,  by 
the  other  Balkan  peoples.  The  Treaty  of  Bucha- 
rest which  put  an  end  to  the  war  was  an  attempt 
permanently  to  kill  Bulgaria's  aspirations  and 
to  surround  her  with  a  ring  of  aggrandized  and 
watchful  enemies.  To  this  end,  Serbia,  Rumania, 
and  Greece  concluded  an  anti-Bulgarian  entente, 
while  Greece  and  Serbia  signed  a  special  treaty 
mutually  guaranteeing  each  other's  Macedonian 
possessions  against  Bulgarian  attack. 

The  so-called  *' Peace  "  of  Bucharest  was  thus  no 
peace.  It  was  merely  a  whetting  of  knives.  In 
anticipation  of  the  next  war,  all  parties  began  to 
consolidate  their  recent  territorial  gains  by  the 
process  known  as  ''extirpation."    This  process 


THE  BALIV.VNS  223 

consisted  in  the  rooting  out  of  hostile  racial  minori- 
ties from  the  freshly  conquered  territories,  thus 
attempting  to  make  race  lines  correspond  to  politi- 
cal frontiers  and  to  assure  the  fanatical  loyalty 
of  the  whole  future  population  within  any  given 
state  border.  The  ruthlessness  with  which  these 
readjustments  were  conducted  scandalized  the  out- 
side world  and  enormously  envenomed  Balkan 
race  hatreds.  The  wretched  victims  of  "extirpa- 
tion" streamed  into  their  respective  motherlands 
by  the  hundred  thousand  and  there  sowed  broad- 
cast the  seeds  of  fury  and  revenge.  Each  Balkan 
people  swore  to  crush  the  accursed  foe  and  erect 
its  special  ''Great  Idea"  upon  his  ruin. 

Such  was  the  miasma  of  unslaked  hatreds  and 
gnawing  desires  which  poisoned  the  Balkan  pen- 
insula at  the  outbreak  of  the  European  War. 
Since  these  terrible  conditions  were  so  largely  re- 
sponsible for  the  occurrence  and  course  of  Arma- 
geddon, it  will  be  necessary  to  examine  the  various 
Balkan  peoples  in  detail. 

A.      SERBIA 

Serbia  is  emphatically  a  land  of  great  expecta- 
tions. Its  people,  a  primitive  race  of  swineherds 
and  small  yeomen,  do  not  appear  exactly  ' '  empire- 
builders"  to  the  casual  eye.  Yet  the  Serbs  are  a 
most  curious  compound:  they  are  pig-raisers  and 
poets  at  one  and  the  same  time.  Preeminently  do 
they  possess  the  "Slav"  temperament — mystic, 
dreamy,  rather  inefficient  under  normal  circum- 
stances yet  capable  of  fanatical  energy  beneath  the 


224  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

spur  of  an  idea.  And  the  Serb  idea — the  inevitable 
''Great  Idea"  of  a  Balkan  people — is  certainly- 
grandiose  enough.  Its  kernel  is  that  "Empire  of 
Stephen  Dushan"  which  bowed  the  Balkans  be- 
neath Serb  hegemony  five  hundred  years  ago. 
But,  like  kindred  Balkan  aspirations,  the  Serb 
Great  Idea  clothes  itself  in  the  modern  doctrine  of 
nationality.  And  the  Serb  sees  his  race  brethren 
both  widely  scattered  through  the  Balkan  penin- 
sula and  occupying  the  whole  southwest  portion 
of  Austria-Hungary  as  well.  Hence,  the  Serb 
great  idea  is  a  Pan-Serb  or  ''Yugo-Slav"  Empire 
which  shall  not  only  revive  the  Balkan  hegemony 
of  Stephen  Dushan  but  shall  also  absorb  all  those 
Serb,  Croat,  and  Slovene  populations  of  Austria- 
Hungary  which  never  knew  Dushan 's  sway. 

Such  has  long  been  Serbia's  ambitious  dream. 
But,  like  their  Russian  cousins,  the  Serb  imperial- 
ists although  united  on  the  ultimate  end,  disagreed 
as  to  the  means.  The  hope  of  absorbing  Austria- 
Hungary's  Yugo-Slav  provinces  was  so  remote 
that  many  Serbs  believed  in  cultivating  the  good- 
will of  their  mighty  northern  neighbor  and  thus 
gaining  Austria 's  assent  to  possible  Balkan  acqui- 
sitions at  the  expense  of  the  declining  Ottoman 
Empire.  This  was  the  "  Austrophile "  doctrine 
which  inspired  Serbia's  foreign  policy  under  the 
Obrenovitch  kings,  Milan  and  Alexander,  down  to 
1903. 

In  1903,  however,  this  Austrophile  policy  came 
to  a  dramatic  end.  King  Alexander  then  fell  be- 
fore a  military  conspiracy  which  placed  upon  the 


THE  BALKANS  225 

throne  Peter,  bead  of  that  rival  Karageorgevitch 
dynasty  which  had  struggled  for  supremacy  with 
the  Obrenovitch  throughout  modern  Serbia's 
troubled  history.  And  Peter  represented  the  sec- 
ond school  of  Serb  imperialism  which  looked  to 
Russia  as  Serbia's  protector  and  hoped  for  the 
speedy  realization  of  a  Pan-Serb  Empire  built 
upon  Austria-Hungary's  ruins.  This  school's  im- 
mediate inspiration  of  course  came  from  the  Rus- 
sian Pan-Slavists,  who  saw  in  Serbia  the  chosen 
instrument  of  Russia's  Balkan  supremacy.  The 
1903  revolution  had  Russian  backing,  and  the  ap- 
pointment of  M.  Hartwig,  the  stormy  petrel  of 
Muscovite  diplomacy,  as  Russian  minister  to  Bel- 
grade, betokened  what  might  be  expected  in  the 
near  future. 

Alarmed  at  the  prospect,  Austria  did  everything 
possible  to  break  Serbia's  rising  spirit,  but  this 
merely  intensified  anti-Austrian  feeling  and  drove 
the  Serbs  still  closer  into  Russia's  arms.  There- 
upon Austria  threw  down  the  gauntlet  by  annexing 
Bosnia-Herzegovina,  the  treasured  "first  step" 
of  Serb  imperialism.  Serbia  was  wild  with  dis- 
appointed fury,  but  beneath  the  German  ultimatum 
Russia  had  to  counsel  submission.  Henceforth, 
however,  the  Austro-Serbian  feud  was  avowedly  to 
the  death.  The  Serbs  made  no  concealment  of 
their  determination  to  disrupt  Austria  for  the 
erection  of  a  Pan-Serb  Empire,  while  Austria  but 
waited  the  chance  to  destroy  her  irreconcilable  foe. 
The  seditious  Pan-Serb  propaganda  carried  on  in 
Austria 's  Yugo-Slav  provinces  became  an  increas- 


22()  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

ing  menace  to  Austria's  future,  and  it  was  a  fa- 
natical Pan-Serb  secret  society,  the  "Narodna  Od- 
brana,"  which  encompassed  Archduke  Franz- 
Ferdinand's  assassination  at  Serajevo. 

The  frenzied  condition  of  Serbian  public  opinion 
during  the  years  preceding  the  European  War 
becomes  clear  from  Serbian  press-comment  and 
utterances  of  representative  Serbians  at  tliat  time. 
On  October  8, 1910,  the  second  anniversary  of  Aus- 
tria's annexation  of  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  the 
Belgrade  "Politika"  wrote,  ''Europe  must  take 
note  that  the  Serbian  people  still  thirst  for  re- 
venge." And  the  ''Mali  Journal"  exclaimed  be- 
tween black  mourning  borders :  * '  The  day  of  ven- 
geance must  arrive !  The  feverish  efforts  of  Ser- 
bia to  organize  her  army  are  a  token  of  this 
accounting  to  come,  as  is  the  hatred  of  the  Serbian 
people  for  the  neighboring  monarchy."  In  April, 
1911,  the  "Politika"  wrote:  "The  annexation  of 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  has  once  for  all  shattered 
even  the  semblance  of  friendship  between  Sorbin 
and  Austria-Hungary.  This  every  Serbian  feels. ' ' 
In  this  same  year  M.  Protitch,  a  prominent  Serb 
politician,  declared  in  the  Serbian  parliament: 
"Peace  and  good  relations  will  never  exist  between 
Serbia  and  Austria-Hungary  until  the  latter  shall 
have  renounced  all  pretensions  of  being  a  great 
Power  and  shall  have  resigned  itself  to  being  the 
Switzerland  of  the  East."  While  a  little  later  the 
noted  Serbian  diplomat,  Chedo  Mijatovitch,  de- 
clared: "The  national  Serbian  program,  to  the 
realization  of  which  all  parties  in  Serbia  are  work- 


THE  BALKANS  227 

ing,  comprises  tlie  annexation  of  all  territories  in- 
habited by  Serbians,  whether  belonging  at  this 
moment  to  Austria  or  to  Turkey." 

Serbia's  double  triumph  in  the  Balkan  wars 
naturally  roused  Serbian  ambitions  against  Aus- 
tria to  an  even  higher  degree.  In  the  sin'ing  of 
1913,  the  ''Balkan"  (Belgrade)  wrote:  "War  be- 
tween Austria- Hungary  and  Ser])ia  is  inevitable. 
We  have  dismembered  the  Turkish  Empire;  we 
shall  likewise  rend  Austria  asunder."  And  in 
October,  1913,  the  *'Piemont"  exclaimed:  ''Ser- 
bian soldiers  have  vowed  tliat  tliey  will  proceed 
in  a  similar  way  against  the  'Second  Turkey'  as 
they  have  by  God's  help  dealt  with  the  Turkey  of 
the  Balkans.  They  take  this  pledge,  confident  that 
the  day  of  vengeance  is  approaching.  One  Turkey 
has  disappeared.  The  good  God  of  Serbia  will 
grant  that  the  'Second  Turkey'  shall  also  disap- 
pear." "Serbia  incites  tlie  Austro-IIungarian 
Serbs  to  revolution,"  admitted  the  "Zastava"  of 
April,  1914;  "Austria  has  lost  all  rights  of  exist- 
ence," asserted  the  "Pravda"  of  the  same  date; 
while  in  tlieir  Easter  issues,  most  Serbian  papers 
Joined  in  expressing  the  common  hope  that  their 
"unliberated,  conquered,  and  oppressed  brethren 
may  soon  celebrate  a  glad  resurrection." 

Very  instructive  in  tliis  connection  is  the  testi- 
mony of  the  celebrated  p]nglish  traveler,  Mary  E. 
Durliam.  Writing  in  the  "London  Nation"  of 
April  10,  1915,  Miss  Durham,  who  probably  knows 
Serl)  lands  more  intimately  than  any  other  West- 
ern observer,  writes  thus  of  her  experiences  in 


228  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

Serbia  and  its  twin  Montenegro  during  the  Balkan 
wars:  ''They  (the  Montenegrin  officials)  cer- 
tainly most  explicitly  stated  that  it  was  the  inten- 
tion of  the  Serb  peoples  to  set  Europe  on  fire,  and 
that  they  should  begin  in  Bosnia.  But  this  was  not 
an  isolated  case.  Peter  Plamenatz,  minister  of 
foreign  affairs,  told  me  frequently  that  the  Serbs 
made  a  great  mistake  in  not  fighting  Austria  in 
1908.  It  was  a  common  boast  that  Cattaro  could 
be  taken  in  twenty-four  hours.  The  assault  by  the 
Serbs  on  the  Austrian  consul  at  Prizren  was  at 
the  time  represented  to  me  as  a  direct  attack  on 
Austria,  and  Austria  was  greatly  jeered  at  for 
being  afraid  to  go  to  war  then.  Serb  as  well  as 
Montenegrin  officers  talked  freely  about  their  next 
war  (which  was  to  be  with  Austria).  Marching 
to  Vienna  and  setting  Europe  on  fire  were  some  of 
their  favorite  topics  of  conversation. ' ' 

Such  being  the  desperate  and  fanatical  state  of 
Serbian  public  opinion,  the  effect  of  the  Serajevo 
tragedy  can  be  imagined.  To  be  sure,  the  Ser- 
bian Government  prohibited  the  use  of  violent 
language,  but  Serbian  press  comment  teemed  with 
thinly  veiled  exultation  and  covert  sneers  at  Aus- 
tria 's  ' '  hopeless ' '  plight.  It  is  also  not  surprising 
that  Serbia,  backed  up  by  Russia,  rejected  Aus- 
tria's ultimatum. 

The  long-expected  war  with  Austria  excited  gen- 
eral enthusiasm.  The  only  regret,  expressed  in 
certain  circles,  was  that  the  war  could  not  have 
been  temporarily  postponed.  ''We  Serbians," 
wrote  Chedo  Mijatovitch  in  a  message  to  the  Eng- 


THE  BALKANS  229 

lish  public  in  late  August,  1914,  "did  not  wish  for 
this  war  at  present.  After  two  bloody  wars  we 
wanted  peace  and  rest  to  recuperate:  time  to  or- 
ganize newly  annexed  countries,  to  create  and 
train  an  army  of  G00,000  soldiers.  We  wanted  at 
least  five  years."  To  most  Serbians,  however,  the 
presence  of  Russia,  England,  and  France  as  their 
allies  presaged  certain  and  speedy  victory. 

Serbia  was  still  further  heartened  by  the  striking 
failures  of  the  Austrian  invasions  during  the  au- 
tumn of  1914.  Curiously  enough,  their  first  ap- 
prehensions arose,  not  from  the  menace  of  their 
foes,  but  from  the  conduct  of  their  allies.  The 
Entente 's  negotiations  with  Italy  in  the  spring  of 
1915  and  Italian  demands  for  Austria-Hungary's 
Adriatic  coast  aroused  anger  and  alarm  in  Serbia. 
The  Serbian  Government  conceded  Istria  to  Italy, 
despite  the  Slovene  hinterland  of  Trieste,  but  Ser- 
bian public  opinion  unanimously  demanded  all  the 
remaining  Austro-Hungarian  coast,  both  as  essen- 
tially Yugo-Slav  country  and  as  the  indispensable 
sea-frontage  for  the  projected  Pan-Serb  Empire. 
Italian  claims  to  Dalmatia  were  scouted  with  es- 
pecial indignation.  The  Allies'  secret  agreement 
of  April  25  with  Italy,  concluded  without  Serbia's 
knowledge  or  assent,  evoked  ill-suppressed  wrath. 
On  June  20,  1915,  the  Serb  Premier  Pashitch  de- 
clared in  parliament  that  *'the  question  of  Dal- 
matia would  be  settled  after  the  war,"  thus  serving 
formal  notice  that  his  government  did  not  pro- 
pose to  give  the  April  agreement  its  assent.  M. 
Pashitch 's  utterance  acquired  added  significance 


230  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

from  an  article  published  in  tlie  official  Serbian 
organ  "  Samouprava "  about  this  same  time. 
"Dalmatia,"  stated  this  obviously  inspired  ar- 
ticle, ''is  not  Italian.  It  is  geologically,  historic- 
ally, and  ethnologically  Serbo-Croatian.  If  Italy 
wishes  to  share  fraternally  with  Serbia  the  Adri- 
atic Sea  on  the  shores  of  which  live  700,000  Slavs 
as  against  18,000  Italians,  Serbia  will  be  greatly 
pleased  and  will  not  fail  to  cultivate  what  the 
ancient  Italian  civilization  shall  have  left  behind 
as  a  heritage.  But  Serbia  will  not  consent  to  hav- 
ing this  Slav  land  pass  from  Austrian  domination 
to  another  domination — that  of  Italy." 

The  tone  of  non-official  journals  was  even  more 
emphatic.  ''Italy  has  decided  to  make  traffic  of 
her  sympathies  and  sell  her  warlike  cooperation," 
wrote  the  Belgrade  "Politika"  acidly.  "The  cry, 
'What  am  I  offered?'  alone  inspires  Italian  policy. 
.  .  .  The  saddest  thing  in  this  whole  business  is 
that  we  are  to  serve  as  the  object  of  the  bargaining. 
England  and  France,  who,  in  the  name  of  the 
Triple  Entente,  carried  on  the  negotiations  with 
Italy,  consent  to  concessions  at  the  expense  of  Ser- 
bia and  of  South  Slavism.  Serbia  asks  no  aid  of 
Italy.  She  does  not  need  to.  All  the  more  is  she 
not  ready  to  cede  an  inch  of  Yugo-Slav  territory. 
If  the  Triple  Entente  is  reduced  to  calling  for 
Italian  assistance,  let  it  pay  the  necessary  price 
out  of  its  own  pocket.  It  possesses  territories 
enough  of  which  it  can  dispose.  Let  it  not  violate 
others'  rights.  Savoy,  Corsica,  Malta,  Tunis,  Al- 
geria, Asia  Minor,  and  Egypt  could  serve  perfectly 


THE  BALKANS  231 

well  as  compensation  for  Italy.  We  are  perfectly 
convinced  that  this  Italian  policy  of  extortion  is 
not  in  the  least  agreeable  to  the  Triple  Entente  and 
that  the  latter  would  agree  only  against  its  will  to 
such  compensations  extorted  by  force.  We  are 
also  persuaded  that  Italy  would  one  day  bitterly 
regret  it.  But  it  is  only  right  and  just  that  he  who 
believes  that  he  must  grant  compensations  should 
take  tliem  out  of  his  own  property.  AVe  have  no 
need  of  Italy.  Consequently,  we  wish  to  make  no 
sacrifice  for  an  assistance  that  we  do  not  request. 
Istria  and  the  Dalmatian  coasts  are  Slav  and  will 
remain  Slav.  Any  attempt  to  upset  the  estab- 
lished order  might  give  rise  to  new  complications 
and  new  conflicts  of  incalculable  extent.  Let  the 
Triple  Entente  and  Italy  take  that  for  certain!" 
This  categorical  refusal  to  yield  Italy  even  Trieste 
represented  a  powerful  body  of  Serbian  public 
opinion,  and  did  much  to  still  further  envenom 
Serbo-Italian  relations. 

The  dispute  with  Italy  was  by  no  means  settled 
when  Serbia's  sensibilities  were  still  further  ruf- 
fled by  another  move  of  her  allies.  The  summer  of 
1915  witnessed  the  Entente's  persistent  attempt 
to  \\^n  Bulgaria  to  its  side,  but  Bulgaria  at  once 
answered  that  the  price  for  her  aid  would  have 
to  be  that  supremely  desired  land  of  Macedonia  for 
which  Bulgaria  had  fought  the  Balkan  wars  and  of 
which  she  considered  herself  foully  robbed  at  the 
Peace  of  Bucharest.  The  Bulgarian  thesis  was 
that  the  IVfacedonians  were  thoroughly  Bulgar  in 
blood  and  speech,  and  that  Bulgaria  could  never 


232  PEESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

rest  until  these  race  brethren  were  reunited  to  the 
motherland.  The  justice  of  this  contention  was  ac- 
knowledged by  influential  sections  of  British  and 
French  public  opinion  which  urged  their  Govern- 
ments to  put  pressure  on  their  Serb  ally  to  sat- 
isfy Bulgaria's  aspirations  and  thus  assure  a  re- 
constituted Balkan  League  which  would  ensure 
Austria's  speedy  collapse  and  thereby  richly  re- 
ward Serbia's  sacrifice  by  giving  her  all  southwest 
Au  stria-Hungary. 

This  line  of  reasoning,  however,  did  not  in  the 
least  appeal  to  Serbian  predilections.  Serbia 
flatly  denied  that  the  Macedonians  were  Bulgars, 
asserting  that  they  were  true  Serbs,  temporarily 
misled  by  Bulgarian  propaganda  but  now  fast  be- 
coming good  Serbs  under  Serbian  rule.  Further- 
more, most  Serbians  claimed  that  Macedonia  was 
vital  to  the  political  and  economic  future  of  their 
country.  In  fact,  they  believed  that  all  Mace- 
donia should  have  gone  to  Serbia  right  down  to 
Salonika  and  the  vEgean  Sea,  and  only  the  feud 
with  Bulgaria  had  prevented  a  quarrel  with  the 
Greeks  over  the  possession  of  Salonika  and  the 
lower  Vardar  Valley.  The  full  extent  of  Serbian 
aspirations  came  out  clearly  in  the  arguments 
which  Serb  writers  now  adduced  in  the  foreign 
press  to  convince  their  Western  allies  of  the  jus- 
tice of  their  contentions.  In  the  Paris  '^  Revue 
Hebdomadaire'*  of  April  10,  1915,  the  Serb  pub- 
licist, J.  Cvijic,  asserted:  **Our  country  is  com- 
posed of  two  great  valleys,  the  Morava  and  the 
Vardar,  which  cut  across  the  Balkans  from  north 


THE  BALKANS  233 

to  south,  from  Bel.i^^rade  to  Salonika,  without  any 
distinct  partition  line.  This  gives  to  Serbia  the 
seal  of  an  almost  perfect  geographical  unity." 
And  a  little  later,  a  prominent  Serb  politician, 
Costa  Stoyanovitch,  wrote  in  the  *'Nuova  Anto- 
logia"  (Rome):  "Macedonia  does  not  even  be- 
long to  Bulgaria  geographically,  while  with  Serbia 
it  forms  a  geographical  unity.  The  valley  of  the 
Vardar,  the  principal  Macedonian  river,  is  only  the 
continuation  of  the  Serbian  valley  of  the  Morava. 
Thus  it  is  the  main  line  of  communication  between 
the  Danube  and  Salonika.  .  .  .  Hence,  for  Serbia, 
the  cession  of  Macedonia  is  not  equivalent  to  part- 
ing with  a  contiguous  province,  without  the  pos- 
session of  which  she  could  continue  undisturbed 
her  national  life.  ...  In  fact,  this  province,  not 
only  because  of  its  resources  and  its  economic 
value,  but  also  because  of  its  geographic  position, 
is  the  most  important  Serbian  province." 

Despite  these  Serbian  contentions,  the  Entente 
Powers  did  urge  Serbia  to  promise  Bulgaria,  not 
all  Macedonia  but  the  districts  west  of  the  Vardar 
River.  However,  even  this  relatively  slight  con- 
cession aroused  bitter  opposition  in  the  Serbian 
press.  The  ''Novosti"  (Belgrade)  exclaimed  de- 
fiantly: **  Serbia  prefers  to  disappear  as  a  state 
rather  than  accept  such  a  renunciation  of  its  lands. 
That  is  what  the  Government  should  declare  to  the 
Entente  instead  of  convoking  the  Skupshtina ! ' ' 

The  Serbs  were,  however,  not  called  upon  to 
make  this  sacrifice.  Bulgaria  rejected  the  pro- 
posed compromise  as  utterly  inadequate,  and  when 


234  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

in  September,  1915,  the  Austro-Germans  began 
their  great  Balkan  "drive"  Bulgaria  joined  the 
Teutonic  Powers  and  struck  savagely  at  the  hated 
Serb  foe.  The  Serbians  resisted  with  the  cour- 
age of  despair,  but  the  odds  were  too  great  and  the 
struggle  was  soon  over.  The  flower  of  the  Serbian 
people  fell  in  battle  or  perished  during  the  awful 
retreat  across  the  snow-clad  Albanian  Mountains. 
Only  a  hardy  remnant  reached  the  waiting  Entente 
ships  on  the  Adriatic  shore  and  were  carried  away 
into  exile.  Before  the  year  was  out  tiny  Montene- 
gro also  fell,  and  the  Serb  states  had  disappeared 
from  the  roster  of  the  world's  nations. 

Whether  they  will  reappear  depends  upon  the 
fortunes  of  war.  Should  the  Teutonic  Powers 
maintain  their  present  Balkan  grip,  it  is  unlikely 
that  an  independent  Serbia  will  ever  be  restored. 
The  most  probable  outcome  at  this  writing  appears 
to  be  a  straight  partition  between  Austria-Hun- 
gary and  Bulgaria,  Bulgaria  taking  the  mixed 
Serbo-Bulgar  populations  of  Macedonia  and  south- 
ern Serbia,  Austria-Hungary  taking  the  pure 
Serb  populations  of  the  north.  In  that  case,  with 
forbearance  and  constructive  statesmanship,  the 
still  plastic  Serb  stock  would  in  all  probability  ulti- 
mately fuse  with  the  closely  kindred  Bulgarian  and 
Croatian  cultures. 

Of  course  all  this  is  cruel  tragedy  for  the  Serbs 
— but  it  is  the  way  of  the  world.  For  many  years 
Serbia  frankly  aspired  to  be  the  ''Balkan  Pied- 
mont" and  worked  to  disrupt  Austria-Hungary  in 
order  to  build  from  its  ruins  a  great  Yugo-Slav 


THE  BALKANS  235 

Empire.  For  botli  states  the  issue  was  thence- 
fortli  one  of  life  and  death,  and  in  such  implacable 
duels  the  loser  must  pay  the  ultimate  forfeit. 

B.      BULGARIA 

Modern  Bulgaria  is  one  of  the  most  extraor- 
dinary phenomena  of  human  history.  Although 
the  Bulgarians  played  a  leading  part  in  Balkan 
politics  during  the  Middle  Ages,  building  up  two 
powerful  empires,  the  Turkish  conquest  of  the  Pen- 
insula bore  harder  upon  the  Bulgars  than  upon  any 
other  Balkan  people.  So  thorouglily  was  the  na- 
tional organization  destroyed  that  forty  years  ago 
the  Bulgarians  were  an  obscure  population  of 
wretched  serfs,  exploited  to  the  limit  of  human 
endurance,  whom  the  world  had  so  completely 
forgotten  that  many  Western  travelers  passed 
through  their  land  without  becoming  aware  of  their 
existence. 

The  Kusso-Turkish  War  of  1877  freed  the  Bul- 
gars from  the  Turkish  yoke  and  restored  their 
national  entity.  In  less  than  ten  years  Bulgaria 
was  the  most  powerful  Christian  Balkan  state,  and 
this  primacy  she  steadily  increased  down  to  the 
late  Balkan  wars. 

This  almost  miraculous  creation  of  something 
out  of  nothing  implies  a  very  unusual  national 
character,  and  a  brief  study  of  Bulgarian  national 
psychology  reveals  the  secret  of  Bulgarian  success. 
One  thing  is  clear  from  the  first:  the  Bulgarians 
are  not  true  Slavs.  Your  typical  Slav,  whether 
he  dwell  on  the  Russian  plains  or  the  Serbian  hills, 


236  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

is  an  idealist,  prone  to  lose  sight  of  bard  facts 
in  day  dreams.  Capable  of  great  accomplishments 
when  under  the  stimuli  of  his  enthusiasms,  in  or- 
dinary times  the  Slav  is  an  easy-going,  improvi- 
dent, open-handed  person,  essentially  likable,  but 
lacking  that  practical  characteristic — efficiency. 
How  different  the  Bulgarian !  Restrained,  sober, 
dour;  with  occasional  outbursts  of  passion,  but 
usually  taking  even  his  pleasures  sadly ;  intensely 
practical  and  hard-headed ;  without  a  trace  of  mys- 
ticism; frugal  to  the  point  of  avarice;  so  solicitous 
about  the  future  that  this  frequently  becomes  an 
obsession ;  above  all,  possessed  of  a  dogged,  plod- 
ding, almost  ferocious  energy  translating  itself 
normally  into  unremitting  labor — such  is  the  folk. 
"The  Bulgar  on  his  ox-cart,"  says  the  national 
proverb,  "pursues  the  hare — and  overtakes  it.** 

This  individual  character-sketch  omits  one  trait 
possessed  by  Bulgarians  in  preeminently  high  de- 
gree— capacity  for  sustained  team-play.  Now  im- 
agine this  people  fired  by  the  typical  Balkan  Great 
Idea,  and  you  begin  to  understand  how  Bulgaria 
rose  from  nothing  to  Balkan  primacy  in  less  than 
ten  years. 

And  that  Great  Idea?  It  was,  first,  the  reunion 
of  the  whole  Bulgarian  race  from  the  Black  Sea  to 
the  Albanian  Mountains,  and  from  the  Danube  to 
the  ^gean.  Then,  invincible  in  its  dominant  cen- 
tral position,  this  "Big  Bulgaria"  would  force  the 
other  Balkan  peoples  to  acknowledge  its  hegemony. 
Finally,  a  united  Balkan  Christendom  would  expel 
the  Turk  from  Europe  and  seat  a  new  Bulgarian 


THE  BALIvANS  237 

Empire  at  Constantinople,  always  significantly- 
known  to  Bulgarians  as ' '  Tzarigrad, ' '  the  '  *  City  of 
the  Tsars."  Grandiose  almost  to  absurdity  ap- 
peared this  ideal  of  the  devastated  little  peasant 
state  created  in  1878  by  the  Congress  of  Berlin. 
But,  if  Bulgaria's  dreams  were  great,  her  waking 
hours  were  long,  and  all  were  given  up  to  strenu- 
ous endeavor  and  rigid  self-denial.  These  high 
hopes  became  part  of  the  national  consciousness. 
They  braced  every  Bulgar  to  gigantic  efforts.  The 
way  Bulgaria  pinched  and  starved  herself  for 
near  forty  years  to  create  proportionately  the 
greatest  war-machine  in  the  world  showed  this 
folk  to  be  possessed  of  a  somber  power  and  fero- 
cious energy  which  made  the  goal  seem  less  im- 
practicable. 

Then  at  last  the  hour  seemed  to  have  struck.  In 
the  Balkan  wars  Bulgaria  cast  the  die — and  lost. 
Not  from  lack  of  courage  or  fighting  ability,  but 
through  a  league  of  all  her  Balkan  neighbors  egged 
on  by  her  traditional  friends,  Eussia  and  France. 
The  moral  effect  was  terrible.  The  foreigner  can 
hardly  realize  the  half-insane  fury  which  then  set- 
tled down  in  those  morose,  half-savage  hearts. 
Forced  to  sit  idly  by  and  watch  the  hated  Serb 
root  out  Macedonian  Bulgarism  by  one  of  the 
most  ruthless  persecutions  known  to  history,  their 
strong-man's  agony  grew,  and  grew,  and  knew  no 
rest.  How  the  Serb  was  regarded  is  shown  by  this 
popular  Bulgarian  war-song  composed  just  after 
the  Peace  of  Bucharest:  ''We  took  your  hands 
as  brothers,  but  hell  lurked  in  your  hearts !    Invet- 


238  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

erate  brigands,  who  have  trampled  under  foot 
honor,  altar,  and  good-name;  you  have  despoiled 
us  without  shame !  You  have  soiled  the  temple  of 
our  country!  Inhuman  demons,  hiding  crime  in 
your  souls;  you  are  the  creatures  of  wickedness 
and  fury!  We  remember  all,  and  savagely  shall 
we  avenge  your  satanic  plans,  your  accursed 
envy  I ' ' 

*' Vengeance!"  That  was  the  watchword. 
''Vengeance  and  victory!"  From  Tsar  Ferdi- 
nand down  to  the  humblest  peasant  boy,  the  Bul- 
garian people  made  no  secret  of  their  determina- 
tion to  tear  up  the  Bucharest  treaty  and  seize 
Macedonia  at  the  first  opportunity,  or  die  in  the 
attempt.  The  first  step  was  a  reconciliation  with 
the  hereditary  Turkish  foe.  Before  the  year  1913 
was  out,  a  close  Turco-Bulgarian  entente  had 
cleared  the  way  for  future  action. 

Then  came  the  European  War.  How  Bulgarian 
popular  sympathies  would  go  was  perfectly  clear 
from  the  first.  Serbia,  the  arch-enemy,  was  fight- 
ing the  Entente's  battles.  Greece,  the  well-hated, 
and  Rumania,  the  abhorred,  were  Entente  sympa- 
thizers. Russia  and  France,  the  false  friends, 
made  up  two  of  the  three  Entente  Powers.  How, 
then,  could  Bulgarian  patriots  wish  for  Entente 
success  ?  Russian  talk  of  ' '  Pan-Slavism ' '  and  ap- 
peals to  the  ** Little  Brothers  of  the  South"  were 
laughed  to  scorn.  The  Bulgarians  knew  well  who 
was  Serbia's  sponsor,  and  knew  equally  well  who 
had  egged  on  Rumania  to  stab  them  in  the  back 
in  the  Second  Balkan  War.    Long  before  the  Eu- 


THE  BALKANS  239 

ropean  struggle,  most  Bulgarians  had  renounced 
not  only  Russia  but  their  very  Slavism  as  well. 
''Call  us  Huns,  Turks,  Tartars,  but  not  Slavs!" 
cried  a  prominent  Bulgarian  shortly  after  the 
Peace  of  Bucharest.  And  in  November,  1913,  the 
great  patriotic  organization  "Narodni  Savetz," 
headed  by  Premier  Radoslavov,  had  passed  this 
resolution:  *'The  Bulgarian  people  must  break 
with  this  ideal,  so  false  and  fatal  for  us — the  ideal 
of  Slav  fraternity."  Many  Bulgarians  recalled 
with  pride  their  partial  descent  from  Finno-Turk- 
ish  nomads  who  had  conquered  the  primitive  Bul- 
garian Slavs  more  than  a  thousand  years  before, 
and  the  famous  Bulgarian  poet,  Cyril  Khristov, 
had  set  the  fashion  by  calling  himself  a  "Tartaro- 
Bulgar."  Therefore,  when  the  European  War 
broke  out,  Russian  advances  were  rejected  with  de- 
fiance. "Slavism  is  a  fatal  barrier  to  our  power 
and  our  national  enthusiasm,"  stated  Dr.  Ghen- 
nadiev  's  organ  ' '  Volia ' '  in  late  August,  1914.  ' '  It 
is  high  time  for  us  to  shed  that  error  and  stop 
preaching  such  a  lie." 

Bulgarian  resentment  likewise  leaped  up  hotly 
against  France.  France  had  shown  herself  more 
hostile  to  Bulgaria  than  had  Russia  during  the 
Second  Balkan  War,  and  it  was  an  open  secret  that 
M.  Delcasse,  French  minister  of  foreign  affairs, 
had  advocated  the  permanent  ruin  and  partition  of 
Bulgaria  in  order  to  erect  a  more  powerful  Serbia 
and  Rumania  against  Austria  and  a  Greater 
Greece  against  the  Levantine  aspirations  of  Italy. 
All  this  the  Bulgarians  remembered,  and  their 


240  PEESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

anti-French  feeling  expressed  itself  in  strictures 
like  that  indited  by  Professor  Petkov  of  Sofia  Uni- 
versity in  the  early  autumn  of  1914.  In  this  bro- 
chure, Professor  Petkov  wrote:  *'An  heroic 
struggle  is  unfolding  before  our  eyes :  the  healthy 
and  powerful  German  culture  battles  with  the  rot- 
ten French  culture  which,  condemned  to  death, 
tries  to  drag  down  with  it  all  the  peoples  of  Eu- 
rope. Present-day  France  is  nothing  but  a  dis- 
gusting sewer  which  taints  the  air  of  Europe.  The 
healthy  German  culture  has  revolted  against  her, 
for  Germany  wishes  to  conquer  a  free  field  for  its 
development.  On  the  other  side,  German  culture 
has  to  struggle  energetically  against  Russian  bar- 
barism which,  for  ten  centuries,  has  tended  solely 
to  become  the  powerful  despot  and  oppressor,  as 
well  by  its  own  peculiar  development  as  by  the 
progressive  development  of  others.  At  the  pres- 
ent hour,  France,  intellectually  degenerate  and 
depopulated,  struggling  against  the  powerful  Ger- 
man culture,  has  for  ally  Russia,  barbarous  and 
benighted. ' ' 

The  strong  pro-German  sentiments  expressed  in 
Professor  Petkov 's  pamphlet  were  typical  of  the 
great  mass  of  the  Bulgarian  people.  Tsar  Ferdi- 
nand and  the  Bulgarian  Government,  to  be  sure, 
maintained  an  attitude  of  even-handed  neutrality, 
but  Bulgarian  public  opinion  made  scant  conceal- 
ment of  its  sympathies.  At  the  outbreak  of  the 
war,  the  noted  Bulgarian  poet,  Cyril  Khristov,  ded- 
icated an  impassioned  ode  ''To  Germania,"  end- 
ing: "Ah!    How  I  love  to  see  thee  march  victo- 


THE  BALKANS  241 

riously  forward  to  the  conquest  of  that  place  in 
the  world  which  is  thy  due !"  "For  us,  one  thing 
is  certain,"  exclaimed  the  Sofia  *'Trgowinski 
Vjestnik"  exultantly  in  the  autumn  of  1914,  "the 
two  powerful  allies,  Germany  and  Austria-Hun- 
gary, are  invincible!"  In  the  Christmas,  1914, 
number  of  the  Vienna  "Reichspost,"  M.  Momt- 
chilov,  Vice-President  of  the  Bulgarian  Parlia- 
ment, wrote:  **A  strong  Bulgaria  is  indispensa- 
ble for  Austria-Hungary.  Every  Bulgarian  knows 
that  Russia,  in  seeking  to  occupy  the  Dardanelles, 
becomes  thereby,  ipso  facto,  the  enemy  of  Bulgaria. 
At  this  critical  hour  the  Bulgarian  Government  is 
energetically  sustained  by  the  people,  which  ac- 
claims with  enthusiasm  the  Austrian  and  German 
victories  and  sees  in  them  the  hope  of  its  owti 
existence.  The  Bulgarian  people  to-day  desires  an 
unconditional  rapprochement  with  the  great  Cen- 
tral Powers,  it  thirsts  for  their  high  'Kultur,*  and 
sincerely  desires  the  harmonizing  of  their  political 
and  economic  interests.  Russia's  efforts  to  gain 
us  by  her  rubles  has  failed.  The  Pan-Slavist  com- 
edy may  still  serve  the  gentlemen  at  Petrograd  as 
an  excuse  for  sumptuous  banquets,  but  for  us  it 
has  gone  out  of  fashion.  If,  notwithstanding, 
Russian  policy  should  dare  to  violate  our  neutral- 
ity, then  Russia  would  run  upon  our  bayonets." 

Russia's  determination  to  get  Constantinople 
roused  deep  anger  and  alarm  throughout  Bulgaria. 
Most  Bulgarian  papers  asserted  that  this  would 
mean  the  death  of  Bulgarian  independence,  and 
a  prominent  Bulgarian  politician  wrote  boldly  to 


242  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

the  Petrograd  "Novoye  Vremya":  ''Sazonov's 
declarations  on  the  subject  of  the  Straits  and  Con- 
stantinople have  profoundly  agitated  all  Bulgarian 
patriots.  Each  of  us  would  sacrifice  his  life  rather 
than  permit  Russia  to  seize  Constantinople.  All 
Bulgaria  would  resist  as  one  man  this  scheme  of 
Russian  chauvinism.  In  fact,  we  consider  that  our 
duty  is  to  range  ourselves  on  the  side  of  the  Turks 
to  defend  Constantinople  against  the  expansionist 
ambitions  of  Russia." 

Under  these  circumstances,  Russian  menaces, 
instead  of  cowing  Bulgaria,  merely  fanned  the  ex- 
isting Russophobia  to  even  fiercer  flames.  The 
great  Austro-German  ''drive"  against  Russia 
which  began  in  June,  1915,  roused  the  undisguised 
jubilation  of  the  Sofia  press.  The  semi-ofificial 
"Kambana,"  usually  so  moderate  in  tone,  wrote: 
'*  Russia,  which  longs  to  extend  her  domination 
over  Constantinople  and  the  Straits,  cannot  permit 
a  big  Bulgaria  to  arise  in  the  Balkans.  She  in- 
tends to  make  Bulgaria  a  Russian  province.  For 
this  reason  we  denounce  as  high  treason  the  at- 
tempts made  by  certain  persons  among  us  to  favor 
Russian  influence.  Russia  must  take  her  hands  off 
the  Balkans  and  devote  her  energies  to  Asia.  It  is 
to  this  end  that  the  German  and  Austro-Hungarian 
armies  are  fighting  to-day.  Therefore,  let  us  hail 
their  efforts  with  enthusiasm  and  wish  them  a 
decisive  victory.  The  hour  is  propitious  for  con- 
juring forever  the  Russian  peril  which  threatens 
our  existence."  And  after  the  fall  of  Warsaw  the 
famous  Bulgarian  military  critic,  Vasili  Angelov, 


THE  BALKANS  243 

wrote:  ** Every  true  Bulgarian  must  rejoice  in 
the  collapse  of  the  Russian  armies.  The  joy  we 
now  feel  is  as  keen  as  was  our  grief  when,  two 
years  ago,  Orthodox  Russia  treacherously  loosed 
against  Bulgaria  a  pack  of  wolves  to  rend  us. 
May  God  aid  the  brave  Austro-IIungarian  and 
German  hosts  to  beat  the  Russian  armies  into  the 
dust  and  hurl  them  into  their  own  swamps,  so  that 
they  may  never  again  disquiet  Europe  and  the 
Balkans  by  their  savage  and  rapacious  instincts." 

Such  being  the  state  of  Bulgarian  public  opin- 
ion, it  is  not  strange  that  Entente  efforts  to  win 
Bulgaria  to  the  Allied  cause  ended  in  failure.  In 
fact,  it  is  probable  that  the  Bulgarian  Government 
had  already  decided  upon  its  future  course  of  ac- 
tion, though  it  cleverly  maintained  its  neutrality 
until  the  proper  moment  for  action  arrived.  That 
moment  came  when  the  Austro-German  "drive" 
into  Serbia  began  in  September,  1915.  There- 
upon Bulgaria  threw  off  the  mask,  leagued  herself 
with  the  Teutonic  Powers,  and  struck  Serbia  down. 

The  great  bulk  of  the  Bulgarian  people  greeted 
their  Government's  decision  with  frank  satisfac- 
tion. "Since  the  interests  of  Bulgaria  coincide 
with  the  interests  of  the  Central  Powers,"  wrote 
the  "Kambana,"  "the  enemies  of  Austria  and 
Germany  are  the  enemies  of  Bulgaria  also.  An 
alliance  between  Bulgaria  and  the  Central  Powers 
will  realize  our  aspirations  more  than  any  other 
alliance.  We  are  too  weak  to  fight  the  Great  Pow- 
ers. But  with  the  diplomatic  and  military  aid  of 
Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  we  can  very  easily 


244  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

and  successfully  fight  against  the  little  states 
which  have  so  criminally  robbed  us. ' '  This  popu- 
lar satisfaction  was  greatly  enhanced  by  the  sub- 
sequent course  of  events.  A  few  short  autumn 
weeks  saw  Macedonia,  the  promised  land,  wholly 
in  Bulgaria's  grasp,  saw  the  hated  Serb  prostrate 
in  the  dust,  saw  Bulgarian  armies  pouring  through 
the  Albanian  hills  and  halting  only  on  the  distant 
shores  of  the  Adriatic  Sea.  Such  triumphs  this 
sober  folk  had  fashioned  only  in  its  wildest 
dreams.  And  still  further  Bulgarian  triumphs 
were  in  store.  Rumania's  adhesion  to  the  Allies 
in  September,  1916,  enabled  Bulgaria  to  settle  ac- 
counts with  another  one  of  her  Balkan  enemies. 
The  Silistrian  province,  filched  away  in  1913,  was 
swiftly  reconquered,  and  Bulgarian  regiments  tri- 
umphantly entered  the  Rumanian  capital,  Bucha- 
rest. 

These  things  have  all  tended  to  draw  Bulgaria 
still  closer  to  her  allies.  In  the  summer  of  1916, 
the  President  of  the  Bulgarian  Parliament  thus 
elucidated  the  deep-going  roots  of  Teuton-Bulgar 
solidarity:  "Our  evolution  against  Russian  in- 
fluence would  in  all  probability  have  come  to  ma- 
turity earlier  if  Germany  had  paid  more  heed  to 
us  and  less  to  Turkey.  But  she  at  last  discerned 
where  her  interest  lay  and  became  our  close  friend. 
Austria  has  never  ceased  to  be  that.  "We,  the  di- 
rectors of  Bulgaria's  policy,  were  well  aware,  when 
the  great  war  broke  out,  that  we  would  take  a 
hand  in  it.  But  we  had  to  wait,  because  we  were 
not  ready,  and  because  we  were  exhausted  by  the 


THE  BxiLKANS  245 

Second  Balkan  War.  Besides,  we  were  so  foolish 
as  to  wait  and  see  what  the  results  of  the  first 
campaign  would  be,  although  it  was  certain  that, 
be  they  what  they  might,  we  would  never  take 
sides  with  the  Entente.  If  the  fortune  of  war  had 
decided  otherwise  than  it  did,  we  would  simply 
have  waited  for  Germany's  revenge  to  take  part 
in  it  by  her  side  with  all  our  strength." 

Bulgarian  public  opinion  heartily  favors  the 
Teutonic  plan  of  '  *  Central  Europe. ' '  In  the  early 
autumn  of  1916,  the  *'Narodni  Prava"  (Sofia) 
wrote:  "This  scheme  interests  Bulgarians  very 
particularly.  During  the  Russophil  phase  they 
made  an  attempt  to  ally  themselves  economically 
with  the  Entente  Powers,  but  they  soon  perceived 
that  they  were  on  the  wrong  track  and  that  their 
interests  linked  them  naturally  to  the  Central  Em- 
pires. For  the  Russians  have  no  industries,  and 
our  raw  stuffs  can  find  no  markets  in  their  coun- 
try, whereas  we  have  German  industry  at  our 
doors,  which  can  absorb  all  our  produce  and  work 
for  us  cheaply.  It  is  probable  that  the  Sobranje 
will  shortly  be  called  upon  to  vote  a  law  depriving 
for  all  time  the  subjects  of  the  Entente  states 
from  access  to  Bulgarian  markets." 

All  this  shows  how  irrevocably  Bulgaria  has 
linked  her  destinies  with  those  of  the  Central  Pow- 
ers. For  her  there  is,  indeed,  no  turning  back. 
With  the  exception  of  Italy,  the  Entente  nations 
have  vowed  vengeance,  and  an  Entente  triumph 
would  spell  Bulgaria's  reduction  to  permanent 
impotence  if  not  her  complete  annihilation.     But 


• 


246  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

even  supposing  the  Allies  willing  to  leave  Bulgaria 
her  frontiers  of  1913,  this  would  mean  the  relin- 
quishment of  Macedonia  to  a  restored  and  power- 
ful Serbia.  It  would  also  mean  Bulgarian  ac- 
quiescence in  a  Russian  annexation  of  Constanti- 
nople, with  the  consequent  nipping  of  Bulgaria 
between  these  two  aggrandized  and  vengeful  Slav 
Powers.  To  Bulgaria,  at  present  enjoying  the  re- 
alization of  her  dearest  hopes,  such  a  future  would 
be  worse  than  death.  Respecting  Macedonia,  es- 
pecially, Bulgaria's  attitude  is  exactly  that  of  a 
she-bear  standing  over  her  newly  rescued  cubs. 
She  will  face  national  death  rather  than  abandon 
her  Macedonian  children.  This  hard,  dour,  indom- 
itable folk  has  deliberately  chosen  the  path  of  tri- 
umph or  downfall. 

C.      GREECE 

Greece  is  preeminently  the  home  of  the  "Great 
Idea."  The  aspirations  of  the  other  Balkan  peo- 
ples never  stray  much  beyond  the  Peninsula,  but 
the  Hellenic  hope  is  truly  imperial  in  its  far-flung 
horizons.  Heir  to  perhaps  the  most  glorious  of 
human  pasts,  the  modern  Greek  burns  to  emulate 
his  ancestors  and  fervently  awaits  the  advent  of 
a  mighty  morrow. 

The  Hellenic  Great  Idea  is  a  revival  of  the  glor- 
ies of  ancient  Hellas  and  the  medieval  Byzantine 
Empire,  incarnated  in  a  new  Greek  Empire  seated 
at  Constantinople  which  shall  embrace  the  Balkans 
and  Asia  Minor  and  win  back  the  whole  Near  East 
to  Hellenism.    The  intensity  of  these  Greek  aspi- 


THE  BALKANS  247 

rations  has  been  strikini^ly  portrayod  by  Professor 
Andreades  of  the  University  of  Athens.  Writing 
of  the  Greek  longing  for  Constantinople,  he  says: 
**For  the  Greeks,  Constantinople  is  the  'Polls,' 
*Urbs,'  'The  City,'  which,  from  Constantine  the 
Great  to  Constantine  XI  (A.D.  323-1453),  unit- 
ing the  Hellenic  cities  and  provinces  into  a  nation, 
permitted  tliem  alone  to  survive  among  all  the  na- 
tions of  Antiquity.  It  is  the  true  historical  cap- 
ital of  Hellenism." 

In  1914  the  hopes  of  the  Greeks  flamed  high.  So 
extraordinary  had  been  their  successes  in  the  pre- 
ceding years  that  further  steps  toward  the  reali- 
zation of  the  Great  Idea  seemed  reasonably  as- 
sured. Of  all  the  parties  to  the  late  Balkan  wars, 
Greece  had  come  off  the  best.  With  a  minimum 
of  loss,  Hellas  had  doubled  its  territory  and  had 
almost  doubled  its  population.  Salonika  and  Ka- 
valla,  after  Constantinople  the  richest  of  Balkan 
prizes,  were  in  Hellenic  hands,  and  the  "Great 
Greek  Island,"  Crete,  had  been  finally  reunited 
to  the  motherland.  The  internal  situation  also 
promised  well.  Greek  finance  was  at  last  upon  a 
sound  footing,  while  factionalism,  that  historic 
curse  of  the  folk,  had  been  at  least  temporarily 
subdued.  Under  the  twin  guidance  of  a  popular 
monarch  and  an  able  statesman,  the  Greek  people 
looked  unitedly  forward  to  a  happy  future. 

True,  the  horizon  was  not  entirely  free  from 
clouds.  The  very  amplitude  of  Hellenic  interests 
involved  corresponding  perplexities.  To  the 
north  lay  the  dark  lower  of  the  Bulgar,  brooding 


248  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

over  his  wrongs  and  dreaming  of  revenge.  To  the 
east  simmered  a  chronic  feud  with  the  Turk,  re- 
calcitrant at  the  loss  of  his  ^gean  isles  and 
alarmed  at  the  aspirations  of  his  numerous  Greek 
subjects  in  Asia  Minor  for  reunion  with  the  Hel- 
lenic homeland.  Even  the  Greco-Serbian  alliance 
was  a  manage  de  raison,  concluded  through  fear 
of  the  common  Bulgar  foe  and  capable  of  tragic 
dissolution  if  ever  Serb  yearnings  for  Salonika 
sliould  get  the  upper  hand.  With  two  of  the  great 
European  Powers,  also,  Greece  was  not  upon  the 
best  of  terms.  Russian  designs  upon  Constanti- 
nople imperiled  the  ultimate  goal  of  the  Hellenic 
Great  Idea,  while  even  more  troublesome  for  the 
immediate  future  was  the  state  of  Greek  relations 
toward  Italy.  Ever  since  Italy's  seizure  of 
Rhodes  and  the  ^gean  Archipelago  of  the  Dode- 
kanese  in  1912,  Greco-Italian  relations  had  been 
strained,  and  since  this  was  but  one  phase  of  a 
rivalry  which  extended  over  both  the  southern 
Adriatic  and  the  whole  Levant,  Greco-Italian  rela- 
tions showed  every  prospect  of  becoming  worse  in 
the  years  to  come.  Still,  Greece's  hopes  so  out- 
weighed her  anxieties  that  the  summer  of  1914 
found  Hellas  in  an  optimistic  mood. 

The  outbreak  of  the  European  War  evoked  a 
wave  of  pro- Ally  feeling  throughout  Greece.  For 
Russia  there  was  naturally  but  little  sympathy, 
but  for  the  other  two  Entente  Powers,  France  and 
England,  the  Greek  people  felt  an  almost  filial 
veneration,  the  traditional  Philhellenism  of  the 
Western  Powers  having  laid  the  Greeks  under  a 


THE  BALIvANS  249 

deep  debt  of  gratitude.  Furthermore,  their  Serl) 
ally  was  fighting  on  the  Entente  side.  Toward 
Germany  there  was  no  antipathy  and  some  liking, 
but  Austria  had  never  been  Greece's  friend,  while 
Turkey  and  Bulgaria,  obviously  potential  allies  of 
tlie  Teutonic  Powers,  were  Greece's  bitterest  foes. 
For  all  these  reasons,  therefore,  the  hearts  of  the 
overwhelming  majority  of  the  Greek  people  were 
with  the  Allies,  and  the  popular  enthusiasm  was 
l)atcntly  shared  by  the  powerful  Greek  Premier, 
Eleutherios  Venizelos. 

Until  February,  1915,  Greece  w^as  little  affected 
by  the  war.  In  that  month,  however,  the  Anglo- 
French  fleet  began  its  bombardment  of  the  Dar- 
danelles, and  the  Allies,  confident  in  their  hold 
upon  Greek  sympathies,  asked  the  Hellenic  Gov- 
ernment to  furnish  an  army  to  supplement  the 
naval  attack.  Premier  Venizelos  and  a  majority 
of  the  Greek  people  favored  compliance  with  the 
Allies'  demands,  especially  since  these  were 
coupled  w4th  glowing  if  rather  indefinite  promises 
of  territorial  rewards  in  Asia  Minor.  King  Con- 
stantine,  however,  together  with  most  of  the  Greek 
generals  and  statesmen,  declared  that  the  sending 
of  an  adequate  army  to  the  Dardanelles  would  so 
weaken  Greece's  northern  border  as  to  invite  a 
Bulgarian  invasion,  and  accordingly  refused  to 
grant  the  Allies'  request. 

This  refusal  was  a  great  shock  to  Allied  antici- 
pations. The  Entente  Powers  had  counted  upon 
Greek  assistance  almost  as  a  matter  of  course, 
and  this  unexpected  upset  to  their  plans  aroused 


250  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

both  astonishment  and  indignation.  In  France 
and  England  the  Greeks  were  accused  of  base 
ingratitude  and  even  of  pro-Germanism.  This 
greatly  alarmed  the  Greeks.  To  many  Hellenes, 
the  favor  of  the  Western  sea-powers  was  for 
Greece  literally  a  matter  of  life  and  death  which 
must  on  no  account  be  lost.  Therefore  these  per- 
sons, including  Venizelos,  asserted  that  Greece 
must  throw  herself  unreservedly  into  the  sea-pow- 
ers' arms,  trusting  to  their  gratitude  to  reward 
her  devotion  and  chancing  temporary  risks.  To 
others,  however,  notably  the  King  and  the  army 
leaders,  the  possibilities  of  a  Turco-Bulgarian  in- 
vasion were  so  terrible  that  they  considered  that 
war  must  at  all  costs  be  avoided  unless  the  Allies 
should  transport  to  the  Balkans  an  army  adequate 
for  the  protection  of  Greece.  Should  Greece  now 
throw  in  her  lot  with  the  Allies  and  then  be  left 
unsupported  at  the  crucial  hour,  her  doom  was 
sealed. 

This  difference  of  opinion  rapidly  split  the 
Greek  people  into  two  increasingly  hostile  fac- 
tions, one  headed  by  Venizelos,  in  favor  of  join- 
ing the  Allies;  the  other,  headed  by  the  King, 
clinging  to  neutrality.  Matters  were  rendered 
still  worse  by  the  fact  that  the  lines  of  cleavage 
ran  sharply  according  to  geographical  situation 
and  economic  interest.  The  islands  and  port 
towns,  which  were  prospering  greatly  by  the  war, 
yet  whose  prosperity  was  of  course  entirely  at 
the  mercy  of  the  sea-powers,  were  for  Venizelos 
and  war.    The  peasantry  everywhere  showed  it- 


THE  BALl^NS  251 

self  averse  to  figliting  and  supported  the  King  in 
his  neutralist  policy.  Macedonia  in  particular, 
exposed  as  it  was  to  the  full  brunt  of  all  possible 
foreign  complications,  was  almost  solid  for  peace. 
Thus  the  Greek  people  divided,  not  by  individuals 
but  by  communities,  and  the  old  Greek  spirit 
of  local  faction  soon  did  the  rest.  Before  long 
Tlollenic  solidarity  had  vanished  in  bitter  partisan 
strife. 

These  dissensions  were  still  further  envenomed 
by  the  conduct  of  the  Allies.  Greece's  failure  to 
live  up  to  their  expectations  had  made  the  En- 
tente Powers  all  the  more  anxious  to  win  over 
Bulgaria,  and  in  early  August,  1915,  the  Allies 
went  so  far  as  to  offer  Bulgaria  certain  Macedon- 
ian districts  belonging,  not  only  to  Serbia  but  to 
Greece  as  well.  This  astounding  diplomatic  action 
aroused  mingled  terror  and  anger  in  Greece.  All 
Greeks,  without  distinction  of  party,  maintained 
that  the  integrity  of  both  the  Greek  and  Serbian 
frontiers  of  Macedonia  was  an  absolute  necessity  if 
Salonika  was  to  be  safeguarded  against  the  Bul- 
garian peril.  Yet  here  were  the  Allies,  without 
so  much  as  a  **by  your  leave,"  offering  Bulgaria 
the  very  things  which  Greece  considered  vital  to 
lier  existence;  territories  of  which,  so  far  as  Greek 
Macedonia  was  concerned,  they  had  not  the  slight- 
est right  to  dispose.  However,  the  two  Greek  par- 
ties construed  the  matter  in  very  different  fash- 
ions. The  Venizelists  asserted  that  this  was  only 
one  more  proof  of  what  Greece  had  to  expect  by 
defying  the  Entente  Powers  and  urged  instant 


252  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

junction  with  the  Allies  to  avert  worse  misfor- 
tunes. The  Royalists,  on  the  other  hand,  main- 
tained that  this  was  convincing  evidence  that  the 
Allies  regarded  Greece  as  a  mere  tool  to  be  used 
and  then  thrown  aside,  and  concluded  that  Greece 
could  on  no  account  trust  herself  blindly  to  such 
unscrupulous  Powers.  So  great  was  their  de- 
spairing rage  that  many  Royalists  began  to  look 
toward  Germany  as  a  possible  savior,  and  Greek 
newspapers  commenced  to  use  language  which 
would  have  been  unthinkable  a  year  before.  ' '  The 
English  are  despots,  despite  their  pretended  love 
of  liberty!"  cried  the  "Nea  Himera"  of  Athens. 
''This  infernal  plot  against  the  territorial  integ- 
rity of  Greece:  behold  the  work  of  England!" 
exclaimed  the  ''Embros."  While  the  ''Nea 
Alithia"  of  Salonika  wrote:  *' After  Serbia,  it  is 
the  turn  of  Greece.  Now  that  Russia  and  Italy 
have  sufficiently  proved  their  voracious  appetites 
to  the  detriment  of  our  interests,  it  seems  to  us  that 
it  is  high  time  to  ask  ourselves  if  Greece  really 
ought  to  seek  a  place  among  the  Entente  Powers. 
Frankly,  no:  for  where  the  wolves  gather,  there 
lambs  who  wish  to  live  had  better  stay  away.  The 
small  nations,  particularly  Greece,  should  there- 
fore turn  their  eyes  toward  Germany,  the  enemy 
of  Russia  and  Italy,  those  two  implacable  foes  of 
Hellenism." 

The  Austro-German  "drive"  into  Serbia  in  Sep- 
tember, 1915,  brought  the  Greek  internal  crisis 
to  a  head.  Premier  Venizelos  prepared  to  stand 
by  Serbia,  but  King  Constantine,  declaring  that 


THE  BALKANS  253 

in  the  absence  of  adequate  Allied  support  Greece 
would  thereby  merely  share  Serbia's  inevitable 
fate,  refused  to  enter  the  war.  Venizelos  resigned, 
and  the  King  thereafter  dissolved  the  Venizelist 
Parliament  and  appointed  a  neutralist  ministry  to 
take  charge  of  the  countiy. 

Things  now  went  rapidly  from  bad  to  worse. 
The  Allies,  realizing  that  they  had  nothing  to  hope 
from  the  Royalist  Government,  proceeded  to  vio- 
late Greek  neutrality  at  will,  seizing  the  greater 
part  of  Greek  Macedonia  and  using  the  Greek 
islands  precisely  like  Allied  territory.  The  Royal- 
ist Government,  sinking  into  furious  despair,  be- 
came more  and  more  Germanophile,  actually  turn- 
ing over  a  Macedonian  border  fortress  to  the  Ger- 
mans in  May,  1916.  The  domestic  schism  ended 
in  civil  war,  Venizelos  fleeing  from  Athens  in  the 
autumn  of  1916  and  establishing  a  revolutionary 
government  at  Salonika  under  the  Allies'  protec- 
tion. The  Greek  islands  mostly  declared  for 
Venizelos,  and  Greek  Macedonia,  being  under  Al- 
lied rule,  naturally  followed  suit,  but  continental 
Greece  stood  by  the  King. 

This,  however,  meant  that  the  Venizelist  revolu- 
tion had  failed,  and  since  the  embittered  Royalists 
were  now  frankly  looking  to  the  Germans,  the 
Allies  regarded  them  as  open  enemies,  to  be  dealt 
with  as  such.  The  Teutonic  conquest  of  Rumania, 
however,  made  the  crushing  of  the  Royalists  a  dan- 
gerous matter.  The  Allies  therefore  attempted  to 
accomplish  their  purpose  by  a  gradual  disarma- 
ment of  the  Greek  forces,  backing  up  their  de- 


254  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

mands  by  a  naval  blockade  of  Greece  wliich  tlireat- 
ened  that  sterile  land  with  starvation.  Such  is 
the  situation  which  still  persists  after  several 
months  of  the  blockade.  Formal  war  betw^een 
Greece  and  the  Allies  has  been  avoided,  although 
severe  armed  clashes  have  taken  place.  Greece 
is  reduced  to  the  direst  extremity,  many  persons 
having  actually  died  of  hunger.  Nevertheless, 
King  Constantine  still  refuses  to  disarm,  and  the 
mainland  Greeks  continue  to  support  their  sov- 
ereign. How  the  crisis  shall  end  it  is  at  present 
impossible  to  foretell,  nor  for  the  general  Eu- 
ropean situation  does  it  greatly  matter,  Greece 
having  ceased  to  be  of  any  considerable  political 
or  military  importance. 

But,  however  matters  turn  out,  and  however 
the  war  shall  end,  the  plight  of  unhappy  Greece 
remains  deplorable.  The  future  of  Hellenism,  so 
bright  a  scant  three  years  ago,  is  to-day  en- 
shrouded in  impenetrable  gloom.  To-day,  Greece 
has  virtually  ceased  to  exist  as  an  independent, 
self-sustaining  nation.  Half  her  territory  is  in 
foreign  hands,  and,  what  is  even  worse,  her  sons 
are  split  into  irreconcilable  factions  whose  fanat- 
ical hatreds  inhibit  national  solidarity  and  may 
yet  forfeit  the  entire  Hellenic  race-heritage. 

D.    RUMANIA 

In  many  ways  Rumania  differs  fundamentally 
from  the  other  Balkan  states.  Serbia  and  Bul- 
garia are  basically  peasant  democracies,  with  no 
large  cities  or  industrial  centers  and  with  prac- 


THE  BALKANS  255 

tically  no  social  stratification.  They  arc  tlius  na- 
tions of  small  yoomon,  intensely  self-conscious  and 
able  to  make  their  voices  heard  in  the  management 
of  their  respective  countries.  Greece,  though  so- 
cially more  complex,  is  politically  much  the  same. 
All  Greeks,  whether  townsmen,  sailors,  fisherfolk, 
or  peasants,  are  keenly  alive  to  the  questions  of 
the  day  and  determined  to  have  their  say  in  the 
guidance  of  Hellas'  destinies. 

In  Rumania,  however,  this  is  far  from  ])eing  the 
case.  Rumania  is  socially  still  in  the  Middle  Ages. 
Its  scheme  of  life  is  positively  feudal  in  character. 
At  the  apex  of  the  social  pyramid  stands  a  class 
of  high-born  landed  proprietors,  known  as 
''Boyars";  beneath  lies  a  great  peasant  mass, 
poor,  uneducated,  often  mere  landless  agricultural 
serfs  upon  the  great  Boyar  estates.  A  middle 
class  hardly  exists.  Wliat  in  Rumania  passes  by 
that  name  consists  of  a  recent  mushroom-growth 
of  officials,  professional  men,  and  numerous  as- 
pirants for  those  coveted  posts  and  preferments. 

In  the  economic  life  of  their  country  the  native 
Rumanians  take  little  part.  Merchants,  manu- 
facturers, bankers,  shopkeepers,  even  the  skilled 
artisans,  are  nearly  all  foreigners  of  various  kinds. 
As  in  the  medieval  Europe,  the  numerous  Jews 
form  a  caste  apart,  largely  parasitic  in  character, 
persecuted  and  despised. 

Another  peculiarity  of  Rumania  is  the  extraordi- 
nary role  played  by  its  capital  city.  It  used  to  be 
said  that  Paris  was  France.  It  is  certainly  true 
that  in  most  things  Bucharest  is  Rumania.    Large 


256  PEESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

as  all  Eumania's  other  towns  put  together, 
Bucharest,  with  its  350,000  people,  prides  itself 
upon  being  a  center  of  light  and  leading  in  an  ocean 
of  benighted  rusticity — ' '  The  Paris  of  the  East. ' ' 
Here  live  the  great  aristocratic  families,  people  of 
the  highest  refinement,  who  prefer  the  gay,  mod- 
em life  of  the  capital  to  the  monotony  of  their 
huge  estates,  abandoned  to  foreign  or  Jewish  over- 
seers. Hither  flock  all  the  bright  young  men  who 
wish  to  carve  out  a  career  in  the  political,  profes- 
sional, or  literary  worlds. 

Under  these  circumstances  we  must  be  very 
careful  to  understand  what  is  meant  by  Rumanian 
"public  opinion."  Especially  in  foreign  politics, 
this  means  the  opinion  of  the  landed  aristocracy 
and  the  educated  elite  of  the  towns,  particularly 
Bucharest.  Here  the  Rumanian  peasant  simply 
does  not  count.  Accustomed  from  time  immemo- 
rial to  do  the  Boyars'  bidding,  he  leaves  such  ab- 
struse matters  to  the  birth  and  brains  of  Bucharest. 
Only  one  thing  vitally  interests  him — land.  He 
wants  land  for  himself  and  his  extremely  large 
family;  he  wants  to  be  freed  from  his  oppressive 
dependence  upon  the  Boyar  and  his  harsh  foreign 
overseer;  he  wants  to  get  out  of  the  clutches  of 
the  Greek,  Jew,  and  Armenian  peddler-usurers 
who  infest  the  countryside  and  suck  his  very  life- 
blood  whenever  his  improvident  habits  lure  him 
into  debt.  Only  ten  years  ago  a  terrible  peasant 
rising  threatened  Rumania  with  social  dissolution. 

High  above  this  volcanic  discontent,  Bucharest 
plays  the  game  of  politics  with  temperamental 
passion  and  artistic  abandon.     There  are  more 


THE  BALKiVNS  257 

politics  to  the  square  inch  at  Bucharest  than  in 
any  other  city  in  the  world — which  is  saying  a 
great  deal.  Also,  Rumanian  politicians  have 
palms  unusually  receptive  to  concrete  ''argu- 
ments"— wiiich  is  saying  even  more.  Altogether, 
it  is  safe  to  say  that  Rumania's  actions  are  de- 
termined more  by  ''politics"  and  less  by  popular 
feolinii:  than  any  other  country  in  Europe. 

Examining  the  viewpoint  of  the  one  portion  of 
the  nation  whose  opinion  does  carry  any  weight 
with  the  ruling  politicians — the  educated  elite  of 
Bucharest,  we  find  its  attitude  singularly  complex. 
The  educated  Rumanian  is  inspired  by  the  normal 
Balkan  "Great  Idea" — the  reunion  of  the  entire 
race  into  a  "Greater  Rumania,"  hegemon  of  the 
Balkans  and  arbiter  of  its  destinies.  The  idea  is 
far-reaching,  for  the  population  of  the  present 
kingdom  of  Rumania  numbers  less  than  eight  mil- 
lion souls,  whereas  the  Ruman  race  totals  fully 
fourteen  millions.  The  union  of  this  extremely 
prolific  folk  within  the  bounds  of  a  single  state 
organism  would  make  Greater  Rumanian  almost  a 
first-class  Power. 

But  the  path  of  Greater  Rumania  is  beset  by 
formidable  difficulties.  Very  few  of  the  "unre- 
deemed" Rumans  dwell  in  the  small  Balkan  states 
to  the  south ;  the  vast  majority  live  under  the  rule 
of  Rumania's  mighty  neighbors  to  east  and  west 
— two  millions  in  the  Russian  province  of  Bes- 
sarabia, three  and  one-half  millions  in  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  provinces  of  Bukovina  and  Transyl- 
vania.    Since  neither  Austria-Hungary  nor  Russia 


258  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

would  voluntarily  surrender  these  provinces, 
Rumania's  sole  chance  is  to  seize  territory  from 
one  or  the  other  during  a  moment  of  Austrian  or 
Russian  weakness.  Furthermore,  little  Rumania 
would  obviously  have  to  ally  herself  with  one  of 
her  giant  neighbors  in  order  to  dismember  the 
other. 

For  this  reason  the  European  War,  which  so 
aroused  Rumanian  irredentist  hopes,  divided 
Rumanian  imperialists  into  two  camps,  one  urg- 
ing a  Russian  alliance,  the  other  a  league  with  Aus- 
tria-Hungary. The  problem  was,  however,  com- 
plicated by  the  disagreeable  fact  that  should 
Rumania  be  so  unlucky  as  to  pick  the  losing  side, 
the  winner  would  probably  overrun  even  the  pres- 
ent Rumania  and  do  away  with  it  altogether. 

Thus  torn  between  their  hopes  and  fears,  the 
Rumanian  imperialists  promptly  split  into  a  vio- 
lent pro-Ally  faction  under  the  leadership  of  M. 
Take  Jonescu,  and  an  equally  violent  pro-Teutonic 
faction  headed  by  MM.  Carp  and  Marghiloman, 
which  factions  long  battled  to  sweep  Rumania  into 
the  war  on  their  particular  side. 

Rumanian  propagandist  literature  is  both  copi- 
ous and  picturesque,  but  to  quote  from  it  would 
serve  no  useful  purpose  because  it  does  not  repre- 
sent ultimate  realities.  Rumania's  decision  was 
determined,  not  by  the  pressure  of  public  opinion 
but  by  the  secret  machinations  of  great  nobles  and 
prominent  politicians,  and  the  activity  of  these 
Rumanian  leaders  was,  in  turn,  largely  determined 
by    clandestine   pressure    from   the    rival    Great 


THE  BALIv^iNS  259 

Powers,  including  the  wholesale  use  of  bribery  and 
corruption. 

The  inside  story  of  Rumania's  entrance  into  the 
war  cannot  now,  if  ever,  be  told.  The  important 
point  to  be  noted  is  that  the  conduct  of  her  armies 
after  intervention  revealed  with  ominous  clearness 
the  unhealthy  bases  of  Rumanian  national  life. 
The  Rumanian  military  machine  creaked  badly 
from  the  start  and  ultimately  went  to  pieces.  The 
officers'  corps,  loaded  do\vn  with  political  generals, 
could  not  lead ;  the  commissariat  was  full  of  graft ; 
and  the  peasant  soldiers,  poverty-stricken  and  in- 
terested only  in  land  reform,  fought  without  en- 
thusiasm. 

However  the  war  shall  end,  Rumanian  imperial- 
ism has  been  dealt  a  blow  from  which  it  may  never 
recover.  During  his  long  reign  the  late  King 
Carol,  by  his  diplomatic  ability  and  dynastic  con- 
nections, gave  Rumania  a  political  importance  not 
warranted  by  intrinsic  facts.  The  bubble  of 
Rumanian  prestige  has  now  been  pricked  by  the 
sharp  sword  of  war.  Should  she  recover  full  in- 
dependence, Rumania  will  have  to  rebuild  her  shat- 
tered state  edifice  upon  far  sounder  and  healthier 
foundations  if  she  ever  aspires  to  attain  the  posi- 
tion which  she  claims  as  her  just  due. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

TURKEY    AND    THE    MOSLEM    EAST 

FOR  many  years  competent  observers  have 
noted  the  awakening  of  the  Moslem  world. 
Like  all  serious  movements  the  roots  of  this  revival 
go  deep  into  the  past,  a  few  keen  eyes  having  dis- 
cerned the  first  stirrings  half  a  century  ago.  But 
the  tide  began  running  swiftly  only  after  the 
Russo-Japanese  War.  The  indirect  consequences 
of  this  triumph  of  a  non-European  people  over  a 
first-class  European  Power  have  already  been  pro- 
digious and  are  still  by  no  means  at  an  end. 

The  moral  quickening  of  the  Japanese  victories 
was  felt  in  every  part  of  Asia  and  Africa,  but  the 
stimulus  to  the  Moslem  world  was  particularly 
great.  For  Islam  was  already  in  full  ferment. 
In  part  this  was  due  to  profound  regenerative 
causes  too  complex  for  brief  analysis,  but  in  still 
larger  measure  it  was  caused  by  the  hostile  pres- 
sure of  the  conquering  West  which  had  long  been 
subjecting  ever  new  domains  of  Islam  to  its  im- 
perious will.  Fear  of  Christian  Europe  was  the 
basis  of  that  *' Pan-Islamic"  propaganda  which 
threatened  the  West  with  a  * '  Holy  War. ' ' 

The  decade  between  the  Russo-Japanese  conflict 
and  the  European  War  greatly  increased  the  ten- 
sion between  the  Moslem  and  Christian  worlds. 

260 


TURKEY  AND  THE  MOSLEM  EAST      261 

Just  at  the  moment  when  Islam  was  thrilled  with 
new  self-contidence  and  hope,  Christendom  re- 
doubled its  aggression  upon  Islam.  In  that  dec- 
ade, two  out  of  the  four  remaining  Mohammedan 
states — Morocco  and  Persia — were  devoured  by 
the  insatiable  West.  Only  remote  Afghanistan 
and  Turkey  survived,  and  Turkey  emerged  battle- 
scarred  and  mutilated  by  the  loss  of  its  Balkan 
provinces  and  Tripoli. 

The  downfall  of  Persia  evoked  especially  bitter 
lamentation  in  Islam.  For  Persia  is  of  much 
deeper  import  to  Islam  than  might  at  first  sight 
appear.  The  broad  belt  of  the  Moslem  world, 
stretching  from  Morocco  to  China,  here  narrows 
to  relatively  slender  proportions,  and  most  Mos- 
lems hold  the  Iran  Plateau  between  Caspian  Sea 
and  Persian  Gulf  to  be  the  vital  bridge  joining 
the  two  halves  of  Islam.  It  is  true  that  the  Per- 
sians are  Shiite  heretics,  but  the  old  bitterness  be- 
tween Sunnite  orthodoxy  and  Shiism  has  been 
much  softened  of  late  by  the  growing  feeling  of 
Moslem  solidarity  against  the  European  peril. 

Although  Islam  included  all  Europeans  within 
the  compass  of  its  dislike,  its  anger  was  especially 
focused  against  those  nations  which  formed  the 
** Triple  Entente"  during  the  years  preceding  the 
great  war.  Eussia  had  always  been  considered 
Islam's  arch-enemy.  France,  the  conqueror  of 
Moslem  North  Africa,  was  Russia's  close  ally. 
England,  once  popular  throughout  Islam,  had  been 
suspect  ever  since  the  seizure  of  Egypt,  and  had 
become  widely  hated  through  her  entente  with 


262  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

Russia  and  the  Anglo-Russian  strangling  of  Per- 
sia. Germany,  on  the  other  hand,  had  shown  con- 
sistent friendliness  toward  Islam.  Alone  among 
the  European  Great  Powers,  Germany  owned  no 
Moslem  territory.  The  German  Kaiser  had  on 
several  occasions  solemnly  declared  himself  the 
friend  and  protector  of  the  Moslem  world. 
Lastly,  for  over  twenty  years  German  soldiers 
and  engineers  had  been  laboring  to  endow  Turkey 
with  the  modern  technical  equipment  and  organi- 
zation necessary  for  her  survival. 

It  is  therefore  not  surprising  that  when  the 
European  War  broke  out  Moslem  sympathies,  par- 
ticularly in  Turkey,  tended  toward  Germany. 
These  sympathies  were,  to  be  sure,  quite  relative. 
The  first  natural  impulse  was  a  grim  satisfaction 
at  this  death-grapple  of  Europe,  which  Moslems 
were  inclined  to  consider  a  judgment  of  Allah 
upon  European  arrogance  and  greed.  Thus,  the 
Constantinople  "Tanine,"  the  most  serious  Turk- 
ish newspaper,  remarked  concerning  the  Euro- 
pean Powers:  '^They  would  not  look  at  the  evils 
in  their  own  countries  or  elsewhere,  but  interfered 
at  the  slightest  incident  in  our  borders ;  every  day 
they  would  gnaw  at  some  part  of  our  rights  and 
our  sovereignty;  they  would  perform  vivisection 
on  our  quivering  flesh  and  cut  off  great  pieces  of 
it.  And  we,  with  a  forcibly  controlled  spirit  of 
rebellion  in  our  hearts  and  with  clenched  but  pow- 
erless fists,  silent  and  depressed,  would  murmur 
as  the  fire  burned  within : '  Oh,  that  they  might  fall 
out  with  one  another!     Oh,  that  they  might  eat 


TURKEY  AND  THE  MOSLEM  EAST      263 

one  another  up!'  And  lo!  to-day  they  are  eating 
each  other  up,  just  as  the  Turk  wished  they 
would.  Whatever  people  may  say,  there  is  in  the 
nature  of  things  an  essential  justice  that  will  at 
last  come  to  light.  To  the  benighted  and  the  vic- 
tims of  injustice  it  brings  a  smile  on  the  face  and 
a  joyous  lightening  of  the  heart." 

Notwithstanding  this  impartial  undercurrent  of 
sentiment  against  all  Europeans,  most  Turks  felt 
tliat  their  one  chance  of  survival  lay  in  seizing 
this  golden  opportunity  of  Europe's  schism  by 
striking  in  on  the  Teutons'  side.  They  knew  that 
the  Entente  Powers  had  long  since  condemned 
Turkey,  like  Persia,  to  death.  Entente  guaran- 
tees of  Ottoman  ''integrity"  in  return  for  Otto- 
man neutrality  were  greeted  w^ith  jeering  scorn. 
'Wliat  had  such  "guarantees"  meant  to  Morocco 
or  Persia?  AMiat  had  Europe's  solemn  pledge 
of  Ottoman  ''integrity"  availed  Turkey  two  years 
before  at  the  opening  of  the  Balkan  wars?  Were 
not  Russian  newspapers  even  then  openly  dis- 
cussing the  inevitable  partition  of  the  "Sick 
Man's"  heritage?  To  Jehannum  with  the  per- 
jured Giaour's  lying  words! 

Not  that  the  Teuton  was  tnisted  overmuch. 
The  Teuton  was  a  Giaour  like  the  rest.  But  an 
intact  Turkey  was  to  the  Teuton's  interest.  The 
Teuton  wished  to  maintain  Turkish  unity  in  order 
to  develop  and  exploit  it  all.  After  Turkey  should 
be  reorganized  and  strong,  perhaps  the  Sons  of 
Othman,  like  the  Japanese,  could  show  the  Euro- 
pean the  door.    In  any  case,  that  was  the  only 


264  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

chance.  The  other  way  lay  certain  and  speedy 
death.  So,  at  the  beginning  of  November,  1914, 
Turkey  took  the  plunge,  defied  the  Entente  Pow- 
ers, and  entered  the  great  war. 

This  decision  excited  the  wild  enthusiasm  of  the 
Constantinople  press.  "To  arms  for  the  mighty 
conflict!"  cried  the  "Ikdam."  "We  shall  march 
gloriously  onward,  sure  of  our  purpose  and  con- 
fident of  its  achievement.  While  we  know  that 
all  Moslems,  far  and  near,  are  with  us,  yet  we 
Moslems  are  not  alone.  We  have  other  friends, 
friends  who  are  already  champions  and  victori- 
ous in  war.    With  them  we  fight  side  by  side. " 

The  Entente  Powers  were  each  the  object 
of  separate  condemnation.  Regarding  Russia's 
longing  for  Constantinople,  the  "Ikdam"  re- 
marked: "This  Russian  dream  is  no  new  thing; 
it  is  a  plan  carefully  concocted  years  ago.  While 
the  best  way  to  treat  so  absurd  a  hope  is  to  laugh, 
it  is  impossible  for  a  Turk  not  to  be  irritated  by  it. 
Yet  we  need  not  worry  ourselves  about  Russia's 
designs.  Turkey,  relying  on  the  help  of  God,  on 
the  strength  of  her  army  and  navy,  on  the  devo- 
tion and  self-sacrifice  of  her  people,  will  render 
impossible  the  realization  of  any  such  dream." 

Britain  was  also  handled  without  gloves.  In 
an  article  entitled  "Hypocritical  England,"  the 
"Tanine"  wrote:  "Ever  since  the  Balkan  war, 
in  dealing  with  the  Moslem  world,  England  has 
covered  her  face  with  a  veil  of  hypocrisy.  To- 
day the  mask  has  fallen  from  the  face  of  our 
enemy;  we  know  where  we  stand.  .  .  .  England 


TURKEY  AND  THE  MOSLEM  EAST      265 

protoiids  tliat  wo  are  takinii:  up  arms  uiidor  pres- 
sure from  Geriiiauy,  instead  of  recoguizing  the 
fact  that  we  are  fighting  to  avenge  all  Moslems 
for  the  oppression  that  I^lngland  has  imposed  upon 
them.  Away  with  hypocrisy!  God  is  with  the 
good.     We  shall,  we  must,  win. ' ' 

Neither  did  France  escape  Turkish  condemna- 
tion. "This  war,"  asserted  the  **Tanine,"  ''has 
opened  a  chasm  between  Turkey  and  France  which 
can  never  be  filled,  and  for  this  we  have  small 
regret.  Turkey  and  France  will  remain  enemies 
when  the  war  is  ended.  For  we  now  know  that  the 
ideas  we  have  had  concerning  French  civilization 
were  wrong.  We  now  see  that  French  civilization 
is  destitute  of  vigor,  sincerity,  and  justice;  that 
it  is  noisy  and  assuming,  ])ut  inefficient;  that  on 
such  a  civilization  a  nation  cannot  build  its  hopes 
for  a  prosperous  future.  We  have  learned  this 
in  the  present  w^ar,  and  any  hope  the  French  may 
cherish  of  a  renewal  of  friendship  with  us  is  vain. 
We  shall  remain  enemies." 

Germany  was  of  course  warmly  praised.  Sheik 
Abdul-Aziz  Tchawisch,  rector  of  Saladin  Univer- 
sity, Medina,  explained  the  bases  of  Moslem  pro- 
Germanism  when  he  wrote  in  the  ''Deutsche  Re- 
vue": "For  many  years  I  and  my  friends  have 
pondered  over  the  problems  of  Islam,  and  we  have 
realized  how  sorely  we  have  had  to  suffer  under 
the  domination  of  the  Latin,  Anglo-Saxon,  and 
Slavic  races.  It  was  therefore  necessary  for  us  to 
ally  ourselves  with  a  people  on  a  high  plane  of  cul- 
ture whose  political  and  economic  interests  ran 


266  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

parallel  to  our  own.  To  tliis  end  we  could  choose 
no  better  people  than  the  Germans,  for  their 
friends  are  our  friends,  their  foes  the  foes  of 
Islam.  Hence  it  comes  about  that  Germans  and 
Moslems  mutually  supplement  each  other." 

The  proclamation  of  the  "Holy  War"  in  mid- 
November,  1914,  swelled  the  tide  of  Turkish  en- 
thusiasm to  its  flood.  A  general  rising  of  the 
whole  Moslem  world  was  confidently  expected, 
and  the  Entente  Powers  were  represented  as  reel- 
ing under  their  death-blow.  "The  help  of  the 
illustrious  Prophet,"  cried  the  Sultan  in  a  public 
announcement,  "will  certainly  ensure  our  success 
and  the  utter  overthrow  of  our  enemies." 

These  confident  hopes  were,  however,  not  des- 
tined to  be  realized.  The  proclamation  of  the 
Holy  War  did  undoubtedly  excite  a  certain  degree 
of  unrest  throughout  the  Mohammedan  world.  In 
Egypt  the  already  smoldering  discontent  against 
British  rule  was  fanned  to  a  still  more  dangerous 
heat,  and  certain  wild  regions,  such  as  the  Indian 
northwest  frontier  and  remote  corners  of  the 
north  African  Sudan,  broke  into  open  war.  But 
the  great  mass  of  orthodox  Moslems  outside  of 
the  Ottoman  Empire  refused  to  heed  the  call.  The 
fact  that  the  Commander  of  the  Faithful  was  in 
close  alliance  with  two  Christian  Powers  chilled 
their  ardor  and  invested  the  "Holy  War"  with 
altogether  too  political  a  complexion.  The  sixty 
million  Indian  Moslems,  from  whom  such  great 
things  had  been  expected  in  Stambul,  turned  out 
to  be  indifferent  or  even  hostile.    A  leading  Indian 


TURKEY  AND  THE  MOSLEM  EAST      267 

Moliammcdan,  the  Aga  Khan,  doclarcd :  ''This  is 
not  the  free  will  of  the  Sultan,  but  the  will  of  the 
German  ollicers  and  other  non-Moslems  who  have 
forced  him  to  do  their  bidding.  If  Germany  suc- 
ceeds, Turkey  will  be  a  vassal  of  Germany.  The 
Kaiser's  resident  will  be  the  real  ruler  and  will 
control  the  holy  cities."  And  that  influential 
Moslem  organ,  the  *'Amrita  Bazar  Patrika"  (Cal- 
cutta), asserted :  "In  view  of  the  present  aspect  of 
war  in  Europe,  let  it  be  generally  kno\vn  that  at 
this  critical  juncture  it  is  the  bounden  duty  of  the 
Mohammedans  of  India  to  adhere  firmly  to  their  old 
and  tried  loj^alty  to  the  British  Raj. "  The  Ameer 
of  Afghanistan  maintained  a  strict  neutrality, 
even  assisting  the  British  in  quieting  the  insurgent 
tribesmen  of  the  Northw^est  Frontier.  There  has 
undoubtedly  been  grave  unrest  in  India  since  the 
beginning  of  the  war,  but  it  has  been  caused,  not 
so  much  by  Moslems  as  by  Hindu  terrorists  whose 
revolutionary  activities  had  disturbed  India  for 
years  previous  to  the  European  struggle. 

The  failure  of  the  **Jahadd"  caused  keen  dis- 
appointment among  the  Turks.  At  first  they 
maintained  their  faith  in  its  ultimate  success. 
*'0f  course,"  argued  the  Constantinople  ''Tasfiri 
Efkyar,"  *'an  instant  general  response  to  the  call 
of  service  in  the  Jahadd  could  not  be  expected. 
Time  must  be  allowed  for  the  call  to  reach  dis- 
tant places  and  for  the  reply  to  come  back.  The 
message  of  the  Khalif  has  to  cross  deserts  and  to 
find  entrance  into  tlie  hearts  and  innermost 
thoughts  of  the  faithful.     Some  cheering  echoes 


268  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

are  coming  back  already.  The  call  has  to  find  its 
way  from  mosque  to  mosque,  from  village  to  vil- 
lage; the  people  are  scattered,  and  to  unite  them 
in  a  great  enterprise  takes  time.  If  patience  is 
needed  for  a  response  from  distant  parts  of  the 
Ottoman  dominions,  how  much  more  of  patient 
waiting  is  demanded  for  the  full  effect  of  the  call 
to  be  realized  all  through  the  Moslem  world!  Our 
enemies  may  exult  over  this  delay  and  build  their 
hopes  upon  it.  How  delusive  those  hopes  are  the 
near  future  will  amply  prove."  This  prophecy, 
however,  remained  unfulfilled.  In  Tripoli,  to  be 
sure,  the  Sennussi  dervishes  from  the  Sahara 
did  excite  a  general  insurrection  which  drove  the 
Italians  back  upon  the  coast,  but  elsewhere  the 
rigorous  precautions  of  the  European  authori- 
ties sufficed  to  keep  the  fanatical  minority  in 
check. 

Disappointed  in  their  expectations  of  a  general 
uprising  of  the  Moslem  world,  the  Turks  centered 
their  hopes  upon  Egypt  and  Persia.  In  both 
these  lands  there  was  indeed  reason  to  expect 
serious  trouble.  Egypt  had  always  been  restive 
under  British  rule.  The  Islamic  fanaticism  of  the 
people  was  powerfully  supplemented  by  a  strong 
''Nationalist"  independence  movement  among 
the  intellectuals  which  had  filled  Egypt  with 
chronic  unrest  and  had  recently  required  the  iron 
hand  of  Lord  Kitchener  to  keep  down.  Further- 
more, the  ruling  Khedive,  Abbas  Hilmi,  was 
frankly  Anglophobe,  and,  finding  himself  at  Con- 
stantinople at  the  outbreak  of  the  European  War, 


TURKEY  AND  THE  MOSLEM  EAST     2G9 

he  refused  to  return  to  Egypt  and  threw  in  his  lot 
witli  the  Turks. 

EngUind  was  frankly  alarmed  at  the  situation. 
The  Suez  Canal  was  a  vital  link  in  Britain's  chain 
of  empire,  and  most  Englishmen  admitted  that 
should  a  Turkish  army  enter  Egypt,  the  country 
would  be  in  a  blaze.  The  Copts  or  native  Chris- 
tians, to  be  sure,  were  zealously  loyal  to  British 
rule  and  a  loyalist  minority  existed  among  the 
Mohammedans,  many  of  whom  dreaded  a  return 
to  the  corrupt  old  Turkish  regime.  England  acted 
quickly,  replacing  the  absent  Khedive  by  his 
cousin,  Hussein  Kamel,  who  was  proclaimed  an 
independent  sultan  under  British  protection.  The 
Egyptian  loyalists  received  these  drastic  measures 
with  apparent  satisfaction.  Their  leading  organ, 
"Al  Mokattam"  (Cairo),  wrote  at  the  end  of  1914: 
"The  Egyptian  nation,  at  this  juncture,  receives 
the  change  in  the  status  of  Egypt  with  satisfaction 
and  gratitude,  knowing  that  it  is  in  the  interests 
of  the  country  and  of  future  generations."  And 
another  loyalist  organ,  "Al  Moayyad,"  thus 
scored  the  Ottoman  summons  to  the  "Holy  War": 
"Turkey's  interference  in  the  present  conflict  was 
an  uncalled-for  foolishness,  and  by  her  action  Tur- 
key has  forfeited  her  right  to  the  Klialifate.  Nor 
is  Turkey's  claim  to  the  Khalifate  justifiable. 
Why  should  the  Turk,  that  old  Mongoloid  de- 
scendant of  Othman,  usurp  the  Khalifate  from 
the  hands  of  the  true  descendants  and  successors 
of  :\rohammedr' 

These  loyalist  utterances  did  not,  however,  rep- 


270  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

resent  the  bulk  of  Egj^ptian  public  opinion,  which 
was  unquestionably  Pan-Islamic  and  eager  for  the 
end  of  British  rule.  At  the  outbreak  of  the  Euro- 
pean conflict,  before  Turkey's  entrance  had  com- 
pelled the  British  to  adopt  extreme  measures,  not 
even  a  rigorous  censorship  could  entirely  suppress 
the  virulence  of  the  native  press.  For  example, 
in  mid- August,  1914,  the  influential  paper,  ''Esh- 
Sha'ab,"  successor  to  the  recently  suppressed  **A1 
Alam,"  wrote,  ''The  life  of  the  Holy  Khalifate  and 
of  the  entire  Moslem  world  depends  on  the  sacri- 
fice which  the  valiant  Turkish  army  will  offer." 
And  shortly  afterwards  it  wrote :  ' '  Moslems  have 
no  hope  except  that  the  nations  of  Christendom 
should  rise  against  each  other.  As  for  us,  who 
are  of  the  Faith,  let  us  stand  aloof  and  watch.  But 
let  us  not  forget  that  the  triumph  of  Germany  is 
more  in  the  interest  of  Islam  than  the  triumph  of 
the  Slavs."  For  this  utterance  **Esh-Sha'ab" 
was  permanently  suppressed,  and  when  Turkey 
entered  the  war  the  British  authorities  did  away 
with  the  whole  native  press  save  a  few  chosen 
loyalist  organs. 

However,  Egyptian  discontent  was  merely 
driven  underground.  The  Egyptian  army  was  so 
untrustworthy  that  the  British  dared  make  no  use 
of  it,  but  practically  interned  it  for  the  duration 
of  the  war.  The  Turkish  raids  on  the  Suez  Canal 
aroused  suppressed  popular  emotion,  and  the 
Turkish  Sultan's  proclamation  to  the  Egyptian 
people,  smuggled  into  Egypt  despite  British  vig- 
ilance, undoubtedly  made  a  considerable  impres- 


TURKEY  AND  THE  MOSLEM  EAST      271 

sion.  "To  my  dear  Egj^ptians,"  ran  this  docu- 
ment. ''You  know  liow  England  took  over  the 
direction  of  the  country.  It  was  a  perpetual  grief 
to  me  to  see  you  suffering  under  the  English 
tyranny,  and  I  awaited  a  favorahle  moment  to  put 
an  end  to  tliat  state  of  things.  I  thank  the  Almighty 
for  having  vouchsafed  me  the  happy  occasion  of 
sending  one  of  my  Imperial  armies  to  deliver  your 
beautiful  country,  which  is  a  Moslem  heritage.  I 
am  certain  that,  with  the  aid  of  God,  my  imperial 
army  will  succeed  in  delivering  you  from  the 
enemy  and  his  interference  in  your  affairs,  and  in 
giving  you  your  autonomy  and  your  liberties.  I 
am  certain  that  love  of  their  country  will  lead  my 
Egj^tian  Sons  to  take  part  in  this  war  of  libera- 
tion with  all  the  zeal  of  which  they  are  capable. — 
Mehmed  V." 

The  Egyptian  Nationalist  attitude  was  clearly 
set  forth  by  a  manifesto  of  its  leader,  Mohammed 
Farid  Bey,  issued  from  his  place  of  exile  at  Geneva, 
Switzerland,  at  the  beginning  of  1915.  He  pro- 
tested hotly  against  ''the  new  illegal  regime  pro- 
claimed by  England  the  18th  of  last  December. 
England,  which  pretends  to  make  war  on  Germany 
to  defend  Belgium,  ought  not  to  trample  under 
foot  the  rights  of  Egypt,  nor  consider  the  treaties 
relative  thereto  as  'scraps  of  paper.'  The  nation 
received  this  change  witli  very  bad  grace,  and 
awaits  with  impatience  the  arrival  of  the  Ottoman 
army  of  liberation.  .  .  .  The  Egj^ptians  await  witli 
calmness,  albeit  with  impatience,  the  happy  out- 
come which  will  put  an  end  to  the  subjection  of 


272  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

their  beloved  country  and  the  usurpation  of  Hus- 
sein Kamel.  He  and  his  accomplices  will  then 
receive  the  punishment  which  they  deserve." 
However,  the  English  defense  of  the  Suez  Canal 
withstood  all  Turkish  assaults,  and  Egypt,  flooded 
with  British  troops,  lapsed  into  sullen  silence. 

In  Persia,  Turkish  efforts  were  crowned  with 
much  more  tangible  success.  The  Anglo-Russian 
coup  of  1911  had  brought  Persian  independence 
virtually  to  an  end.  Persia  was  thenceforth  di- 
vided into  a  Russian  ** sphere  of  influence"  in  the 
north,  a  British  sphere  in  the  south,  and  a  *' neu- 
tral" zone  between.  This  state  of  affairs  had, 
however,  by  no  means  received  the  assent  of  the 
Persian  people.  The  national  revival  previous  to 
1911  had  been  intense,  and  this  dashing  of  the  cup 
of  liberty  from  their  parched  lips  had  plunged  the 
Persian  patriots  into  a  condition  of  despairing 
rage  which  made  them  ripe  for  any  sort  of  violent 
action. 

All  this  was  well  known  to  the  Turks,  who  built 
far-reaching  hopes  upon  the  prevalent  Persian  un- 
rest. No  sooner  had  Turkey  entered  the  war  than 
columns  of  light  troops  were  thrown  across  the 
Persian  frontier,  while  numerous  Turkish  and 
German  emissaries  under  the  able  leadership  of 
the  German  minister  to  Persia,  Prince  Henry  of 
Reuss,  sowed  disaffection  throughout  the  country. 
So  widespread  was  the  popular  response  to  this 
Turco-Teutonic  action  that  for  a  time  it  looked  as 
though  Persia  would  flame  into  a  national  insur- 
rection from  end  to  end.    Despite  heavy  Russian 


TURKEY  AND  THE  MOSLEM  EAST      273 

and  British  forces  hastily  th^o^vn  into  Persia  large 
sections  of  the  country  rose  in  revolt,  while  the 
Turkish  invasion  continued  to  gain  ground. 

This  naturally  excited  high  hopes  at  Stambul. 
The  scope  of  Turkish  expectations  may  be  judged 
from  the  proposals  for  a  Turco-Perso-Afghan 
Triple  Alliance  earnestly  discussed  by  the  Turkish 
press  at  the  beginning  of  1915.  "Among  the 
learned  and  enlightened  classes  at  Teheran  the 
idea  of  a  Triple  Alliance  of  Western  Asia  is  gain- 
ing acceptance  and  strength, ' '  wrote  the  *  *  Tanine. ' ' 
''This  alliance  of  Turkey,  Persia,  and  Afghanis- 
tan will,  of  course,  be  federated  with  the  Triple 
Alliance  of  Europe — Germany,  Turkey,  and  Aus- 
tria-Hungary. That  this  idea  is  most  welcome 
not  only  to  the  Khalifate  but  also  to  all  centers  of 
Moslem  influence  goes  without  saying.  We  have 
long  expected  this  development.  The  proposal 
is  sure  to  gain  strength  as  it  is  brought  to  the 
serious  and  urgent  attention  of  the  statesmen  of 
the  parties  concerned.  ...  In  our  times  neither 
religious  nor  racial  ties  are  essential  for  the  con- 
traction of  an  alliance.  Community  of  interest  is 
the  one  indispensable  thing.  The  interests  of 
Turkey,  Persia,  and  Afghanistan  are  identical,  as 
we  have  so  often  showTi  in  detail  before.  United 
and  federated  with  the  Central  Powers  of  Europe, 
they  will  wield  a  commanding  influence  in  West- 
ern Asia  and  make  a  conspicuous  contribution  to 
the  world's  progress.  They  are  from  olden  times 
related  one  to  the  other  in  religion  and  language, 
and  their  alliance  is  a  logical  necessity.    We  must 


274  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

repeat  that  it  is  based,  not  on  community  of  re- 
ligion but  upon  identity  of  political  and  economic 
interests,  vital  needs  which  must  be  satisfied ;  but 
we  may  admit  that,  as  far  as  Persia  is  concerned, 
religious  differences  are  negligible."  "Grermany 
and  Austria,"  said  the  "Sabah,"  "have  promised 
to  assure  the  integrity  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  and 
also  our  sovereignty  in  Egypt  and  Cyprus.  The 
Austro-German  press  applaud  the  idea  of  a  Turk- 
ish-Persian-Afghan alliance.  .  .  .  Germany  limits 
her  policy  to  economic  questions.  Such  a  policy  is 
compatible  with  the  rights  of  the  Asiatic  nations 
to  existence,  independence,  civilization,  and  prog- 
ress :  and  this  brings  about  a  community  of  interest 
between  the  Triple  Alliance  and  the  Asiatic  Pow- 
ers. The  policy  followed  by  the  two  groups  of 
Powers  explains  the  reason  for  the  profound  ha- 
tred that  the  Asiatic  nations  feel  against  the  Pow- 
ers of  the  Triple  Entente." 

The  one  cloud  upon  the  horizon  was  the  Shah's 
hesitation  to  declare  himself  openly  for  the  Turco- 
Teutons,  thus  throwing  the  weight  of  the  Persian 
Crown  into  the  wavering  scales.  This  soon  intro- 
duced a  warning  note  into  Turkish  appeals.  In 
May,  1915,  the  ' '  Tanine  * '  wrote :  * '  When  the  war 
opened,  for  Persia  to  enter  the  lists  against  the 
two  great  Powers,  England  and  Russia,  would 
have  been  stark  rashness  and  blindness.  They 
would  have  taken  frightful  vengeance  for  her  folly. 
She  was  forced  to  remain  neutral.  But  she  has 
the  duty  of  showing  that  she  has  the  desire  and  the 
right  to  live  as  a  nation.    If  she  wishes  to  pre- 


TURKEY  AND  THE  MOSLEM  EAST     275 

serve  her  national  existence  when  this  war  ends, 
she  cannot  forever  remain  neutral  in  this  mighty 
strife  of  nations.  This  pressure  upon  her  to  take 
part  in  the  war  increases  day  by  day.  The  en- 
lightened Persians  know  this  as  well  as  we  do. 
England  and  Russia  have  planned  to  divide  Persia 
between  them.  She  is  a  big,  sweet  morsel  all  ready 
for  them  to  swallow.  If  these  Powers  are  victori- 
ous in  the  war,  then  Persia  will  be  wiped  off  the 
map,  her  national  existence  will  be  finished,  for  we 
know  how  weak  peoples  fare  at  their  hands  in 
such  a  case.  The  one  hope  of  Persia's  salvation  is 
for  her  to  join  us  and  our  allies  without  delay,  for 
events  up  to  the  present  time  give  ninety  chances 
in  a  hundred  of  the  final  victory  remaining  with 
Germany  and  her  allies."  And  in  the  late  sum- 
mer of  1915,  the  "Tanine"  asserted:  '^ Nations  in 
the  condition  Persia  is  now  in  are  not  saved  by 
diplomacy.  In  all  friendliness  we  tell  our  neigh- 
bors and  co-religionists  that  there  is  one  and  only 
one  way  of  salvation.  \\Tien  this  war  ends,  the 
present  map  of  Europe  and  that  of  Western  Asia 
will  be  changed.  If  Persia  then  hopes  to  begin  a 
period  of  prosperity,  she  must  now  demonstrate 
her  worthiness  for  such  prosperity.  This  war 
will  one  day  end,  and  around  a  table,  where  con- 
ditions of  peace  will  be  agreed  upon,  will  meet  the 
representatives  of  those  peoples  w^hose  sons  in 
thousands,  yes,  millions,  have  been  sacrificed.  If 
Persia  hopes  for  decisions  from  the  men  at  that 
table  that  will  mean  life  and  peace  for  her,  she 
has  one  thing  to  do  to-day:    With  the  watchword. 


276  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

'Liberty  or  Death,'  she  must  throw  herself  into 
the  breach,  and,  with  us,  trample  down  the  foe." 

The  Persian  Government  was,  however,  not  des- 
tined to  adopt  any  such  heroic  resolutions.  Torn 
between  the  veiled  threats  of  the  Turco-Teutons 
and  the  even  more  outspoken  menaces  of  the 
Anglo-Russians,  the  boy  Shah  and  his  timid  coun- 
selors fell  into  a  state  of  terrified  irresolution 
and  ended  by  following  the  traditional  Persian 
custom  of  doing  nothing  at  all.  The  result  was 
what  might  have  been  expected.  Both  sets  of 
Powers  poured  fresh  troops  into  Persia,  and  be- 
neath the  battling  combatants  and  their  rival  prop- 
agandas unhappy  Persia  sank  into  complete  an- 
archy. The  mass  of  the  Persian  people  was  un- 
questionably hostile  to  the  Anglo-Russians  and 
friendly  to  the  Turco-Teutons,  but  Anglo-Russian 
bribery  and  intimidation  swayed  many  high-placed 
Persians  to  the  Entente  side. 

Thus  Persia  continues  to  the  present  hour — a 
fiercely  contested  battleground  of  rival  foreign 
Powers  and  domestic  factions.  The  one  thing 
certain  is  that  the  land  itself  is  falling  into  an 
ever-deepening  slough  of  anarchy  and  ruin. 

Up  to  the  spring  of  1916,  Turkey  remained  in  an 
optimistic  mood.  And,  despite  the  failure  of  the 
Holy  War,  the  disappointment  in  Egypt,  and  the 
indecisive  operations  in  Persia,  the  Turks  had 
good  grounds  for  their  optimism.  The  flurry  of 
alarm  at  the  Anglo-French  attack  upon  the  Dar- 
danelles which  began  in  March,  1915,  soon  gave 
place  to  exultation  over  the  invincible  obstinacy 


TURKEY  AND  THE  MOSLEM  EAST      277 

of  the  Turkish  defense.  The  "Tanine"  boasted 
that  Turkey  had  **  destroyed  the  myth  of  English 
sea-power,"  and  went  on:  "These  Turks,  de- 
spised by  all  the  world,  heroically  dared  to  bare 
their  breasts  in  defense  of  their  country's  fort- 
resses against  the  attack  of  her  enemy.  The  Eng- 
lish fleet  was,  in  two  days,  to  silence  the  forts  and 
overthrow  the  Ottoman  capital,  and  so  wipe  off 
the  Ottoman  name  from  the  map !  How  different 
tlie  result !  The  weak,  insignificant  Turks  proved 
more  than  a  match  for  proud  Britannia,  and  all 
the  world  wondered.  We  boldly  faced  this  enemy 
of  humanity  and  all  her  threats,  and  proved  all 
lier  boasting  vain.  First  and  most  we  now  re- 
joice, but  we  have  also  set  an  example  to  be  fol- 
lowed by  all  those  suffering  oppression  under 
British  rule.  For  us  the  fear  of  English  domina- 
tion, trembling  before  her  absolute  power,  is  a 
thing  of  the  past.  Let  others  follow  our  exam- 
ple!" 

The  collapse  of  Russian  resistance  before  the 
Austro-German  ''drive"  into  Poland  which  began 
in  June,  1915,  greatly  intensified  the  enthusiasm 
of  the  Turkish  press.  After  the  fall  of  Warsaw, 
the  '  *  Tanine ' '  wrote :  * '  Russia  is  defeated.  This 
we  see  clearly  everywhere  and  in  all  respects.  It 
is  not  a  retreat.  It  is  a  rout.  The  distressing 
plight  of  the  Russian  army  as  their  fortresses 
fall  one  after  another  is  like  an  orchard  whose 
overripe  fruit  covers  the  ground.  The  fear  of  the 
pursuing  Germans  drives  them  in  headlong  flight, 
in  universal  panic,  into  the  interior  of  Russia. 


278  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

Cities  and  towns  are  deserted.  Terror  and  anx- 
iety reign  in  Petrograd,  in  Moscow,  in  all  the  chief 
cities  of  the  empire.  The  evidence  of  utter  defeat 
is  overwhelming. ' ' 

Turkish  delight  grew  even  sweeter  when  the 
Teuton's  autumn  Balkan  "drive"  annihilated 
Serbia,  won  over  Bulgaria,  and  opened  direct  com- 
munication between  Constantinople  and  Berlin. 
In  Turkish  eyes  the  war  was  as  good  as  over. 
"While  the  Quadruple  Entente  watches  the  com- 
plete loss  of  all  its  trump  cards,"  wrote  the 
"Hilal,"  "the  new  Quadruple  Alliance  has  just 
accomplished  its  object — the  junction  of  its  allied 
armies.  This  junction  not  only  makes  the  Alli- 
ance invincible  in  the  Balkans,  but  it  puts  it  in  a 
position  to  threaten  the  world-power  of  proud 
Albion.  England  is  perfectly  well  aware  of  the 
lot  that  is  to  be  hers  in  the  very  near  future.  .  .  . 
Since  the  war  must  end  where  it  began,  there  can 
be  no  further  doubt  that  we  have  already  entered 
the  last  phase  of  the  general  war." 

These  rejoicings  were,  however,  premature. 
Grand  Duke  Nicholas 's  sudden  spring  upon  Erze- 
rum  in  February,  1916,  dealt  Turkish  optimism  a 
heavy  blow,  and  the  subsequent  fall  of  Trebizond 
and  the  overrunning  of  Turkish  Armenia  by  the 
Russian  armies  diffused  an  air  of  gloom  over 
Stambul  which  not  even  the  surrender  of  General 
To^vnshend's  British  Mesopotamian  army  at  Kut- 
el-Amara  could  entirely  dispel.  The  economic 
situation  was  also  far  from  good.  The  strain  of 
prolonged  war  and  the  Allied  naval  blockade  were 


TURKEY  AND  THE  MOSLEM  EAST      279 

producing  acute  famine  conditions  in  many  parts 
of  the  empire. 

The  Russian  conquest  of  Turkish  Armenia 
brought  an  old  problem  of  Asiatic  Turkey  once 
more  prominently  to  the  fore.  The  Armenians, 
though  greatly  reduced  by  the  massacres  of  Ilam- 
idian  days,  were  still  an  important  element  in  the 
population,  and  their  position  on  the  Russo-Turk- 
ish  border  gave  them  opportunities  for  revenging 
themselves  upon  their  Moslem  foes  wliich  had 
seriously  disquieted  the  Ottoman  Government 
since  the  beginning  of  the  war.  Russia  had  clev- 
erly made  the  most  of  this  situation.  In  Novem- 
ber, 1914,  the  Russian  Government  had  issued  a 
ringing  proclamation  urging  the  Armenians  to  rise 
against  their  Turkish  masters  and  promising  them 
freedom.  The  large  Armenian  population  of  Rus- 
sian Transcaucasia  had  enthusiastically  supported 
Russia,  and  the  ''Catholicos"  or  head  of  the  Ar- 
menian Church,  who  resided  in  Transcaucasia,  had 
warmly  espoused  the  Russian  side. 

All  this  had  produced  a  deep  impression  upon 
the  Armenians  under  Ottoman  rule,  and  Turkish 
Armenia  was  soon  seething  with  unrest.  The  agi- 
tation was,  however,  destined  to  cause  the  most 
deplorable  results.  At  the  beginning  of  the  war 
tlie  Turks  had  apparently  tried  to  gain  over  the 
Armenians  by  inspiring  them  with  fear  of  falling 
under  Russian  domination.  In  November,  1914, 
the  Constantinople  ''Ikdam"  thus  adjured  the  Ar- 
menians :  ' '  Even  if  Russia  were  to  take  our  East- 
ern provinces,  it  would  not  be  to  make  them  auton- 


280  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

omous  under  Armenian  rule,  but  merely  to  add 
them  to  the  Russian  Empire.  They  will  make  the 
Armenians  just  a  cat's  paw  for  their  own  designs, 
and  for  this  there  is  ample  evidence. ' ' 

But  the  Armenians'  Russophile  sentiments  soon 
became  clear,  whereupon  the  traditional  Turkish 
antipathy  for  the  Armenians  flamed  up  hotly  as  in 
the  past.  Taking  advantage  of  this  mood,  cer- 
tain high-placed  Armenian-haters  like  Talaat  Bey 
persuaded  their  colleagues  to  take  drastic  action. 
The  Turkish  Government's  decree  ostensibly  pro- 
vided for  the  removal  of  the  Armenian  population 
from  the  Russian  border  provinces  to  the  interior 
of  the  empire,  but  the  ruthless  manner  in  which 
these  orders  were  carried  out  precipitated  one  of 
the  most  appalling  tragedies  in  human  history. 
Allowing  for  all  possible  exaggerations,  hundreds 
of  thousands  of  Armenians  must  have  already  per- 
ished. Nevertheless,  Turkish  public  opinion  sanc- 
tions these  measures.  As  a  prominent  Turkish 
leader,  Halil  Bey,  remarked  toward  the  close  of 
1916:  *'I  will  say  that  the  loss  to  the  Ottoman 
Empire  through  the  deportation  of  the  Armenians 
has  been  immense.  The  Armenian  is  able  and  in- 
dustrious, and  therefore  valuable  in  the  economic 
scheme ;  but  what  could  ]?e  done  ?  We  were  at  war, 
and  therefore  obliged  to  employ  every  means  to 
make  secure  our  position,  which  was  betrayed  so 
basely  through  our  confidence." 

Vastly  more  serious  for  Turkey  was  another  in- 
ternal difficulty — Arab  disaffection.  The  Arabs 
are  not,  like  the  Armenians,  a  scattered  border 


TURKEY  AND  THE  MOSLEM  EAST     281 

I'olk;  thoy  are  as  numerous  as  the  Turks  them- 
selves and  occupy  very  much  more  than  half  the 
total  area  of  the  empire.  No  Ottoman  Turkish 
population  is  found  east  of  Asia  Minor,  the  inhab- 
itants of  Syria  and  Mesopotamia  as  well  as  of  the 
xlrabian  Peninsula  being  mainly  of  Arab  blood. 
Now  Arab  and  Turk  had  never  gotten  on  well  to- 
gether. Their  racial  temperaments  were  too  in- 
compatible. Still,  down  to  comparatively  recent 
times,  their  common  Islamic  faith  had  united  them 
against  the  Christian  world  whatever  the  state  of 
their  domestic  relations.  But  ever  since  the 
"Young  Turk"  Revolution  of  1908,  the  rift  be- 
tween the  two  races  had  been  widening  with  alarm- 
ing rapidity.  The  Young  Turk  ideal  had  been  a 
unified  Ottoman  state,  based  upon  the  unques- 
tioned supremacy  of  the  Turkish  language  and 
culture,  and  they  had  accordingly  started  in  to 
"Ottomanize"  all  the  non-Turkish  races  of  the 
empire.  But  this  had  roused  the  Arabs  to  mutin- 
ous wrath,  for  the  Arabs  considered  the  Turks 
their  mental  inferiors  and  despised  Turkish  cul- 
ture, or  rather  declared  that  such  a  thing  did  not 
exist.  Furthermore,  they  themselves  were  devel- 
oping a  ** nationalist"  movement  looking  to  po- 
litical separation  from  Turkey  and  the  founding 
of  a  great  Arab  Empire.  Even  before  the  great 
war,  Turkey's  Arab  provinces  were  full  of  sep- 
aratist unrest. 

Turkey's  entrance  into  the  European  struggle 
and  the  proclamation  of  the  Holy  War  did,  it  is 
true,  rally  many  of  the  Arabs  against  the  Euro- 


282  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

pean  foe.  But  a  considerable  disaffected  minor- 
ity remained,  and  these  malcontents  were  steadily 
swelled  by  Turkish  tactlessness  and  severity.  The 
upshot  was  a  revolt  of  the  Grand  Shereef  of  Mecca 
in  the  summer  of  1916  which  quickly  brought 
Turkish  rule  throughout  Arabia  to  an  end.  The 
Shereef  proclaimed  Arabia's  independence  and 
courted  the  friendship  of  the  Entente  Powers. 
This  was  a  body  blow  to  the  Turks.  Their  loss 
of  the  holy  cities,  Mecca  and  Medina,  gravely 
damaged  their  prestige  throughout  Islam,  while 
the  Arab  populations  of  Syria  and  Mesopotamia 
might  also  burst  into  flame.  The  Stambul  press 
made  no  secret  of  its  alarm.  The  authoritative 
'^Tanine"  wrote:  ''Interest  compels  us  to  use 
force  and  reconquer  the  Arab  countries  at  the 
point  of  the  sword.  Let  us  not  be  hampered  by 
gentle  scruples,  because  they  are  of  no  avail,  and 
because  the  Arab  revival  is  imminent. ' ' 

But  Arabia  has  not  been  reconquered,  and  the 
Arab  revolt  continues  to  threaten  Turkey's  hold 
upon  her  possessions  to  the  east  of  Asia  Minor, 
already  menaced  as  these  are  by  the  British  in 
southern  Mesopotamia  and  by  the  Russians  in 
the  Armenian  north. 

Thus  the  year  1916,  which  opened  so  brightly 
for  the  Turks,  closed  in  a  gloom  which  none  of 
the  events  of  early  1917  have  been  able  to  dispel. 
Of  course  the  Turks  realize  that  the  present  strug- 
gle is  for  them  preeminently  one  of  life  and  death. 
The  Entente  Powers  have  formally  announced 
their  fixed  determination  to  partition  the  Ottoman 


TURKEY  AND  THE  MOSLEM  EAST     283 

Empire,  and  Entente  victory  would  certainly  re- 
duce Turkey  to  a  small  and  insignificant  state  upon 
the  xVsia  Minor  jDlateau,  if  it  did  not  extinguish 
Turkish  national  life  altogether. 

The  Turks  are  therefore  increasingly  dependent 
upon  their  Teutonic  allies.  Their  political  future 
is  thus  not  particularly  bright,  menaced  as  they 
are  with  utter  destruction  on  the  one  hand  and 
close  subordination  on  the  other. 

For  that  matter,  the  prospects  of  the  whole  Mos- 
lem East  are  in  complete  flux,  and  no  certain  out- 
come can  be  predicted  at  the  present  hour.  Pos- 
sibly in  the  remoter  future  a  sustained  revival  of 
the  Eastern  races  togetlier  with  Europe's  relative 
weakening  through  internecine  war  may  enable  the 
whole  iMoslem  world  to  throw  off  the  Western 
yoke.  But  this  is  venturing  too  far  into  the  realms 
of  speculation. 


CHAPTER  IX 

BELGIUM    AND    HOLLAND 

IT  is  interesting  to  speculate  upon  what  might 
have  been  the  future  of  the  Low  Countries 
had  the  ''Kingdom  of  the  Netherlands,"  estab- 
lished by  the  Vienna  Congress  of  1815,  remained  in 
existence.  This  union  of  llolland  and  Belgium 
created  a  state  which  was  almost  a  first-class 
Power  in  the  Europe  of  that  day,  and  when  we 
consider  the  subsequent  progress  of  both  coun- 
tries, ^  it  is  highly  probable  that  their  united 
strength  would  have  averted  their  recent  misfor- 
tunes. 

However,  a  united  Netherlands  was  not  to  be. 
In  1830  the  Belgians  revolted  against  their  Dutch 
king  and  set  up  for  themselves.  Thenceforth  the 
history  of  the  two  neighbors  was  to  have  little  in 
common.  Accordingly,  we  must  consider  sepa- 
rately their  reactions  to  the  European  War. 

A,      BELGIUM 

When  the  German  invasion  of  August,  1914, 
dramatically  thrust  everything  else  into  the  back- 
ground, Belgium  was  facing  an  acute  domestic 
problem — the  Flemish- Walloon  nationality  ques- 
tion. Belgium  is  compounded  of  two  race-ele- 
ments— the  French-speaking  Walloons  of  the  east- 

284 


BELGIUM  AND  HOLLAND  285 

ern  provinces  and  the  Teutonic  Flemings,  who 
inhabit  the  low-lying  plains  of  the  north  and  west. 
The  Flemings  slightly  outnumber  the  Walloons, 
but  the  Walloons  have  long  played  the  leading 
role  in  Belgian  national  life  owing  to  the  superior 
cultural  attraction  of  their  mighty  kinsman  and 
neighbor,  France.  This  French  influence  had  been 
greatly  strengthened  by  the  generation  of  direct 
French  rule  over  Belgium  from  1793  to  1814.  The 
Flemish  element  could  do  little  to  stem  the  Gallic 
tide.  A  small  people,  speaking  a  dialect  of  Dutch, 
their  culture  could  not  compare  with  that  of  the 
race  which  had  for  centuries  given  the  tone  to 
European  civilization.  In  fact,  at  the  beginning 
of  the  nineteenth  century,  the  Flemish  upper 
classes  were  largely  Gallicized. 

All  this  explains  the  Belgian  rising  of  1830. 
That  revolution  was  the  work  of  the  Walloons, 
who  saw  the  despised  Flemish  culture  reviving 
under  Dutch  rule.  The  Walloon  dream  was  the 
complete  Gallicization  of  the  Flemings  and  the 
welding  of  Belgium  into  a  homogeneous  Gallic  na- 
tion closely  connected  with  France.  In  1830  they 
wanted  a  French  king,  and  only  tlie  determined 
veto  of  foreign  Powers  prevented  the  seating  of  a 
French  monarch  upon  the  Belgian  throne.  Al- 
though disappointed  in  this,  the  Walloons  suc- 
ceeded in  giving  the  new  Belgian  state  a  thor- 
oughly French  complexion,  Flemish  occupying  a 
decidedly  subordinate  position  in  every  depart- 
ment of  the  national  life. 

This  settlement,  however,  contained  within  itself 


286  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

the  seeds  of  future  trouble.  The  nineteenth  cen- 
ture  was  preeminently  the  "Era  of  Nationalities," 
and  before  long  the  nationalist  leaven  began  work- 
ing among  the  Flemings  in  truly  dynamic  fashion. 
In  1830  the  Flemish  element  had  been  almost  in- 
articulate, but  twenty  years  later  a  cultural  revival 
began  which  has  progressed  steadily  down  to  the 
present  day. 

The  Flemings'  first  effort  was  to  win  back  their 
Gallicized  upper  class  brethren,  and  these,  con- 
temptuously dubbed  "Franskiljons"  and  treated 
as  renegades,  succumbed  more  and  more  to  popu- 
lar pressure  and  increasingly  abjured  their  ac- 
quired Gallicism.  The  Flemings'  ultimate  object- 
ive was  the  full  recognition  of  their  language  and 
culture  as  the  absolute  equals  of  French. 

Here,  however,  they  met  with  the  most  deter- 
mined opposition.  The  Walloons  were  resolved 
to  Gallicize  Belgium  and  refused  to  surrender  the 
privileged  position  which  they  had  acquired  in 
1830.  The  result  was  a  chronic  race-struggle 
which  for  more  than  half  a  century  perturbed  Bel- 
gium's internal  life.  This  struggle  was  further 
embittered  by  religious  considerations,  most  of  the 
Flemings  being  ardent  Catholics,  whereas  the  Wal- 
loons were  steadily  going  over  to  free-thinking 
laicism. 

Despite  the  Walloons'  best  efforts  and  privi- 
leged position,  the  Flemings  steadily  gained 
ground.  The  census  of  1910  showed  the  latter 's 
undoubted  numerical  superiority.  In  that  year 
2,800,000  persons  spoke  only  Flemish,  2,500,000 


BELGIUM  AND  HOLLAND  287 

spoke  only  French,  while  less  than  800,000  spoke 
both  lani,qiages.  And,  be  it  noted,  nearly  all  the 
bilinguals  should  be  accounted  Flemings  in  blood, 
since  Walloons  usually  refuse  to  learn  the  '*  in- 
ferior" tongue.  The  fact  that  so  small  a  per- 
centage of  the  Flemings  had  any  knowledge  of 
what  was  practically  the  state  language  showed 
tlie  failure  of  Gallicization  and  encouraged  the 
1^'lomings  to  redouble  their  efforts  for  complete 
political  and  cultural  equality. 

Yet  the  Walloons  refused  to  admit  their  defeat 
and  clung  doggedly  to  their  privileges.  They 
were,  however,  pessimistic  as  to  the  future,  some 
even  fearing  an  ultimate  Flemish  ascendancy.  To 
such  a  fate  they  declared  they  would  never  submit, 
preferring  in  that  case  Belgian  disruption  in  favor 
of  an  independent  Walloon  state  or  annexation  to 
France.  But  this  further  embittered  the  Flem- 
ings, who  declared  that  they  would  either  obtain 
their  "rights"  or  join  their  Dutch  cousins  in 
a  "Great  Netherland."  Some  Flemings  even 
sought  German  aid  in  this  struggle  of  "Teuton- 
ism's  vanguard"  against  the  encroaching  Latin 
tide. 

Such  was  Belgium's  disturbed  condition  in  July, 
1914.  In  fact,  certain  Belgian  writers  have  as- 
serted that,  but  for  the  European  War,  Belgium 
might  have  gone  to  pieces  within  a  comparatively 
short  time. 

The  German  invasion  wrought  a  dramatic 
change.  Both  races  rallied  round  their  country's 
flag  and  fought  desperately  against  the  common 


288  PEESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

enemy.  The  subsequent  hardships  and  humilia- 
tions suffered  under  German  rule  appear  to  have 
effaced  race  lines  and  engendered  a  common  pa- 
triotic longing  for  freedom. 

The  chief  cloud  upon  the  horizon  of  future  Bel- 
gian solidarity  is  the  attitude  of  the  exiles.  Those 
Belgians  who  remained  at  home  seem  to  have 
pretty  well  forgotten  their  intestine  quarrels. 
But  at  the  time  of  the  German  invasion  hundreds 
of  thousands  of  Belgians  fled  the  country.  Like 
most  exiles,  these  people  have  ever  since  then  done 
little  save  brood  over  their  troubles  and  dream 
of  the  morrow.  As  a  result  of  this  rather  morbid 
occupation  many  exiles  have  developed  a  fanatical 
temper  which  may  cause  serious  trouble  in  a  re- 
stored Belgium. 

The  exiles  have  sorted  themselves  largely  ac- 
cording to  their  special  racial  and  cultural  predi- 
lections; the  Walloons  and  ''Franskiljons'*  go- 
ing to  France,  the  Flemings  to  Holland.  Amid 
these  congenial  surroundings  their  respective 
sympathies  have  been  heightened  while  their  antip- 
athies have  been  intensified.  The  Walloons  have 
developed  an  uncompromising  hatred  of  every- 
thing "Teutonic,"  and  many  of  them  exultantly 
declare  that  one  result  of  the  war  will  be  the  ex- 
tinction of  the  Flemish  movement  and  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  thoroughly  French  Belgium  in  close 
communion  with  France.  The  Walloon  exiles  also 
tend  to  be  hostile  to  Holland  for  maintaining  her 
neutrality  instead  of  joining  against  the  Germans. 
Many  have  been  strongly  affected  by  the  French 


BELGIUM  AND  HOLLAND  289 

"Neo-Imporialist"  movement  and  foresee  a 
"Greater  Belgium,"  enlarged  not  only  by  German 
districts  between  Belgium's  present  eastern  bor- 
der and  the  Rhine  but  also  by  several  Dutch  prov- 
inces, notably  Dutch  Flanders  and  the  mouth  of 
the  Scheldt,  the  Maestricht  salient,  Luxemburg, 
and  even  Dutch  Limburg. 

All  this,  however,  rouses  the  ire  of  the  Flemish 
exiles,  who,  in  the  hospitable  atmosphere  of  Hol- 
land, have  still  further  developed  their  proclivi- 
ties toward  a  "Great  Netherland."  They  reject 
hotly  the  Walloons'  projects  for  a  Gallicized  Bel- 
gium and  a  partition  of  Holland,  and  they  ardently 
desire  a  close  understanding  between  the  Dutch 
and  Belgian  nations. 

Such  an  understanding  is  being  consciously  or 
unconsciously  furthered  by  the  policy  of  the  Ger- 
man rulers  of  Belgium.  The  Germans  are  doing 
everything  possible  to  encourage  Flemish  self- 
consciousness,  notably  by  the  establishment  of  a 
Flemish  university  at  Ghent — a  thing  for  which 
the  Flemings  had  vainly  agitated  for  many  years. 
The  German  motive  has  probabl}^  been  to  reconcile 
the  Flemings  to  German  rule,  and  in  this  the  Ger- 
mans will  undoubtedly  fail,  no  Flemings  save  a 
few  "Teutonist"  fanatics  having  the  least  desire 
to  become  Germans.  Nevertheless,  the  Germans 
are  steadily  quickening  Flemish  national  con- 
sciousness and  are  fast  placing  the  Flemish  ele- 
ment in  a  favored  position  akin  to  that  enjoyed 
by  the  Walloons  previous  to  the  war.  If,  after 
the  war,  the  Walloon  exiles  should  try  to  put 


290  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

through  their  program  of  general  Gallicization 
and  aggression  against  Holland,  the  present  unity 
of  the  Belgian  people  in  Belgium  will  end  in  sud- 
den and  disastrous  fashion. 

It  is  to  be  hoped  that  when  the  war  is  over  the 
lessons  of  adversity  will  have  taught  the  exiles  to 
forget  their  present  dreams  in  the  joy  of  restored 
national  life  and  in  aspirations  for  a  harmonious 
morrow.  Otherwise,  Belgium's  future  will  be 
anything  but  a  happy  one. 

B.      HOLLAND 

In  Europe's  tragedy  few  episodes  have  been 
more  admirable  than  the  quiet  way  in  which  the 
Dutch  nation  has  kept  its  poise  and  maintained  a 
dignified  neutrality  under  circumstances  which 
might  well  have  demoralized  a  far  more  powerful 
and  better  situated  people. 

For  of  all  the  neutral  nations  in  the  present 
struggle,  none  save  Greece  is  so  hard  placed  as 
Holland.  A  forlorn  islet  of  peace  in  a  roaring 
flood  of  war,  her  position  is  indeed  deplorable. 
Environed  by  contending  armies  and  embattling 
fleets,  her  merchantmen  pick  their  homeward  way 
through  mine-fields  and  submarines  to  bring  her 
the  food  that  will  keep  from  starvation  her  dense 
population  and  the  hundreds  of  thousands  of  Bel- 
gian refugees  now  destitute  objects  of  her  bounty. 
The  mobilization  of  her  entire  army  ever  since  the 
outbreak  of  the  European  War  has  added  another 
heavy  burden  to  her  already  overstrained  re- 
sources.   Holland  is  to-day  living  almost  exclu- 


BELGIUM  AND  HOLLAND  291 

sively  upon  her  saviuys.  These  are  indeed  con- 
siderable, but  llolhind's  needs  are  great,  and  her 
main  sources  of  wealth,  lying  not  at  home,  but 
abroad,  are  failing  one  by  one.  The  wealth  of 
Holland  is  proverbial,  yet  few  persons  realize 
that  by  nature  she  is  one  of  the  poorest  countries 
in  the  world.  Virtually  without  coal,  iron,  timber, 
or  stone,  unable  to  feed  her  dense  population  by 
her  own  agriculture,  Holland  lives  primarily  upon 
her  rich  colonies,  her  merchant  marine,  and  the 
vast  transit  trade  between  the  German  Rhineland 
and  the  outer  world.  This  last  is  of  capital  im- 
portance. "VMiat  the  Nile  is  agriculturally  to 
Egypt,  that  the  Rhine  is  commercially  to  Holland. 
The  pulsing  throb  of  Germany's  main  trade-artery 
is  the  index  of  Dutch  economic  life.  Now  that  this 
artery  has  almost  ceased  to  beat,  only  Holland's 
capital  and  credit  stand  between  her  and  ruin. 

Yet  in  this  tragic  hour  Holland  rises  with  a 
proud  courage  which  once  more  proves  her  "the 
little  nation  with  a  great  heart."  On  the  out- 
break of  the  European  War  she  took  her  stand 
upon  the  firm  rock  of  strict  neutrality,  and  neither 
menace  nor  cajolery  has  moved  her  a  hair's 
breadth  from  that  determination.  At  times  the 
pressure  has  been  great,  but  Holland  has  stood 
firm.  Her  resolve  is  not  of  yesterday.  As  she 
builds  her  dikes,  so  she  has  long  been  raising  her 
ramparts  of  neutrality  against  that  cataclysm 
which  wise  men  have  seen  gathering  these  many 
years.  Despite  the  annoyance  of  her  neighbors, 
she  steadily  perfected  her  defensive  armaments, 


292  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

and  at  the  outbreak  of  the  present  war  Holland 
was  well  prepared  against  attack  from  both  land 
and  sea. 

This  firm  basing  of  Holland's  policy  upon  the 
principle  of  unswerving  neutrality  and  determina- 
tion to  prevent  their  beloved  land  from  becoming 
a  cockpit  of  war  rendered  the  Dutch  better  pre- 
pared to  meet  the  mental  shock  of  war  than  any 
other  European  people.  The  Dutch  knew  exactly 
what  they  intended  to  do  long  before  the  dread 
eventuality  actually  came  to  pass,  and  the  enthu- 
siastic adhesion  of  every  shade  of  Dutch  public 
opinion  to  Queen  Wilhelmina's  neutrality  procla- 
mation at  the  beginning  of  August,  1914,  showed 
that  the  Queen  had  voiced  her  people's  will.  The 
desire  to  keep  Holland  at  peace  is  as  strong  to-day 
as  it  was  three  years  ago,  no  political  group 
evincing  the  slightest  inclination  toward  war.  In- 
terventionists, like  the  cartoonist  Louis  Rae- 
maekers  and  his  paper  the  *'Telegraaf,"  are 
merely  the  exceptions  which  prove  the  rule. 

The  bait  of  German  territory  held  out  by  Allied 
publicists  in  attempts  to  rouse  interventionist  sen- 
timent in  Holland  has  fallen  on  deaf  ears;  the 
Dutch  are  a  self-contained  folk  with  no  desire  for 
European  expansion  save  possibly  a  union  with 
the  Flemings,  and  the  entrance  of  hosts  of  recal- 
citrant Germans  into  the  Dutch  family  circle,  even 
if  one  excludes  the  danger  of  a  German  war  of  re- 
venge, would  be  both  disturbing  and  displeasing 
to  Holland's  well-ordered  domestic  life. 

If  we  turn  from  the  field  of  self-interest  to  thai 


BELGIUM  AND  HOLLAND  293 

of  sentiment,  we  arrive  at  the  same  pacific  conclu- 
sion. Holland  is  not  pro-anytbing  except  pro- 
Dutch,  nor  distinctly  anti-anytliing  save  foreign 
intervention.  Certain  British  publicists  have  as- 
serted that  the  Dutch  were  sympathetic  to  Ger- 
many, but  this  is  untrue.  There  are,  of  course, 
strong  natural  ties  between  the  Dutch  and  German 
peoples.  Nearly  related  in  blood  and  speech,  in- 
tellectual and  social  intercourse  is  very  close,  es- 
pecially in  university  circles,  while  most  educated 
Hollanders  read  German  books,  magazines,  and 
newspapers  as  a  matter  of  course.  Economic  re- 
lations are  also  extremely  intimate.  The  vast 
Rhine  transit  trade  is,  we  have  seen,  Holland's 
chief  source  of  prosperity,  Germany  is  her  best 
customer,  and  there  are  more  Germans  domiciled 
in  Holland  than  all  other  foreigners  put  together. 
It  is,  therefore,  not  strange  that  the  Dutch  upper 
and  middle  classes  are  friendly  to  Germany  in  a 
general  way,  while  those  aristocratic,  conservative 
circles  represented  by  ex-Premier  Kuyper  are  un- 
doubtedly pro-German  in  the  political  sense. 

But  with  the  mass  of  the  Dutch  people  this 
last  is  far  from  being  the  case.  Holland  is  em- 
phatically a  land  of  individualism,  which  in  the 
lower  classes  verges  upon  license  and  an  unreason- 
ing aversion  to  any  sort  of  official  regulation  of 
private  affairs,  coupled  with  an  intense  dislike  of 
whatever  savors  of  '* militarism."  The  Dutch 
and  German  peoples  thus  differ  widely  in  tempera- 
ment, and  though  the  Dutch  are  not  positively 
anti-German,  there  is  a  latent  incompatibility  of 


294  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

temper  which  inhibits  sjonpathetic  feeling.  The 
flood  of  Belgian  refugees  has  increased  these  es- 
tranging tendencies.  The  sight  of  so  much  suf- 
fering and  the  practical  identity  of  blood  and 
speech  between  the  Dutch  and  the  Flemings,  who 
form  the  vast  majority  of  the  refugees  in  Holland, 
have  done  much  to  transform  negative  dislike  of 
Germans  into  positive  antipathy. 

Nevertheless,  if  Holland  is  not  pro-German,  she 
is  emphatically  not  pro-British.  In  the  soul  of 
nearly  every  Hollander  lies  a  deep-seated  rancor 
against  England.  No  nation  has  suffered  more  at 
English  hands  than  Holland,  and  the  Dutch  have 
not  forgotten  England 's  destruction  of  their  mari- 
time and  colonial  greatness.  This  latent  hostility 
was  sharply  fanned  by  the  Boer  War,  which  roused 
in  Holland  a  flood  of  wrathful  grief  and  sullen 
suspicion,  since  kept  alive  by  a  whole  series  of 
unfortunate  incidents.  England's  alliance  with 
Japan  caused  lively  apprehensions  for  the  Dutch 
East  Indies.  The  bullying  tone  of  many  British 
publicists  urging  Holland  to  join  the  Allies  and 
threatening  her  with  all  sorts  of  penalties  if  she 
does  not,  has  been  deeply  resented  by  a  proud  and 
independent  people.  Lastly,  England's  wholly 
illegal  strangling  of  Dutch  trade  and  commerce, 
forcing  Holland  under  threat  of  starvation  to  that 
humiliating  limitation  of  sovereignty,  the  ''Neth- 
erlands Overseas  Trust,"  has  infuriated  Dutch 
commercial  and  maritime  circles.  Anti-British 
feeling  in  Holland  would  be  even  stronger  than  it 
is  to-day  were  it  not  for  Germany's  equally  fla- 


BELGIUM  AND  HOLLAND  295 

grant  violations  of  Dutch  rights  by  her  U-boats 
and  Zeppelins. 

However,  despite  strong  feeling  against  both 
their  great  neighbors,  the  Dutch  have  displayed 
noteworthy  self-control.  At  the  very  beginning  of 
the  war  the  Government  appealed  for  moderation 
in  speech  and  in  the  press,  and  forbade  anything 
likely  to  raise  popular  passions,  such  as  partizan 
demonstrations,  the  display  of  belligerent  flags, 
and  even  the  exposure  of  foreign  *'war"  post- 
cards in  shop  windows.  The  Dutch  people,  appre- 
ciating the  danger  of  partizan  recrimination,  have 
seconded  their  Government's  efforts  in  admirable 
fashion.  Their  task  was  the  easier  because  Dutch 
sentiments  toward  the  belligerents  are  rather  neg- 
ative than  positive  in  character ;  a  decisive  victory 
for  either  side  is  regarded  as  fraught  with  peril 
to  Holland's  future,  and  a  stalemate  would  un- 
doubtedly be  the  outcome  most  popular  in  the 
Netherlands. 

Holland  is  to-day  the  most  genuinely  ''neutral" 
country  in  the  world.  She  may  yet  be  forced  into 
the  war,  but  it  will  not  be  from  lack  of  effort  to 
keep  out. 


CHAPTER  X 

SCANDINAVIA 

ONE  of  the  most  noteworthy  episodes  of  the 
twentieth  century  has  been  the  "Scandi- 
navian Revival" — the  reawakening  of  the  three 
Scandinavian  nations,  Norway,  Sweden,  and  Den- 
mark, to  self-conscious  national  life  and  hope  in 
a  brighter  morrow. 

By  the  world  at  large  it  has  been,  and  still  is, 
quite  the  fashion  to  regard  the  Scandinavian  states 
as  belonging  to  that  category  of  "little  nations" 
whose  day  is  over;  whose  very  existence,  indeed, 
depended  upon  mutual  jealousies  of  greater 
neighbors  or  sentimental  consideration  for  a  he- 
roic past.  That  Scandinavia  could  ever  develop 
within  itself  such  renewed  national  energy  as 
might  assure  its  independent  future,  probably  oc- 
curred to  few  persons  unfamiliar  with  Scandina- 
via's somewhat  obscure  internal  history. 

This,  to  be  sure,  is  not  strange.  A  generation 
ago  most  Scandinavians  held  similar  opinions. 
Throughout  the  greater  part  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury the  prevailing  note  in  Scandinavia's  political 
thought  w^as  a  pessimistic  acceptance  of  national 
insignificance,  a  desire  to  be  let  alone,  a  tendency 
to  seek  safety  in  external  guarantees  rather  than 
self-defense.     Sweden  continued  stunned  by  the 

296 

i 


SCANDINAVIA  297 

Russian  coiKiuost  of  Finland  in  1809  and  con- 
sumed her  surplus  energies  in  chronic  bickerings 
with  Norway,  culminating  in  the  violent  separa- 
tion of  1905.  For  Denmark,  also,  the  nineteenth 
century  was  a  time  of  loss  and  sorrow,  Denmark 
losing  Schleswig-Iiolstein  to  Prussia  in  1864. 
Amid  those  clashing  imperialisms  of  world  em- 
pires which  marked  the  closing  decades  of  the 
last  century,  the  lot  of  the  Scandinavian  peoples 
appeared  at  first  sight  to  offer  little  save  vain  re- 
grets for  a  dead  past. 

Nevertheless  it  was  during  just  this  period  that 
the  foundations  of  the  Scandinavian  revival  were 
laid.  These  foundations  were  in  the  first  instance 
economic.  A  century  ago  Scandinavia  was  pro- 
foundly poor.  Sweden,  with  her  cold,  frost-bound 
soil,  could  never  hope  greatly  to  extend  her  culti- 
vable area.  Denmark,  though  possessed  of  rich 
farm-land,  was  very  small  and  had  suffered 
greatly  from  the  Napoleonic  wars.  Norway  was 
but  a  strip  of  barren  mountains.  However,  all 
three  peoples  proceeded  resolutely  to  the  devel- 
opment of  what  they  had,  and  the  economic 
tendencies  of  the  nineteenth  century  presently 
brought  into  play  latent  resources  unknown  or 
unutilizable  before.  Rapid  steamship  and  railway 
transportation  gave  Denmark  an  inexhaustible 
market  for  her  farm  and  dairy  products  in  Eng- 
land and  Germany.  These  same  transportation 
facilities  unlocked  Sweden's  vast  mineral  w^ealth, 
carrying  iron  ore  and  timber  from  her  remote 
mountains  to  the  seaboard  and  thence  to  the  outer 


298  PEESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

world.  In  Norway  the  steamsliip  developed  the 
Arctic  fisheries  and  bore  to  her  remotest  fjords 
annual  freights  of  tourists  with  their  welcome 
tithes  of  gold.  Furthermore,  for  Sweden  and 
Norway,  electricity  presently  wrought  as  great  a 
miracle  as  had  steam.  The  myriad  torrents  and 
waterfalls  of  these  mountain  lands  became  sources 
of  wealth  as  well  as  things  of  beauty ;  and,  already 
richly  dowered  with  iron  as  they  were,  this  ''white 
coal"  gave  Sweden  and  Norway  the  second  pre- 
requisite of  modern  industrial  life.  Soon  fac- 
tories sprang  up  everywhere,  and  changed  Sweden 
from  an  agricultural  to  an  industrial  land,  with 
Norway  following  close  suit.  Lastly,  as  befitted 
the  sons  of  the  Vikings,  all  three  peoples  remem- 
bered the  open  sea,  Norway  especially  building  up 
a  great  merchant-marine.  In  fine,  by  the  begin- 
ning of  the  twentieth  century,  the  poor  and  back- 
ward Scandinavia  of  former  days  had  been  trans- 
formed into  one  of  the  most  prosperous  regions 
of  the  earth,  striding  forward  daily  in  wealth 
and  population. 

The  mental  and  spiritual  consequences  of  all 
this  were  as  obvious  as  they  were  inevitable.  The 
Scandinavian  peoples  ceased  to  gaze  sadly  back- 
ward into  the  past.  Furthermore,  as  they  looked 
upon  their  works,  they  felt  a  growing  pride  in 
themselves  and  in  their  type  of  civilization.  It 
was  their  intelligence,  their  virile  energy,  which 
had  transformed  these  apparently  unpromis- 
ing northlands  into  realms  of  prosperity  and 
plenty.    It  was  their  character  which  had  made 


SCANDINAVIA  299 

them  pioneers  in  the  solution  of  many  vexed  po- 
litical and  social  problems.  It  was  their  genius 
which  had  produced  masterpieces  of  literature 
and  music  gratefully  acknowledged  by  the  entire 
world.  These  achievements,  together  with  a  glor- 
ious past,  convinced  the  Scandinavians  that  theirs 
was  a  race  soul  of  rare  endowment,  whose  rich 
promise  must  be  preserved  and  developed  to  the 
full.  Accordingly,  the  old  pessimism  disappeared 
before  a  vigorous,  optimistic  nationalism.  Litter- 
ateurs and  savants  no  longer  professed  cosmopol- 
itan doctrines:  instead  they  became  consciously, 
aggressively  Swedes,  Danes,  Norwegians.  Even 
those  who  realized  the  somewhat  narrowing  effects 
of  such  intensive  development  of  the  national 
consciousness  asserted  that  neither  cosmopolitan- 
ism nor  the  predominance  of  any  of  the  great 
world  cultures  could  be  tolerated  if  these  small 
nations  were  to  develop  freely  their  peculiar 
individualities. 

It  was  with  such  high  hopes  for  their  material 
and  spiritual  future  that  the  Scandinavian  peo- 
ples looked  out  over  the  new  century.  But,  as 
they  gazed,  they  grew  troubled.  While  they  were 
busied  laying  dowTi  the  bases  of  national  revival, 
the  outer  world  had  been  moving  fast.  Huge  em- 
pires had  spread  over  the  face  of  the  earth,  near- 
ing,  clashing,  striking  bright  friction-sparks  with 
every  clash.  Everywhere  economic  and  colonial 
rivalries  were  becoming  keener,  race  hatreds 
growing  deeper.  Europe  already  suffered  from 
that  ominous  malaise  which  heralded  the  present 


300  PEESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

world  war.  A  hungry,  predatory  spirit  was 
abroad.  It  was  an  evil  day  for  the  ''little  peo- 
ples." The  Scandinavians  felt  their  danger  and 
scanned  the  horizon  for  latent  perils. 

Two  dangers  patently  menaced  the  future  peace 
of  the  Scandinavian  peoples:  Germany  on  the 
south,  and  Russia  on  the  east.  From  the  stand- 
point of  Scandinavian  unity  against  aggression, 
this  duality  of  danger  was  unfortunate.  A  single 
peril  threatening  all  alike  would  have  driven  these 
kindred  peoples  forthwith  together.  As  it  was, 
Denmark  alone  felt  herself  menaced  by  the  Ger- 
man, whom  Sweden  and  Norw^ay  considered  a 
possible  counterpoise  to  Russian  aggression; 
while  this  same  Russia  was  to  Denmark  a  poten- 
tial ally  against  her  German  neighbor.  For  this 
reason  the  current  of  national  revival,  though 
psychologically  identical  in  all  three  countries, 
had  such  diverse  external  stimuli  that  it  branched 
into  separate  channels. 

Yet  whosoever  the  potential  foe  might  be,  the 
paramount  issue  in  all  three  countries  was  whether 
or  not  to  arm  against  him.  Accordingly,  through- 
out Scandinavia  the  years  preceding  the  great  war 
witnessed  a  vigorous  "preparedness"  campaign. 
The  political  line-up  was  everywhere  the  same. 
On  the  side  of  preparedness  stood  the  Conser- 
vatives, heirs  of  the  proud,  aristocratic  tradition 
of  national  honor,  together  with  the  younger  gen- 
eration in  all  classes  of  society  imbued  with  the 
self-confident  optimism  of  the  new  time.  Against 
preparedness  were  the  old-line  Liberals,  exponents 


SCANDINAVIA  301 

of  iiiid-ninotecnth  century  cosmopolitanism,  and 
the  orthodox  JSocialists  with  their  dogmatic  pacif- 
ism and  exclusive  devotion  to  internal  reform. 

At  first  the  prospects  of  preparedness  did  not 
look  overbriglit.  The  adoption  of  universal  man- 
hood suffrage  throughout  Scandinavia  in  the  open- 
ing years  of  the  twentieth  century  had  enfran- 
chised the  Socialist  masses,  and  a  prompt  Liberal- 
Socialist  alliance  had  placed  pacifist  cabinets  in 
power  in  every  Scandinavian  country.  But  the 
great  international  crises  which  shook  Europe 
between  1905  and  1914  gradually  convinced  Scan- 
dinavian public  opinion  that  foreign  perils  were 
nigh,  while  the  cynical  disregard  of  right  and 
justice  displayed  by  all  the  Great  Powers  in  their 
treatment  of  weak  nations  from  Morocco  to  China 
discredited  the  Liberal  faith  in  international  guar- 
antees and  drove  home  the  grim  truth  that  the 
most  inoffensive  people  can  find  safety  only  in 
the  strength  of  its  o^vn  right  arm.  The  pacifists 
fought  hard,  but  the  patriotic  tide  was  irresisti- 
ble, and  the  outbreak  of  the  great  war  found  all 
the  Scandinavian  countries  reasonably  well  pre- 
pared. 

The  first  impulse  of  the  Scandinavian  peoples 
after  the  outbreak  of  the  European  War  was  to 
concert  measures  for  the  maintenance  of  their 
neutrality  and  for  defense  against  possible  ag- 
gressions of  their  giant  neighbors.  The  warmest 
sentiments  of  Scandinavian  unity  were  voiced  in 
all  three  countries,  and  this  unitary  feeling  ex- 
pressed itself  in  acts  such  as  the  meeting  of  the 


302  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

Scandinavian  monarchs  at  Malmo  and  the  Swed- 
ish-Norwegian pledge  not  to  fight  against  each 
other  under  any  circumstances. 

Unfortunately  this  era  of  good  feeling  has  been 
somewhat  marred  by  the  divergent  sympathies 
and  antipathies  entertained  in  the  various  Scan- 
dinavian countries  toward  the  European  com- 
batants. What  these  divergent  sentiments  are  we 
will  now  examine  in  detail. 


A.      DENMAKK 

In  Denmark  the  national  psychology  closely  re- 
sembles that  of  Holland,  the  overwhelming  ma- 
jority of  the  people  being  for  strict  neutrality  and 
the  resolute  avoidance  of  entanglement  in  the  war. 
As  in  Holland,  aristocratic  and  army  circles  and 
many  of  the  intellectuals  are  pro-German,  whereas 
the  popular  masses,  extremely  individualistic  and 
ultra-democratic,  are  instinctively  unsympathetic 
toward  Prussian  conservatism  and  '^ militarism." 

Of  course  Schleswig-Holstein  is  not  forgotten, 
and  there  is  an  ''interventionist"  group  which 
listens  eagerly  to  Allied  offers  of  the  "lost  prov- 
inces" as  a  reward  for  Danish  aid.  But  this  party 
is  very  small  and  has  slight  political  weight. 
Most  Danes  declare  that  they  would  refuse 
Schleswig-Holstein  even  if  pressed  upon  them  by 
the  victorious  Allies.  The  provinces  are  over- 
whelmingly German,  only  150,000  out  of  their 
1,700,000  inhabitants  speaking  the  Danish  tongue. 
The  entrance  of  all  those  recalcitrant  Germans 


SCANDINAVIA  303 

into  the  small  Danish  nation  would,  it  is  asserted, 
make  Danish  political  life  unworkable  even  if  the 
probability  of  a  German  war  of  revenge  were  by 
some  miracle  to  be  entirely  excluded.  The  utmost 
to  which  most  Danes  aspire  is  the  annexation  of 
the  150,000  Danes  of  North  Schleswig,  who  dwell 
compactly  in  a  few  small  districts  just  south  of  the 
present  Danish  border.  And  even  so,  Danes  gen- 
erally say  that  they  would  receive  these  districts 
only  as  a  free  gift  from  Germany,  their  forcible  an- 
nexation being  not  worth  the  future  perils  to  which 
Denmark  would  be  thereby  exposed. 

B.      NORWAY 

Norway  is  predominately  pro-Ally.  A  few  in- 
tellectuals, notably  Sigurd  Ibsen  and  Bjornstjerne 
Bjornson,  are  strongly  pro-German,  but  tradi- 
tional economic  and  cultural  ties  with  the  Western 
Powers  incline  the  Norwegian  people  toward 
England  and  France.  Eussia  is  frankly  feared, 
her  longing  for  the  warm-water  harbors  of  the 
Norwegian  North  exciting  universal  suspicion  and 
dread.  But  most  Norwegians  believe  that  only 
England  and  France  can  stay  Russia's  hand,  and 
they  therefore  feel  that  Anglo-French  friendship 
must  at  all  costs  be  retained.  Moreover,  Nor- 
way's great  merchant-marine  and  general  eco- 
nomic life  are  entirely  at  the  Western  sea-powers ' 
mercy.  England 's  high-handed  regulation  of  Nor- 
wegian shipping  and  commerce  has,  it  is  true, 
awakened  some  indignation,  but  this  resentment 
is  more  than  counterbalanced  by  the  deep  anger 


304  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

roused  at  the  ruthless  sinking  of  Norwegian  ships 
by  German  submarines.  So  bitter  is  the  resent- 
ment at  Germany's  U-boat  campaign  that  some 
Norwegians  have  advocated  armed  intervention 
on  the  Allies'  side.  Most  Norwegians,  however, 
oppose  the  abandonment  of  neutrality  except  in 
case  of  a  direct  violation  of  Norwegian  territorial 
integrity. 

C.      SWEDEN 

Sweden's  attitude  differs  radically  from  that  of 
the  other  two  Scandinavian  nations.  The  Swedes 
are  an  intensely  proud  people  with  a  glorious 
past  and  a  keen  sense  of  honor.  The  tone  of 
Swedish  social  life  is  set  by  an  unusually  fine 
aristocracy,  and  despite  recent  industrialization 
the  backbone  of  the  nation  is  still  a  sturdy  class  of 
independent  peasant  farmers  akin  to  the  old  Eng- 
lish yeomen.  Swedes  never  forget  that  through- 
out the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries  their 
country  was  a  Great  Power,  and  they  recall  with 
kindling  hearts  the  days  of  Gustavus  Adolphus 
and  Charles  XII.  Indeed,  unlike  the  other  minor 
states  of  western  Europe,  Sweden  has  never 
settled  down  to  the  *' little  nation"  point  of  view. 
Even  the  Dutch,  with  all  their  patriotism,  have 
renounced  all  thought  of  increased  authority  in 
the  world.  Sweden,  on  the  other  hand,  has  never 
ceased  to  consider  herself  the  predestined  leader 
of  a  powerful  Scandinavian  North. 

The  great  bar  to  all  such  dreams  is  Russia,  the 
traditional  foe  of  Sweden,  the  destroyer  of  her 


SCANDINAVIA  305 

former  Baltic  Empire,  the  brutal  ravisber  of  Fin- 
land— a  country  considered  an  integral  part  of  tbe 
Swedish  fatherland  rather  than  a  Swedish  depend- 
ency. Ever  since  the  "Russification"  of  Finland 
in  1899  the  old  hatred  of  Russia  has  sharpened  into 
do\\'nright  terror  at  Russian  designs  upon  Swed- 
en's national  life.  Before  1899  Finland,  as  an 
autonomous  Grand  Duchy,  made  an  ideal  buffer 
state,  but  to-day  this  friendly  buffer  has  been 
transformed  into  a  huge  Russian  intrenched  camp, 
and  since  the  beginning  of  the  w^ar  Russia's  forti- 
fication of  the  Aland  Isles  has  established  a  Rus- 
sian naval  base  only  a  few  hours'  easy  sailing 
from  Stockholm. 

In  her  despairing  terror,  Sweden  has  turned 
more  and  more  to  Germany  as  her  only  possible 
savior  from  the  menacing  shadow  of  the  Bear. 
Accordingly,  the  European  War  evoked  an  out- 
burst of  anti-Russian  and  pro-German  feeling 
throughout  Sweden.  Noting  with  joy  German  as- 
sertions that  the  war  could  end  only  when  the 
Russian  colossus  had  been  permanently  crippled 
and  thrown  back  upon  Asia,  many  Swedes  began 
to  call  for  Sweden's  entrance  into  the  war  by 
Germany's  side,  thereby  improving  a  unique  op- 
portunity to  win  back  Finland  and  assure  Swed- 
en's future  for  all  time.  This  movement,  known 
as  ''Activism,"  attracted  men  from  all  political 
parties  and  social  classes,  several  prominent  So- 
cialists even  supporting  the  ''Activist"  cause. 
Its  main  strength,  however,  came  from  the  aristoc- 
racy, the  army,  the  intellectuals,  and  Conservative 


306  PEESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

circles  generally.  The  bulk  of  the  old-line  Liber- 
als and  Socialists  were,  as  might  have  been  ex- 
pected, for  neutrality  and  peace.  Strong  pro- 
Ally  sentiment  was  conspicuous  by  its  absence. 

The  mainspring  of  Activism  was,  as  we  have 
seen,  fear  and  hatred  of  Russia.  But  before  long 
Activism  was  further  aided  by  the  rapidly  grow- 
ing popular  hatred  of  England.  From  the  very 
beginning  of  the  war  Great  Britain  had  used  her 
sea-power  in  decidedly  high-handed  fashion,  in 
flagrant  disregard  of  neutral  rights  and  suscepti- 
bilities. To  all  this  most  neutral  nations  sub- 
mitted with  more  or  less  bad  grace.  Not  so 
Sweden.  British  naval  arrogance  had  touched  the 
Swede  *s  tenderest  spot — that  keen  sense  of  dignity 
for  which  he  has  always  stood  ready  to  make  any 
sacrifice.  Alone  among  neutrals  Sweden  an- 
swered British  encroachments  with  retaliation  in 
kind,  seizing  British  mail-bags  and  laying  an  em- 
bargo on  Swedish  exports  to  England.  British 
threats  evoked  defiance,  while  British  appeals  to 
Swedish  self-interest  merely  called  forth  angry 
scorn.  Typical  of  the  Swedish  attitude  are  the 
protests  of  the  Swedish  press  at  British  proposals 
for  a  regulative  organization  for  Swedish  imports 
similar  to  the  ** Netherlands  Overseas  Trust." 
Such  recognitions  of  British  usurpation  might  be 
''well  enough  for  Dutchmen  and  Americans," 
said  the  Swedish  papers,  but  they  hardly  com- 
ported with  Sweden's  honor.  These  controver- 
sies with  Great  Britain  are  as  yet  by  no  means 
ended,  and  they  have  awakened  in  Sweden  a  hatred 


SCANDINAVIA  307 

of  England  equaled  nowhere  else  in  Europe  save 
in  Germany. 

Sweden  is  thus  to-day  overwhelmingly  pro-Ger- 
man and  anti-Ally.  Her  future  attitude  will  prob- 
ably depend  upon  the  course  of  the  war.  Should 
victory  incline  toward  the  Entente  Powers, 
Sweden  will  almost  certainly  remain  neutral,  for 
she  knows  what  her  fate  would  be  if  she  defied 
the  Allies  and  was  then  left  alone  with  the  Rus- 
sian Bear.  But  if  the  Germans  should  break  fur- 
ther into  Russia,  especially  toward  Petrograd  and 
the  Gulf  of  Finland,  Sweden  would  burst  into  such 
a  passion  of  Activist  emotion  that  she  would  al- 
most certainly  put  her  fate  to  the  test  and  *'go 
in ' '  against  the  hereditary  foe. 


CHAPTER  XI 

SPAIN   AND   PORTUGAIj 

DESPITE  their  geographical  propinquity,  the 
national  psychologies  of  the  two  Iberian 
peoples  have  so  little  in  common  that  separate 
treatment  will  throughout  be  necessary. 

A.       SPAIN 

Spanish  political  life  strongly  resembles  that  of 
Italy.  There  is  the  same  artificiality  of  the  par- 
liamentary regime,  the  same  administrative  cor- 
ruption, the  same  popular  disillusionment,  and 
finally,  similar,  irreconcilable  party  oppositions  to 
the  existing  state  of  things. 

Spanish  parliamentarism  was  from  the  first  a 
sickly  growth.  Despite  specious  constitutional 
forms  and  phrases,  all  real  power  is  lodged  in  a 
caste  of  professional  politicians  who  have  erected 
a  system  even  more  oppressive  and  corrupt  than 
Italian  transformismo:  the  system  known  as 
caciquism.  Caciquism  is  a  sublimated  and  nation- 
wide Tammany  Hall.  The  system  is  worked  by  a 
knot  of  big  bosses  (caudillos)  at  Madrid  and  is 
enforced  by  a  swarm  of  local  bosses  known  as 
caciques,  who  "make"  the  elections  as  Madrid 
commands  and  take  their  pay  in  local  offices, 
power,  and  plunder.  When  the  country  cries  too 
loud  a  safety-valve  is  found  in  an  electoral  change 

308 


SPAIN  AND  PORTUGAL  309 

of  parties,  but  the  relief  is  a  sham,  for  both  the 
great  Spanish  parties — ''Conservatives"  and 
' '  Liberals ' ' — play  the  game  of  rotation  in  office  to 
perfection  and  hand  over  the  treasury  to  each 
other  at  the  precise  psychological  moment.  The 
only  result  of  a  Spanisli  "election,"  therefore,  is 
the  coming  to  power  of  an  alternate  gang  of 
caudillos  and  caciques  zealously  imbued  with  the 
Jacksonian  maxim,  "To  the  victors  belong  the 
spoils." 

All  this  is  well  known  to  the  Spanish  people, 
which  accordingly  takes  no  interest  in  politics 
and  views  the  kaleidoscopic  shifts  of  "ins"  and 
"outs"  with  a  cynical  and  sullen  indifference. 
Irreconcilable  protestors  against  the  ruling 
regime  exist,  but  the  Spanish  people  fears  them 
even  more  than  its  present  masters.  These  ir- 
reconcilable parties  are  the  Carlists  and  the  Re- 
publican-Socialists. The  Carlist  program  is  the 
restoration  of  the  Pretender  to  the  throne  of  Spain 
and  tlie  reestablishment  of  absolutism  in  both 
church  and  state.  The  Republican-Socialists  dif- 
fer considerably  among  themselves,  but  their  as- 
pirations tend  towards  ultra-radical  proletarian 
rule  and  church  disestablishment  in  favor  of  an 
atheistic  laicism.  To  tlie  average  Spaniard  both 
these  alternatives  are  abhorrent.  He,  therefore, 
prefers  to  endure  his  present  ills  rather  than  in- 
voke a  cure  which  would  probably  prove  worse 
than  the  disease. 

Since  Spanish  politics  are  thus  widely  divorced 
from  popular  support,  it  is  unnecessary  to  con- 


310  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

sider  the  Liberal  and  Conservative  party  atti- 
tudes toward  the  European  War  in  an  analysis  of 
the  Spanish  national  state  of  mind.  Only  the 
Carlists  and  Republican-Socialists  reflect  any  gen- 
uine body  of  public  opinion. 

One  other  peculiarity  of  Spanish  national  psy- 
chology must  be  noted.  When  we  speak  about 
Spanish  "public  opinion,"  we  must  be  careful  to 
state  what  public  opinion.  In  fact,  there  is  no  one 
national  public  opinion  in  the  ordinary  European 
sense,  because  the  various  racial  elements  which 
make  up  the  Spanish  nation  have  never  wholly 
fused  and  their  diverse  ethnic  peculiarities  ac- 
cordingly tend  to  align  popular  sentiment  by  prov- 
inces on  different  sides  of  a  given  question.  These 
provincial  differences  are  very  considerable.  For 
example :  Catalonia  is  far  more  akin  to  Southern 
France  than  it  is  to  Castile. 

Nevertheless,  certain  popular  tendencies  do  ex- 
ist which  cut  across  all  the  national  strata.  There 
is  a  universal  popular  discontent  with  the  ruling 
regime  and  a  keen  desire  to  cure  the  political 
plagues  which  eat  the  heart  out  of  the  country 
and  render  any  sound  national  revival  impossible. 
This  translates  itself  into  a  hatred  of  "militar- 
ism" and  of  ambitious  foreign  policies.  Even  the 
recent  modest  expeditions  to  Morocco  were  dead 
against  the  popular  will  and  at  one  time  threatened 
to  provoke  a  revolution.  Of  course  there  are 
Spanish  imperialists,  but  these  are  mostly  ambi- 
tious politicians  who  find  scant  popular  echo. 

Such  being  the  state  of  Spanish  national  psy- 


SPAIN  AND  PORTUGAL  311 

cliology,  the  outbreak  of  the  European  War 
naturally  evoked  a  general  call  for  strict  neutral- 
ity. The  irreconcilable  parties,  to  be  sure,  took 
up  extreme  attitudes  on  opposite  sides.  The  Re- 
publican-Socialists, like  their  Italian  brethren,  be- 
came ardently  pro- Ally  through  love  of  the  Radi- 
cal-Socialist French  Republic.  The  Carlists 
emulated  the  Italian  Catholics  in  their  strong 
pro-Germanism.  The  province  of  Catalonia  was 
generally  pro-French  in  accordance  with  its  racial 
affinities.  Most  of  the  Spanish  imperialists  were 
pro-German.  The  dreams  of  Spanish  imperial- 
ism are  the  annexation  of  all  Morocco,  the  recov- 
ery of  Gibraltar,  and  the  absorption  of  Portugal. 
The  great  barrier  to  the  realization  of  tliese  as- 
pirations is  Anglo-French  opposition.  Teutonic 
agents  hastened  to  whisper  that  Spain  could  real- 
ize her  hopes  as  the  reward  for  assistance  to  Ger- 
many. 

But  these  very  partizanships  tended  to  confirm 
the  mass  of  the  Spanish  people  in  their  neutral- 
ist determination.  Whatever  the  irreconcilables 
champion  is  thereby  suspect.  As  for  the  imperial- 
ists, the  Spanish  people  have  learned  by  bitter  ex- 
perience that  foreign  policy  merely  spells  fat  pick- 
ings for  politicians  and  gross  mismanagement, 
ending  in  national  humiliation.  No  legitimate 
Spanish  interest  was  jeopardized  by  the  war,  and 
no  forward  policy  was  possible  in  the  deplorable 
state  of  Spanish  political  life.  Accordingly,  the 
voice  of  Spain  told  the  Government  in  no  uncer- 
tain words  to  keep  out  of  trouble. 


312  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

As  to  Spanish  popular  sympathies,  they  seem  on 
the  whole  to  be  mildly  pro-German.  England  and 
France  are  Spain's  traditional  enemies.  Ger- 
many, on  the  other  hand,  has  in  recent  years  been 
gaining  rapidly  in  Spanish  popular  favor.  Ger- 
man economic  penetration  has  been  extraordinary 
and  welcome.  There  are  probably  nearly  100,000 
Germans  in  Spain  to-day,  and  they  generally  get 
on  well  with  the  people.  Furthermore,  the  Span- 
iards admire  Germany,  not  so  much  for  her  mili- 
tary prowess  as  for  her  all-round  efficiency — the 
direct  antithesis  to  the  sloth,  wastefulness,  and 
corruption  which  keep  Spain  down.  Patriotic 
Spaniards  have  taken  Germany  as  the  model  for 
that  political  and  social  regeneration  so  vital  to 
their  country.  But  these  sympathies  are  strictly 
platonic:  they  imply  no  disposition  to  ally  Spain 
with  Germany  or  to  make  war  on  the  Entente 
Powers. 

Thus  Spain  remains  neutralist  to  the  core.  Ex- 
tremists may  clamor  for  intervention  and  poli- 
ticians may  weave  fine-spun  schemes  of  imperial 
policy:  the  heart  of  Spain  remains  fixed  upon  in- 
ternal reform  and  dreads  the  lure  of  grandiose 
foreign  dreams. 

B.      PORTUGAL 

The  dominant  fact  in  Portuguese  national  life 
is  the  connection  with  England,  existent  since  the 
Middle  Ages  and  defined  by  the  Methuen  Treaty 
of  1703.  It  is  this  English  connection  which  alone 
has  preserved  Portugal  from  absorption  by  Spain 


SPAIN  AND  PORTUGAL  313 

— a  fate  unutterably  dreaded  by  the  Portuguese 
people. 

The  European  War  thus  found  Portugal  from 
tlie  first  aligned  solidly  with  the  Entente  Powers. 
In  accordance  with  treaty  obligations  the  Por- 
tuguese Government  promptly  offered  England 
its  aid,  and  though  Portugal  did  not  enter  the  war 
until  1916,  it  rendered  the  Entente  valuable  serv- 
ices in  its  African  and  Asiatic  colonies. 

This  action  of  the  Government  was  heartily  en- 
dorsed by  the  Portuguese  people.  Portuguese 
public  opinion  was  virtually  unanimous  for  the 
Allies.  Portugal  was  therefore  from  the  first 
practically  w^ith  the  Entente  Powers,  the  rupture 
with  Germany  being  a  mere  formality  regularizing 
previously  existing  facts. 


CONCLUSION 

OUR  survey  of  present-day  Europe  is  at  an 
end.  The  varying  currents  of  its  war  psy- 
chology have  been  analyzed.  What  is  the  out- 
standing feature  of  that  analysis?  The  answer 
must  be :    Its  infinite  complexity. 

And,  be  it  here  remembered,  our  study  has 
sought  unity  rather  than  diversity;  its  aim  has 
been  a  portrayal  of  high  lights  rather  than  a  pho- 
tograph redundant  of  detail.  Only  the  main  prob- 
lems have  been  touched,  while  many  a  minor  is- 
sue has  been  dismissed  with  a  word  or  passed  over 
altogether  in  silence.  Lastly,  unity  of  vision  has 
permitted  us  to  include  within  our  purview  only 
the  reciprocal  relations  of  the  European  peoples, 
although  we  should  never  forget  that  Europe 
forms  but  a  part  of  a  vaster  whole — the  world — 
and  that  its  future  is  indissolubly  linked  with  those 
of  America,  Africa,  and  the  East.  Yet  even  thus 
simplified,  how  involved  the  web  of  destiny  which 
Fate  has  woven  for  Europe's  children! 

One  lesson,  at  least,  shines  clear  from  out  the 
gloom:  the  futility  of  simplicist  solutions.  De- 
spite our  natural  shrinking,  we  must  recognize 
that  the  Great  War  is  a  normal  phase  in  human 
evolution.  Europe's  agony  is  the  inevitable  tra- 
vail of  birth — the  birth  of  a  new  age.    That  new 

314 


CONCLUSION  315 

age  must  evolve  nonnally  according  to  those  basic 
laws  of  life  which  w^e  so  imijorfectly  understand. 
How  futile — perchance  how  dangerous,  then — are 
present  efforts  to  sooth  Europe's  anguish  with  the 
nostrum  of  a  phrase ;  or,  with  the  petty  yardstick 
of  a  formula,  to  plot  the  evolutionary  pathway  of 
the  morrow.  How  absurd  to  assign  Europe's  ills 
to  a  single  cause,  such  as  ''secret  diplomacy," 
''Prussian  militarism,"  "British  navalism,"  or 
*' Pan-Slavism,"  and  then,  having  verbally  de- 
molished this  poor  bogey,  to  announce  the  advent 
of  the  Golden  Age. 

No,  no !  Life  is  not  so  simple  as  all  that.  This 
cataclysm  was  not  the  work  of  any  man  or  set  of 
men.  Its  incidents  may  have  been  within  human 
control.  Its  substance  was  the  inexorable  legacy 
of  the  past.  The  ultimate  reality  of  the  great  war 
thus  reveals  itself  as  merely  a  doffing  of  the  old 
and  a  putting  on  of  tlie  new. 

What,  then,  of  the  future?  We  cannot  tell.  A 
little  we  may  venture,  but  not  much.  Some 
streams  of  tendency  run  fairly  clear.  We  may, 
therefore,  predict  that,  if  their  course  remain  un- 
changed, certain  results  will  follow.  But  will  they 
thus  remain?  The  warp  of  human  destiny  is 
woven  upon  one  loom,  and  the  threads  are  inter- 
twined in  wondrous  fashion.  Who  can  say  that 
some  hidden  strand  may  not  suddenly  appear  and 
change  the  pattern  in  strange  wise? 

T1iis  may  seem  a  most  unsatisfactory  conclu- 
sion. But  is  it  not  the  truth?  Our  finite  minds 
here  wrestle  with  infinity.    To  weigh  the  present 


316  PRESENT-DAY  EUROPE 

and  take  counsel  of  the  past  is  wise :  so  only  may 
we  pierce  a  little  the  mists  ahead.  But  to  read 
the  future  clearly  and  afar — that  is  beyond  our 
human  understanding. 


INDEX 


'A 


Abbas  Hilmi    (Khedive),  268- 

2tJ9 
Abdul-Aziz      Tchawisch,      2G5- 

2G0 
Activism,  305-307 
Adriatic,     147,     160-167,     171- 

172,  229-231 
JEge&n     Islands      (see     "Dode- 

kanese") 
Af^'hanistan,    105-107,   273-274 
Africa,  105-106,   172,  260,  266, 

314 
"After  the  War,"  31-38,  62-70, 

115-118 
Aland  Isles,  305 
Albania,  164,  174,  234 
Alexeiev    (Professor),  189 
Algeria,    105-106,   230 
Allbutt,  Sir  ClilTord,  17-18 
Alsace-Lorraine,   41-43,  57 
America,  94,  114-115,  314 
Anatolia,   104 
Anarchists,  145-146 
Andrassy,    Count    Julius,    124, 

140 
Andreades    (Professor),  247 
Angelov,  Vasili,  242-243 
Apponyi,     Count    Albert,     124, 

133 
Arabia,  280,  283 
Armenia,  206,  278-280 
Armenians,   197,  250,  278-280 
Asia,    76.    106-107,    172,    181- 

182,    184,   201-202,    207,   260 
Asia  Minor,  165,  230,  246,  249, 

283 
Atrocities,    44-45,   83-86,    157- 

159 
Attrition,  26,  28-29 
Austria-Hungary,      33-34,      37, 

52,  55,  72-74^   117-118,   119- 

144,    147,    149,    160-168,   176, 


317 


182-187,    191,   224-229,   234- 
235,  244-246,  257-258 
Austrian    Germans,    119,    123- 
124,   139-140,   143 


B 


Balkans,  10,  20,  107,  143,  173- 
174,  189,  203-205,  220-259 

Ballod,  Karl,   90-91 

Baltic  Provinces,   110 

Bandini    (Signor),  153 

Barker,  J.  Ellis,  21-23 

Barres,  Maurice,  41-43,  48,  52- 
53 

Bar/ini,  Luigi,  158 

Beauchamp   (Earl),  28 

Belgium,  10,  15,  17,  33,  55,  83- 
84,  103-104,  284-290 

Bergson,  Henri,  44 

Bernhardi  (General  Fr.  von), 
72 

Bertrand,  Louis,  66 

Bessarabia.  257 

Bethmann-Holl  weg  (Chancel- 
lor), 96 

Bevione,  Giuseppe,  164 

Bjornson,  Bjorn,  87 

Black   Sea,    189 

Blockade,  90-95,  110-115 

Blume    (General  von),  92-93 

Bohemia    (sec  "Czechs") 

Bosnia-Herzegovina,  121-122, 
225-229 

Bourtzev,  Vladimir,  193 

Bovars,  255 

Brailsford,  H.  N.,  10-11 

Brasst'V    (Lord),  28 

British  Empire,  15-16 

Bucharest    (City  of-),  255-256 

Bucharest  (Treaty  of-),  222, 
239 

Bugatto    (Deputy),   136-137 

Bukovina,  257 


318 


INDEX 


Bulgaria,  33,  117,  143,  174, 
204-205,  231-233,  235-246, 
247-248,  254-255 

Billow   (Prince  von),  87 

Buzek,  Josef,  130 


Caciquism,   308-309 

Caillaux,  Joseph,  40 

Callwell       (Major-General      C. 

E.),  25 
Carlists,  309,  311 
Caspian  Sea,  261 
Castle,  D.  L.  B.,   16 
Catalonia,  310 
Catholic  Party   (Italian),  145- 

146,  150-152,  175 
Caucasus        ( see        "Transcau- 
casia") 
Central  Europe  (see  "Mitteleu- 

ropa") 
Chauveau,  Frank,  58-60 
Chesterton,  G.  K.,  13 
Chiappelli,     Alessandro,      171- 

172 
China,  105-106,  202,  206,  261 
Clilumecky       (Freiherr      von), 

133-134 
Cippico,  Antonio,  173 
Civilization,  28-29,  33,  37,  47, 

66,    76,   78-79,   85,    108,    116, 

126,  129-130 
Constantine    (King),   249-253 
Constantinople,     181,     188-191, 

205,    217,    241-242,    246-247, 

204 
Conybeare    (Dr.),  14 
Copts,  269 
Corfu,  174 
Corsica,  147,  230 
Crete,  247 

Croats   (see  "Yugo-Slavs" ) 
Curzon    (Lord),  27 
Cvijic,  J.,  232-233 
Czechs,    120-121,    127-128,   132, 

135,  138 

D 

D'Anniuizio,  Gabriele,   156-157, 

168-171 
Dalmatia,    135,    137,    147,    161- 

167,   173,  229-231 
Daugny,  Jacques,  61 


Decadence,  3-4,  24 

Delaisi,   Francis,  40 

Delbruck,    Hans,    73-74,     109- 

110,  116 
Delcassg,  Th6ophile,  41,  239 
Democratic      Control       ( Union 

of-),   10 
Denmark,  297,  300,  302-303 
Dernburg,   Bernhard,   91 
Deschanel,    Paul,   49-50,    65-66 
Dictatorship,   23 
Dillon,  E.  J.,  21-23,  25 
Ditfurth    (Major-General  von), 

86 
Dmowski,  Roman,  208 
Dodekanese,   164-165,  248 
Dontenville,   J.,  58-59 
Doumic,  Rene,  48 
"Dread  of  Victory,"  194-195 
Driault,  Edouard,  56-60 
Drink,  187-188,  198-199 
Dumba,  C.  T.,  125 
Durham,  Mary  E.,  227-228 


E 


East  (Near-),  20,  206-208,  246 

Eastern  question,   190 

Egypt,  105-106,  207,  230,  261, 
268-272 

Elsenhans,  Theodor,  88 

England,  5,  7,  38,  63,  67-69, 
76-82,  97-99,  105-107,  113- 
114,  143,  152-153,  172,  175, 
200,  207-208,  218-219,  248- 
249,  252,  261,  264-265,  272- 
276,  294-295,  303-304,  305- 
307,  311,  312-313 

Eucken,  Rudolf,  77 

"Extirpation,"  222-223 


Federzoni   (Deputy),  149-150 

Fera   (Signor),  156 

Ferrero,  Guglielmo,   157,   167 

Finland,   193,  297,  305 

Finot,  Jean,  51,  67-68 

Flammarion,   Camille,   47 

Flemings,  103,  284-290,  292, 
294 

France,  10,  15,  17,  20,  32,  39- 
70,  82-83,  97,  102-103,  143, 
160,  152,  172,  174,  200,  218, 


INDEX 


319 


237,    239-240,    248-249,    261, 

265,    285,    288-28'J,    303-3U4, 

311-312 
Fianz-Ferdinand      (Archduke), 

122-123,   127,  226 
Franz-Joseph    (Emperor),    133, 

142 
French  Xeo-Imperialism,  56-62 
Friedjiing   (Dr.),   139 
Frubenius    (Colonel),  72 


G 


Calieia,  20,  120-121,  129,  137, 
180,  209 

Callipoli,  20,  205,  270-277 

Gaul,  50-00 

Germanism   (Pan-),  71,  210 

Germany,  9-38,  43-48,  51-70, 
71-118,  139-140,  157-160, 
172,  175,  182-187,  192-193, 
200-202,  208-209,  217-219, 
240-245,  253-254.  262,  265- 
267,  270,  272-273,  287-280, 
292-295,  300,  302-303,  305- 
307,  311-312,  313 

Ghennadiev   (Dr.),  239 

Giolitti  (Ex-Premier),  107- 
168,   171,   175 

Golvtzin    (Prince).  216 

Gorky,  Ma.xim,  199-200 

Gosse,  Edmund,  35 

Graham,  Stephen,  33 

Great  Britain   (see  "England") 

*'Great  Idea,"  220-224,  236- 
237,  246-248,  257-258 

"Great  Netherlan.l,"'  287,  289 

Greece,  65,  113,  174,  203-204, 
233,  239,  246-254,  255 

Guyot,  Yves,  55,  65 


Hauptmann,     Gerhard,     78-79, 

H2-H;{,  85-86 
Ilauser,   Ilonri,  65 
Ilervf",  (Justave,  01 
Herzoji,   Willielm,   99 
Heydebrand,  Dr.  von,  114 
Higii   finance,  30 
Hindenburg  ( Field-Marshal 

von),   110 
Hirst,  Francis  W.,  28 
Iloetscli,  Otto,  108 
Hohenzollorn     dynasty,     11-12, 

30,  34,  53,   122 
Holland,   55,  60,  284-285,   289, 

290-295 
"Holv  War,"  105-106,  260,  2QQ- 

269,  282-283 
Hoschiller,  Max,  65 
Hungary    (see  "Magyars") 
Hurd,  Archibald,   16 
Hussein  Kamel    (Sultan),  269, 

271 


Imperialism,  5,  40-42,  108- 
110,  125-126,  160,  171-172, 
178-185,  202-203,  217-219, 
224-225,  246-248,  310-312 

India.  105,  207,  200-207 

Intelligentsia,  178-181,  195, 
202,  217-218 

Intervention,   166-171 

Ireland,  7 

Irredentism,  147-148 

Isac,  Emil,  142 

Islam,  105-107.  122,  200-283 

Italy,  5,  19,  33,  49-50,  61,  05- 
67,  94-95,  122,  133-137,  143, 
145-177,  229-231,  239,  245, 
248,  268 


Haeckel,  Ernst,  77 
Haenisch   (Deputy),  98,  116 
Halil  Bey,  280 
Hanotaiix,   Gabriel,   51,   62 
Hapsburg  Dynasty.  34,  141 
Harden,    Maximilian,    72,    87- 

88,  89-90,  92,  96 
Harrison,  Austin.  21 
Hartwig.  M.  de,  225 
Hate   (Cult  of),  8(>-82,  98-100, 

111-113,  115 


Jilckh,  Ernst,  104-105,  108 
Jacks,  L.  P.,  25-26 
Jahadd    (see  "Holy  War") 
Janni.   Ettore.    158-159 
Japan,  78,  172,  202,  260,  263 
Jenks,  Edward,  19 
Jews,   197.  255-256 
Joffre   (General),  42-43 
Johnston,  Sir  Harry,  25 
Jonescu,  Take,  258 


320 


INDEX 


Kaden        ( Lieutenant- Colonel ) , 

81—82 
Kaiser  Wilhelm  II,   11-12,  38, 

51,  112-113 
Khristov,  Cyril,  239,  240-241 
Kipling,    Rudyard,    16-17,    18- 

19,  33 
Klein,  Dr.  Franz,  139 
Kotchubey  (Prince),  185 
Kotliarievsky    (Professor),   189 
Kultur,    30,   51,    67-68,    77-79, 

100 
Kuropatkin    (General),  185 
Kut-el-Amara,  20,  278 


Labor,    8,    10,    23-24,    40,    185, 

194 
Lampreclit,  Karl,  77-78 
Lankester,  Sir  E.   Ray,   18 
Latinism,     46-47,     49-50,     59, 

156-157,  161 
Latinism    (Pan-),   65-66,    156- 

157 
Leger,  Louis,  54-55 
Lenin,  194-195 
Leroy-Beaulieu,  Paul,  43-44 
Leuthner,  Karl,  108-109 
Liebknecht,   Karl,  75 
Liechtenstein     (Prince    Alois), 

139 
Likowski    (Mgr.),  131 
Lilly,  W.  S.,  18 
Lissauer,  Ernst,  80 
Lithuania,  110,  192 
Lloyd-George     ( Premier ) ,    24- 

25,  26-27 
Loreburn    (Lord),  28 
Lusitania  disaster,  18 
Luxemburg,  Rosa,  75 

M 

Macedonia,  222,  231-234,  238- 
240,  244-246,  251-252 

McClellan,  George  B.,    148 

Magyars,  119-120,  124-126, 
132-135,  139-141,  143 

Maklakov,  V.  A.,  213-214 

Malta,  147,  230 

Marmottaai-  Paul.  58-59 


Mayer,  E.  W.,  94-95 
Meda  (Deputy),  151-152 
Mediterranean      Sea,      147-148, 

152-153,  207 
Mehmed  V   (Sultan),  270-271 
Menshikov,  186-187,   188 
Mesopotamia,  20,  104,  278,  281- 

283 
Metliuen  treaty,  312 
Meyer,  Eduard,  116 
Miguline   (Professor),  207 
Mijatovitch,     Chedo,     226-227, 

228-229 
Militarism,  11-13,  15,  30,  34 
Miliukov,  Paul,   184 
Mitrofanov,  Paul,  184 
Mitteleuropa,  118,  139-140,  143, 

245 
Mohammed  Far  id  Bey,  271-272 
Mohammedans   (see  "Islam") 
Molden,  Bernhardt,  106-107 
Moltke    (Count  von),  90 
Momtchilov,  M.,  241 
Mongolia,  202,  206 
Monod,  Wilfred,  49 
Montenegro,  228 
Moravia   (see  "Czechs") 
Morf,  Heinrich,  99-100 
Morocco,  106,  261,  263,  310 
Moslems    (see  '"Islam") 
Miinsterberg,  Hugo,  76 


N 


Nabokov,  V.,  185 
Narodna  Odbrana,  226 
Narodni  Savetz,  239 
Natali,  Giulio,  156 
Nationalism,   146-150 
Naumann,  Friedrich,  72,   118 
Near  East,  20,  206-208,  246 
Neo-Imperialism   (French),  56- 

62 
Neutrality,     148-149,     151-155, 

159,    166-171,    175,    250-253, 

293,  295,  310-312 
Neutrals,  33 
Nice,  147 

Nicholas  II   (Tsar),  182,  189 
Nicholas  Nicholaievitch   (Grand 

Duke),   184,  208-209,  278 
Niemetz,  186 

Norwav,  298,  300,  303-304 
Novoselski,  Dr.,   198-199 


INDEX 


321 


Ohnet,  Georges,  48-49 

P 

Pacinsm,  10,  30,  30-40,  50-51 
Pfllyi.  Eduard,   13!) 
Pan-dermanisin,   71,  210 
Pan-Latinisra,  65,  (j6,  15G-157 
Pan-Slavism,     72-73,     10!)- 110, 

125-120,    141-142,    182,    190, 

20S-211,  238-23!t,  241 
Pashitrh    (Promicr),  229 
Pavlovitcli,  Michael,   1S5 
Pcacp,    26-31,    51-52,    96,    111- 

113,   143,   192,  200-202,  217- 

218 
Persia,   105-106.  201-202,  206- 

207,  201.  272-276 
Persian  Gulf,  207,  261 
Petkov    (Professor),  240 
Philhellenism,  248 
Philippovitch,  Eupen  von,  139 
Pichon,   Stephen,  51-52 
Pobiedonostsev,  C,  181 
Poland,   20,    110,    120,   128-131, 

137-138,     140-141,     192-197, 

208-214 
Portugal.  66,  312-313 
Posen,  129,  131 
Protitch,  M.,   226 
Prussia  (see  "Germany") 


R 


Radoslavov  (Premier),  239 
Ramsay,  Sir  William,  36-37 
Rasputin.  Gregor,  216 
R^  Arundel  del,  162-163 
Reaction,    196-197,   216-217 
Reelus,  On^sime,  53,  59 
"Red    Week"    (The-),    5,    148, 

177 
Regeneration,      48-40,      88-89, 

187-188,  197-200 
Republicans,  145-146,  150,  155- 

156,    170,   309-311 
Reuss  (Prince  Henry  of),  272 
Reventlow    (Count    Ernst    zu), 

90,  94,  103 
Revolution,   177,  179-180,  194- 

195,  200 


Reynaud,  Louis,  48 
Rheims  Cathedral,  45,  86 
Rliine,  40,  55-61,  291 
Richepin,  .lean,  03-64 
Rolirbach,  Paul,  78,  107-108 
Holland,  Roniain,  50-51,  68,  85 
Rosen    (Baron),   184 
Rumania.     00,     141-142,     244, 

254-259 
Russell,  Bertrand,  24,  28 
Russia,  5,  8,   10-11,   15,  32-33, 
72-80,  97,   107-110,    122-127, 
129-133.    140-141,    143.    163- 
164,   175.   178-219,  225,  237- 
239,    241-246,    257-258.    261, 
264,  272-280,  300.  304-305 
Ruthenians    (see  "Ukraine") 


S 


Sabatier,  Paul,  51,  68 

Salandra   (Premier),  150 

Salonika,  232-233,  247,  251 

Savoy,    147,   230 

Sayce,  A.  II.,  17 

Sazonov,  Sergius,  203 

Scandinavia,  290-308 

Scarfoglio,  152-153 

Schleswig-Holstein,  302-303 

Schrors,  Ileinrich,  83 

Schiiller,  Ludwig,  88-89 

Senussi,   100,  268 

Serajevo,  72,   185,  226,  228 

Serbia,  8,  33,  72-74,  95,  122- 
132,  161-167,  174.  182,  184- 
185,  20.3-205,  223-235,  237, 
238,  246,  249,  254-255 

Shaw,  George  Bernard,  29 

Shiites.  105,  261 

Simmel,  Georg,  88 

Slavism  (Pan-),  72-73.  75-76, 
109-110,  12.5-126,  141-142, 
182,  190,  208-211,  238-239, 
241 

Slavs,  10-11,  54-55,  120-122, 
191,  223-224,  231.  235-236 

Solidarity    (European),  37 

Sonnino,  Sydney,   159 

South  Slavs  (see  "Yugo 
Slavs") 

Spain,  66.  308-312 

Stahl,  Felix,  101 


322 


INDEX 


starvation,  89-93,  110-111 
Stolypin,  P.  A.,  179-180 
Stoyanovitch,  Costa,  233 
Straits     (The),    188-191,    207, 

249 
Struve,  Peter,  184 
Stiirmer   (ex-Premier),  215 
Submarines,   93-94,    114-115 
Sudan,  266 
Sunnites,  105,  261 
SustersicB    (Deputy),   127 
Swedon,  296-298,  300 
Syndicalism,    5,    146-148,    150, 

176-177 
Syria,  52,  281 


Tabu,  19 

Talaat  Bey,  280 

The  Straits,   188-191,  207,  249 

Ticino,  147 

Tisza    (Premier),  124,  140 

Transcaucasia,  105 

Transylvania,      141-142,     257- 

258 
Trasformismo,  146,  308 
Trentino,  135,  136,  147 
Trieste,  135-136,  160-161,  229- 

231 
Tripoli,  105,  148,  176,  268 
Troeltsch,  Ernst,  98-99 
Troubetzkoi    (Prince    Eugene), 

100 
Tunis,  105,  147,  230 
Turkestan,  105 
Turkey,    20,    33,    52,    104-107, 

117,'    143,    188-191,    204-208, 

220-221,   227-244,   248,   260- 

283 
Turner,  Sir  A,  E.,  18 
Tyrol,  136 


u 

Ukraine,     110,     121-122,    131- 

132,   138,   140-141,   183,   186- 

187,  193 
Union   of   Democratic    Control, 

10,  24 
United  States  of  America,  94, 

112,  114-115 
Unity    (German),    14,    16,    34, 

52-65,  71 
Unrest,  3-6,  72,  145-148,  176- 

177 


Venizelos,  Eleutherios,  249-253 
Vierordt,  Heinrich,  81 
Viviani,  Rene,  50 
Voboryov,  K.,  187 

W 

Walloons,  284-290 

War    (after    the),    31-38,    62- 

70,  115-118 
Warsaw,  137-138 
Weisskirchner,  Dr.,  139 
Wells,  H.  G.,  11,  17,  35-36 
Westarp   (Count  von),  114 
Wilhelm    II     (Kaiser),    11-12, 

38,  51,  112-113 
Wilson,     President     Woodrow, 

26 


Yugoslavs,    121-127,    135-136, 
161-167,  224-231 


Zulawski,  George,  130 


■   L 


I 


DUE  DATE                                i 

1 

201-6503 

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